This article examines critically Bernard Lonergan’s two-fold transcendental foundational proposal in light of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s private language argument with a view towards providing a viable option to Lonergan’s understanding of the relationship between religious experience and language. It contends that Lonergan’s transcendental foundation, the success of which depends upon the viability of its pre-conceptual, pre-propositional core, is incoherent according to a Wittgensteinian account. The conclusions drawn from this critical engagement will be relatively modest in character, for while attention will be drawn to a more economical understanding of “theological foundations,” this understanding does not provide a conclusive argument against Lonergan or the only alternative account of religious experience and language. It simply provides theologians with a less cumbersome account of how religious language and experience are related, an account that must nevertheless be proven by its fruitfulness in the theological enterprise.
The Foundations of Lonergan's Theological Method

Transcendental Method

In Lonergan's view, objectivity in theology, and in the human and natural sciences, is achieved by employing the invariant cognitive operations of the knowing human subject. The conscious human subject (i.e., the operator of consciousness, conscious of both intended objects and of the intending self) may, through introspection, objectify the contents of consciousness and thereby identify the common invariant and dynamic human cognitive structure. Once objectified, this dynamic structure of human consciousness (experiencing, understanding, judging and deciding) provides Lonergan with the "transcendental method" that serves to ground not only the theological method but also any field of inquiry that seeks "a normative pattern of recurrent and related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results" (Lonergan 1972, 4).

Attending to cognitive operations involves distinguishing between four levels of consciousness and intentionality, i.e., the empirical, the intellectual, the rational and the responsible. While each level of consciousness is itself a distinct mode of consciousness, they are also dynamically related and involve a progressively fuller awareness of the self. Intending, likewise, while it has an appropriate object on each level of cognitive operation, cumulatively builds upon the previous level(s). Each operative level of consciousness has a different intentional object, whether sense data, intelligible construals of sense data, or concrete conceptions or viable action, which cumulatively presuppose the previous level(s).

Lonergan argues that the most fundamental differentiation among the modes of intending is between the categorical and transcendental modes. Categorical intending, on the one hand, presents consciousness with provincial or culturally determinate categories, and/or classifications, and logical distinctions. The mode of intending that aims at the transcendental is, on the other hand, much more radical. Its goal is that which is invariant over culture, that which is unrestricted and comprehensive. Thus, while they themselves are not grasped in any concrete categorical or propositional objectification of consciousness, the transcendental are the ideal objects of intentionality at each of its levels which
move one from ignorance to knowledge. They may be objectified then, not in concrete categories or propositions but as the ideal content of intending at any one of its four levels. Thus, for example, "... if we objectify the content of intelligent intending, we form the transcendental concept of the intelligible. If we objectify the content of reasonable intending, we form the transcendental concepts of the true and the real." These *a priori*, unrestricted and comprehensive transcendental concepts intend the "unknown whole" that serve as the dynamic drive behind intentional human consciousness at each of its levels.

The invariant pattern of human intentional consciousness (experience, insight, judgement and decision) provides the basis for what Lonergan calls the "transcendental method." It is a method because "it is a normative pattern of recurrent and related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results." It is further, a transcendental method since "the results envisaged are not confined categorically to some particular field or subject, but regard any result that could be intended by the completely open transcendental notions" (1972, 14). While anyone may practice this method by acquiescence—in so far as they are attentive, intelligent, reasonable and responsible—in order to be at home with it, it is necessary to objectify the contents of consciousness by applying the operations as intentional to the operations as conscious. That is to say, one must direct one’s intending away from the object intended and toward the usually peripheral intending subject.

In this way it is possible to experience one’s experiencing, understanding, judging and deciding and indeed each of the conscious operations in relation to the others, i.e., it is possible to make the conscious operations of the intending subject the object of intentionality. Once one is able to produce and recognize this operation in oneself (to experience the operations) so that the process becomes intelligible (that is, understood in its unity and relatedness) the need for critical reflection arises. Do each of the operations of consciousness exist and occur? And, moreover, do they occur as Lonergan has put them forward? To both of these questions Lonergan responds in the affirmative. He argues, in the case of the former, that each of the operations are indispensable to a "credible human being," and that the differentiation of consciousness is only an objectification of consciousness as it is given. Lonergan can thus conclude that the human subject, in his conscious, unobjectified atten-
tiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, [and] responsibility, is the "rock" upon which he can build his transcendental method (1972, 17-20).

The State of Being In Unrestricted Love With God

Lonergan also points to a second, "more important, part of the rock" (1972, 19, n. 5). In his view, human beings achieve authenticity in self-transcendence. The possibility of this achievement is grounded in their ability to ask questions in an unrestricted fashion. Human questioning proceeds from brute sensitivity in attempts to grasp things in intelligent relationships to attempts to grasp whether these intelligible relationships actually correspond to the ways things are. Moreover, it proceeds outside of the cognitive domain through deliberation into the realm of action where self-transcendence becomes moral in an attempt to live in accordance with objective value. "The transcendental notions, that is, our questions for intelligence, for reflection, and for deliberation, constitute our capacity for self-transcendence" (1972, 105).

For Lonergan, the a priori dynamic implicit within the human cognitive structure which issues in unrestricted questioning (i.e., the desire to comprehend the unknown whole or totality of things) is the question of God. This question, unlike its attainment, lies within the horizon of humanity. The human capacity for self-transcendence driven by the question of God, nevertheless, seeks an answer. This answer, or the "fulfillment of conscious intentionality," is found in religious experience, which Lonergan understands as the gift of being unconditionally in love with God.2

To get a better sense of what Lonergan is after on this point, three questions need to be asked: first, what is the nature of being in love with God?; second, why is it located on the fourth level of intentional consciousness when he calls it religious experience?; and third, is being in love with God a sufficiently broad characterization of "religious experience" to encompass the experience of non-Christian religious adherents? Being in love with God is, for Lonergan, an unrestricted state. It involves being "... in love without limits or qualifications or conditions or reservations" (1972, 106). This state is not the result of knowledge; rather its transforming power relativizes the horizon in which our knowing goes on. It is also a conscious dynamic state although it is conscious without being known, i.e., it is conscious in the sense that it is experi-
enced but it is the experience of mystery, of the *mysterium fascinans et tremendum*. It is, moreover, not an experience to be possessed, but an experience by which one is possessed and grasped. It is in sum, a conscious, dynamic and immediate state of awe-evoking mystery (1972, 112).

If Lonergan characterizes this state as religious *experience*, why does he locate this kind of consciousness on the fourth level of intentional consciousness? (Gregson 1981, 546). Experience, argues Gregson, as Lonergan uses it with reference to the basic level of consciousness, must be distinguished from the way he applies it to the whole range of consciousness itself. It is in this second sense that “religious experience” can refer to “... the awareness immanent in one’s highest activity, in one’s performance at what Lonergan calls the fourth level, in one’s orientation toward the Transcendent” (1981, 546). Religious experience is thus the *telos* or peak of human intentional consciousness. It is the highest level of human consciousness brought to a fulfillment or having undergone a conversion, the basis of which may be expanded but not be superseded.

Lonergan’s characterization of the fulfillment of human consciousness at its highest level in the experience of God’s love leads to a consideration of its comprehensiveness and specificity. While one must be careful to recognize Lonergan’s distinction between the gift itself and its various manifestations, the question nevertheless arises as to whether his notion of religious experience is broad enough to incorporate diverse religious experiences or whether it is so broad that it misses the subtlety of them all. His response to this concern is two-fold. He points out that the expression of the immediate experience of the *mysterium fascinans et tremendum* varies depending on the “stage of meaning” that a culture may be at (1972, 85-86). Only when a religion comes to associate its experience(s) with a specific time and place does it issue in an expression which becomes a distinct occasion for human consciousness. With this minimal understanding of religion in place Lonergan argues along two lines for his model of religious experience. First, there is the theological “fact that God is good and gives to all men sufficient grace for salvation” (1972, 109). Second, he uses the work of Friedrick Heiler who argues that there are areas common to many of the major and minor world religions.³ It is not hard to see, argues Lonergan, how these commonalities are implicit in the experience of being in love in an unrestricted manner.
In sum, the dynamic invariant structure of human consciousness objectified in transcendental concepts by applying the operations as intentional to the operations as conscious provides the basis for Lonergan’s transcéndental method. This objectification is not, however, to be confused with the pre-conceptual-transcendental-transcultural notions which constitute the very dynamism of radical human questioning and push it forward on all levels of operation toward comprehending the unknown whole or totality of things. This dynamism, the question of God, while it lies within the human horizon, nevertheless anticipates a fulfillment outside of it by grace in the unrestricted and immediate state of being in love with God. Evidence for this second part of Lonergan’s transcendental-transcultural foundation (immediate religious experience) can be seen implicitly in the common features of the world religions and it is, moreover, an implicit feature of Christian theological convictions about the nature of God.

\textit{The Private Language Argument of Ludwig Wittgenstein}

\textbf{The Problem of Finding a Critic}

Foundationalism is not lacking in critics.\(^4\) In fact, it could be argued that contemporary work in philosophy and theology in many ways presupposes it demise. Nicholas Wolterstorff writes,

\ldots within the community of those working in the philosophy of knowledge and the philosophy of science, foundationalism has suffered a series of deadly blows in the last 25 years. To many of those acquainted with the history of this development it now looks all but dead. (1984, 33)

Many theologians and philosophers are, therefore, engaged in proposing alternate non-foundational strategies for the justification of truth claims (see e.g., Sosa 1988). However, before Lonergan’s proposal is bypassed as another version of foundationalism, it is important to recognize that the anti-foundationalist critique—insofar as it is concerned only with disqualifying potential foundational propositions—does not apply to his particular formulation. The two-fold foundation or “rock” upon which Lonergan wants to ground objectivity is both pre-propositional and pre-con-
ceptual and thus cannot be strictly identified with any of its concrete, determinate linguistic instantiations.

There is at least one strand of the anti-foundationalist critique stemming from the philosophy of language that would seem to encompass and deny the foundational option which Lonergan proposes. Simply put, many linguistic philosophers deny that there is such a thing as pre-linguistic (pre-propositional, pre-conceptual) experience which (1) gives us objective purchase on reality as it is, and/or (2) provides a norm to which language seeks to be adequate. Instead language, particularly as it is embodied in texts, is the objective idiom or paradigm by which human experiences are normed (Lindbeck 1984; Green 1989). While this understanding of language can be found in a number of contemporary philosophers and theologians, their indebtedness to a particular thinker on this issue is apparent. I will, therefore, turn to the work of Wittgenstein to highlight the way his account of language opposes Lonergan’s foundational proposal.

The Possibility of Private Language

"It has been," writes Fogelin, "a recurrent theme, at least since the time of Descartes, that the foundation of knowledge is given in subjective self-certainty." The immediate contents of consciousness, whether they are self-evident truths or non-propositional items, have functioned to ground the edifice of knowledge. "Perhaps," continues Fogelin, "the chief reason that the private language argument [of Wittgenstein] has attracted so much attention is that it seems to show that this whole approach (in all its forms) is fundamentally misguided" (Fogelin 1976, 153). This section will, therefore, develop the argument against private language which Wittgenstein puts forward in the *Philosophical Investigations*.

Wittgenstein’s argument against the possibility of private languages represents the coalescence of two strands of thinking. The first is the consideration of how language is acquired or learned. Early in the *Investigations* Wittgenstein takes up the “Augustinian” view that the meaning of language is learned solely by ostention. In Wittgenstein’s view, while this is sometimes true in the case of naming, “for a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word ‘meaning’ it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language"
Transcendental Method and Private Language

Words have "meaning" then not primarily by corresponding to something, but by virtue of their relationship to other words within a particular "language-game." The sense or meaning of words may, therefore, be said to be learned by using language in varied social circumstances rather than by reference to an independent reality (see Kightley 1976, 37-40).

In addition to Wittgenstein's view of how words acquire meaning in the context of language use, an understanding of the full force of his argument against the notion of a private language must also take in account his discussion of what is involved in obeying a rule. For Wittgenstein, obeying a rule is a practice and not a private affair. If obeying a rule were solely a private affair, then anything could be made to be in accord with it and, conversely, anything could be made out to be against it, i.e., it would be strictly a matter of private interpretation. The way out of this paradox is to show "... that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not a matter of interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call 'obeying the rule' and 'going against it'" (Wittgenstein 1958, §202). The way of grasping a rule which meets this requirement is, for Wittgenstein, training. Fogelin writes, "Training accomplishes what no amount of interpretation can fix: it determines that we proceed in a particular way out of all the possible ways that could be made to be in conformity with the rule" (1976, 154). To follow a rule is then to act in the generally acknowledged way.

Wittgenstein's case against private language rests largely on these two arguments. If learning the meaning of words is achieved through their use in particular language-games, then learning language is a matter of training in a social practice. And if language is thus a matter of custom, i.e., is a rule-governed activity, then the notion of a private language is incoherent.

The Private Language Argument and Transcendental Foundations

Private Language and The Objectification of Consciousness

The first half of this section will evaluate Lonergan's transcendental deduction through the application of the operations as intentional to the operations as conscious in the light of Wittgenstein's private language argument. For Lonergan, the transcendental concepts—experience,
insight, understanding and decision which are obtained through the objectification of consciousness—provide the ground for any discipline which seeks to be objective. The basic logic or method of every discipline is thus given in the \textit{a priori} structures of consciousness. This dynamic structure of consciousness, while only ever approximated in relative culturally-determinate categories, nevertheless remains the invariant transcultural pattern to which relative and determinate expression is given.

The main problem with this account, in Wittgenstein’s view, is that it seeks to ground determinate linguistic practices in a private pre-linguistic experience. If Wittgenstein is right about private languages, then it simply is not possible to determine apart from all particular “language-games” or “forms of life” the logic to which they must, if they are to be objective, conform. Determinate linguistic practices are simply given. They are not justified with reference to an invariant cognitive structure: rather they are simply practiced. Wittgenstein writes,

\begin{quotation}
Our mistake is to look for explanation where we ought to look at what happens as a “protophenomenon.” That is, where we ought to have said: \textit{this game is being played}. The question is not one of explaining a language-game by our experience, but of noting a language-game. (1958, §654-655)
\end{quotation}

To expand this criticism it is useful to remember the two-pronged objection that Wittgenstein raises against private language: first, he contends that the meaning of words is not fixed by ostention, and second, that language, like obedience to a rule, demands training in social custom. Lonergan’s attempt to provide transcendental concepts by directing attention to the realities to which they refer (i.e., to our invariant cognitive structure) neglects the degree to which the language used to express transcendental concepts is itself given meaning by its use within particular “language-games.” Wittgenstein writes, “one forgets that a great deal of stage-setting in the language is presupposed if the mere act of naming is to make sense” (1958, §257). Moreover, if the meaning of a concept can be shown to have a public employment “sufficient to fix its sense, then it is already up to snuff as far as significance goes and there is no point in saying that it also has a private [transcendental] reference”
Transcendental Method and Private Language

(Fogelin 1976, 161). Fogelin concludes that “the private reference is the freely spinning wheel to be removed from the mechanism by Wittgenstein's spanner—the successor of Occam’s razor.”

The second prong of Wittgenstein’s argument also applies to Lonergan’s transcendental method. If the meaning of a word or concept is fixed by appeal to the private transcendental experience of the invariant structures of human consciousness, then there is no way of independently justifying that one report of the experience is right and another wrong. A subjective appeal to memory or to an awareness of the transcendental notions will not do because, as Wittgenstein notes, this is like someone buying “several copies of the morning newspaper to assure himself that what it said was true” (1958, §265). The correct or bogus employment of words and concepts must be determined not a priori but by their skillful use within particular language-games.

Private Language and the Immediate Experience of God’s Love

Wittgenstein’s private language argument may also be used to critique Lonergan’s understanding of a “core” religious experience behind the diverse outer manifestations associated with particular religions. In order for an experience to be characterized as a religious experience it must be, according to a Wittgensteinian view, the result of training in a particular religion’s conventions; it could not be an immediate pre-linguistic pre-conceptual affair. Experiences which may be characterized as “religious” are thus enabled by the norming objectivities (texts, rituals, customs, etc) of a particular religion. The term “religion” does not point to a generic commodity apart from determinate religions. However, it may be retained, according to a Wittgensteinian view, as a way of referring indirectly to those features of diverse “language-games” grounded in particular “forms of life” which overlap with one another. If it is the case that the external dimension of particular religions provide the objectivities which in turn norm its adherent’s experience, then Lonergan’s notion of an immediate experience of God’s love apart from any particular religion would be an incoherent notion which relies on a “nominalist” understanding of the term religion.

If one adopts the Wittgensteinian proposal concerning religious experience, i.e., that the norming objectivities of a particular religion enable religious experience, what can be made of the immediacy of reli-
gious experience? In other words, how does one account for what Lonergan identifies as the immediate experience of being unconditionally in love with God? According to George Lindbeck, there is no need to resort to the notion of an unthematized yet conscious experience to make sense of the immediacy of religious experience. A more economical hypothesis is to suppose that religious experiences are the “by-products of linguistically or conceptually cognitive activities of which we are aware because they are first intentional” [the act whereby we grasp objects] (Lindbeck 1984, 30). Although it does not arise to focal awareness during the experience of an object, the linguistic framework that makes religious experience possible is nevertheless tacitly operative. It can only be made explicit in the second intention (i.e., during the reflex action of reflecting on the experienced object) when the subject’s attention is focussed on the experience itself rather than the object. Religious experience, on this account, while it could be called “direct” could not properly be called “immediate,” i.e., without mediation. For while a subject’s attention is radically focused in the case of a religious experience, the experience itself is nonetheless tacitly mediated through a determinate linguistic framework.

Lonergan’s account of a primal religious experience of God’s love prior to training in the customs of any particular religious tradition is, from a Wittgensteinian point of view, at best needlessly complicated, and at worst incoherent. If, as Wittgensteinian argues, it is the norming objectivities of a religion that constitute the a priori grounds for the possibility of religious experience, then there is no need to resort to a primal religious experience apart from, and yet behind, every determinate religious tradition.

A Transcendental Response to the Private Language Argument

Lonergan’s Response

In his response to the contemporary theological appropriation of Wittgenstein, Lonergan generally agrees with the notion that “the ordinary meaningfulness of ordinary language is essentially public and only derivatively private,” he nevertheless contends that the source of the “original meaningfulness” of new words or usages is a mental act (1972, 255). At the base of his linguistic innovation is a mental act of which the
new word or usage is an expression. The communication of these innovations may in turn be “done technically by introducing definitions or spontaneously . . . [t]hrough a process of trial and error.” “Original meaningfulness” then, unlike “ordinary meaningfulness,” “originates in expressed mental acts.” Wittgensteinians have, however, overlooked this distinction because of their resignation over the reality of mental acts and their subsequent reductionistic delimitation of “philosophic discourse to the usage of ordinary language illumined, perhaps, by the metalanguages of syntax, semantics, and pragmatics” (Lonergan 1972, 256).

A Wittgensteinian Rejoinder

If Lonergan intends to suggest that Wittgenstein denies the reality of mental acts and is thereby unable to distinguish between the “ordinary” and “original” meaningfulness of words, he has misdiagnosed the problem. Wittgenstein’s commentators have defended him on the grounds that public language can also be put to private use (e.g., Fogelin 1976, 155; and Geach 1957, 2-4). Moreover, Wittgenstein himself noted that descriptions of someone’s thoughts are not to be dismissed as meaningless because they are unverifiable. Rather, they have meaning because of their connection to “a wider, public, language-game of describing people’s thoughts” (Geach 1957, 3). One can, therefore, conclude that Wittgenstein does not deny the reality of private mental acts.

Perhaps more can be made of Lonergan’s objection if it is understood as an argument about the nature of mental acts, i.e., about whether there is such a thing as a “pre-linguistic” mental act at the base of linguistic innovation. This is met, however, by Wittgenstein’s argument against the conceivability of such a possibility. On Wittgenstein’s view, there is simply no way out of the linguistic web. We may be able to get some critical purchase on Wittgenstein’s view, nevertheless, on the issue of linguistic innovation. How is it possible to account for new words or new usages of old words without recourse to private pre-linguistic mental acts? How can Wittgenstein account for linguistic innovation when he insists that words have their meaning in relation to particular givens, i.e., in relation to particular language-games and their relative forms of life?

According to Wittgenstein’s view, linguistic innovation may be thought of as analogous to “naming.” This process, while it may occur by
ostentation, does not supply a term with meaning. It involves no more than putting a piece on the board. In order for a new word or the new usage of a word to take on a meaning it must be related through definition or usage to the words or sentences or language-games with which it is already familiar. Lonergan himself notes that linguistic novelties are introduced by "definition" or "trial and error" both of which involve specifying in words the way(s) in which new words or usages are related to other words (1972, 256).

Another possibility consistent with Wittgenstein's account of language that may account for the introduction of new words or usages is the overlap or "family resemblances" between language-games. Through creative interaction with other language-games words may be appropriated into new linguistic contexts which in turn may supply—together with the original context—the term with a novel meaning. Terms (e.g., memory) that have a literal meaning in one context (e.g., human psychology) may be applied by analogy to another linguistic context (e.g., computers) without positing a pre-linguistic source of meaning, an act of understanding, of which the novel use is the expression.

The meaning of new words and new usages of words can be, in Wittgenstein's view, accounted for without recourse to pre-linguistic private mental acts. One may, on the one hand, allow that a new word is put into place by ostension or "naming," but is, on the other hand, given its meaning by its place within a particular language-game. Moreover, words that were originally situated in one particular language-game may be given a new meaning by analogy in another language-game.

Conclusion

Through a critique of Lonergan's transcendental foundations, I have tried to demonstrate the viability of a Wittgensteinian reading of religious language and experience. Whether Wittgenstein's account of language and experience is more coherent and satisfactory than Lonergan's is difficult to say. The problem is, moreover, compounded since Wittgenstein's account is anti-foundational and thus will not allow for a privileged account of reality from which competing methodological alternatives can be adjudicated. While I have argued that a Wittgen-
which Lonergan covers in a more economical fashion, it nevertheless remains to be seen whether Wittgenstein’s understanding of language and experience can yield fruitful and faithful theological results. While many theologians have regarded the critique of foundationalism in all its forms as *fait accompli*, they must still produce an epistemological account that is not anti-realist and/or fideistic. In other words, granting the basic epistemic point that there are no privileged accounts of reality, how is it possible to assert that Christian truth claims are anything more than a way of speaking that helps us get what we want? Until this question is given a satisfactory answer, the pressure of what Richard Bernstein has called “Cartesian Anxiety” will continue to make foundational proposals such as Lonergan’s epistemologically attractive.9

**Endnotes**

1. Lonergan writes, “They are a priori because they go beyond what we know, to seek what we do not know yet” (1972, 11).

2. The category “religious experience” is an example of a “special theological category.” While it, like the transcendental method, ultimately refers to a transcultural reality apart from any determinate cultural formulation, it may nevertheless, take on a determinate categorical shape for the sake of theological/religious discussion. “General theological categories” are likewise given a determinate shape apart from the transcendental notions which they instantiate but, unlike “special theological categories,” are common and therefore useful to both theology and other disciplines (1972, 281-293).

3. Lonergan states “that there is a transcendent reality; that he is immanent in human hearts; that he is supreme beauty, truth, righteousness, goodness; that he is love, mercy, compassion; that the way to him is repentance, self-denial, prayer; that the way is love of one’s neighbour, even of one’s enemies; that the way is love of God, so that bliss is conceived as knowledge of God, union with him, or dissolution into him” (1972, 109).

4. Foundationalism is provisionally defined here as the conviction that in a rational noetic structure every proposition is justified by its relation through an ancestral chain to a foundational proposition, i.e., to a self-evident or incorrigible proposition itself in need of no support.
5. Lonergan does make a distinction between the "ordinary" and "original" meaningfulness of words, the former deriving its meaning from the public world of discourse and the latter from mental acts of understanding (1972, 255-56).

6. By "nominalist" I mean a kind of reification of the term religion which gains a life of its own apart from its intended indirect reference to the commonalities between various particular religious traditions.

7. Geach also notes that Wittgenstein used the simile of a chess move worked out on a piece of paper which has "significance through its connection with the whole practice of playing chess." Words may thus, on Wittgenstein's account, have a private reference (Bedeutung) but not a private sense (Sinn).

8. One need not posit a pre-linguisitic mental act of understanding as the source of this creativity. Instead, understanding may be thought of as the linguisitic ability to use correctly an expression and to give an explanation of that use. Linguisitic innovation thus involves successful performance, i.e., the spelling out of the intended novel use in terms of the familiar so that others may do likewise (Baker and Hacker 1985, 1:347-370).

9. "With a chilling clarity Descartes leads us with an apparent and ineluctable necessity to a grand and seductive Either/Or. Either there is some support for our being, a fixed foundation for our knowledge, or we cannot escape the forces of darkness that envelope us with madness, with intellectual and moral chaos" (Bernstein 1985, 18).

Works Cited


