further expansion of these ideas. To conclude, one could say the following with regard to *Jesus Remembered*: that which is Dunn is well done; that which is less Dunn is not done as well and there is more yet to be done.

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God & Time: Four Views. Edited and with an introduction by Gregory Ganssle. Downers Grove, Ill: InterVarsity Press, 2001. ISBN 0-8308-1551-1. Pp. 247.

In both philosophical and systematic theology the issue of God and time has become an important topic. Entrance into this debate can be a daunting task however, and so a dialogue like the one edited by Ganssle is an important resource. The discussion is between four significant representatives of contemporary philosophical theology, all of whom have published on the issue and are committed to biblical and orthodox Christianity. Each essayist presents a paper, which is then critiqued by the other representatives and finally a response to the critiques is given.

In "Thinking about God and Time", Ganssle introduces the volume, its participants and the five key issues involved: the nature of time, God and creation, God's knowledge of the future, God's interaction with his people, and the fullness of God's being. The reader will soon realise that the nature of time itself becomes a major issue, where, based on the work of JME McTaggart one will find two standard views: A-theory (time as tensed or process) and B-theory (time as tenseless or stasis). As Ganssle helpfully points out, both seek to answer whether or not "the Now" exists independent of human experience: "The A-theorist says that the Now exists in a way that the past and future do not. The Now is a privileged temporal location. The B-theorist holds that the Now is dependent on the psychological states of knowing minds. In other words, it is part of how we are conscious of the world" (14). This distinction will become important as the collection moves from the discussion of the eternalist (atemporal) view toward the everlasting (sempiternal, temporalist) view, with two middle positions.

In "Divine Timeless Eternity", Paul Helm, Regent College, defends the traditional eternalist position where God exists outside of time, a position elaborated upon in his *Eternal God* (1988). God creates and acts not in response to creation, which would imply immutability and impassibility, but by an eternal act of the will which endures through creation. The basic intuition of this view is that God "possesses the whole of his life *together*" (30). He defends his position

with an appeal to Augustine, Anselm and Boethius and in dialogue with contemporary analytical philosophers. He also retrieves the view of God as pure act, in response to the charge of an impassionate view of God. Moreover, Helm admits that there is a tension between a God who is timeless and omniscience. In his view, God cannot have indexical knowledge of time, and hence, in a certain sense, God lacks a power which humans have; thereby he concedes a claim to absolute omnipotence (40-42). Since this argument is based on a tenseless theory of time, the three other participants reject Helm's eternalist view.

In the first of the middle positions, Alan G. Padgett, Luther Seminary (St. Paul), articulates what he calls "Eternity as Relative Timelessness". He argues that Christians need to affirm the basic intuition that God is the Lord of Time, and thus is open to some form of God's timelessness or God's transcending time. It is clear to him, however, that since the biblical God acts in creation, there is some sort of non-essential change within God due to his relation to that creation. He therefore argues for two forms of time: the indexical or measured time of creation's existence, and God's own temporality, pure duration. As stated in his God, Eternity and Time (1992), Padgett contends that God's time is a predicate of God's being and not the other way around. Though very similar to his view, Craig dubs this the "Oxford" position because of its ties to Swinburne. Craig and Padgett differ regarding the idea of time being tied in with creation and not a predicate of God's being in pre-creation, a position which Craig maintains.

A second middle position is presented by William Lane Craig, research professor at Talbot School of Theology. In "Timelessness and Omnitemporality", he argues, both biblically and philosophically, that time began with *creatio ex nihilo* and does not pre-exist as pure duration within the being of God. This naturally implies that God was timeless before creation but became temporal afterward. With analytical rigor he articulates God's temporality through three arguments: the impossibility of atemporal personhood, divine relations with the world and divine knowledge of tensed facts. God, therefore, changes extrinsically by relating to creation and intrinsically by the acquisition of new factual knowledge. Those wishing to examine Craig's position more closely may look to his recent book length treatment in *God, Time, and Eternity* (2001).

The final position, "Unqualified Divine Temporality," proposed by Nicholas Wolterstorff of Yale Divinity School, begins by arguing that a basic presupposition of the scriptural narrative is that God has a history, "and in this history there are changes in God's actions, responses and knowledge" (188). Wolterstorff then examines particular biblical texts for timelessness and immutability before proceeding to tackle the tenseless theory of time, as done by the previous two essayists. Like Padgett and Craig, he articulates a view of God's action and response to creation, but unlike them he does not "speculate" on the

before of creation, in that he does not argue for either a pure duration or timelessness in God before creation. In his response to Padgett, Wolterstorff contends that their positions are quite similar, with some clarifications concerning the idea of God's pure duration and creation's time (233-236). In the end, Wolterstorff's position is quite minimalist: God has a history of acting, responding and also acquiring knowledge.

For those wishing to get a quick taste of some of the basic positions concerning God and time this is a fine place to start. The level of argument is accessible yet remains sophisticated. Since readers will no doubt desire more detailed expositions of the respected authors, the selected bibliography is satisfactory, notably for analytical philosophy of religion, though it misses some of the fine historical discussions available. This dialogue is quality reading for undergraduate courses in philosophy of religion or the doctrine of God.

To examine the issue of God and time from a more authentically Christian perspective, however, the discussion would have to include the central doctrines of the trinity and incarnation. The doctrine of the incarnation is mentioned anecdotally a few times, and the trinity sparingly. It would seem to me that the doctrine of the trinity would be an excellent starting point, or *the* starting point, to speak of the fullness of God's being – which itself is not given the place it deserves, despite being one of the five important issues mentioned by Ganssle in the introduction. These two central doctrines would give the discussion not only more problems but more resources for thinking through this important issue in Christian theology and philosophy.

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Matthew, Poet of the Beatitudes. By H. Benedict Green, CR. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2001. ISBN 1-84127-165-9. Pp. 350.

Matthew, Poet of the Beatitudes explores, in significant detail, numerous texts within the Matthean gospel, examining their poetic style as well as the background sources for each example. The focus texts are, as the title indicates, the Beatitudes, though the work extends well beyond. It challenges the reader to see the gospel's redaction of text as based, in many instances, on poetics, and not simply on ideological tendencies or, better perhaps, as based on ideological tendencies shaped in a poetic fashion.

The work examines Matthew's use of the Old Testament and generally