

trine of original enlightenment gets worked out in Tendai Buddhism. Ohashi considers the notion of *kire-tsuzuki*, cut-continuance or discontinuous continuity, as an expression of the relation between the art-world and the ordinary world (31); through a series of elegant connections, he reveals the relationship between the cut of *kire* and a Buddhist attitude of resignation or *akirame*, allowing in the process for a Buddhist reading of not only the usual suspects of Zen aesthetics—*nō*, tea, haiku, *bushidō*—but also Chikamatsu's puppet theatre and Kuki Shuzo's *iki*. Graham Parkes takes up the idea of cut-continuance in his "The Eloquent Stillness of Stone," as well as working with Kukai's teaching of *hosshin seppō*, the Dharmakaya expounds the dharma (57), and Dogen's *mujō seppō*, insentient beings expound the dharma (58), in developing a framework for reading the rock garden at Ryōan-ji as a sutra. Parkes's essay here is a version of the piece he wrote to accompany Francois Berthier's *Reading Zen in the Rocks*.

More valuable still than these lucid and engaging pieces however is the method presented by the volume as a whole of thinking about difference in a way that neither accedes to a mute acceptance of Japan and the West as radically unknowable to the other, nor denies any possibility of alterity by locating a Western original for every element of Japanese thought. Marra wonders in his introduction how a literary history can be written without the support of a history of meaning, of taste, and of interpretation (3); adding this volume to his *Modern Japanese Aesthetics: A Reader*, Marra has surely made a profoundly helpful contribution to at least two of these three vital histories.

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*Buddhism and Deconstruction: Towards a Comparative Semiotics.* By Youxuan Wang. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press 2001. ISBN: 0-7007-1386-7. Pp. xiii+242.

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When I first began reading this book, I was surprised that the content did not match my expectations. I had assumed that the 242-page volume entitled *Buddhism and Deconstruction: Towards a Comparative Semiotics* would have more than one chapter of twenty-nine pages and an afterword of six pages on the actual comparison of Buddhism and Deconstruction. Rather, what this book delivers is five chapters on Chinese Buddhism and one chapter on comparative philosophy. As such, this book should provide value for two groups. First, scholars interested in Chinese Buddhist understandings of language or semiotics will find the first five chapters a useful examination of some early Chinese Buddhist thinkers on the sign. Second, those interested in the comparative study of Buddhism and Deconstruction will find the last chapter of some interest.

The first five chapters develop a Buddhist framework that follows the standard movement from the so-called Hīnayāna to the Mahāyāna, in this case represented by the Mādhyamaka and Vijñānavāda authors Kumārajīva, Paramārtha, and Xuánzàng. The primary interest of Wang is on Kumārajīva's text, the *Dàzhidù Lùn*. This text is used extensively throughout the book.

The first chapter is a summary of the Hīnayāna analysis of *dharma*s as found in both Sautrāntika and Sarvāstivāda texts of the Taishō Canon. Within this chapter is a useful chart that lists all of the seventy-five factors (in Sanskrit and Chinese) in these texts as well as a step-by-step analysis of these factors. Chapter Two sets the stage for later chapters by examining lists of the eighteen points about emptiness by the Mahāyāna authors cited above. These lists and their basic view towards emptiness are used as a starting point with which to examine the more detailed semiological theories of Kumārajīva, Paramārtha, and Xuánzàng in chapters three, four and five, respectively.

The comparative exercise of Youxuan Wang is really only brought to bear in the last chapter of this book. In this chapter, Wang examines some of the works of Jacques Derrida and compares these with the works of authors from the previous chapters of the book. It seems to me that these previous chapters are only minimally necessary as background for this chapter, which focuses primarily on an explanation of Derrida's view of the structural relationship of the sign in *différance* and a critique of structuralism. Wang's exposition of Derrida's view uses Derrida's examination of Descartes and Derrida's analysis of Foucault's interpretation of Descartes.

One of the things that Wang's book inherits from the field of Comparative Philosophy is a naïve attitude toward comparison that does not self-referentially attempt to ask why comparison is being done. The first five chapters suffer little from this naïve view, as there is little comparison in them. One point that caught me off guard was Wang's uncritically common use of the term "deconstruction" scattered throughout the first five chapters to refer to the project of the Buddhists. This seems to me to be a bit circular, given that the final chapter and afterword aim at drawing a comparison between deconstruction and Buddhism. By calling it deconstruction before he gets to the final chapters, Wang seems to beg the question.

This naïveté can really be felt in the final chapter. Wang says on page 192: "I want to submit Derrida's text to a play of *différance*, and argue that, by referring to the 18-point list and the 3-step approach, we can also translate Derrida's post-modern project on deconstruction into the pre-modern Madhyamaka language without ending up equating one with the other." Again, I ask, why?

That is not to say that Wang's last chapter is unmeritorious. Quite the opposite. I found Wang's analysis of Derrida's position to be cogent and insightful. While I have some other small concerns with the analysis (for example, the uncritical acceptance of Foucault as a structuralist), they can easily be allayed by the strength of Wang's interesting comparison. In fact, my

early concerns in reading the last chapter were soon forgotten by the strength of Wang's analysis in section 6.3. This chapter left me with much to think about in the comparison of Derrida and Madhyamaka Buddhism.

The afterword should really be taken as a post-text to chapter six, and provides itself a space within the field of comparing Derrida and Buddhism. In counterpoint to figures like Robert Magliola, and to a lesser extent David Loy, who argue that Buddhism is able to go a deconstructive step further than Derrida, Wang provides us with a model that shows that Derrida can match a Buddhist deconstructive analysis. Here, I am sympathetic to Wang's arguments showing how Derrida's work takes that third step which parallels the emptiness of emptiness stage of Buddhist analysis. This argument places Wang's last chapter as something that should be read by those interested in Buddhism and Deconstruction.

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*Gospel Women: Studies of the Named Women in the Gospels.* By Richard Bauckham. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2002. ISBN 0-8028-4999-7.

*Gospel Women's* primary purpose, as the title would suggest, is to direct scholarly attention to the named women of the Gospels. It emphasizes the significant contributions that women make to the gospel narratives and the early Jesus movement, while also emphasizing the prominence of the women contained in the birth, passion and resurrection narratives of the Gospels.

Bauckham's first chapter is focused on the book of Ruth and sets the paradigm for the rest of the book. He indicates that the book of Ruth and other sections of scripture can be utilized within the canon to correct a dominant androcentric perspective; Ruth, in emphasizing the female role, acts as a corrective counterbalance to androcentrism. From this introduction, he moves to the second chapter.

This second chapter focuses on the Gentile women presented in Matthew's genealogy. After summarizing much of Raymond Brown's work, *The Birth of the Messiah*, he concludes that Tamar, Rahab, Ruth, and the wife Uriah are included in the genealogy because of their status as Gentiles, which fulfills the promise to Abraham that, through him, all nations should be blessed. Bauckham adds no more evidence as to why Bathsheba should be regarded as a Gentile; rather, this is an assumption based on her marriage to Uriah, a Hittite. He makes a contribution to the study of the above women in his detailed search for the ancestry of Tamar, dismissing some evidence that has been used for supporting her gentile ancestry while still holding to the postulation nonetheless. He indicates that many of the above women were viewed as proselytes (25, 33) and not only as Gentiles. Perhaps this aspect could have been emphasized