Greenawalt's approach is, in general, rather pragmatic. He does not seek to draw fine philosophical lines, but is looking for what works within an existing liberal democratic framework. The primary problem with his approach is this starting point. In asserting that the use of comprehensive views must be made to conform to liberal democratic ideals and practices he is imposing a comprehensive view upon all the members of that society. Such a requirement can be justified only under two conditions: first, that all members of that society do in fact hold that specific comprehensive view; second, and more problematically, that there are no inherent conflicts between this liberal democratic comprehensive view (à la Charles Laramore's position that liberal democracy is a political and not a moral system) and other comprehensive views within that society—or, alternately, that liberal democratic values necessarily have priority. It is not clear that either condition exists.

On a pragmatic level, in arguing that public officials should rely primarily or exclusively upon public reasons, he is also imposing on them a duty to conform to this liberal democratic comprehensive view without identifying the contents of that view (i.e., whose definition of liberal democracy is to be applied). When ethics are not tied to an individual (such as an individual legislator), but rather to an amorphous group, one risks introducing either ethical relativism or ethical indeterminism.

A final point of note is that, despite the obvious influences of feminist thinkers on Greenawalt's use of language and a number of the ideas he puts forth, it is curious that he neither engages specific feminist thinkers in dialogue on this subject nor significantly cites their work. Since there are a number of feminist thinkers who could have made valuable contributions to this work, this failure is troubling.

Despite these problems, Greenawalt's work is generally well written and argued. It is a useful contribution to the debate, deserving of attention.

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On January 13, 1996, Israeli President Ezer Weizman declared to members of the German Bundestag and Bundesrat that, in the name of those Jews who were murdered in German concentration camps, he could never forgive Germany for the Holocaust. Just days before Weizman's declaration, German President Roman Herzog announced that the German government would recognize January 27, the date Auschwitz was liberated by the Soviet Red Army fifty-one years earlier, as the official day of remembrance for victims of National Socialism. In view of Weizman's confessed inability to forgive Germany, despite its newly-instituted day of remembrance, there arises out of this conflict and contradiction a critical ethical question: Is forgiveness possible between historical, political enemies?
Shriver’s book tackles this complex matter, attempting to provide an historical outline of conflict between enemies, the memories they recollect, and the arduous process toward reconciliation and forgiveness. For practical purposes, Shriver limits his study to the U.S. and enemies of the U.S. (both external, focusing on Germany and Japan, and internal, primarily concerning racism against African Americans), from the end of World War II to the present.

In chapter one, “Revenge, the End of Politics, and Justice, the Beginning,” Shriver sets out to forge an historical foundation for the position that forgiveness is, indeed, possible between enemies. He begins by locating three myths that positively portray forgiveness: in the works of Aeschylus, Thucydides, and the Hebrew Bible. The former two demonstrate, according to Shriver, that vengefulness is unreasonable and poorly serves the state power both inside and outside a state’s borders, perhaps even leading to a Hobbesian “war of all against all.” The writings of Aeschylus and Thucydides emphasize a willingness to subjugate memories of past injury to hope for future blessings (22). In the case of the Hebrew Bible, where there is little attention to the theme of forgiveness, Shriver focuses on the well-known stories of “Cain, Joseph, and their Kin.” He argues that the message of forgiveness in these stories lies in the conclusion that cities and nations exist because they managed to name the evils of their past and their agents, as well as maintain a sense of community among the evildoers (28).

Following the work of Hannah Arendt, Shriver suggests in Chapter Two (“Forgiveness in Politics in Christian Tradition”) that in the Christian tradition, principally founded on the ethical teachings of Jesus in the New Testament, there is a fundamental shift from the Hebrew Bible emphasis of “promise”—a language of contracts and obligations—to “forgiveness.” In the teachings of Jesus, there appears to be a “realization” that the moral capacity to honor contracts tends to be fragile. Consequently, because interpersonal relationships, that is, social relationships within a community, often break down, forgiveness must (first) be learned within a community, and only then can one request: “Father forgive them, for they know not what they do” (Luke 23:34). This, Shriver contends, is basic to Jesus’ ethical teachings (35). In this same chapter, Shriver very briefly sketches the history of forgiveness in the Christian tradition, from Augustine to Kant, showing how the horizon of forgiveness expanded from the Christian community to the secular. His outline is remarkably informative (especially if one thumbs to the end notes), though only up to the German *Aufklärung*. 

In the short third chapter (only ten pages), “Political Ethics as Moral Memory,” Shriver addresses the delicate issue of constructing an ethic of forgiveness in a postmodern, pluralistic world, where norms exist only as socially constructed values within particular communities. This theoretical discussion is crucial to his argument (in fact, one wonders why the author did not develop it further), for if there can be no common, cross-cultural ethical standard, then an ethic of forgiveness, which includes forgiveness across cultural divides, is irrelevant. Shriver proposes that there is, in fact, a minimal ethical norm: the affirmation of life (64–8). Though a review is not the proper forum in which to construct a counter-argument, this ethical norm may certainly be challenged on the basis that it simply reflects the Western-Enlightenment conviction that life is somehow “sacred”
a position foreign to some cultures. In this discussion, Shriver also attempts to formulate a method for an ethic of forgiveness. In terms of locating Shriver's method in relation to others, it contains elements of both an ethic of responsibility (which the author seems to have inherited from Dietrich Bonhoeffer), and a discourse ethics (as currently proposed by Seyla Benhabib and Jürgen Habermas). Shriver is clearly conscious of his indebtedness to Bonhoeffer, but he does not seem to be aware that he has much in common with Benhabib, especially in regard to the proposal that dialogue requires "reciprocity" (141), or, as Benhabib might call it, "the principle of egalitarian reciprocity."

The next three chapters, "Vengeance and Forbearance: Germans and Americans," "Enmity and Empathy: Japan and the United States," and "Justice and Forgiveness: The Long Road to Equal Citizenship for African Americans," address the historical relationships between the United States and Germany, Japan, and African Americans. In general, Shriver's modus operandi is to begin with a historical analysis of the conflict (including war crimes, civilian deaths, and racism), then to highlight various attempts at "reconciliation" (often misconceived as "forgiveness" of war reparations, open economic markets, and political rhetoric), and to conclude with an evaluation of current trends within each society that hold promise for a lasting forgiveness. A paradigm emerges in these three chapters: Enemies must listen to their "former" adversaries' stories of violence and terror, they must take responsibility for their own actions, and then in dialogue they will have to work toward reconciliation and forgiveness in mutual respect.

Shriver concludes his study by asking: "Whither Forgiveness in American Politics?" He uses this question to speculate what forgiveness might look like in the current geopolitical context, pointing out potential barriers and warning that forgiveness will involve rehashing painful memories. For Shriver, institutions such as governments, schools and families, along with journalists, have a responsibility to educate society about forgiveness. But churches, synagogues, and mosques, even though they have traditionally focused on their differences instead of their similarities, contain the most potential to affect change, for their disciples often represent a wide variety of cultures, from many continents and different socio-economic classes. Moreover, such diversity is possible within just one urban congregation (232).

Like all books, this one is written for a specific audience; in this case, Shriver seems to have written to Baby Boomers and their parents. Baby Boomers are old enough to remember their fathers going off to war to fight the Germans and the Japanese. They are old enough to remember the legalized racism, the separate water fountains, swimming pools, and schools. Their parents were the civic leaders and school board members in charge of carrying out the "separate but equal" doctrine. But what does Shriver have to say to the sons and daughters of Baby Boomers—the so-called Generation X—who were not born until after World War II was long over, schools and public institutions were "officially" racially integrated, Martin Luther King, Jr. and Malcolm X were already historical figures, and Vietnam was at an end? What does the "rhetoric of forgiveness" have to offer a generation whose greatest enemy, the (former) U.S.S.R., is now a friend; whose most recent enemy, Saddam Hussein (not necessarily Iraqis), was crushed in
video-game-like fashion in a matter of days; and whose sports heroes and musical stars are predominantly black? In fact, Shriver's argument has much to say to Generation Xers, though Shriver himself does not make this explicit. Given his thesis that one learns forgiveness in a community, it might be equally argued that one also learns the negation of forgiveness (vengeance, hatred) within a community. Thus, a community has a corporate identity, one which carries both positive and negative attributes. If Generation Xers will read Shriver's work with both a sense of corporate violence and shame (original sin), then this book will affect the way they deal with political enemies in the near future.

By (re-)introducing forgiveness into political discourse, Shriver has hopefully initiated a movement which ventures to reconcile political enemies, whether the enemies be Jewish-German, Korean-Japanese, Slavic-Croatian, Hutu-Tutsi, Chechen-Russian, U.S.-Iraqi, and so on. A book which breaks open old, festering wounds in an attempt to achieve long-term wholeness is, to be sure, daring. However daring it might be, Shriver, recalling Hobbes's "war of all against all," would argue that it is necessary; for without forgiveness in politics, human existence may be in peril—and he just may be right.

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Gregory Baum's latest book is a collection of eleven essays, ten of which have been published in various journals and books (from 1989 to 1992) and one new article that responds to the critical theorist Ray Morrow. The first section focuses on the shortcomings of deconstruction and postmodernism while the second looks at the possibilities of change within the Catholic Church. One could summarize the book by saying that Baum saves a universal ratio from the clutches of relativism and overtones of nihilism implicit in postmodern theories (22–6), while defending a highly modified view of natural law that identifies him as a radical reformer within the church and places him at odds with much of Catholic orthodoxy (184–6).

Baum accomplishes these two goals through diverging means. He argues against what he considers to be the monolithic interpretation of capitalism put forth by theorists of the postmodern. He submits that Jean-François Lyotard and Jean Baudrillard are in fact former Marxists who, having rejected modernity because of the failure of socialism, have not lost their appetite for grand theories (80–91). Against Lyotard's claim of a dominant capitalism, Baum speaks about different types of capitalism, each of which has to be analyzed on its own terms (88). The same holds true for Daniel Bell's anti-utopian theory of post-industrialization. Although the information highway has replaced a previous focus on industrial production, this does not result in a classless society that is only interested in technical solutions to economic problems. The marginalization of cul-