

ing set of comments. In such a manner we are constantly encouraged to be challenged by the text, to confront its characters and its phrases. Even the experienced reader of Nietzsche will find here the basis of new thoughts and interpretations.

In his final section White enters the critical part of his work. He moves from commentary to application. At this point it is no longer a question of who is Nietzsche (as in Part 1), or what did he say (as in Part 2); it is now a question of what does he mean? White is able to apply this question personally to the reader by posing the challenge of Nietzsche: can you live in the labyrinth? can you be a yes-sayer? can you be a dancer? We are aided in such considerations by reference to Alexander Nehamas, Milan Kundera and Marcel Proust. These three personalities help define the contemporary age that an interpreter of Nietzsche must consider. They also raise the challenge to a level above the mere individual. Nietzsche's questions both include and surpass us. They hold political implications and raise several ethical concerns. Still, the point is that the doctrine of the eternal return, which by now the reader knows as the central piece, can be maintained in the contemporary world.

There is much to be applauded in White's volume; considering its size, he has accomplished a lot. A critical introduction, an enlightening commentary, and an application to contemporary issues. The problem lies in classifying the book. It is too simple to be used in graduate courses, but too detailed for introductory survey courses. It will, therefore, likely end up on lists of "Further Reading" without being given much attention. This is a shame, for the volume is capable of drawing the novice to reading Nietzsche's works for themselves, and of enticing the experienced reader to take a new look. The book will not, however, satisfy those in need of a commentary on the complicated questions of genealogy, hermeneutics and history.

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***Descartes Among the Scholastics.* By Marjorie Grene. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1991. ISBN 0-87462-158-5. Pp. ii+50.**

This volume presents the 1991 edition of the annual Aquinas Lecture at Marquette University. The prominence of the Aquinas lectures is indicated by its distinguished roll of previous lecturers, including *inter alia*, Alasdair MacIntyre, Paul Ricoeur, Alvin Plantinga, Charles Hartshorne, Roderick Chisholm, Bernard Lonergan, Etienne Gilson, Emil Fackenheim, and Jacques Maritain.

Grene begins by explicitly stating her objective which is “to show . . . how Gilson’s thesis of Descartes’ debt to scholasticism has been vindicated by recent scholarship” (2). This vindication is developed in two stages: first Grene shows that Gilson’s thesis “has been rendered subtler and more complex by the work of a great many scholars,” both French and American (she appends a bibliography to support this); and second Grene provides her own contribution to this subtler scholarship by more closely examining Descartes’ use of the concept of substantial form—“a concept Descartes needed to eliminate for the construction of his new physics, but which he retained in one special context,” namely the human soul (3).

Grene establishes her version of Descartes’ objectives and methodological motives by emphasizing particularly his desire to construct a new metaphysical foundation for the new mathematical metaphysics. What he really wanted to overthrow was not all his former opinions (though this is how he puts it in the *Meditations*), but rather “just so much of what his teachers had taught him” that would interfere with his new metaphysical foundation. Grene contends that this does not make Descartes a liar or a hypocrite; he is rather a “superb philosophical rhetorician [who] uses the concepts and vocabulary available to him to effect . . . a radical change in our approach to the knowledge of nature” (7). Consequently, he must be read in the context of his own time and not by the objectives of twentieth-century scepticism.

According to Grene, such a reading indicates that, although Descartes did hope his readers would shed their Aristotelianism, he was not quite as radical an innovator as has often been supposed, or as he wanted to be perceived. This is due in large part to the complexity of Jesuit scholasticism, which combined with the received Thomism of the likes of Duns Scotus, Francisco Suárez, Gabriel Vasquez and even Augustine. The extent of this philosophical complexity is often overlooked in relating Descartes to his own context thereby making him seem more radical than he really was.

This qualified radicalness is also seen in Descartes’ retention of substantial forms and real qualities. Grene’s concern is two-fold: first, to establish how Descartes could reject substantial forms in every case of reality (i.e., objects are now understood simply as physical extensions in Euclidean space)—except that of humanity; second, by corollary, to establish how “two substances [soul and body] could form one substance, or, strictly speaking, a substantial unity.” To facilitate this discussion, she lists and discusses the places in Descartes’ works where he both rejects substantial forms in general and where he retains substantial forms for the human soul.

Grene concludes that Descartes’ retention of substantial forms for humanity, including his sharp mind/body dualism, is possible because of how he “wildly

misunderstands" the Aristotelian tradition, and how he consequently alters ("impoverishes"!) the concept of substance. Descartes' various uses of substance, including his distinction between simple and complex substances, led him to "consider substance as a possible mode, and thus as a non-substance." To do this he abandoned "a fundamental axiom of the [Aristotelian] tradition . . . that everything there is is unambiguously and ineradicably either substance or accident of a substance—and not both" (39). Thus Descartes "could save the unity of man in the face of his sharp dualism only through the radical impairment of the concept of substance itself" (40).

Grene's lecture is clearly written although at times it feels a bit sparingly illustrated (the bibliography indirectly helps to rectify this). Her discussion of Descartes' relationship to scholasticism would benefit from Roger Ariew's recent work on Descartes' correspondence, which for this issue is as important as his philosophical writings. Nonetheless, I find Grene's arguments largely persuasive, and a good antidote to those inclined to interpret Descartes outside of his own times.

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***The Irony of Theology and the Nature of Religious Thought.* By Donald Wiebe. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991. ISBN: 0-7735-1015-X. Pp. xiv+251.**

When scholars and students of religious studies gather to discuss faith and reason, one often hears the argument that not only are the two both necessary for religious life, but despite the puzzling and frequently paradoxical nature of this relationship, faith and reason are also both fundamentally compatible modes of experience/thought. Last year the University of Toronto's Donald Wiebe published *The Irony of Theology and the Nature of Religious Thought* to demonstrate that as modes of thought, faith and reason are logically incompatible and that the latter actually undermines religious life.

Wiebe devotes a great deal of energy to defending the basic paradigm of anthropologist Lucien Lévy-Bruhl who posited the existence of two dichotomous modes of thought which he called mythopoeic and rational (or modern and primitive). Lévy-Bruhl and Wiebe argue that there is a fundamental difference between the way "primitives" and "moderns" think, and that this difference concerns the latter's preference for rational, non-contradictory explanations of reality. Unlike rational thought, mythopoeic thought is not inherently logical and