with current issues in Paganism and with research within Pagan Studies. Again, the issues raised within the first two chapters of this section—the ethics of cultural appropriation, gender roles, environmental ethics, the political nature of Pagan rituals, interfaith relations (especially with Judaeo-Christian traditions), Wicca in the media and the commodification of Pagan beliefs—are common within Pagan circles and present few novel ideas for the seasoned Pagan Studies academic, although those new to the field may find some directions for future study.

The final chapter suffers from Davy’s own background in the anthropology of religion. Despite the professed interdisciplinarity of Pagan Studies, Davy’s final chapter amounts to a survey of the sociological and anthropological studies of Paganism performed in the last decades, to the exclusion of philosophical and psychological texts that have also had some bearing on the field. While one will quickly be forced to admit the overwhelming corpus of work within these two fields dealing with Paganism, this truth need not be normativised, a move that dissuades academics in other fields from turning their attention to Paganism.

The result of Davy’s work is a suitable introduction for academics without any familiarity with Paganism, yet one that may prove more effective at providing basic information than at highlighting the nuanced differences between Pagan traditions or at encouraging reflection upon the many philosophical and methodological problems that exist within Pagan Studies. The seasoned Pagan Studies scholar is likely to find these two points a source of great frustration. Still, Davy is to be praised for venturing into these uncharted waters and drafting the first introduction to the field of Pagan Studies, with hopes that others will be inspired to take up the same challenge.

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Reconsidering Evil
Reviewed by Nathan Loewen, McGill University.

What would be lost if ‘evil’ were dropped from the vocabulary of philosophical reflection? Petruschka Schaafsma introduces Reconsidering Evil with a promise to address the “dismantling” of evil (5) and to “regauge” the notion of evil (8) in order to reestablish its vitality amid the plurality of modernity. To this end, Schaafsma closely reads Paul Ricoeur, Immanuel Kant, Karl Jaspers and Karl Barth in order to survey each for content related to evil. This study overtly engages only Western thought in relation to Christianity, and its figures deliberately bookend German idealism. G.W.F Hegel’s thought on religion and evil is dismissed as without novelty or import for
the project (268n.94). Mention of Martin Heidegger’s relation to this matter is also scrupulously absent from the discussions of Jaspers, Barth and Ricoeur.

Schaafsma’s hypothesis is that evil, as a notion, is comparatively more at home in religion than in speculative reflection. ‘At home’ implies that evil occupies a natural and self-evident place (4n.9) that is thus least prone to misrepresentation (12, 193). If so, then evil is a typically religious category (14) that is best understood against a religious background (241).

Schaafsma’s allegiance is given from the outset to Ricoeur for the most comprehensive philosophical reflection on evil. His innovation is to emphasize “ambiguity,” the “ethical” and the “tragic” in order to thereby extend Ricoeur’s analytic beyond its self-declared aims (94). Schaafsma then sensitizes his other presentations via these emphases in order to reveal the “one-sidedness” of Kant and Jaspers’ views (98) in contrast to Ricoeur’s coherence (255).

Ricoeur is found to avoid the pitfalls of either “thinking more” or “thinking less” about evil (31). The former risks the pretense to total comprehension; the latter risks leaving thought bereft of insight. These risks arise because the ambiguity of evil resists the speculative desire for summative conclusion (92). Kant and Jaspers are the foils that exhibit these pitfalls. Kant’s view, represented as focused solely upon formal ethics, ignores the inevitability of evil. Jaspers’ view, oriented by the inevitable tragedy of the human condition, domesticates evil. Ricoeur’s hermeneutical attention to the symbolics of pre-philosophical religious views articulates the ambiguity of evil “most naturally” (242) with an analytical depth (44) unmatched by speculative rational investigations (37 n. 90). Schaafsma’s ‘regauging’ is more accurately an alternate tuning of Ricoeur.

The hypothesis about evil ‘at-home’ within religion is to be generalized vis-à-vis Barth’s idiosyncratic analysis of das Nichtige. Barth’s “fully theological” approach (194) is to clearly present what a religious view on evil can look like (240). This claim is striking given the nature of Barth’s work. Comparable figures to obtain such generality would be the twentieth century’s neo/anti-modern religious reformers. Perhaps such robustly exclusivist religious discourses are where the notion of evil is most at home? Schaafsma does not consider this ramification.

Barth’s emphasis on the brokenness of all human endeavours (202) is found to give depth of consensus on the intractable ambiguity of evil (266), which denies guarantees of completeness and comprehension. God’s directly creative “yes” tacitly conjures an infinite series of “no’s,” whose ultimately non-real resistance to God nevertheless opposes Creation. Eschewing normal terminology, Barth deems this ontically peculiar reality das Nichtige (208): the opus alienum to God’s opus proprium. Without confessing hopeful faith in God as Lord over all, humans then mistakenly deem their confrontations with das Nichtige as various dismantled and mis-gauged construals of evil.
Since they are conspicuously unmarked by the brokenness he presumes of all human artifice, Barth’s emphatic proclamations of God’s Lordship and the eschatological elimination of das Nichtige appear as hubris when placed alongside Ricoeur’s subtle analyses. Though methodologically diametrical to Jaspers, the evilness of evil in Barth’s thought—where sin before the Lord is absurd—is diminished (231) to the point of appearing theoretical (237). Nevertheless via Barth, Schaafsma concludes that religious hope is always tempered by a properly guaged awareness of human finitude. As such, religious views on evil accomplish a coherence not possible for speculative thought (279).

So what would be lost were evil omitted from philosophical reflection? Four finite insights: evil does obtain as a notion, humans do bear ethical responsibility for evils, humans do tragically suffer evils, and evil in general will eventually come to an end. Primarily via Ricoeur and Barth, Schaafsma ‘regauges’ evil according to this quadrilateral of insights that are reciprocally critically counterbalanced (286) “pre-eminential” in a religious context (287).

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**Religion in the Media Age**

Reviewed by Warren Kappeler, McGill University.

In the twenty-first century, religious life is increasingly moving from churches, mosques, and temples into the realm of the mass media. In this book the influential communication scholar Stewart M. Hoover examines the way in which media and religion intermingle and collide in the cultural experience of media audiences. Hoover is the director of the Center for Media, Religion and Culture and a professor of media studies at the School of Journalism and Mass Communication, at the University of Colorado. A leading authority on the topic of religion and media, Hoover’s study provides a critical introduction for those who want to understand the role of media in contemporary practices of religious belief. Readers will find that this book provides an insightful analysis of the variety of ways that media contribute to religious practice.

The interviews discussed in Religion in the Media Age were generated from Hoover’s endeavor to bridge the chasm between ethnographic data and social theory. This book emerged from an earlier work entitled Media, Home, and Family (2004), which outlines a research project undertaken by Hoover, Lynn Schofield, Diane F. Alters, Joseph G. Champ, and Lee Hood. Briefly put, Hoover’s research team began with the idea that the significance of mass media for meaning (including