

claimed to follow Kant's ethics. For Maccannell, Eichmann's position is a distortion of Kant, yet others in this same volume would argue that this is part of the internal logic of Kant's own position.

In the most remarkable essay of all—Andrew Hewitt's "The Bad Seed"—a reading of Eichmann and Kant is joined by discussion of the themes of the body (via Adorno and Arendt) and the "taint" or "stain" of radical evil (Kant). These themes lead Hewitt to reflection on the body's response to the concentration camps: women ceased to menstruate, normal diseases disappeared and were replaced by an ill-defined dis-ease, and men ceased to ejaculate, except for homosexual unions. The issue is life and reproduction: the need for sex disappears in the context of horror and privation. Yet homosexual sex continues, serving "to recirculate the 'bad seed' as the 'hygienic' avoidance of a conception" (95). In so far as there is no possibility of conception, the flow of seed continues for homosexual acts, but not for heterosexual acts that will lead to conception: the camps effect genocide *avant la lettre*. What is most welcome in Hewitt's reading is an insistence on the materiality of evil: it is the body, physiology, that is the focus of our attention.

In this way Hewitt's paper comes closest to that which I find lacking in this volume, and that is an explicitly Marxist contribution. What is wanting is a materialist analysis that provides a sustained reflection on radical evil—especially the Nazi experience—from the perspective of political economics. It is only then that the sheer materiality of evil, evil as a positive force in Kant's sense, may be understood properly. At the same time, but only in conjunction with a materialist analysis, should the long history of reflection of evil from theology be brought to bear: here many of the themes that appear in this volume would also be found—the role of human will and freedom, the positivity of evil, and the inability of humans to do good.

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The Becoming of Time: Integrating Physical and Religious Time. By Lawrence Fagg. Atlanta: Scholar's Press, 1995. ISBN 0-7885-0060-0. Pp. xiii+ 282.

This book of fertile metaphors does not so much prosecute an argument as note interesting arenas of similarity between some religious texts and some recent findings of theoretical physics. It then seeks to elucidate these similarities through metaphors that suggest that, at some deep level, science and religion are saying the same thing. Religious insights are translated into scientific metaphor and scientific results are translated into religious metaphor. Following these interdisciplinary translations, the author frequently breaks into praise of the universe's profundity and expresses his own awe at the self-evidence of his conclusions. The reader is left to fill in the conceptual gaps or, barring that, to appreciate the author's creativity in juxtaposing old and new material in surprising and exciting ways.

This is a book about time, and two themes permeate the entire book: (1) religious and scientific insights concerning time are mutually supporting; and (2) time cannot be spatialized, because the phenomenon of becoming cannot be captured spatially. The book is masterful in its presentation of the discussion of time in contemporary physics. Difficult problems are presented clearly and uncompromisingly, with the areas of experimental or theoretic uncertainty explicitly marked as such. For its accessibility, I would rank it even above Paul Davies' *About Time* (1995), though it understandably does not have the same scope of scientific detail. The use of illustration is effective, and a tremendous amount of material is compressed into these chapters. The short summaries at the end of each chapter help to reinforce the important details of that chapter, allowing the next chapter to build successfully upon it. Not only is the author an accomplished physicist, but he is also capable of expressing the details of his field non-technically.

Philosophically, however, it is somewhat odd that a physicist's book should rely almost exclusively on a "Continental" approach, quoting Bergson, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty under the heading of "Philosophers Thinking about Time." He does cross the Channel by referring to McTaggart's distinction between temporal A and B series, but he mistakenly reduces the distinction to one between subjective and objective time (127). This leads to comments such as: "Might there not be a primitive 'now' immanent in nature, but inexpressible by humans? If so, then the heated controversy over which of McTaggart's series, A or B, has ascendance might be unnecessary for they may then essentially coincide" (142).

This seems to be saying that, if there were an objective "now" in nature, the A and B series would "coincide." But this is questionable. The A series cannot be reduced to "the subjective mode of human experience" (147), for McTaggart insists that the A series grounds all time, picking out an objective "now" in nature. Thus in the earlier quotation Fagg is criticizing McTaggart for not recognizing an alternative that McTaggart is in fact famous for clarifying (though the irony would be lost on anyone who accepted the reduction of A series to subjective time). This sort of basic mistake leads me to doubt that the author has engaged the Anglo-American literature on the philosophy of time or has truly participated in (rather than merely attended) the sorts of "prolonged and laborious philosophical discourses" (128) in which such issues are argued rigorously.

The author's use of religious material also lacks a certain critical awareness, allowing him to put a variety of religious texts alongside one another to spark intuitions of similarity and, presumably, the conviction that there exists some fundamental *Ur*-experience of time that can be called "religious." For example, within the span of three pages we have quotations from St. Augustine, St. Thomas, Advaita Vedanta, the Hebrew Scriptures, the New Testament, the Koran, and the Tao te Ching (184–6). All these quotations serve to suggest that some experience of "timelessness" is essential to our notion of the divine, but their brevity demands that this suggestion be less argument than free association. Unfortunately this pattern is repeated throughout the book, until we reach a statement of one of the author's goals: the development of "a global, ecumenical eschatology" and "a unifying theology embracing the immanent wisdom of Bud-

dha, the transcendent perception of Shankara, the quietude and humility of Lao Tzu, the love and grace of Jesus, and the courage and insight of Moses and Mohammed" (210). In short the book is driven by a religious ideology that demands of the author an indefatigable search for some fundamental, unitary phenomenon of "religion" and its unique spiritual experience of time. Whether or not such ideology is personally justifiable, it does not make for good religious scholarship.

Within academia I would only recommend this book for use in an upper-level religious studies seminar. It is important that the book only be used amongst students who have already developed the skills of religious scholarship, lest students read the book and think that a hodgepodge of quotations from disparate religious texts and traditions can constitute a viable analysis of religious concepts.

However, among advanced students this book would be enormously useful as a conduit for teaching the relevant basics of contemporary theoretical physics in a religion-friendly context. Too frequently we discuss issues involving time (origins of the universe, divine transcendence, death and beyond, the final culmination, et cetera) and completely ignore the discussion that has been occupying physicists for almost a century. Our tolerance of such ignorance is inexcusable, and this book is a much-needed weapon in the fight against the ghettoization of religion and science. Its well-organized presentation of physics imparts knowledge without intimidation. For this, I recommend *The Becoming of Time* for any whose mind already revels in the wisdom of ages but clouds over with the advent of Einstein.

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***Interpreting God and the Postmodern Self: On Meaning, Manipulation and Promise.* By Anthony C. Thiselton. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm B. Eerdmans, 1995. ISBN 0-8028-4128-7. Pp. xii+180.**

Must all claims to religious "Truth" be reduced to manipulative power bids? Although theologians have been grappling with this question since Nietzsche's monumental challenge to Christianity at the close of the last century, the recent advent of the postmodern mood has ushered it into the forefront of contemporary religious concerns. Anthony Thiselton, professor of Christian theology at the University of Nottingham and a scholar well versed in the bearing of philosophical hermeneutics on the reading of biblical texts, dedicates this volume to the difficult issues behind the question of truth claims. His effort involves a long detour of listening to the many voices that have contributed to the debate. In the end a Christian response is attempted: the message of non-manipulative love anchored in the cross of Christ is offered to the distrustful postmodern self as a timely source of hope.

Thiselton structures the conversation with Nietzsche and postmodernism into four equal parts, each containing six short chapters. Part one traces the philo-