i.e., that P2 is identical with P1 only if God wills that P2 be P1, is, of course, controversial, but Davis defends it convincingly. Criterion 3 is also peculiar because it specifies a property (uniqueness) that a post-mortem person P2 must have in order to be identical with a pre-mortem person P1, and, that property is extrinsic to P2. In other words, if P2 is numerically identical with P1 then there can be only one P2 in the post-mortem world, i.e., there can be no competitors for the P2 state, for if, by way of illustration, two or more persons appeared in the resurrection world having my memories and physical properties, then it could scarcely be said that I had survived death. Would it not be more reasonable to say that two or more duplicates of me now existed in the resurrection world?

The duplication objection to post-mortem survival trades on this peculiarity of the uniqueness criterion of identity. The objection holds that the logical possibility of duplicates renders post-mortem survival incoherent. Davis agrees with one of the premises of the duplication objection in so far as he maintains that our concept of a person includes the notion that there is only one instance of each person, and that the existence in the resurrection world of multiple qualitatively identical persons resembling a pre-mortem person P1 would place too great a strain on our concept of a person for us to say that P1 had survived death. He concludes that if God intends that a given person should survive death, then God will not allow replicas of that person in the afterlife. But Davis also defends the plausibility of the uniqueness criterion of personal identity against such philosophers as Derek Parfit and Harold Noonan. His arguments are clear and sophisticated and have relevance beyond the application to the question of post-mortem survival. Anyone concerned with the meaning and coherence of the concepts of the self and personal identity should benefit from Davis's treatment of the issue.

Davis has provided us with a clear and detailed discussion of central issues posed by Christian resurrection claims. Philosophers, theologians, exegetes, preachers and teachers will find much of value here.

John Simons
Montreal Diocesan Theological College


Rational Faith is a fine collection of nine essays representing a variety of responses to current forms of Reformed epistemology as represented by Alvin Plantinga, Nicholas Wolterstorff, and George Mavrodes. Its purpose, states Zagzebski, is "to present critical reflections on Reformed epistemology by Catholic philosophers who appreciate the theories in question but who also have a special interest in, and understanding of, Catholic philosophy." The volume is useful for those well-versed in this area of the philosophy of religion in that it offers the latest on the on-going dialogue between Catholic and Reformed philosophers on the epistemology of religious beliefs. But it is also a useful introduction for those unfamiliar with this philosophical topic. Zagzebski's introduction provides a road map of
sorts as she charts the way through the major issues involved in the debate. Her clear discussion and succinct accounts of each of the authors will greatly facilitate introduction to this area.

The theme common to the essays is the claim that natural theology is not superfluous; it maintains a vital role in the cognitive life of the believer, despite the Reformed epistemologists' claim that it is unnecessary for the epistemic respectability of religion. On the one hand, Reformed epistemology focuses on the properties of the abstract belief itself; it is externalist and non-voluntarist, and its conception of justification is person-relative. Catholic epistemology, on the other hand, places more importance on the properties of the believer, on an internalist criterion which allows for greater activity on the part of the will, and on the role of the community in belief-forming and in defining rationality. One of the contributing factors to these differences in conviction, though by no means the most telling, is the differing ecclesiologies of the respective sides. Because Catholics hold that much of our cognitive capacity has been preserved despite the Fall, their epistemology is more comfortable with allowing religious belief to be a function of the will, hence their emphasis on cognitive voluntarism. In addition, Catholicism possesses a rich tradition of authority which the Reformers do not, and as a consequence, their philosophy is more inclined to focus on the social aspects of human activity, including, says Zagzebski, evaluating religious beliefs. Because the will, for Calvin, was much more damaged, it is untrustworthy for forming beliefs. And it is not a coincidence that they have an individualistic epistemology, as their ecclesiological emphasis is on the individual.

The critiques of Reformed epistemology range from objections that it is wrong, to the more consensual claim that a great deal hangs on the fate of natural theology. Greco, for instance, argues that natural theology is necessary for knowledge regarding one's theistic beliefs, at least in "epistemically hostile conditions." Meynell states that it is required, at least in order to discern between veridical and non-veridical assertions about God. Zeis concurs, saying that natural theology is indispensable for the adjudication of truth of general religious claims. Quinn argues that natural theology is necessary in light of potentially defeating phenomena like the existence of evil and the theory of God as projection.

* Rational Faith * is both a critique and a clarification of Reformed epistemology. The contributors are distinguished from the Reformed epistemologists under study by their respect for natural theology and the efficacy of natural reason. Yet, although they disagree with Plantinga's conclusions to varying degrees, they still concur that he has provided Christian philosophers with a "much-needed sense of pride" with his rigorous and critical work on epistemology in general and religious epistemology in particular. Their essays are no less critical or rigorous, and they further what Zagzebski sees as a *rapprochement* between Catholic and Protestant philosophies, which have been divided by historical as much as by religious contingencies. The volume includes a sizeable bibliography on Reformed epistemology for the many, no doubt, who will be prompted by these essays to explore further this important topic.

Stephen Gaudet

McGill University