

emptiness in Mahayana; and Buddha-nature in Vajrayana. She concludes that all three key concepts support the idea that gender is, like other human characteristics, a non-enduring and non-essential aspect of the human being, and therefore they do not support gender inequity or gender hierarchy (chaps. 11–13).

Finally, in the fourth part, Gross draws conclusions from her research and sketches her agenda for a feminist reconstruction of Buddhism. Her verdict is that Buddhism maintains an “intolerable contradiction between view and practice” in that the core Buddhist teachings are gender neutral, but that unequal gender practices have nonetheless held sway in Buddhist institutions (209). This leads her to the view that Buddhism is undoubtedly patriarchal, but not hopelessly so. What it has lacked thus far is someone to claim the “prophetic voice” which would require Buddhism to critique, challenge, and change society (134, 216). Giving herself permission to use that voice, Gross concludes by suggesting ways in which the rules of Buddhist lay and monastic practice might be rewritten to eliminate gender inequality (chap. 14), and by proposing an agenda for reconceptualizing Buddhism in “androgynous” terms (chap. 16).

Gross’s book provides a useful compendium of information on women in the history of Buddhism, and is a fascinating and thorough study of the attempt to engage Buddhist doctrine with western feminist ideology. However, the book’s potential utility for students and scholars is marred by its lack of referencing and lack of grounding in primary sources. Given the relative scarcity of secondary source material on women in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism, it would seem difficult to justify such an oversight.

More disturbing than these methodological inadequacies, however, is the Western bias that seems inherent to the book. This bias is evident most clearly in Gross’s invocation of the prophetic voice to bring Buddhism to a post-patriarchal state. Surely the kind of patriarchy associated with Buddhism cannot be discussed apart from the specific socio-historical milieu within which each form of Buddhism is located. If so, the particular form of patriarchy and the problems it creates for women will be unique to each socio-historical situation, and will therefore require unique solutions. On this view Gross’s adoption of the prophetic voice and her assumption that western feminism should be the savior for all Buddhists, is, to say the least, problematic; among other things, it seems to trade male dominance for western.

Barbra Clayton

McGill University

***The Electronic Eye: the Rise of Surveillance Society.* By David Lyon. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994. ISBN 0-8166-2515-8. Pp. x+270.**

In this book David Lyon aims to illustrate and clarify some of the main issues of the surveillance debate, and to offer an alternative, normative stance on surveillance from a Christian perspective. Lyon describes the “surveillance society” as one in which “[p]recise details of our personal lives are collected, stored, retrieved

and processed every day within huge computer databases belonging to big corporations and government departments" (3). The context for Lyon's discussion is primarily sociological, under the rubric of modernity and postmodernity. However, the subject matter demands an interdisciplinary treatment; thus Lyon addresses technological, political, ethical, and metaphysical aspects of the debate. This book will be of interest to anyone concerned with the inadequacy of present ethical and political responses to rapid technological change.

The work is organized in three parts: "Situating Surveillance," which examines surveillance from its origins to the present-day context; "Surveillance Trends," which discusses contemporary examples of surveillance; and "Counter-Surveillance," which examines various responses to surveillance, offering a positive normative stance.

In part one, "Situating Surveillance," Lyon presents a historical synopsis of surveillance and its significance in everyday life. Different surveillance technologies are examined in a context of interdependence between society and technology. Primary sources for the discourse on surveillance are presented, namely George Orwell's dystopia, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (1954) and Jeremy Bentham's *Panopticon* prison (1791) via the writings of Michel Foucault. Conceptions of privacy and personhood are also introduced.

Part two, "Surveillance Trends," serves to familiarize the reader with contemporary examples of surveillance. Three general spheres of surveillance are discussed. Firstly, Lyon assesses surveillance and the state, which include positive aspects of social participation such as voting, health care, and welfare, as well as the more ominous examples of policing, tax investigation, and state security. Secondly, surveillance in the workplace is examined, as is the relationship between surveillance and Taylorist and Fordist theories. Finally, Lyon considers consumer surveillance, including geodemographic marketing, data entrepreneurship, and commercial surveillance.

In the third part of the book, "Counter-Surveillance," Lyon moves from the exegetical to the critical, the previous parts serving as a comprehensive introduction to the problem of surveillance *per se*. Lyon begins by asking about the types of responses, both political and social, that have arisen in reaction to surveillance. These responses consist mainly in rudimentary privacy and data-protection legislation, as well as the fledgling efforts of groups such as the Electronic Freedom Foundation and Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility. Lyon finds these responses lacking, and thus engages in a more detailed analysis of the context of the present debate.

Lyon first returns to the conception of privacy, which has played a central role in the reaction to increased surveillance. He concludes that privacy, as a concept, is fundamentally flawed for two reasons: (1) privacy has emerged from a context of patriarchy and privilege; and (2) privacy's predominant role in the surveillance debate is, in a liberalist context, only one value or commodity among many.

Lyon then reexamines the dystopic outlook which is representative of *Nineteen Eighty-Four* and the *Panopticon*. They are both dystopian, that is, pessimistic visions of the future which are to be avoided. Since dystopic models are primarily

negative in nature, Lyon argues, they fail to elucidate the positive as well as the more ambiguous aspects of surveillance.

As an alternative to dystopian approaches, Lyon looks to Jürgen Habermas's "undistorted communication" and to Augustine's "other city" as being more constructive in the evaluation of surveillance. As well, Lyon proposes three criteria of a positive nature to assess surveillance: *participation*, *personhood*, and *purposes*. By participation Lyon intends to emphasize the early relationship between surveillance and increased social rights and benefits, such as voting and health care. Personhood refers to the relationship between persons and the computer records that mediate their consumer and social opportunity. Purpose is posed as a reminder that we, as a society, should be vigilant with regard to the intent and function of surveillance technologies. Lyon understands these criteria to be a necessary balance to a conceptual field dominated by dystopia.

As an introduction for the scholar wishing to enter the surveillance debate, *The Electronic Eye* is exemplary. The history and fundamental issues that inform the debate are presented in a clear and forthright manner. Lyon's proposed alternatives of participation, personhood, and purposes should clear space in a discourse that has become increasingly confrontational.

Chris Johnson

Concordia University