that they will do nicely. One may be inclined to question, though, whether he is attempting to stretch scientific (245) as well as classical theological categories beyond their limits, to the point where alternate schemes may be called for.

Those who will benefit most from this work are they whose hope rests in a reconciliation of science with a commitment to more traditional modes of theological thought. As for those having convictions which lie elsewhere than a received, albeit modified, tradition, they will not be satisfied with Peacocke's conventional treatment.

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While the heuristic methodology of Bernard J.F. Lonergan (1904–1984) is not readily known by most, the mention of his name, at least in religious studies, no longer elicits the familiar blank expressions that were common only a decade ago. As of 1987, ten international research centers have been founded with the intention of further exploring and disseminating Lonergan's thought. The University of Toronto Press is playing a critical role in this development as it seeks to reissue the entire Lonerganian corpus in a twenty-two volume format: Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan (1988—). The same university press has also seen fit to publish simultaneously another series, conveniently designated "Lonergan Studies," which brings together the best that Lonergan scholarship has to offer in English translation.

The volumes under consideration constitute initial installments of this worthy project. Both titles are, as the little word "and" suggests, comparative in nature. Potential readers should not be anxious about a presumed specialized knowledge that such undertakings usually presuppose. In addition to the fact that Lonergan reads more easily than Kant, Hegel or Heidegger, there is enough repetition here of the famed quaternary (experience-understanding-judgment-decision) to assuage such groundless trepidation—at the expense, of course, of irritating the seasoned reader.

Lonergan and Feminism is the most daring of the two as it attempts to show how the scholarly work of Lonergan—a white male, who belonged to an exclusively male society and spent most of his career in exclusively male institutions; whose work drew its substance from the achievements of Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas—is amenable to current feminist awareness. Editor Cynthia S.W. Crysdale is to be commended for attempting to rectify "the virtual absence of feminism as a topic for discussion...in the application of Lonergan's thought" (5).
The extent to which this application is convincing, however, will depend largely on the reader's acquiescence to Lonergan's notion of "subject" as essentially gender-neutral.

An initial essay by the "grandfather" of Lonergan studies, Frederick E. Crowe ("The Genus 'Lonergan and...' and Feminism"), provides a somewhat cautionary note on the application of a generalist thinker like Lonergan to a particular topic like feminism. Crowe counsels that what is needed in such endeavors is intelligent (fuller and more determinate understanding) rather than mere logical mediation. He proposes Lonergan's concept of self-mediation as a useful category to achieve this end.

Contributions by Paulette Kidder ("Woman of Reason: Lonergan and Feminist Epistemology"), Michael Vertin ("Gender, Science, and Cognitional Conversion"), and Elizabeth A. Morelli ("Women's Intuition: A Lonerganian Analysis") focus on questions of gender and epistemology. Kidder relies on the work of Lor­raine Code and Sandra Harding as a way of introducing Lonergan's solidarity with feminist reactions against the masculine perspective on objectivism and so-called postmodern relativism. Vertin applauds biophysicist Evelyn Fox Keller in her repudiation of "static objectivity" and proposes Lonergan's portrayal of "cogni­tional conversion" as a means to clarify and generalize Keller's alternative, "dy­namic objectivity." Morelli engages critically the common stereotype of "women's intuition," arguing that this so-called feminine ability to "just know" is simply the end-product of intelligent, though unobjectified, noetic activity.

Cynthia Crysdale's essay ("Women and the Social Construction of Self­ Appropriation") examines Lonergan's notion of self-appropriation in light of women's social and historical situation. Indebted to the "historical analysis" of L. Code and the "empirical research" of M.F. Belenky, B.M. Clinchy, N.R. Gold­berger, and J.M. Tarule, Crysdale promotes Lonergan's understanding of community, belief, and self-appropriation as a complementary and exacting paradigm which accounts for the social location of knowers, while concurrently providing evidence of the social conditions of possibility for women's (self-) knowledge.

Tad Dunne ("Authentic Feminist Doctrine") and Denise L. Carmody ("Lon­ergan's Transcendental Precepts and the Foundations of Christian Feminist Eth­ics") find their point of entry through Lonergan's analysis of "authenticity." Aware that feminism is not a univocal philosophy, Dunne addresses the pressing question, "Which feminist doctrines are authentic?" He argues lucidly that Lon­ergan's transcendental heuristic and its relation to power, authority, conversion, and historical change provide concrete guidelines for determining such difficult questions. Carmody's piece takes a similar approach but tends to be too sermon­izing.

The ecofeminist critique of patriarchal hierarchies and, as a result, men's time­honored conceptions of nature is tackled by Michael Shute ("Emergent Probabil­ity and the Ecofeminist Critique of Hierarchy"). He argues that while Lonergan's notion of world process is hierarchical, having retrieved a normative core of classical notions of nature, it does not surrender to the distortions of patriarchal hier­archy—a difficult position to argue indeed. Nevertheless, Shute is convinced that Lonergan's account of emergent probability provides an explanatory key for
establishing an undistorted yet hierarchical notion of world order that pertains to both the processes of nature and the dynamics of human history.

The two specifically theological essays of this volume are by Mary Frohlich ("From Mystification to Mystery: Lonergan and the Theological Significance of Sexuality") and Charles C. Heffling, Jr. ("On the Possible Relevance of Lonergan's Thought to Some Feminist Questions in Christology"). Frohlich takes issue with Mark Frisby who recruits Lonergan to renovate "the old idea that the male/female difference is constituted by God to represent the grace/nature distinction" (176)—an idea often invoked to justify the restriction of the ordained ministry to men. Enraged, Frohlich contends that not only is this a gross misunderstanding of Lonergan, but it is also a dangerous short-circuiting (scotosis/mystification) of the tension toward transcendence that is engendered by the basic anxiety humans experience in the face of non-being.

Heffling, drawing chiefly on the work of Daphne Hampson, is preoccupied with the question, so amiably put in the subtitle of a well-known essay by Rosemary Radford Ruether, "Can a Male Savior Save Women?" Lonergan's response to this problematic (i.e., Christ's maleness and the meaning of his crucifixion) centers on the way in which consciousness is conceived. The argument is that when appropriate distinctions have been drawn between different ways in which Christ “assumed our humanity,” his being male need not be thought of as intrinsically conditioning his redemptive work. Heffling cautiously concludes that the question whether Lonergan's Christology as a whole is compatible with feminism ultimately turns on the value of "power" and the implications of religious conversion.

Unlike the Crysdale volume, Giovanni Sala's comparative venture is by far more specific in scope and, because of Kant, the more demanding of the two. Most of the essays that comprise this splendid effort appeared originally in German (1981, 1982, 1984, 1986), except chapter one (1976), which initiated the English-reading public into some of the important discoveries of Sala's seminal work on the a priori (cf. Das A Priori in der menschlichen Erkenntnis. Eine Studie über Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft und Lonergans Insicht, 1971). While the book's relevance to religious studies is not altogether apparent, the influence alone of Kant and Lonergan in theology justifies a brief outline of its philosophical burden.

A paramount service this collection renders is its careful analysis of terminological similarities and conceptual differences. Lonergan, like Kant, speaks of "experience" (Erfahrung/Empfindung), "understanding" (Verstand), "reason"/"judgment" (Vernunft), "subject" (Subjekt), "object" (Gegenstand), "activity" (Tätigkeit), "content" (Inhalt), "the unconditioned" (das Unbedingte), and so forth. However, the key terms which place these two philosophers at odds and, as a consequence, which qualify the reciprocal meaning of the foregoing terms, are "reflective insight" (Lonergan) and "intuition"/Anschauung (Kant). For Kant, to know is to intuit (phenomena), while noumena (Dinge-an-sich) are intuitively impenetrable, hence, unknowable. Although he notes ambiguities, Sala, along with other Kant scholars, complains of a blurring in the Critique of "concept" and "judgment," which come to mean essentially the same thing. Furthermore, Verstand-Vernunft is not reality-constituting; it merely arranges, organizes, elaborates what the senses
already know: "What and how much of reality is known is already from the very beginning given by intuition. For it alone can see reality [phenomena], and therefore know. This is the logical consequence of the principle of intuition, according to which only an act like intuition (looking) can reach the object. In order to know something (not merely to work on it afterwards, or conceptualize it, or unify and order it, but in order first of all to know it!), one must see it" (49-50). Thus, thought stands in the service of sensible intuition, determining the meaning and range of reality (79).

For Lonergan, the opposite is true. Reality, as humans know it, is in the judgment (ens iudicio rationali cognoscitur). On this account, so-called sensible and intellectual intuition serve the intending operations of understanding and judgment, which Lonergan clearly demarcates: the former is an act of consciousness propelled by questions for intelligence (Quid sit?) which culminate in conceptual objectifications; the latter, too, is an act but one guided by qualitatively distinct questions, questions for reflection (An sit?) which intend a noetic grasp of the conditions that ground affirmative or negative judgments. This allows Lonergan to collapse Kant’s antithetic distinction of a reality proper (noumenon), about which nothing can be known, and appearances (phenomena), toward which Verstand-Vernunft tend: “It is just as much a matter of judgment to know that an object is not real but apparent, as it is to know that an object is not apparent but real” (75; cf. 71). Sala feels justified, then, in characterizing Kant’s intellectual move as a return to sensibility, which alone mediates the object as phenomenally real, and Lonergan’s as a forward movement of intentionality to the judgment of fact, which satisfies the question of the object as noumenally, "really" real (cf. 132).

Lonergan and Kant is a masterly piece of work that is required reading for scholars working in the areas of epistemology and philosophy of religion. Its claim that Lonergan is “the philosopher of human subjectivity” should elicit the critical attention such claims usually summon (xii). Sala handles himself well in terms of his capabilities as a Kant scholar. One only hopes that future contributions to this series can maintain similar levels of scholarship, but perhaps in a less comparative way. What is also needed, to borrow Bernard McGinn’s recent description, is the ability “to think along with” Lonergan, which takes one beyond exegesis and preferential comparisons.

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