argument, Wiebe dwelt excessively both on his vindication of Lévy-Bruhl and an elaborate and highly technical discussion of ancient Greek thought. Finally, although this may have been intentional, he does not explore sufficiently how we—as individuals and a culture—are able to function when such an unruly coexistence of contradictory modes of thought characterizes our existence.

The book raises a great many more questions than it answers; but perhaps that is the mark of a successful academic text. A book which involves the reader (sometimes contemporaneously) in the worlds of ancient Greek and modern philosophy, and medieval scholastic and modern theology is, to say the least, quite ambitious. But Wiebe’s command of his resources is more than sufficient to keep the reader’s attention. As a deft and disciplined examination of a fundamental issue in religious studies, theology and religious life in general, I recommend this book to anyone interested in rethinking a fairly entrenched presupposition among religious studies scholars and students.

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In the early 1960s Time magazine wrote, “Bernard Lonergan is now considered by many intellectuals to be the finest philosophic thinker of the twentieth century.” This praise rests largely upon the excitement generated by Insight, the most important of Lonergan’s writings, which was initially published without much popular attention in 1957. It is now being re-published as the third volume of a projected twenty-two volume project. This new edition contains a number of textual changes based on the painstaking textual study of Robert Doran. These changes are, for the most part, made in the light of a comparison between Lonergan’s own autograph of Insight (MSA), the “good copy” (MSB) from which the publisher worked and the published text itself (PT). In general, the editors of this volume have worked to restore the language, word order and occasionally the punctuation of the manuscripts. The rationale for each change is provided in explanatory editorial notes at the end of the book.

The editors have also added references to significant primary sources on which Lonergan was dependent but did not specifically identify, and to useful secondary material that might facilitate further research. Included also is an interesting discussion of the conflicting evidence concerning the order in which
the chapters of *Insight* were composed (xix-xxii), a lexicon of Latin and Greek phrases, a list of lectures Lonergan gave as explanations of *Insight* and a lengthy and useful index.

*Insight* is, in a certain sense, born out of Lonergan’s teaching experience where he found it difficult, if not possible, to teach theology without first identifying the foundations upon which knowledge, including theological knowledge, was possible. Lonergan’s experience of the “fragmentation of knowledge” motivated him to uncover the unifying and objective basis of all knowledge. Lonergan’s answer to the problem of objectivity and unity is radical in the sense that he searches for it in human interiority, i.e., by attending to the invariant cognitive operations of the knowing human subject. Objectivity is possible, even at the level of common sense, when these invariant operations are employed, but philosophers and theologians are able to give an account of this objectivity by consciously attending to these operations. *Insight* is concerned then with the “organizing intelligence that brings within a single perspective the insights of mathematicians, scientists, and men of common sense” (4); it is concerned with “insight into insight” or a “knowledge of knowledge” (4). Unlike others (e.g., Kant) who employed this turn to the subject, Lonergan notes that the foundation, which he has uncovered, is transcendental, i.e., pre-conceptual and pre-proposition, and not categorical; it is dynamic and not-reducible to any of its determinate cultural or linguistic expressions; it is prior to any of its instantiations. For this reason, the foundation which Lonergan lays bare has practical and universal utility: “insight into insight, then, will reveal what activity is intelligent, and insight into oversights will reveal what activity is unintelligent” (8).

Generally speaking there are two kinds of critics of Lonergan’s work: one theological, the other, either philosophical or sociological. Lonergan’s theological critics object to the notion that knowledge, including the knowledge of God, must be grounded upon some general foundation for the sake for credibility. These critics do not share the Thomistic tradition concerning the relation of faith and reason. Knowledge of God is a gift of grace, a practical trust which is only secondarily concerned with the intelligibility of all of reality. Knowledge of God, from this perspective is in no way tied up with grand explanations of reality or the general foundations of intelligibility.

According to Ingolf Dalferth, philosophical objections to Lonergan’s “foundationalist and subject-centred approach” focus on whether this “approach does justice to the social, multiform and perspectival nature of our knowledge.” Do the so-called invariant patterns of human consciousness precede the inculcation of the human subject or vice-versa? Moreover, must one suppose a foundation, a basis for knowledge which embraces every human enterprise? Why not presuppose the atomistic universe of Democritus rather than the unified
universe of Plato? Why not proceed in a piece-meal fashion doing epistemological *bricolage* rather than retaining such permanent foundational construction? Finally, there is the challenge of one of Lonergan’s twentieth-century philosophical rivals, Ludwig Wittgenstein, who eschews the possibility of such transcendental enterprises altogether. Wittgenstein instead makes the more modest gesture of grounding the possibility and justification of knowledge claims in the social soil in which any given claim has its root.

The ongoing *Lonergan Workshop*, begun in 1974 at Boston College, provides a forum for those interested in the dialogue which Lonergan’s work has engendered. To commemorate the thirtieth anniversary of its publication, the 1987 *Workshop* concentrated on a discussion of *Insight*. The papers presented at this meeting have been published by Scholars Press and serve as an excellent supplement to this volume.

Richard R. Topping

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This collection of essays, which are directed at a specific question, is not for everyone. It will be enjoyed and perhaps even accepted as a significant contribution only by those specialists well-versed in the postmodern “crisis.” The book’s anti-climatic character, however, creates a certain frustration that frequently leaves the reader wondering if the question posed by the title has really been addressed.

This title defines the postmodern “crisis” which consists precisely of the loss of the subject. But crisis in this case does not refer to the strain involved in a recovery. The investigation is not an attempt to reclaim the lost. Rather, it is a question of accepting the loss of the subject as a turning point. It is a crisis only insofar as the question, “Who comes after the subject?” invites opportunity. The answer cannot be merely a new subject or even a revised one: what is demanded is something other than what has been known as the modern “subject.”

As a guide to this inquiry, the editors have assembled an impressive group of contributors including, among others, Etienne Balibar, Maurice Blanchot, Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida, Didier Franck, Emmanuel Levinas and Jean François Lyotard. The three editors deliberately chose to restrict the submissions to “French” theorists. This choice was determined both by the practical concern