misunderstands" the Aristotelian tradition, and how he consequently alters ("impoverishes"!) the concept of substance. Descartes' various uses of substance, including his distinction between simple and complex substances, led him to "consider substance as a possible mode, and thus as a non-substance." To do this he abandoned "a fundamental axiom of the [Aristotelian] tradition... that everything there is is unambiguously and ineradicably either substance or accident of a substance—and not both" (39). Thus Descartes "could save the unity of man in the face of his sharp dualism only through the radical impairment of the concept of substance itself" (40).

Grene's lecture is clearly written although at times it feels a bit sparingly illustrated (the bibliography indirectly helps to rectify this). Her discussion of Descartes' relationship to scholasticism would benefit from Roger Ariew's recent work on Descartes' correspondence, which for this issue is as important as his philosophical writings. Nonetheless, I find Grene's arguments largely persuasive, and a good antidote to those inclined to interpret Descartes outside of his own times.

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When scholars and students of religious studies gather to discuss faith and reason, one often hears the argument that not only are the two both necessary for religious life, but despite the puzzling and frequently paradoxical nature of this relationship, faith and reason are also both fundamentally compatible modes of experience/thought. Last year the University of Toronto’s Donald Wiebe published _The Irony of Theology and the Nature of Religious Thought_ to demonstrate that as modes of thought, faith and reason are logically incompatible and that the latter actually undermines religious life.

Wiebe devotes a great deal of energy to defending the basic paradigm of anthropologist Lucien Lévy-Bruhl who posited the existence of two dichotomous modes of thought which he called mythopoeic and rational (or modern and primitive). Lévy-Bruhl and Wiebe argue that there is a fundamental difference between the way "primitives" and "moderns" think, and that this difference concerns the latter's preference for rational, non-contradictory explanations of reality. Unlike rational thought, mythopoeic thought is not inherently logical and
normally requires the thinker to accept the existence of something (usually a
divine something) without a strictly "rational" justification.

Not surprisingly, Wiebe identifies mythopoeic with religious thought and
the world of faith (especially Jewish and Christian), whereas he identifies rational
with scientific thought. He asserts that not only do these two modes operate on the
basis of fundamentally different presuppositions about truth and the good, but that
their association also invariably damages them both. Not only is Christian belief
jeopardized by the demands of reason, but as Wiebe puts it, a rational defence of
the God of the Bible "would [also] amount to a destruction of rational argumenta-
tion itself" (209).

Wiebe argues that, although most people use both modes of thought, one
should resist the temptation to formulate philosophical explanations that posit
some underlying or implicit complementarity between them. In other words, the
totally distinct characteristics of mythopoeic/religious and scientific thought
should not be compromised by the scholarly tendency to sustain unconvincing
and awkward alliances through philosophical gymnastics.

Wiebe's overview of Lévy-Bruhl's paradigm will not surprise the majority
of scholars who either work on the basis of, or have already categorically
dismissed Lévy-Bruhl's dichotomy hypothesis. However, Wiebe extends his
argument to place academic theology ("rationalized religious thinking disguised
as theology" [175]) in the same category as science. Academic theology, he
asserts, differs from poetic theology in that the former applies the philosophical
(in fact, scientific) tools of rational justification and non-contradiction to faith,
whereas the latter maintains the mythopoeic essence of religious experience in the
form and content of its discourse. This contention represents this book's essential
thesis and its true contribution to the "faith and reason debate" within religious
studies.

Wiebe does not attempt simply to illustrate the futility of using philo-
osophical and scientific methodologies to establish the validity of a particular
religious or theological assertion. He goes further to claim that this endeavour
actually undermines both the assertion in question and the religious traditions in
which believers make these assertions. Wiebe affirms Durkheim's comment that
the moment one introduces reason (or academic theology) into the world of faith
"the enemy has gained a foothold" (208). This explains the term "irony" in the
title, for it is surely ironic that, although it is a venerated mode of religious
thought, academic theology threatens the mythopoeic essence of religion.

Wiebe's reliance on extensive and exceptionally detailed footnotes allows
readers the opportunity to conduct further research on the subject. However, some
of his clearest and most essential theoretical work is buried in dense footnotes
which sometimes occupy well over an entire page. While it was crucial to his
argument, Wiebe dwelt excessively both on his vindication of Lévy-Bruhl and an elaborate and highly technical discussion of ancient Greek thought. Finally, although this may have been intentional, he does not explore sufficiently how we—as individuals and a culture—are able to function when such an unruly coexistence of contradictory modes of thought characterizes our existence.

The book raises a great many more questions than it answers; but perhaps that is the mark of a successful academic text. A book which involves the reader (sometimes contemporaneously) in the worlds of ancient Greek and modern philosophy, and medieval scholastic and modern theology is, to say the least, quite ambitious. But Wiebe’s command of his resources is more than sufficient to keep the reader’s attention. As a deft and disciplined examination of a fundamental issue in religious studies, theology and religious life in general, I recommend this book to anyone interested in rethinking a fairly entrenched presupposition among religious studies scholars and students.

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In the early 1960s *Time* magazine wrote, “Bernard Lonergan is now considered by many intellectuals to be the finest philosophic thinker of the twentieth century.” This praise rests largely upon the excitement generated by *Insight*, the most important of Lonergan’s writings, which was initially published without much popular attention in 1957. It is now being re-published as the third volume of a projected twenty-two volume project. This new edition contains a number of textual changes based on the painstaking textual study of Robert Doran. These changes are, for the most part, made in the light of a comparison between Lonergan’s own autograph of *Insight* (MSA), the “good copy” (MSB) from which the publisher worked and the published text itself (PT). In general, the editors of this volume have worked to restore the language, word order and occasionally the punctuation of the manuscripts. The rationale for each change is provided in explanatory editorial notes at the end of the book.

The editors have also added references to significant primary sources on which Lonergan was dependent but did not specifically identify, and to useful secondary material that might facilitate further research. Included also is an interesting discussion of the conflicting evidence concerning the order in which