sion of a secondary issue of vocabulary (125). While this is not uninteresting, it is irrelevant to the argument and strikes the careful reader as a red herring.

Despite its failure to make a sufficiently strong case for the redating of the Magdalen papyrus, the volume is provocative in the important questions of historical method that it raises: what place and authority should papyrology be given in the study of gospel origins? Are the results of this science precise enough to take precedence over literary and historical-critical observations? How should these results be used? It is simply unfortunate that the answers given tend to exaggerate the precision of papyrology's results and disdain other modes of historical inquiry.

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Curators of the Buddha represents the first in what is likely to be a long line of scholarly efforts in the genre of "postcolonial" Buddhist studies. The overall aim of the volume is to contribute to a cultural analysis of the history of the study of Buddhism. Following the kind of Orientalist critique modeled by Edward Said, each of the essays that comprise the book traces the genealogy of one of the idées reçues within Buddhist studies. This is achieved primarily by delineating the social and historical context of the scholarly figures associated with them.

In an introductory chapter Donald Lopez outlines Orientalist themes in the history of Buddhist studies. While he rightly acknowledges that there are limitations in applying Said's critique to Buddhist studies—most importantly in that the direct political role of the study of Islam in colonialism is not apparent in the study of Buddhism—he highlights several other features of Orientalism that can be said to characterize Buddhist studies. Most notable are: the enduring tendency of Buddhologists to privilege ancient texts in classical languages over vernacular, oral traditions; the tendency to overlook the context within which texts were produced and a marked neglect of non-religious aspects of Asian history and culture. He argues that these features have led to the creation of a reified object called "classical" or "original Buddhism" that has served for the Orientalist as a kind of transhistorical repository of ancient wisdom, and a standard by which to judge, usually unfavorably, the practices and beliefs of contemporary Buddhists in Asia. The general thesis of the book is that Buddhist studies has largely functioned as a kind of Romantic Orientalism. In the remaining chapters the details and nuances of the theme of Buddhist studies as Romantic Orientalism are elaborated.

Charles Hallisey's "Roads Taken and Not Taken," for example, explores the history of privileging ancient, classical sources over modern, vernacular texts through the work of T.W. Rhys Davids and some of his lesser-known colleagues.
He shows evidence for the influence of modern Asian interpreters and texts on these scholars, and suggests that this is an indication that we need to rethink the assumption that the construction of the “East” is entirely embedded in the “West.” He also suggests that attention to how texts are produced and perpetuated rather than to questions of original meaning points the way toward a postorientalist study of Buddhism. In “Jung and the Indian East,” Luis Gomez discusses Jung’s role in creating the notion of the “Asian mind,” and identifies Jung’s ambivalence towards the Orient as perhaps endemic to any encounter between self and other. In “The Zen of Japanese Nationalism,” Robert Sharf traces the origins of the notion that “Zen is pure experience” by teasing out the intellectual and nationalistic forces at work on figures who were important in the spread of Zen in the West, such as D.T. Suzuki and Nishida Kitaro. Gustavo Benevides, in “Guiseppe Tucci, or Buddhology in the Age of Fascism,” elaborates on the political role of Zen by showing how this notion of Zen as timeless, and as equated with a warrior creed (*bushido*), appealed to Guiseppe Tucci because of its affinity with fascism and the rejection of modernism. Stanley Abe’s “Inside the Wonder House” traces the history of the idea that the image of the Buddha is Western in origin, and in his own chapter, “Foreigner at the Lama’s Feet,” Lopez discusses the changing perceptions of Tibetan Buddhism—sometimes as pristine or original Buddhism, sometimes as degenerate—and the ambivalent nature of the relationship between the scholar and the lama.

*Curators of the Buddha* has much to recommend it. The historiographical essays assembled are for the most part interesting, well written, and well documented. Given that Said’s *Orientalism* was published in 1978, Donald Lopez should be applauded for his brave attempt to force an evidently sluggish and reluctant community of scholars to reflect on the implications of a postcolonial critique for the study of Buddhism. My only dispute with *Curators* is that there is not more discussion of what Gomez identifies (229-30), I think rightly, to be the key question raised by such a critique: does the kind of historicizing and cultural analysis offered in these essays help us understand the “logics of representation” (11) so as to allow us to see the self and other more clearly, or are we doomed to replace Orientalism with yet another form of projection?

In offering suggestions for what a postorientalist study of Buddhism might look like, Hallisey would give an optimistic response to this question. Lopez, on the other hand, is evidently less sanguine and is careful to clarify that his aim is not to somehow correct our vision of Buddhism but simply to illuminate the process by which the vision is created. As he indicates, “the question is not one of how knowledge is tainted but of how knowledge takes form” (11). While Lopez’s prudence in this matter is entirely understandable given the far-reaching, almost paralyzing implications of a critique like Said’s, I think it fair to ask: what is the purpose of understanding how knowledge is constructed if not to somehow improve that knowledge? If Said is correct that one of the primary functions of Orientalists is to provide their society with what it needs most at the time (29, n. 51), then Orientalism can be understood as a kind of projection on a societal level. If so, then I take it that the value in the kind of cultural analysis provided by the authors in *Curators* is to reveal the nature and origins of this projection, not
only so we might understand ourselves and our own culture better, but presumably so we might be more aware of where and why we are projecting so as to see the "other" more clearly. If this is not the purpose, then the value of the kind of academic exercise represented by Curators is less clear to me. Thus if my prediction proves correct, that this volume marks the inception of a long line of postcolonial critiques of Buddhist studies, I would hope that these future studies address the question raised by Lopez's work and reflect carefully on the purpose behind such endeavors.

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From a press that has refused to consider religious and theological issues coming out of the New Left and British analytic Marxism it is refreshing to see something that glides in more closely to the traditional (but now eroded) territories of religion and, especially, theology. Not that there is anything particularly traditional about the way evil is dealt with in Radical Evil. This is the second volume in series "S" from Verso, edited by Joan Copjec, who has been busy, along with Slavoj Zizek, pursuing the legacy of Jacques Lacan's psychoanalysis into society, politics, and economics.

The essays range from deliberations on eighteenth-century philosophers to the central role that the Jewish Holocaust has had in twentieth-century politics and philosophy. Indeed, apart from Renata Salecl's essay on hate speech and human rights, the contributions may be organized along this divide: papers on Schelling (Zizek), Kant (Rogozinski), Machiavelli (Sfez), and Kant via Lacan on Sade (Zupancic), appear interspersed with papers on fascism (Maccannell), Auschwitz (Hewitt), and the memory of Germany's Nazi past (Geyer).

The volume begins with Kant's proposal of the idea of radical evil in his Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone (1793). In her introduction Copjec argues that Kant tried to move past the standard view and his own earlier one that evil is a negative phenomenon. In making evil a positive element Kant posited human will as all pervasive, but then this reveals the problem that humans choose good for evil reasons. Interestingly, although Copjec blocks a long history of theological reflection on evil, she accepts a basic theological category that is itself increasingly troubled: human nature. Time and again the argument for a sinful human nature is used within the Church, and in conservative politics, for political quietism. Any progressive politics is thereby excluded.

Zizek's essay twists its dialectical way—characteristically—through the work of Schelling, in which he discovers, via Lacan, a number of contradictions. First, the point from which meaning and purpose is attributed to the natural world—humanity—is the same point from which emerges senseless destruction and the useless expenditure of forces. Second, evil arises not from human limitation but