

of sacrificial love, and "order" is circumscribed within the bounds of the gathered body of Christians. Huebner and Schroeder avoid the Catholic emphasis on natural law by highlighting the biblical vision of community and grace. Moreover, they insist, in the face of traditional Protestant protests against "works righteousness," that ethics and theology cannot be divorced.

A question that could be asked is whether modernity is as individualistic and wilful as the authors make it out to be. Instead of using Kierkegaard and Nietzsche to illustrate the subjective and nihilistic aspects of society, as Huebner does in the first chapter, one could utilize Freud's insights into the id and superego, and Durkheim's exploration of the collective unconscious, to argue for the existence of a social morality that holds sway in modern life.

A social conscience is evident when Americans hold congressional hearings to investigate personal and business improprieties of their leaders. Canadians display a similar sentiment when tobacco and alcohol consumers are asked to pay a higher tax for products that are harmful to their health. Social mores are even more apparent when one realizes that there are more prisoners per capita in the United States and Canada than anywhere else in the world. The "law and order" legislation against drugs along with the high incidence of violent crimes have forced Canadians and Americans to spend more and more money on penitentiaries and put more and more criminals in jail.

The authors' repeated references to an ecclesiological moral order is thus similar to the concerns of general society. Both church and society have discovered that an increase in freedom (e.g., the right to bear arms) can result in further entanglement in the social web (the court and penitentiary systems). Both groups have realized, too, that a *laissez-faire* attitude to social arrangements (e.g., marriage) raises complicated questions about the legal status of one's partner, longevity of commitment, child support, etc.

Distinctions between church and world, coercion and persuasion, freedom and submission, are thus not as easily made as the authors assume. Both church and society are involved in the socialization process of Christians. The moral order the authors envision can thus be compared favourably to Augustine's *City of God*, in which the divine light transcends the boundaries of the church and illuminates the entire world.

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*Christian Perspectives on Religious Knowledge.* Ed. C. S. Evans and Merold Westphal. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993. ISBN 0-8028-0679-1. Pp. 221.

*Reasoned Faith.* Ed. Eleanore Stump. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993. ISBN 0-8014-9796-5. Pp. 357.

*Word and Spirit: A Kierkegaardian Critique of the Modern Age.* By R. L. Hall. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1993. ISBN 0-253-32752-0. Pp. x+206.

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The past decade has been a very productive period for Christian philosophy and philosophical theology, a fecundity to which these three books contribute. The

first two are anthologies, mostly in the analytic tradition; the third is a monograph in the Continental tradition.

The Evans/Westphal volume is notable for several reasons. First, the contributors include some of the most prominent names in the field: William Alston, Alvin Plantinga, and Nicholas Wolterstorff. Other worthwhile contributions are made by Laura Garcia, William Hasker, Donn Welton, Galen Johnson, and of course the editors. The book is accurately titled, for the articles stay close to issues of philosophy of religion (e.g., epistemology, rationality, personhood), rather than entering into doctrinal issues from a philosophical perspective. Second, this is Eerdmans's first venture into this particular publishing domain and format, which in North America has been primarily the preserve of the presses of Notre Dame and Cornell universities. For its initiative, Eerdmans is to be commended. Third, this volume intentionally attempts to include both Continental and analytic streams of philosophy in a "meeting of the traditions." Unfortunately, this encounter has but limited success, for just two of the articles are written out of the Continental tradition—"Christian Philosophers and the Copernican Revolution," by Westphal, and "Zarathustra's Song: Faith after Nietzsche," by Johnson. Nonetheless, both articles are to be commended, as is the intention to bring together both traditions under one cover.

The second volume, edited by Stump, is likewise noteworthy on several counts. It is Cornell's largest such anthology to date, with 14 contributors. Subtitled "Essays in Philosophical Theology in Honour of Norman Kretzmann," the papers actually provide an eclectic mélange in both philosophical theology and philosophy of religion. Although thematically diverse, the quality of papers is consistently high, as one would expect from both Stump and Cornell. Contributions which this reader found helpful include those by Robert Adams ("Truth and Subjectivity"), Peter van Inwagen ("Genesis and Evolution"), William Alston ("Theological Predication"), Richard Swinburne ("God and Time"), William Mann ("Hope"), and Philip Quinn ("Abelard on Atonement"). A couple of the contributors do not consider themselves Christian; their inclusion may signal a sense of dialogical self-confidence recovered in recent years by Christian philosophy.

Both these books, along with the Zagzebski volume reviewed above, reflect a genuine sense of mutual endeavour among their contributors. This is not for lack of controversial subjects! Rather, this seems to reflect a sense of shared enterprise among Christian philosophers today, allowing them to hear and learn from each other even in the midst of disagreement. Such mutuality in the midst of controversy is surely a significant reason for the current productivity of this field, a virtue which has too often been lacking among Christian thinkers in the past.

The volume by Hall provides a creative use of Kierkegaard as a critic of both modernity and post-modernity. Hall takes his cue from the distinction made in *Either/Or* between two types of self/world relationships: one of Greek origin, characterized by "psyche" (soul), which creates a static self/world relationship; the other of Christian origin, namely "pneuma" (spirit), which creates a dynamic self/world relationship. These amount to two "world-pictures" (*Weltbild*, in Wittgenstein's sense), the former figuring its world-picture on *visual* and *spacial* analogies, models, and metaphors; the latter on auditory ones. Two types of auditory media

exist: speech (pneumatic/existential) and music (pneumatic/aesthetic). Music, however, being aesthetic, lacks certain resources of speech, showing us that the pneumatic/aesthetic world-picture (for which music is used as a metonym) "provides no resources within itself for establishing the dialectical self/world relationship that spirit...demands...eventually spirit itself will be called into question and we will begin to disappear as persons" (14).

Hall contends that Greek society was psychic, whereas modernity is pneumatic. Given this context, the malaise of the modern age "is rooted in the fact that it does not find its center of gravity in the dynamics of the speech-act but in the dynamics of music" (14). This is explored through *Don Giovanni* and *Faust*, where speech is transformed into music. Though appropriated by post-modernists (most incisively by John Caputo), Kierkegaard is only partially supportive of their endeavours, diverging from post-modernists in his understanding of the pneumatic self/world relation. Derrida and post-modernists contend that speech is logocentric, and thus hold "*writing* as the paradigm of the expression of meaning; the post-modernist definition of writing, however, ends by transmuting it into music" (188). Thus, in modernity, spirit falls victim not to psychical or logocentric subversion (as post-modernists claim), but rather to pneumatic subversion, into a version of which post-modernists themselves fall: "The mistake the post-modernist makes is her assumption that presence is always and ultimately static, eternal, atemporal" (190). Hall argues that "what the post-modernist cannot bring herself to acknowledge is the possibility of constancy, stability, or reliability in the midst of the flux. Such constancy does not necessarily entail logocentric presence." There is indeed another, dynamic sense of presence, namely, the pneumatic presence and its "faithful speech...before some other." Though Hall's "music" metonym is problematic, there is much to mine in this original and stimulating work.

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