ards and Joseph Raz. In each case, his analysis reveals that these thinkers have either substituted an alternative moral value to that offered by the central tradition (e.g., Devlin, Dworkin and Richards), have conflated distinct but contemporaneous issues (e.g., Waldron), or have failed to present arguments which specifically preclude moral legislation as distinct from other forms of legislation (e.g., Raz).

Finally, George presents a brief overview of his "Pluralistic Perfectionist Theory of Civil Liberties." Here he outlines his view of the moral basis for central civil liberties such as freedom of speech, freedom of press, privacy and freedom of religion.

The author's review of the liberal position is generally well-reasoned and cogently presented. While one might quibble with his inclusion of Richards as a thinker deserving of serious attention, the others he has chosen are generally important representatives of this tradition. In that he has limited his attention to the liberal tradition, one cannot seriously fault him for a failure to consider alternative positions in this debate or the critiques coming from those perspectives (although their total absence is a clear limitation on this work). If not necessarily innovative in all respects, it is nonetheless a rigorous presentation of the arguments.

George's presentation of his own theory is much more problematic. While he asserts that it is "no more than a sketch" and that it will be necessary to defend it in detail in "future works" (189), the problem is deeper than the mere brevity of the chapter. Unfortunately, this chapter loses the rigor and precision which marks the preceding portions of the book. Instead of a focused, tightly argued presentation, the author sets out a sampling of civil liberties with his rationale as to why these are "moral goods." He does not, for example, identify how one determines what is a moral good and/or how one balances competing goods. Moreover, here, more than anyplace else, his work would be enhanced by considering the work of thinkers such as Seyla Benhabib, Jürgen Habermas or Iris Marion Young (to name just a few). One can only hope that George's future work will remedy these problems.

David Sinacore-Guinn
McGill University


Kent Greenawalt's new book is a welcome addition to the debate regarding church-state relations. While this topic is, perhaps, most hotly debated in the United States—the actual, self-identified context of this work—Greenawalt's approach raises important questions for any liberal democracy by focusing upon the issue of the use of religion in the making of public, political decisions within the liberal democratic tradition.

He begins by highlighting the complex interrelationship between this issue
and numerous other related political issues which, in his eyes, must be brought together. Perhaps Greenawalt’s most valuable contribution occurs here in his initial, well-reasoned contextualization of religion as being only one of a number of possible “comprehensive views,” and the argument that any restriction on the use of religious grounds of reasoning should logically be applicable to any other comprehensive view (5). This move allows him to focus his arguments not simply on religion, but on whether or not a political judgement should be appropriately restricted so as to rest upon publicly accessible grounds.

Greenawalt initially develops these ideas through a consideration of the work of a number of thinkers arguing either for or against restrictions upon religious (comprehensive view) justifications for public judgements. Reviewing the work of Robert Audi, Stephen Carter, Franklin Gamwell, Thomas Nagel, Michael Perry, John Rawls, Joseph Raz, and David Smolin (an eclectic group to say the least) he argues that the restrictions or rejection of restrictions suggested by these thinkers are either impractical (i.e., in terms of their conformity with the actual practices of individuals in making their judgements) or inappropriate (i.e., they unfairly restrict the legitimate freedom of the individual).

The author develops his own approach through a discussion of how decisions are (1) made and (2) publicly justified by (a) judges and administrators, (b) legislators and citizens, and (c) religious institutions. While admitting that comprehensive views will inevitably be involved in this process, he argues that judges and administrators (who are charged with implementing or interpreting the law) should make the least use of comprehensive views in making their judgements and, even when relying upon comprehensive views, should limit the justifications given for their decisions to publicly accessible reasons. While voters, and to a lesser extent legislators, as the parties holding the power to make law, have some right to use such power to express and carry forward their comprehensive views, practicality requires that they limit the exercise of this right. In particular, Greenawalt notes that public discourse is frequently inhibited rather than advanced when people invoke a comprehensive view in support of a position. As a practical matter, one is more likely to win an argument using public reasons as opposed to private, inaccessible ones. Moreover, advancing comprehensive views can be divisive in a pluralistic society such as the United States. Nonetheless, Greenawalt acknowledges that citizens have a right to state their comprehensive views in making and justifying their judgements in certain circumstances.

Finally, in considering the role of organized religion, he uses a practical argument to suggest that while it is obviously appropriate for a religious group to put forth religious reasons, organized religious groups should not argue for or support specific politicians or policies. Citing Booth Fowler’s findings that “[t]he average church attender does not want social activism from his or her church or clergy” (173), he argues that political activism is not only opposed by members of religious groups but it also creates a divisive atmosphere where individuals outside a group may perceive an inappropriate attempt to usurp political power for sectarian gain. He argues that, save in exceptional circumstances, “churches should limit themselves to moral pronouncements, leaving members to draw their own political conclusions” (174).
Greenawalt’s approach is, in general, rather pragmatic. He does not seek to draw fine philosophical lines, but is looking for what works within an existing liberal democratic framework. The primary problem with his approach is this starting point. In asserting that the use of comprehensive views must be made to conform to liberal democratic ideals and practices he is imposing a comprehensive view upon all the members of that society. Such a requirement can be justified only under two conditions: first, that all members of that society do in fact hold that specific comprehensive view; second, and more problematically, that there are no inherent conflicts between this liberal democratic comprehensive view (à la Charles Laramore’s position that liberal democracy is a political and not a moral system) and other comprehensive views within that society—or, alternately, that liberal democratic values necessarily have priority. It is not clear that either condition exists.

On a pragmatic level, in arguing that public officials should rely primarily or exclusively upon public reasons, he is also imposing on them a duty to conform to this liberal democratic comprehensive view without identifying the contents of that view (i.e., whose definition of liberal democracy is to be applied). When ethics are not tied to an individual (such as an individual legislator), but rather to an amorphous group, one risks introducing either ethical relativism or ethical indeterminism.

A final point of note is that, despite the obvious influences of feminist thinkers on Greenawalt’s use of language and a number of the ideas he puts forth, it is curious that he neither engages specific feminist thinkers in dialogue on this subject nor significantly cites their work. Since there are a number of feminist thinkers who could have made valuable contributions to this work, this failure is troubling.

Despite these problems, Greenawalt’s work is generally well written and argued. It is a useful contribution to the debate, deserving of attention.

David Sinacore-Guinn
McGill University


On January 13, 1996, Israeli President Ezer Weizman declared to members of the German Bundestag and Bundesrat that, in the name of those Jews who were murdered in German concentration camps, he could never forgive Germany for the Holocaust. Just days before Weizman’s declaration, German President Roman Herzog announced that the German government would recognize January 27, the date Auschwitz was liberated by the Soviet Red Army fifty-one years earlier, as the official day of remembrance for victims of National Socialism. In view of Weizman’s confessed inability to forgive Germany, despite its newly-instituted day of remembrance, there arises out of this conflict and contradiction a critical ethical question: Is forgiveness possible between historical, political enemies?