forced or overemphasized. The last section is "Being Commissioned" and it emphasizes 'going into the world' outside of the church. Here the movement of liturgy and worship is complete—one could say the liturgy is incomplete without this accompanying outward movement.

There are many interesting, informative and contemporary articles in this companion, and in general it conforms well to the orientation of The Blackwell Companions to Religion series, which attempts to "approach the subject in a creative and forward-thinking style" (ii). Most of the essays are not overly difficult and they present both traditional practices and thinking, and new perspectives on the issues discussed. While not a reference book on Christian ethics, this edition is still very valuable for the theologian or Christian ethicist, if these can indeed be distinguished. However, it would have been helpful in my opinion, to hear more voices from the Christian tradition outside Western society. Generally speaking, Asian and African voices are lacking, and these constitute a significant portion of the practicing Christian church; these are 'creative and forward-thinking' Christian voices that have much to say to the West.

One other note relating to the overall tone and approach of the book is that it seemed to clearly be written by Christians, primarily for Christians. In many ways, it is refreshing to look at different aspects of Christian life and ethics unapologetically described through the lens of Christian worship, by practitioners of the faith. However, I could not help but think throughout the book that it was more for those inside the Christian faith than those outside of it. This may or may not be a problem for those outside of Christianity, but I would have preferred to see an approach that was slightly less liturgically focused and less aimed toward helping "Christians recover the story and practices that are the form and substance of their lives" (50). In addition, more articles addressing the relationships of Christians to those of other faiths would have been welcome as this was largely omitted. By way of summary, I am certain that many readers will be pleased by the abundance of up-to-date and creatively written articles in this volume. Whether it will be a 'landmark' for Christians is yet to be seen.

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Bernard Lonergan, a Canadian philosopher and Jesuit theologian, while not exactly a household name, has been nonetheless gaining more recognition in recent years, not only as an important thinker in his own right, but also as a significant contributor to the debate between Analytic and Continental thought. For anyone who has ever struggled to understand Lonergan's dense
and challenging logic, this recent book, edited by Jim Kanaris and Mark J. Doorley, will certainly prove to be a useful companion, particularly in regards to the problem of subjectivity as a self-transcending process that necessarily opens up onto an other. Over and above that, however, this small collection of very accessible essays serves as a welcome addition to the growing number of publications attempting to bring into clearer focus the similarities and differences between, as it were, two ways of doing philosophy, which for all intents and purposes define the vast majority of contemporary Western thought, as much in philosophy itself as in cultural theory, ethics, psychology, or, indeed, religious studies.

There are eight essays contained in this volume, each dealing with a somewhat different aspect of Lonergan's thought, and each focusing on a different Continental thinker (or group of thinkers). One of the more intriguing among these is Kanaris's essay, "To Whom do We Return in the Turn to the Subject? Lonergan, Derrida, and Foucault Revisited," which looks at some of the main challenges faced by Lonergan scholars in light of the deconstructionist theory of Jacques Derrida and the historical-archeological approach of Michel Foucault. Kanaris' argument succeeds in offering a convincing defense of Lonergan as a scholar who attempts to push his understanding of the subjective structure beyond certain limitations inherent in the work of Kant and Hegel; at the same time, the essay provides a sensitive critique which acknowledges the problematization of the very notion of subjectivity in Continental thought, something that demands a serious consideration if Lonergan is to continue to remain relevant in the contemporary academic context. In Kanaris' view, any philosophical "return" to the subject today must always necessarily be an ambiguous one, aware of its own limitations and open to a radical questioning from the "outside." Lonergan, to be sure, offers a dynamic model for subjective self-appropriation, yet the subject cannot be treated only as a prior, isolated structure, but must rather also be regarded as always already a participant in a textual/discursive practice or context.

Similarly, in his essay Doorley effectively uses Lonergan to engage some of the fundamental, critical concerns of Continental thinkers, particularly their focus on the inexhaustibility and particularity of human experience in the face of theoretical systems. Doorley takes a careful look at the legitimacy of some of the claims of John Caputo, Emmanuel Levinas, and especially Jacques Derrida, and offers a thorough defense of ethics as well as of the necessity—and possibility—of judgment, arguing that reason is not by definition instrumentalist in its aims, nor is it by nature reductionist or insensitive with respect to the Other. Focusing on Derrida's notion that texts by definition remain open to a multiplicity of interpretations—an openness that eludes all attempts at absolute closure—Doorley points out that, nonetheless, this very openness does not exclude the possibility of making informed judgments, or of articulating some kind of meaning (by means of what he refers to here as "critical realism"), even if these, in turn, must remain subject to future revision. Doorley remains optimistic that the very notion of ethics—understood as a response to the call of the Other—will continue to prove its relevance even in a "postmodern world," and that the critiques of certain central Continental thinkers can be reconciled with the Enlightenment project.
The book also contains an insightful and captivating essay by Ronald H. McKinney, entitled "Lonergan and the Ambiguity of Postmodern Laughter." Beginning with a brief but effective analysis of Umberto Eco's well-known book, *The Name of the Rose*, and incorporating an interesting discussion of Aristotle and Kierkegaard, McKinney manages to set up a strong argument for the importance of humor in philosophical endeavors, which he then cleverly applies to Lonergan's most influential work, *Insight*, arguing that laughter does indeed play a role in Lonergan's notion of self-appropriation, particularly in terms of bringing about a realization (and perhaps an overcoming) of the limits and contradictions of human knowledge and experience. Laughter, in McKinney's view, enables us to maintain a certain necessary openness in the face of such limits and contradictions, an openness which, in Lonergan's case, nonetheless does not dissolve into nihilism or relativism.

There are other absorbing essays to be found here, such as Christine E. Jamieson's very original treatment of Lonergan's notion of the ascent to a "higher viewpoint" via the work of Julia Kristeva, and Frederick Lawrence's attempt to define the unique position of the Lonerganian subject by looking at a number of different ways in which subjectivity has come to constitute a contemporary problem. In addition, there is a brief but concise foreword by John Caputo.

There are certainly some regrettable omissions here. A number of renowned Continental thinkers who have made crucial contributions to the contemporary debates around issues of subjectivity and otherness are not discussed by any of the authors: Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Lacan, Maurice Blanchot, and Roland Barthes, for instance. Most curiously, perhaps, there is almost no mention of Jürgen Habermas, a scholar who, to a large extent, stands apart from the more deconstructionist or post-structuralist theorists, and who is a very fitting conversation partner for Lonergan. Such omissions, however, are to be expected in a book of this size (under 200 pages), and do not undermine its general aim, which is to bridge some of the existing gaps between the two philosophical "worlds" and their unique sets of concerns.

One central question that recurs throughout this collection of essays, at least implicitly, is whether the fundamental differences in the Analytic and the Continental traditions can, or indeed should, be reconciled in some manner. Are attempts at such "reconciliations" necessarily naïve or superfluous—like trying to bring together a naturalist and a cubist painter and forcing them to agree on the nature of art? More concretely still: is it possible to strive for clarification and remain open to the intangibility of human experience and the virtually inherent paradoxicality of Truth? It appears that most, if not all, of the authors who have contributed to this volume would respond in the affirmative—at least to the first and last of the above questions. At its most optimistic, *In Deference to the Other* seems to assume that the divide between the two philosophical ways of thinking is rather superficial, that it can be eliminated with time and effort on both sides, and that Lonergan is an important means to bridge this gap.

In the end, this collection of essays constitutes a sensitive treatment of the problem, one that remains continually aware of the complexity of the issues at hand and of the limitations that we constantly encounter when

Louise Joy Lawrence writes an excellent summary and critique of social science criticism and its relation to the New Testament, though her title is a summary in itself: An Ethnography of the Gospel of Matthew: A Critical Assessment of the Use of the Honour and Shame Model in New Testament Studies. Although many view the bounds of social science criticism as limitless and applicable to each area of the New Testament, Lawrence questions the method, the application of the method, as well as its overall relevance to the New Testament. To achieve this goal, she employs the gospel of Matthew as a case study.

The first chapter introduces the reader to many of social science’s critical terms: anti-introspective self, agonistic interaction and challenge-riposte, limited good, dyadic personality, and sexual division of labour. With a focus on Malina and Neyrey, the book summarizes various approaches to these concepts and their common applications to New Testament texts. Providing the basis for the remainder of her work, Lawrence demonstrates in this chapter that current honour/shame models are deterministic (matching the evidence to fit the model), contain an outdated view of culture, and contain problems regarding “reification” (35).

Chapter Two focuses on the need for a return to the literary sources. Drawing upon the work of Mikhail Bakhtin, Lawrence focuses on three aspects of his theories regarding literary ethnography: “First it constitutes an attempt to be truly interdisciplinary, looking at various developments in anthropology as regards literary texts and transplanting those methods and insights into biblical study. Second, it provides an attempt to categorise the ways in which context and text can be interrelated . . . Third . . . it shows, in light of the developments within anthropological studies . . . that texts and social life itself cannot be simplified” (57–58).