

is particularly interesting. There is much to consider here which both merits further reflection, and evokes interest in areas once thought to be out of one's field. Indeed, there is considerable dimension and substance for a book of this length.

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***Risen Indeed: Making Sense of the Resurrection.* By Stephen T. Davis. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1993. 0-8028-0126-9. Pp. xii+220.**

The author defends the credibility of two assertions traditionally made by Christians: (1) that Jesus was raised bodily from the dead; and (2) that on some future day all the dead will be bodily raised. In the first four chapters Davis argues in favour of the former claim, discussing various questions: On what grounds is it rational to believe that Jesus was raised from the dead? Do the canons of historical research allow for recognition of events such as the resurrection? Which theory of Jesus' resurrection is most defensible on philosophical and exegetical grounds? Is the empty tomb tradition historically reliable, and if so, what is its significance for belief in the resurrection? In chapters five through seven, Davis defends two different views of the general resurrection, one based on a dualistic understanding of human beings, and the other based on physicalist assumptions. The last three chapters address a range of related issues. In chapter eight Davis presents an argument against universalism, i.e., the doctrine that all human beings will ultimately live eternally with God. Chapter nine is a reprise of themes treated earlier in the first four chapters, and chapter ten poses the question of the relevance for daily life of belief in the resurrection.

Davis distinguishes two sorts of apologetic arguments in favour of the resurrection of Jesus. Hard apologetic arguments intend to prove the irrationality of not believing in the resurrection. They amount to claiming that any rational person who honestly looks at the evidence must be convinced that Jesus was raised from the dead. Soft apologetic arguments, on the other hand, intend to demonstrate only that belief in the resurrection is rational and do not entail the irrationality of unbelief.

Davis's interest is to advance an apologetic argument of the soft type. Religious skeptics, he says, are within their intellectual rights in denying that a resurrection has occurred, for the probability is very high that a person dead for parts of three days stays dead. Hence the evidence that may be adduced in favour of the resurrection is not conclusive. A skeptic can say, "We do not know exactly what happened after the crucifixion—it was, after all, a long time ago—but whatever happened, we can always offer plausible explanations of the evidence that appeal to immanent, natural factors and do not commit us to the proposition that a dead man lived again."

But if the skeptic is within her intellectual rights in denying the resurrection, how can it be rational to affirm it? Davis argues that even if the skeptic and the believer agree that a resurrection is improbable, the believer can still rationally

affirm that it happened because the believer accepts a supernaturalist worldview. Supernaturalism is a basic metaphysical position expressible in the following four statements: (1) something besides nature exists, namely, God; (2) nature depends for its existence on God; (3) the regularity of nature can be and occasionally is interrupted by miraculous acts of God; and (4) such divine acts are humanly quite unpredictable and inexplicable.

Davis's view, then, is that the rationality of belief in the resurrection is relative to the truth of a particular worldview, namely, supernaturalism. One might expect that a philosophical argument in favour of the resurrection would therefore be concerned to demonstrate the truth of supernaturalism, or alternatively, to explain why the truth of a worldview is, in principle, indemonstrable, but Davis has nothing to offer on these fundamental issues. One is left wondering whether the price of Davis's philosophical candour regarding the rationality of belief in the resurrection is an admission of the hypothetical character of all rationality.

Perhaps one reason why Davis avoids addressing these issues is that his envisaged audience is not exclusively a philosophical one interested in abstract questions of truth and rationality, but a theological one concerned with making sense of traditional articles of faith. In defending the claim that Jesus was raised from the dead he evidently wishes to argue against those Christian thinkers who offer reductive theories of the resurrection. A reductive theory of the resurrection is one that holds that the assertion "Jesus is risen" is translatable without loss of meaning into a statement that does not necessarily entail that a man dead for parts of three days lived again. Bultmann's statement that "faith in the resurrection is really the same as faith in the saving efficacy of the cross" is typical of reductive theories. Davis accuses the reductivists of doing exegesis under the influence of an ideology that prevents a correct reading of the NT texts, and he presents a forceful argument to show that historical criticism as generally practised by contemporary scholars presumes to settle metaphysical questions—such as whether there are any divinely caused events—by methodological principles. Against the claim that the historian as historian cannot affirm that God raised Jesus from the dead, Davis says that Christians "will treat any claim that all events must be naturally explicable as a piece of deist or naturalist imperialism" (33).

Davis identifies four theories of Jesus's resurrection: (1) bodily resuscitation; (2) bodily transformation; (3) spiritual resurrection; and (4) reductive resurrection theories; and he argues on exegetical grounds that the theory of bodily transformation is "the proper Christian interpretation" of Jesus's resurrection.

The transformed body of the risen Jesus, he tells us, is the same physical body which was crucified, except that it has exceptional new properties: it is "glorified;" it lives "in a new mode of existence;" it is "fully dominated by the Holy Spirit;" it is "liberated from many of the limitations of ordinary life." These descriptions of Jesus's risen body are no doubt faithful to the biblical data, but they are philosophically and theologically rudimentary. It is unfortunate that the concepts of body and bodily transformation are not adequately clarified or developed by Davis because the notions that he apparently accepts are unable to bear the weight of critical scrutiny. For example, Davis wants to emphasize that the risen body of Jesus is a physical object. This means that it has location relative to other

bodies within the spatial (and temporal) continuum of the material universe. Since the risen Jesus is still alive, and unless his body has undergone some further transformation, he must now be located somewhere in the same universe of bodies as are we. This consequence is not only implausible but also perhaps incompatible with other things that Christians have traditionally wanted to say about the glorified body of Jesus, i.e., that it is in heaven.

In chapters five through seven, Davis argues in favour of the general resurrection by defending the coherence of two quite different theories of post-mortem survival, i.e., temporary disembodiment and temporary non-existence. His preferred view is that human beings are typically psycho-physical beings, and that the soul can exist for a time apart from the body and retain personal identity. However, this is an incomplete form of human existence. The promise of a general resurrection is the promise that the soul will be (re-)united with its resurrection body and so be in a position to live a complete human life in the presence of God.

Once one accepts the coherence of the notion of temporary disembodied existence, the issue for resurrectionists is whether the Patristic view that the matter of which the body once consisted will be miraculously reassembled by God and re-united with the soul is to be accepted, or the modern view, that our glorified bodies will be significantly different from our pre-mortem bodies. Davis argues that both views are viable. If the presence of the soul is sufficient for personal identity, however, then the Patristic requirement that the post-mortem body consist of the same matter as the pre-mortem body is otiose.

Davis also argues that a Christian understanding of resurrection is coherent even if human beings are essentially material objects. For the issue in this case is whether personal identity is gap-inclusive, i.e., whether it makes sense to say that a person who has ceased to exist can be the same person as someone else with similar properties who appears in the resurrection world. If personal identity always requires spatio-temporal continuity then the Christian hope that we will be raised from the dead is groundless, for no matter how much the denizens of the resurrection world might resemble us, they will be mere replicas of ourselves. Davis's answer to the difficulty is creative and provocative. He proposes four criteria of personal identity: (1) striking psychological (memory and personality) similarities between earlier and later persons; (2) striking bodily similarities; (3) uniqueness; and (4) the will of God. He argues that there are two sufficient conditions for the numerical identity of discontinuously existing human persons, namely, the satisfaction of criteria 1, 3 and 4, or, the satisfaction of criteria 2, 3 and 4.

Davis's denial that memory and personality similarities are necessary conditions of personal identity is puzzling since we are unlikely to believe that a post-mortem person P2 is the same as the pre-mortem person P1 if P2 at no time is able to remember anything from P1's point of view. Whether infants and amnesiacs provide Davis with the examples he needs to deny the necessity of Criterion 1 is debatable. We may have good reason to deny that consciousness is a necessary condition of personal identity, but it could be argued that memory is more fundamental than consciousness and is constitutive in different ways of both consciousness and personal identity.

The claim that the will of God is a necessary condition of personal identity,

i.e., that P2 is identical with P1 only if God wills that P2 be P1, is, of course, controversial, but Davis defends it convincingly. Criterion 3 is also peculiar because it specifies a property (uniqueness) that a post-mortem person P2 must have in order to be identical with a pre-mortem person P1, and, that property is extrinsic to P2. In other words, if P2 is numerically identical with P1 then there can be only one P2 in the post-mortem world, i.e., there can be no competitors for the P2 state, for if, by way of illustration, two or more persons appeared in the resurrection world having my memories and physical properties, then it could scarcely be said that I had survived death. Would it not be more reasonable to say that two or more duplicates of me now existed in the resurrection world?

The duplication objection to post-mortem survival trades on this peculiarity of the uniqueness criterion of identity. The objection holds that the logical possibility of duplicates renders post-mortem survival incoherent. Davis agrees with one of the premises of the duplication objection in so far as he maintains that our concept of a person includes the notion that there is only one instance of each person, and that the existence in the resurrection world of multiple qualitatively identical persons resembling a pre-mortem person P1 would place too great a strain on our concept of a person for us to say that P1 had survived death. He concludes that if God intends that a given person should survive death, then God will not allow replicas of that person in the afterlife. But Davis also defends the plausibility of the uniqueness criterion of personal identity against such philosophers as Derek Parfit and Harold Noonan. His arguments are clear and sophisticated and have relevance beyond the application to the question of post-mortem survival. Anyone concerned with the meaning and coherence of the concepts of the self and personal identity should benefit from Davis's treatment of the issue.

Davis has provided us with a clear and detailed discussion of central issues posed by Christian resurrection claims. Philosophers, theologians, exegetes, preachers and teachers will find much of value here.

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Rational Faith: Catholic Responses to Reformed Epistemology. Ed. Linda Zagzebski. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993. ISBN 0-268-01643-7. Pp. vi+290.

Rational Faith is a fine collection of nine essays representing a variety of responses to current forms of Reformed epistemology as represented by Alvin Plantinga, Nicholas Wolterstorff, and George Mavrodes. Its purpose, states Zagzebski, is "to present critical reflections on Reformed epistemology by Catholic philosophers who appreciate the theories in question but who also have a special interest in, and understanding of, Catholic philosophy." The volume is useful for those well-versed in this area of the philosophy of religion in that it offers the latest on the on-going dialogue between Catholic and Reformed philosophers on the epistemology of religious beliefs. But it is also a useful introduction for those unfamiliar with this philosophical topic. Zagzebski's introduction provides a road map of