

universe of Plato? Why not proceed in a piece-meal fashion doing epistemological *bricolage* rather than retaining such permanent foundational construction? Finally, there is the challenge of one of Lonergan's twentieth-century philosophical rivals, Ludwig Wittgenstein, who eschews the possibility of such transcendental enterprises altogether. Wittgenstein instead makes the more modest gesture of grounding the possibility and justification of knowledge claims in the social soil in which any given claim has its root.

The ongoing *Lonergan Workshop*, begun in 1974 at Boston College, provides a forum for those interested in the dialogue which Lonergan's work has engendered. To commemorate the thirtieth anniversary of its publication, the 1987 *Workshop* concentrated on a discussion of *Insight*. The papers presented at this meeting have been published by Scholars Press and serve as an excellent supplement to this volume.

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***Who Comes After the Subject?* Ed. Eduardo Cadava, Peter Connor and Jean-Luc Nancy. New York: Routledge, Chapman & Hall, 1991. ISBN 0-415-90359-9. Pp. v+258.**

This collection of essays, which are directed at a specific question, is not for everyone. It will be enjoyed and perhaps even accepted as a significant contribution only by those specialists well-versed in the postmodern "crisis." The book's anti-climatic character, however, creates a certain frustration that frequently leaves the reader wondering if the question posed by the title has really been addressed.

This title defines the postmodern "crisis" which consists precisely of the loss of the subject. But crisis in this case does not refer to the strain involved in a recovery. The investigation is not an attempt to reclaim the lost. Rather, it is a question of accepting the loss of the subject as a turning point. It is a crisis only insofar as the question, "Who comes after the subject?" invites opportunity. The answer cannot be merely a new subject or even a revised one: what is demanded is something other than what has been known as the modern "subject."

As a guide to this inquiry, the editors have assembled an impressive group of contributors including, among others, Etienne Balibar, Maurice Blanchot, Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida, Didier Franck, Emmanuel Levinas and Jean François Lyotard. The three editors deliberately chose to restrict the submissions to "French" theorists. This choice was determined both by the practical concern

of keeping their endeavour to a reasonable size (about 250 pages) and by the editorial decision to offer the reader a reflection of modern French thought. Thus, though the responses cover a full range of subjects—from the Heideggerian “soul-searching” (animus) of Franck to the Freudian “ego” reviewed by Mikkel Borch-Jacobson—the reader is continually dealing with the specific climate of French post-structuralism and deconstruction. Although not all the contributors are presently living and working at home (Vincent Descombes, for example, is at Emory University; Borch-Jacobson, at the University of Washington), the editors can be congratulated for achieving in a single volume such a fair selection from so-called “post-Sartrian” France.

Still, what about the frustration mentioned above? Many readers may be disappointed with some of the responses. The collapse of the “modern” subject is related to an apprehension of the constructed subject and its usefulness as a verifier of the modern quest. Since this hermeneutical circle has been identified for more than twenty years now (specifically in France with Foucault’s *Les mots et les choses*) the reader could reasonably have expected, at least occasionally, some other options. After all, the title calls for: an anticipation of the next move, a looking beyond the dead-end to which modernity has taken us, some historic perspective on how “subject” functioned in other times and places, and if not for solutions, at least for some positive elements of an alternative. “Postmodernity” should be “after” the modern and not merely a vigil set to watch over it. This will be the reader’s frustration, namely, the feeling that the question, despite several outstanding personalities assigned to address it, is never really given an adequate response. Part of the problem might be that some of the great personalities who could present this kind of insight are limited to only a few pages (e.g., Deleuze and Blanchot), while Derrida offers a good but very circumscribed interview. The result is that rather than dealing with “Who comes after the subject?” one is confronted with the question, “Who is” (or at least, “was”) the subject in modernity? The question of an “after” remains on hold.

These comments are critical of the overall volume, but should not be taken as criticism of each author (nineteen in all). Even though I sometimes felt like I was reading about a question different than the one announced by the title, this did not detract from some of the finest commentary available on Descartes, Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger. Moreover, as a thoroughly pleasing encounter with the contemporary debate among the philosophers of France, this volume serves its purpose well. Individuals motivated by curiosity, and those in need of a critical source on postmodernism, will be well-served by these essays.