to discover a reconstituted identity... 'Grace' means love 'without strings.' It signals the end of manipulation... [Divine promise] constitutes 'a sure and steadfast anchor'... which re-centres the self” (163).

Quite apart from Thiselton’s refreshing “hermeneutical” approach to Christian apologetic, his effective appropriation of the Ricoeurian hermeneutic of detour constitutes the originality of this work. Similar to the model offered by many of Ricoeur’s own writings, Thiselton dedicates much of his efforts to the “detour” of careful listening to those who stand in opposition to his preunderstanding. After grappling with their judgments, he appropriates what is essential and then moves forward. Thiselton also lets the fruits of this self-transforming process fashion his formulation of the Christian promise. A more humble yet more engaging presentation of the Gospel ensues.

Unfortunately this otherwise commendable attitude of deference has a negative effect on style. The incessant introduction of new interlocutors regularly disturbs the flow of argument; and the dense proliferation of quotes and references often turns the prose into an unpalatable mosaic of other peoples’ utterances.

This rhetorical weakness should not reduce the impact of this thoughtful and informative monograph. It is a bold attempt to cast a bridge between contemporary Christian theology and philosophical thought—particularly hermeneutics. It can also serve to pastorally educate reflective Christian believers and pastors on postmodernism’s view of their religious claims and roles.

Marc Debanné
McGill University


This volume comprises a series of transcribed and carefully edited lectures of the late Bernard Lonergan (d. 1984) on various topics of philosophy and theology. The lectures are ordered chronologically and span the years 1958–1964, a particularly productive period in Lonergan’s career that is also partially accounted for by volumes four, five, and ten of the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan (CWL). Even so, the editors forewarn that, because this period holds “a gold mine of ideas still to be tapped” (xii), further installments await us. These proposed installments, three in all, will consist of a set of graduate course lectures given by Lonergan at the Gregorian University in Rome between 1958 and 1964, along with their mediation to North American institutions of higher learning (i.e., Regis College, Gonzaga University, and Georgetown University [CWL 19 and 20]); and of certain shorter papers and reviews (CWL 17) that also contribute to an understanding of Lonergan’s post-Insight development.

Though hardly a table talk, the present installment (CWL 6) may be seen as
representing a different, more intimate stream of Lonergan’s North American mediation—with the exception of two lectures (chapters 2 and 6). Most of the lectures were delivered at the Thomas More Institute in Montreal “to circles of close friends, almost en famille.” As the editors point out, this allowed Lonergan to test out his ideas without “censors looking over his shoulder” (xii), although his graduate seminars in Rome ostensibly provided him with a relatively free environment to pursue his ideas. Lonergan’s congenial relationship with the Institute brightened the possibility that he would deliver, while on return summer visits to North America, the opening lecture to a course. Seven of the volume’s eleven lectures suggest that he was in the habit of so obliging his friends and Institute staff. The other four lectures, two of which have been previously published (chapters 2 and 6), were given principally at Nottingham University (England), North American College (Rome), and Regis College (Ontario).

Besides their intrinsic worth as reflective lectures on weighty philosophical and theological topics, these and other papers like them (written between 1958 and 1964) elicit the attention they do because they promote a greater understanding of the post-Insight period that led to Lonergan’s 1965 breakthrough to the eight “functional specialties” of theology (research, interpretation, history, dialectic, foundations, doctrines, systematics, and communications) given definitive expression in Method in Theology (1972). As Frederick Crowe has pointed out, method, which served for Lonergan as a corollary to the philosophical study of human understanding roughly up to 1957, had by 1961/2 become Lonergan’s main preoccupation. Serious readers of Lonergan, fascinated by what was “going forward” in this period of Lonergan’s intellectual history, will find quite apropos the stylistic and paradigmatic parallels that hold together this and the Method volume.


Although almost half of the collection has previously appeared in published or mimeographed form, the editors are to be praised not only for bringing together in one volume these and other important lectures that have not appeared before (chapters 3, 5, 7, 9, 10, and 11), but also for meticulously editing Lonergan’s free style. In addition, the reader is provided with thorough footnotes as to the historical setting of each lecture, along with other valuable cross-reference details that would otherwise go unnoticed. In keeping with the general format of the CWL, the present installment also contains a bibliography of Lonergan’s works cited in the text, a modest lexicon of Latin and Greek phrases that appear...
sporadically throughout the text (mostly chapter 6), a few spirited discussions (at the end of chapters 6, 9, 10, and 11), and an analytic index for which every Lonergan scholar continues to be grateful.

Jim Kanaris
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Religion and Practical Reason is the third and final collection of essays resulting from a series of nine international conferences held from 1986-92 at the Divinity School of the University of Chicago. Seen beside the two previous collections Myth and Philosophy (SUNY Press, 1990) and Discourse and Practice (SUNY Press, 1992), this collection represents both a denouement and a summons to further, more self-conscious comparative philosophizing.

The notion of practical reason, which both emerged from and linked the Chicago colloquia, is defined here not in the Aristotelian sense (that is, as a mode of reason to be distinguished from theoretical reason), but rather as referring to that "realm where those details of contingent human life that we include in 'practice' actually meet the sorts of disciplined thinking we mean by 'theory'" (2). Practical reason refers then to critical reflection on practice and practices, and this central concern ties together the two poles of the comparative philosophy of religion identified by editor Frank E. Reynolds: the formalist or methodological pole on the one hand and the descriptive and historical pole on the other (3). Both of these poles can be seen in terms of practice—the prior relating to the practice of scholars and others involved in the comparative philosophy of religion, the latter referring to the practices involved in or emerging from the philosophies of religion being compared.

The essays collected here can therefore be divided into those dealing, at the meta-level, more strictly with the methodological and theoretical issues involved in comparing religions philosophically, and those that, though aware of these methodological issues, work closer to the ground level of particular religious and historical data, comparing particular religious philosophical practices. Of course these are not strict divisions: most of the essays straddle to some extent both of the poles comprising comparative philosophy of religion and some work equally well in either mode. In this respect the chapter by Hallisey, "In Defense of Rather Fragile and Local Achievement: Reflections on the work of Gurulogomi," is particularly successful. While the essays dealing with particular religious practices (ranging from discussions on religious practices in Islam and Buddhism, to studies of religious philosophers such as Gurulogomi and Al-Farabi) will have obvious relevance to scholars working with those traditions, the methodological papers should be of interest to all who study comparison and do comparative studies. I shall therefore limit my comments to some of these essays.