Chaos and Control: The Implementation of Reforms in Wittenberg, 1521-1522

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Recent events in the former Soviet empire have shown that the forces of reform, once unleashed, are difficult to control. A strong leader may be able to direct the course of events to a certain extent, but often the competing voices and agendas of others in influential positions, both impatient radicals and recalcitrant conservatives, combined with spontaneous popular demonstrations and cautious governmental policy, can make the reform process chaotic and unpredictable. Such were the circumstances at the beginning of the Protestant Reformation as the controlling authority of the Catholic Church was first challenged in Luther's Wittenberg and ecclesiastical and social reforms began to be implemented. This article will examine the complex set of forces at play in those events, and will offer an assessment of the political repercussions as the reform process was implemented, endangered and ultimately rescued.

In mid-April 1521, Martin Luther appeared before the Imperial Diet at Worms and was condemned for his teachings. On his return trip to Wittenberg Luther was "kidnapped" by agents of his protector, Frederick the Wise, the Elector of Saxony, and for the next ten months he remained in seclusion at the Wartburg Castle, his location kept secret from all but a few of his closest friends.

The Edict of Worms, signed by the Emperor Charles V on May 26, 1521, formally placed Luther under the imperial ban. While the ban effectively removed Luther from the centre of activity in Wittenberg, it did not still his voice. Luther had already outlined a program for radical reforms to ecclesiastical and civil practice in his treatises of 1520, although so far few changes had actually been instituted. Yet the popular appeal of Luther's message had created a strong desire among many for sweeping reforms, and a certain momentum for change had already begun. From the Wartburg Luther now produced more tracts (such as those on private masses and monastic vows) that proposed further bold changes in the name of Christian freedom and faithfulness to the Gospel.

In Wittenberg by the fall of 1521 agitation for reform began to break
out spontaneously, often with disruptive and uncontrollable results. The Elector was extremely cautious about making any changes to the established ecclesiastical system, although the final authority for instituting such reforms lay in his hands. The Wittenberg city council was more amenable to change, and was quite willing to legislate reforms on its own. The students at the University of Wittenberg, for their part, expressed their impatience by demanding immediate, tangible results whether they had legal sanction or not. Caught in the middle were the members of the Faculty of Theology at the University who were expected to take leadership in controlling these activities, while people on all sides appealed to the absent figure of Luther to back their aims.

Three figures emerged as primary actors in shaping the course of the Wittenberg reforms: the first was Andreas Karlstadt who, as dean of the Faculty of Theology at the University, saw himself as the principle spokesperson and organizer of the reform process (Williams 40). For the most part he urged that restraint, order, and due process be maintained in implementing the reforms which he proposed. Yet he was also prone to stubbornness in the face of opposition, to a legalistic view of the Gospel, and to a certain primitivistic concept of authentic Christianity. The second figure was Philipp Melanchthon, Luther’s close and trusted friend on the theological faculty. His *Loci communes* completed in April 1521 represented the first systematic presentation of the new evangelical theology, and he was the one best able to articulate the theological rationale for the reforms. Yet Melanchthon was also young and still maturing in his ideas; he was shy, conciliatory in debate, easily influenced by other powerful personalities, and had a tendency to fall apart under pressure. The third important actor in the Wittenberg events was Gabriel Zwilling, an Augustinian monk with a fiery temperament whose ability as a dynamic preacher could easily incite hearers to action.

The issue which proved most disruptive in the reform process concerned the implementation of changes to the mass. For some time Luther had been publishing writings critical of the traditional teaching and practice of the mass. Karlstadt had recently expressed his criticism of existing eucharistic practice as well. Then in the fall of 1521 a series of dramatic events rapidly began to unfold as various parties began to demand action on the reforms which the Wittenberg theologians had been advocating. On September 29, Melanchthon and some of his students departed from tradition and received communion with both bread and wine at the Town
Church. On Sunday, October 6 Zwilling delivered a powerful sermon which unequivocally rejected the idea of the mass as a sacrifice, and condemned the saying of private masses. Under pressure, the prior of the Augustinian cloister suspended the daily celebration of mass. On October 5 and 6, when the hermits of St. Anthony came to the city on their periodic round of begging, the university students pelted them with mud and interrupted their ceremonies (Rupp 1969, 94). Zwilling continued his calls for doing away with the mass in its present form in his sermons on each of the following Sundays. His services were well attended by the university students and particularly impressed Melanchthon who expressed a strong desire to see the Eucharist celebrated according to a simple New Testament pattern (Bornkamm 24-25). In the weeks following, such modified celebrations of the Eucharist as Melanchthon had already shared with his students occurred at various services both within and beyond the academic community (see Sider 153).

Disturbed by these unauthorized actions, the Elector ordered both the University and the chapter of his Castle Church to prepare formal statements setting out their positions on the mass. Karlstadt, in the usual manner of academics at the time, prepared a lengthy list of theses for disputation on October 17 (see Barge 484ff). The priests of the Castle Church took a traditionalist position opposing changes to the mass. Karlstadt and Melanchthon, representing the reformist views within the University, were divided on their views: Melanchthon, influenced by Zwilling's impassioned arguments, wanted immediate action to abolish the mass; Karlstadt argued that first the people should be persuaded to accept the changes through continued preaching, and that ultimately changes should be implemented only with the prior agreement of the City Council. Karlstadt's more moderate approach won out, and the final report delivered to the Elector on October 20 requested that he legislate changes to the existing liturgy rather than abolish the mass altogether. But responding to continuing complaints from the traditionalists, Frederick delayed his decision and called for further discussion of the issues (Sider 155-56; Bornkamm 25-27).

On December 3, however, a group of students and townspeople, decided that it was time to take action against conservative priests who were resisting reform, and forced their way into the Town Church, threw away the missals, and prevented the priests from saying mass. The next day a mob of about forty nailed a manifesto to the door of the Franciscan church threatening its seizure, and pelted the priests with stones (Sider 157; Rupp
1969, 96-97). The Elector demanded that the offenders be brought to justice, and that a full investigation be made. He also solicited a report from the University on what, in their opinion, should be done. In the end, three separate reports were submitted: Karlstadt and Melanchthon, speaking for those within the University who favoured reform, urged changes to the mass; the traditionalists rejected all proposed innovations to the mass; and a humanist faculty member, in a separate report, also argued against the reformers (Sider 157). At about the same time, a delegation of members of the congregations presented a petition to the city council requesting pardon for the rioters and sweeping changes to both ecclesiastical and civil regulations so as to prevent further public disorder (Rupp 1969, 98; Loewen 33). In response to the conflicting nature of these reports, the Elector, on December 19, decreed a return to the former practices and ordered his representative to forbid the introduction of any innovations to the mass (Sider 157).

Karlstadt by this time, however, had already elected to follow the example of the Augustinian monks, and was personally refusing to preside at the mass in its traditional form. More conservative colleagues from among the sixty-four priests who were retained at All Saints Church where Karlstadt was archdeacon willingly substituted for him, until he preached a particularly strong sermon against the existing order of the mass. Then they refused to cover for him in order to force him either to celebrate the traditional mass again or to face a reprimand for neglecting his official duties. Karlstadt, in turn, stated that if he had to say mass, then he would preside at an evangelical one. And in a Sunday sermon on December 22, 1521, he announced that at the next festal mass for which he would be responsible (i.e., at the Feast of Circumcision on January 1), he would celebrate an evangelical mass (Sider 158; Rupp 1969, 98). The Elector, upon hearing of Karlstadt’s plan, expressly forbade him to carry out his intention; Karlstadt, in turn, advanced the date for the reformed service to Christmas Day, possibly to prevent the Elector from having time to block his actions.

At All Saints Church on Christmas Day, before a large expectant crowd, Karlstadt conducted what has frequently been called the first full “Protestant” communion service of the Reformation. He appeared without vestments, and addressed the congregation as “fellow laymen.” In the sermon he invited communicants to receive the Eucharist, even if they had not been to confession and had not fasted. Then in saying the mass, he
departed from the prescribed Latin canon by carefully deleting all sections which referred to the mass as a sacrifice, and ignored the rubrics for bowing and genuflecting. At the consecration of the elements, he omitted the elevation of the bread and wine. And instead of whispering the Latin words of institution, *hoc est corpus meum*, as was customary, he spoke them loudly in German for all to hear. The laity received the wine in addition to the bread, and the bread was placed directly in the communicants' hands rather than in their mouths (Kidd 100; Sider 159-60).

This new “Protestant” form of service was repeated on New Year’s Day, the Sunday after, and on Epiphany. Zwilling and others inaugurated their own form of evangelical masses both in and beyond Wittenberg. On January 24, the city council, in an attempt to make these changes uniform, enacted the Ordinance of the City of Wittenberg which officially adopted changes to the mass modelled after Karlstadt’s evangelical service at Christmas, instituted the removal of images from the churches which Karlstadt had also called for, and reorganized the city’s community chest to aid the poor (see Rupp 1969, 101-105; Lindberg 322).

The heady days of change in late 1521 and early 1522 were not without their problems. On Christmas Eve riotous revellers invaded the parish churches, smashed sacred images, destroyed votive lamps, threatened the priest, and heckled the choir by singing popular tavern songs (Sider 159; Rupp 1969, 99). Karlstadt, rather unjustly, received some of the blame for that incident, since it came to be linked with his call for, and implementation of, changes in the mass on the following day. Then, two days after Christmas three so-called “prophets” from Zwickau who were associated with Thomas Müntzer’s brand of radical reform, suddenly appeared upon the scene in Wittenberg and caused a great deal of confusion before disappearing again. During Epiphany the Augustinian monks, prompted by Zwilling, burned the paintings and removed the side altars in their chapel in an outbreak of iconoclastic activity. Other sporadic incidents of mob violence and vandalism against churches were also reported. The situation seemed to be degenerating into general chaos.

Reports of these events reached the surrounding rulers and on January 20, under pressure from Duke George of Ducal Saxony, Frederick’s loyally Catholic cousin, representatives of the imperial government meeting in Nuremberg called on the regional authorities (both princes and bishops) to take appropriate countermeasures to put down these activities and to keep them from spreading to other regions. They specifically demanded that no
innovations to existing practice be sanctioned, and that all acts of rebellion be punished (Rupp 1969, 106). Frederick was thus put in a difficult position: he was a devoutly religious person who had consistently stated that he did not feel competent as a lay person to decide religious disputes, and he was genuinely reluctant to move against Luther and his colleagues, whom he still considered to be sincere in their religious undertakings. Yet he was also being pressed to take decisive action. In the end he commissioned his personal representative to negotiate with the city council, the University, and the chapter of All Saints to prevent further disruptive actions from taking place. His advice, tactfully but firmly stated, was that "We have gone too quickly . . . The common people have been incited to folly, and no one has been edified. We should consider the weak. Images should be left until further notice . . . No essential portion of the mass should be omitted . . ." (qtd. in Green 127). Strongly worded letters were also sent to Melanchthon urging him to put a stop to Zwilling's inflammatory speech, and to Karlstadt ordering him to curtail his own inflammatory message (see Rupp 1969, 107; Sider 171). Melanchthon at this point retreated from his former position of advocating the speedy implementation of reforms; Karlstadt, however, firmly stood his ground.

On February 13, negotiations took place between the Elector's representative and the committee from the University and the city council; Karlstadt and Melanchthon were included in the talks. A compromise was reached which would have the consecration of the Eucharist remain in German and allow communion in both kinds, with the other ecclesiastical reforms of the Wittenberg Ordinance being rescinded. On February 17, however, the Elector rejected the proposed compromise, and demanded a complete return to the old ecclesiastical practices (Rupp 1969, 108). Karlstadt and the city council both refused to do so on principle.

The situation had developed into a dangerous stand-off. Melanchthon and the city council separately appealed to Luther for help. The Elector was already in touch with Luther concerning these developments. Luther announced his intention to go to Wittenberg and settle matters personally. But Frederick, fearing for Luther's safety, forbade him to go. Then suddenly, over the Elector's objections, in what Richard Friedenthal refers to as the most courageous and foolhardy act of his career (314), Luther abruptly left the Wartburg and returned to Wittenberg. His reasons, as he described them in a letter to the Elector, were threefold: his congregation had pleaded for his return; it was his pastoral duty to protect his "flock"
against the disruptions which he regarded as "Satan's work"; and he feared
that if the situation were allowed to continue unchecked, it would lead to
even greater rebellion throughout the German territories (see WA Br
2:460-61; LW 48:395-96).9

Luther arrived back in Wittenberg on March 6. Once there, he
quickly took control of the situation, and satisfied the Elector's concern for
maintaining law and order. Re-donning his black Augustinian habit and
freshly tonsured, Luther mounted the pulpit of his parish church. In eight
powerful sermons which he preached on successive days from March 9 to
16 (see WA 10.3:1-64; LW 51:70-100), he reshaped the public attitudes
toward the reforms they had just experienced. He spoke, as Gordon Rupp
aptly summarizes, of the primacy of love over zeal, and of concern for
weaker consciences as being more important than intolerance toward former
practices. Admittedly, the right actions had been taken, but they had been
done in the wrong way: Christian liberty, not enforced prohibitions, was
paramount; the Gospel must not be turned into a new legalism (1969, 109;
1959, 316-17). Luther saw to it that the former liturgical practices were
restored (at least for the time being) as per the Elector's demand. At the
Easter services that year the Eucharist was celebrated in its traditional form:
the priest was fully vested and faced the altar during the service; the liturgy
was once again entirely in Latin with the prescribed rubrics fully restored;
and the laity were not offered the cup at communion (Bornkamm 78; Sider
172-73).10

Luther was quick to pin the blame for the uncontrolled disruptions on
Karlstadt and Zwilling. (Melanchthon's own eagerness to press for rapid
changes was largely overlooked.) Zwilling quickly fell into line, and Luther
later expressed his restored confidence in him (see Loewen 38). Karlstadt
alone remained defiant, and as a result, he lost his position of leadership.
As David C. Steinmetz states, "he was exiled . . . to the sidelines, where
he watched, rather than guided, the (subsequent) course of events" (176).
His own preaching was immediately curtailed, his new pamphlets were
censured and destroyed, and he was left with only his lectures to teach at
the University—which he began to do less and less frequently (Sider
174-75).

Gradually, Karlstadt withdrew from Wittenberg to the nearby town
of Orlamünde. There, unconstrained by Luther's presence, he was able to
put into effect many of his ideas for ecclesiastical reform. Through his ex-
periences in Wittenberg, and especially his rough treatment at the hands of
Luther after his return, Karlstadt became thoroughly radicalized and soon emerged as Luther’s arch-foe.

Was Karlstadt wrong in taking the actions he did? Would Luther have handled things any differently? It is difficult to say what Luther would have done if he had been in Karlstadt’s place during the period in question. Luther’s statements made after his brief visit to Wittenberg in early December of 1521, indicate that he had no significant disagreement with the reforms which were taking place at the time; he himself had called for broad reforms in the celebration of the mass. His writings from the Wartburg even seemed to goad those in Wittenberg into proceeding with these reforms, although he also cautioned them not to rebel against the civil authorities in doing so.11

Ronald J. Sider argues that the main cause for the polarization between Luther and Karlstadt did not lie in the kind of reforms Karlstadt instituted, nor even in theological disagreement (he states that Luther and Karlstadt were in fundamental theological agreement up until March 1522). Rather, the conflict between them primarily had to do with a disagreement over strategy and timing (146-47, 197, 201). Much of what can be seen in Karlstadt’s actions would seem to warrant this conclusion. However, one must not consent to Sider’s judgment too quickly.

Karlstadt’s strategy for introducing changes was quite commendable for most of the period in question: he coordinated his reforms with the representations made to the city council, and received the council’s endorsement; his timing was aimed at channelling the already present popular and often disruptive insistence for change into a productive, peaceful course of action. It was only when his actions were censured by the externally imposed authority of the Elector that Karlstadt became obstinate, unyielding, and more radicalized. Hans J. Hillerbrand states that “there was a bit of pristine exuberance in him, a careless disregard for practical consequences or for the attitude of the high and mighty” (396). And it was this fault more than anything else which seemed to cause his downfall: Karlstadt failed to give sufficient heed to the political crisis which his reforms had generated. It is only as the issues of strategy and timing are put within a political context, that it is possible to discover what really prompted Luther’s intervention.

Luther left the Wartburg only when the Wittenberg events reached a politically charged stand-off: from his perspective the city council had taken the position of retaining some reforms contrary to the demands of the
Elector; Karlstadt, as the religious leader in charge of the program of reform, had taken an obstinate stand in defying the Elector’s demands; and random acts of violence were creating further public disorder. Luther felt that the cause of the Gospel itself was being threatened and that these events left one vulnerable to the charge that the reform process inevitably leads to rebellion and insurrection. He was aware that if the Elector (or any of the neighboring rulers) stepped in forcibly to put down the reforms, the possibility of pursuing reform even at a later time might be lost all together. The princes of the neighbouring territories had already condemned Luther and his message; yet Frederick the Wise had dared to stand against them. The Elector’s continuing support and protection was paramount; if it were lost, the evangelical movement in Wittenberg could well be dealt a fatal blow. Luther’s direct intervention in effect resolved the political stand-off, kept the Elector as a much needed ally, and preserved the possibility for reforms to be attempted once again at a later date.

One may speculate that had Luther remained in Wittenberg all along he, unlike Karlstadt, would never have lost control of the movement, and would have been able to begin implementing his reforms at a gradual and safe pace. But this misses the complex picture of the events that existed immediately after Luther’s condemnation by the Imperial Diet. The times were so precarious, the people’s expectations so high, Luther’s presence so inflammatory, and the opposition from the Catholic hierarchy so strong, that had Luther kept a visible presence at all (even without implementing any of the reforms he had called for), the evangelical cause still could well have been lost through outside political intervention. For the preservation of the Reformation movement, it was just as necessary for Luther to go into hiding immediately after the pronouncement of the Diet, as it was for him to return to public view ten months later. In both cases, the matter was necessitated by political realities and done in the interests of preserving the fledgling Reformation movement.

In this sense, it must also be recognized that Karlstadt was not so much a fomenter of new reforms in Wittenberg, as one who had to deal with the foment which Luther had created from a distance. For a long time he had tried to take a cautious, orderly approach, working through legitimate channels—even in opposition to Melanchthon’s call for rapid changes. In the end, Karlstadt was swept up in a tide of events far beyond his control. He was in a position of leadership where he could exert some guiding influence, and it was certainly reasonable for him to think that he
Could channel the pent-up energy for dramatic reform in a constructive manner, one which would forestall further violent disruptions, by taking the actions which he did at the Christmas Mass.

This is not meant to obscure the fact that Karlstadt took an obstinate stand in defiance of the Elector's demand that the reforms which had been instituted in Wittenberg be rescinded. But was this stance really any different than the one which Luther himself took before the Imperial Diet in refusing to recant his teaching? Since Karlstadt saw the reforms which he had initiated as being sanctioned by divine command, he, no less than Luther, found it necessary to reject the other demands placed upon him for the sake of the Gospel. In retrospect one can state that the most strategic error Karlstadt made was to mistake the Elector for the enemy, while Luther, through his intervention, preserved the Elector as an ally in the cause of the Reformation movement and thus secured its continuation and preservation.

Notes

1. Among these reforms was the creation of a “community chest” to provide relief for the poor in late 1520 or early 1521 (Lindberg 326-27).

2. Frederick found himself in a dangerously delicate position: his policies were being watched by the staunchly Catholic rulers of the neighbouring territories, and his cousin Duke George took a special interest in noting any failure on Frederick's part to comply with the Edict of Worms. Armed intervention by others to quash the reform process in Electoral Saxony was not out of the question (Rupp 1969, 88-90).

3. In its historical usage the term “evangelical” denotes the “Lutheran” variety of Protestant theology in distinction from traditional Catholic thought. It is not to be confused with later “evangelical” movements in Britain and North American with which the term is commonly associated today.

5. See Karlstadt’s theses for a baccalaureate disputation on July 19, 1521 (Barge 1905, 1:290-91; Williams 40-41).

6. Note that six months later Luther would accuse Karlstadt of taking the position represented here by Melanchthon, and would use the very arguments which Karlstadt here advocates in condemning Karlstadt’s subsequent actions (Sider 155-56; Rupp 1969, 94-95).

7. In the midst of these events, Luther made a secret visit to Wittenberg in the first week of December. He was aware of the disruptive actions taken by some, but did not seem to be unduly alarmed by these events. He quietly returned to the Wartburg reporting that in general “everything I hear and see pleases me very much” (WA Br 2:410; LW 48:351).

8. See Karlstadt’s treatise “On the Putting Away of Images” (January 1522), which called for the destruction of sacred images on the grounds that reverence shown toward them constitutes idolatry (Lietzmann 3-22; Sider 166-67; Rupp 1969, 103).

9. This carefully composed letter, which required several drafts before reaching its final form, was written by Luther in response to a tactful request from the Elector, forwarded to Luther through a mediary, that Luther provide a statement suitable for circulation that would make it clear that his return to Wittenberg was without the Elector’s permission and against his will, thereby clearing him from any implicit involvement (see WA Br 2:458-59). The tactic was successful, and Frederick was able to use it to persuade Duke George that he was not responsible for Luther’s return to public life (Bornkamm 68).

10. Interestingly, Luther retained some of the modifications reached in the earlier compromise proposal that had been agreed to by the other reformers and the city council but was rejected by Frederick; this time there was no opposition from the Elector. Luther deleted those portions of the liturgy that made reference to the mass as a sacrifice, and a separate communion service was provided for those who wished to receive both the bread and the wine. Luther later gradually re-intro-
the changes to the mass which he had favoured all along. By the fall of 1522 Luther’s congregation was once again practising communion with both elements, and his new “Order of Mass and Communion” was instituted later that fall (WA 12:205-20; LW 53:19-40). Adoption was not universal, however, as the conservative priests at the Castle Church continued their traditional practices until December 1524 (Bornkamm 120, 130-36).

11. See Luther’s treatises of the time: “The Abrogation of the Private Mass” (1521) (WA 8:411-76); “The Misuse of the Mass” (1521) (WA 8:482-563; LW 36:133-230); “The Judgment of Martin Luther on Monastic Vows” (1521) (WA 8:573-669; LW 44:251-400); and “A Sincere Admonition to All Christians to Guard Against Insurrection and Rebellion” (1522) (WA 8:676-87; LW 45:57-74).

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