The notion of a conflict or even warfare between religion and science is something to which John Draper alerted us over a century ago. This idea, however, did not come ready-made with the scientific revolution but evolved along with it. In the intervening time, many authors—both scientists and theologians—have taken the warfare theme for granted as part of the package of the growth of science. But other authors—again of both varieties—assume no inherent conflict between science and religion. One of the authors in the latter camp is Arthur Peacocke, who in his most recent offering aims to enable adherents of traditional Christianity to continue in their faith "with intellectual integrity" in the face of scientific advancements (x). He sees a compatibility between science and religion and considers both to be approaches to reality which fruitfully interact (20).

Peacocke maintains that Christians need not fear scientific findings, for both science and religion constitute avenues to knowledge and seek "intelligibility and meaning" vis-à-vis the world (5). The two disciplines can proceed with cooperation despite asking different questions. Both science and, for Peacocke, Christianity (more so than most other religious traditions) make cognitive claims and affirm the reality of that which they seek to describe (6). Yet Peacocke cautions against a naive attitude toward either (9). He rejects both "very conservative [biblical-theological] positions" (viii) as well as the prestige ascribed to "aristoscientists," whose unwarranted authority is analogous to that of medieval theologians (8).

Peacocke refers to his approach as "critical-realist" (39) and offers the following resolution. In order to develop the application of its criteria of reasonableness in a community in which no authority would be automatic, theology has to be authenticated intersubjectively to the point of consensus by inference to the best explanation (17). With this frame of reference, he argues, the church can overcome its failure to come to grips theologically with recent scientific advancements, a failure which is symptomatic of its diminished relevance in the eyes of the modern world (10).

Peacocke is aware of the limitations of science; it is incapable of completely describing or explaining the nature of persons. Humans are not merely biological; for instance, we experience aspirations, fulfillment and suffering—all categories which the sciences are not competent to address (77). The scope of science is thus not unbounded, for it "can tell us nothing about why we have the experience of [say] subjectivity" (110). He is thereby driven to endorse the plausibility of the anthropic principle in which the universe possesses the necessary mechanisms whereby humans would eventually emerge. Within this overall evolutionary
structure-with-a-purpose, creativity comes about through “the interplay of chance and law” (65), while the exercise of our freedom is contained within “lawlike’ regularities” (75), and operates within our genetic constitution (229).

Peacocke speaks of the world in terms of both being and becoming and applies this scheme also to God. As the world changes so too does God’s relation to it (100). But the change does not end there, for Peacocke integrates evolutionary thought with the idea of God as immanent and passible (5). And if God is not impassible, then God too can experience change in God’s self through God’s interaction with the world, for example, in suffering along with it (126).

In Peacocke’s view, divine transcendence means that God is substantially different from the natural world (104). Hence, in order meaningfully to interact with the world, God must place constraints on God’s self, namely a self-limitation on omnipotence and omniscience (121). This implies that God neither completely knows the future course of events nor exercises power so as fully to determine it (123). There is, however, no corresponding restriction on omnipresence (132).

God, for Peacocke, is not only transcendent but also personal, thus “possessing succession—that is, some kind of temporality” (132). In view of what the sciences teach us, Peacocke is compelled to posit a Creator “as the best explanation of all-that-is” (134). He envisions the notion of a top-down approach in human action—namely, mind to brain to body—as analogous to God’s relation to the world (161). Such a model would circumvent referring to God’s activity as intervention in the sense of interference with, or suspension of, natural laws (163). More specifically, Peacocke accepts the organic as opposed to the monarchical model of the God-world relation, since the former stresses the “intimacy and reciprocity” between God and the world (166). He submits that “[t]he processes revealed by the sciences are in themselves God acting as Creator and God is not to be found as some kind of additional factor added onto the processes of the world” (176).

As for other theological distinctives, Peacocke objects to the classical doctrine of “the Fall” as “the explanation of biological death,” where sin is the cause of death (222). This also necessitates, for him, a reformulation of the doctrine of soteriology, wherein Christ’s role involves redeeming humanity from death (248, 329). He further rejects the Virgin Birth on scientific grounds (275–279) and urges that the view of Resurrection as an event in history be recast (280–287).

Peacocke’s central endeavor is to disclose whether “there can be a Christian theology which is consonant with the best established perspectives on the natural world that the sciences can provide” (213). His standard of measurement for this task, however, is scientific legitimation, in the sense that the proper aim of theology is to take its cues from science (21). He thus accepts the canons of the scientific enterprise without being critical of them, save for the reductionist mentality (245, 383 [n.81]). Nor does he appear to recognize, as do Langdon Gilkey, the late Ian Barbour, and others, that science is a religious activity. He also accepts conventional categories of theology, though with significant alterations. To this extent he is “conservative” in both disciplines, not countenancing the need for a new paradigm in either (67). Currently adopted criteria in both science and religion are sufficient for his purposes and, for the time being at least, he intimates
that they will do nicely. One may be inclined to question, though, whether he is attempting to stretch scientific (245) as well as classical theological categories beyond their limits, to the point where alternate schemes may be called for.

Those who will benefit most from this work are they whose hope rests in a reconciliation of science with a commitment to more traditional modes of theological thought. As for those having convictions which lie elsewhere than a received, albeit modified, tradition, they will not be satisfied with Peacocke's conventional treatment.

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While the heuristic methodology of Bernard J.F. Lonergan (1904–1984) is not readily known by most, the mention of his name, at least in religious studies, no longer elicits the familiar blank expressions that were common only a decade ago. As of 1987, ten international research centers have been founded with the intention of further exploring and disseminating Lonergan's thought. The University of Toronto Press is playing a critical role in this development as it seeks to reissue the entire Lonerganian corpus in a twenty-two volume format: Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan (1988–). The same university press has also seen fit to publish simultaneously another series, conveniently designated "Lonergan Studies," which brings together the best that Lonergan scholarship has to offer in English translation.

The volumes under consideration constitute initial installments of this worthy project. Both titles are, as the little word "and" suggests, comparative in nature. Potential readers should not be anxious about a presumed specialized knowledge that such undertakings usually presuppose. In addition to the fact that Lonergan reads more easily than Kant, Hegel or Heidegger, there is enough repetition here of the famed quaternary (experience-understanding-judgment-decision) to assuage such groundless trepidation—at the expense, of course, of irritating the seasoned reader.

Lonergan and Feminism is the most daring of the two as it attempts to show how the scholarly work of Lonergan—a white male, who belonged to an exclusively male society and spent most of his career in exclusively male institutions; whose work drew its substance from the achievements of Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas—is amenable to current feminist awareness. Editor Cynthia S.W. Crysdale is to be commended for attempting to rectify "the virtual absence of feminism as a topic for discussion...in the application of Lonergan's thought" (5).