

trinitarian hermeneutic is required to aptly appreciate and appropriate the divine communicative action: the Spirit provides perlocutionary power to enable applied response to the illocutions tied to Christ and conveyed in the Father's authorized verbal locutions.

Vanhoozer advocates a theological approach for all reading—not only the Bible. Such a strategy, remaining aware of the limits of its own grasp, should show more regard than does deconstruction for the “other.” Submission to the Spirit's witness in the letter brings personal receptivity to the text's authority and force, as well as recognition of the Spirit's enabling of others likewise to heed it. Largely sympathetic to this stance, philosopher Dallas Willard asks for a further spelling out of how the Spirit's action in bringing understanding ties in with one's own involvement in a manner that is not merely occasionalist, but rather upholds our responsibility as discerning agents.

All the presenters here disclaim pretentious certainty. They all agree that genuine understanding is shown in personally pursued, practical conformity to what the text is taken as calling forth. They differ over the degree to which they feel postmodern, and particularly deconstructionist, outlooks can or must be incorporated into a consistently Christian approach.

Unfortunately, contentious characterizations are made at several points of contrasting views—without being either adequately supported, or subsequently challenged. Overall, one might wish for more extended interaction on several specific issues, especially as could arise in a direct three-way conversation between Westphal, Wolterstorff and Vanhoozer on appropriation of Derrida, use of speech-act theory, and the sense of the text. Still, there is already enough explicit, and implied, contrast to give the reflective reader a worthwhile sense of how differing emphases represented here arise, and how their proponents relate to both enduring and emerging questions.

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The Challenge of Tradition: Discerning the Future of Anglicanism. Ed. John Simons. Toronto: Anglican Book Centre, 1997. ISBN 1-55126-163-4. Pp. 188.

Most, if not all, major denominations in North America experience internal dissonance over the doctrines and practices of their church. In recent years, this dissonance has taken its own particular form within the Anglican Church of Canada (hereafter ACC). This article will both review a particular volume published within the ACC context, and directly engage in the Anglican debates by means of this review. Nonetheless, outsiders are invited in—both to hear the conceptual content and to observe the process. Perhaps the Canadian Anglican experience may be helpful for others as they engage in their own discourses.

The “particular form” of which I speak arises out of a conference, called “Essentials ‘94,” held near Montréal in 1994. This gathering of about 700 peo-

ple brought together supporters of several organizations, thereby covering Anglicanism's three main types of "doctrinal conservatives"—charismatics, evangelicals, and traditionalist anglo-catholics. Their threefold purpose could be described as: *theological*, that is, to respond to unwanted doctrinal trends, often collectively labelled "liberal," within the ACC; *emotional*, that is, to meet and reflect on their feelings of ostracization within the ACC; and *practical*, that is, to strategize about their future influence therein. One outcome of the conference was a formal doctrinal statement, twenty-four articles in length, entitled "The Montréal Declaration," as well as a book of thirty-four papers by thirty-eight authors entitled *Anglican Essentials: Reclaiming Faith Within the Anglican Church of Canada*.

The response from within the ACC to the so-called "Essentials Movement" and the Declaration has been varied. *The Challenge of Tradition* (hereafter *Challenge*) is a collection of eight papers responding critically to the Declaration. Part I of this review will examine several of the papers (space prohibits a review of every article); Part II will make some general observations. The reviewer's own position with respect to the Declaration is that of a "critical supporter."

1. Articles

The editor, John Simons, Principal of Montréal Diocesan Theological College, provides both the introduction and one of the articles. While his introduction serves mostly to preview the various articles to follow, it does enter the debate by critiquing the notion of "essentials" as used by the Declaration. Simons's argument is that there is "an unacknowledged ambiguity in the language the document uses to describe itself. It is a declaration of Anglican essentials, and it affirms the essentials of Christian faith" (10).

Two objections thereby arise: items of Anglican identity (e.g., *The Book of Common Prayer*) cannot be Christian essentials; and, contrary to what the term "essential" entails, refusal to accept one or more of the articles of the Declaration does not thereby mean forfeiting one's claim to being either Anglican or Christian. Another contributor, Terry Brown, points out a further ambiguity, namely that certain matters, such as the Declaration's comments on the *Book of Alternative Services*, can only be applied to Canadian Anglicanism, not Anglicanism as a global whole.

This reviewer agrees that the term "essentials" is used ambiguously in the Declaration. Furthermore, whether they be Anglican essentials or Christian essentials, it is unclear whether the framers of the Declaration consider it a complete set or a partial set of essentials—leaving those outside the "Essentials Movement" with a valid question about the scope of what the Declaration is asking them to affirm.

For instance, Simons objects that baptism and the eucharist have been inadequately attended to. If the Declaration is intended as a complete set, then Simons is quite right to object; if it is intended as a partial set, that is, as a series of assertions made in response to particular current issues, then Simons

is incorrect—these topics are not articulated because for the framers they are at present less controverted within the ACC.

So this provides a good example of the complete-vs.-partial problem. I personally view the Declaration as a partial set, for three reasons: As seen with baptism and communion, it omits adequate attention to important elements of both Anglican and Christian tradition and doctrine; the Declaration intentionally defers to other doctrinal statements (e.g., the Creed, the Articles); and there are serious philosophical problems with any claim to provide a complete set of essential Christian doctrines. It would have been much more helpful, then, for the Declaration to have omitted the word “essentials,” and instead have said something like: “These are doctrinal affirmations which we believe need to be made at this time within the Anglican Church of Canada.”

Simons also contributes an article to the collection, entitled “Naming and Glorifying the Trinity.” This article is too complex to give it the detailed attention here it deserves—both to identify its helpful theological insights on the nature of the Trinity and on trinitarian language, and to rebut its frustrating theological omissions and misinterpretations of the Declaration. Here I will only consider a few items of the many that deserve attention.

Simons’s article is theologically incisive on a number of fronts, and supporters of the Declaration must be careful not to dismiss it without consideration of its virtues. For instance, the framework for his discussion of the nature of the Trinity is orthodox: Scripture contains divinely-revealed truth about God, authoritatively expressed in the Church’s creeds. From this Simons elucidates a biblical model of the nature of the trinitarian relations, from which he then provides several helpful principles in support of trinitarian orthodoxy, such as: that the existence of the three divine Persons is compatible with the unity of God because the distinction of Persons is eternally produced within God and by God; that the Triune dynamic—the relationship between the triune Persons—is one of mutual glorification; and that this Triune dynamic is manifested to the church in the events to which the New Testament bears witness (with a range of New Testament support provided) (29). Thus, for instance, the Father glorifies the Son,

by accepting his sacrifice and exalting him as universal Lord. The atoning and renewing work of the Son, accomplished once and for all on Calvary, is thus given a permanent, universal, operative power. The Father bestows upon Jesus Christ, crucified and risen again, all the authority of deity. How then does the church enact, with the Father, the Father’s glorification of the Son? By affirming Jesus Christ as the saviour and redeemer of the world (33).

Simons’s point in all this is that the church is to glorify each of the divine Persons in just the same sorts of ways as they glorify each other (at least as far as this is humanly possible). This is the framework by which Simons assesses the Declaration—a framework which can provide worthwhile insights for any Christian to consider. Furthermore, Simons also contends that “there are strong warrants for retaining [the classical trinitarian formula] in the baptismal formula, the creeds, and eucharistic prayers” (37). All this is to be appreciated.

Still, there are several important points with which one may disagree with Simons. One point arises from his objection that restricting the divine names to male-gendered language results in social patriarchy and hence repression of women. Without doubt this has indeed been the case through history. And no doubt it is also true that "an androcentric bias has unconsciously directed our reading of the Bible and the church's selection of scriptural images and metaphors for God" (41).

Nonetheless, we may say that these are potential, but not necessary, problems. Any good thing can be misused, and where something worthwhile is misused, the appropriate response is to eliminate the misuse—and so too for the classical divine names from Scripture. Then how do we avoid misusing the classical formula? Simons provides the key himself when he asks: "How, in our context, will the church be able to signify the Trinity who transcends the division of sex and who undermines systems of domination, if [the church] is unable to re-situate the classical Name within an expanded repertoire of divine names?" The answer is indeed to "re-situate the classical Name"—though not within new names, as Simons suggests, but rather within the scriptural narrative of Jesus' life, and within a repertoire of terms, titles, and descriptions as appropriate to both the believers' context and the scripturally-revealed character of God.

Simons is concerned by the assertion in Article 1 that "we decline proposals to marginalize or modify these names [Father, Son and Holy Spirit]"; he considers this "uncompromisingly restrictive" on the Triune name. However, Simons muddies the discussion by confusing names with terms, titles, and descriptions. Thus he states or asks the following: "the Declaration refuses an expansion of the repertoire of trinitarian terms..." (38); "There is no good reason to decline proposals to integrate terms such as these (e.g., Fount, Advocate, Life-Giver) into the church's prayer, liturgy, and hymnody" (40); "Why should the church be prevented from using feminine imagery in signifying the divine Persons?" (42).

However, titles, terms, descriptions, and imagery are not the same thing as names, and so Simons has missed that the Declaration is not necessarily refusing an expansion of the repertoire of terms, nor necessarily objecting to using feminine imagery for the divine persons (for such can be clearly scriptural), nor declining proposals to integrate other new terms or titles, as appropriate to the character of God (such as Fount, Advocate, etc.). Rather, the Declaration is concerned with at least two aspects to naming in any relationship—unambiguous reference, and the prerogative of self-identity. Restricting the divine names to the classical formula reflects concern for both these roles.

Recognizing these roles allows us to address another of Simons's concerns, specifically his objection to the rationale given in Article 1 for restricting the Divine Names: "the Gospel invites us through the Holy Spirit to share eternally in the divine fellowship, as adopted children of the God in whose family Jesus Christ is both saviour and our brother." This rationale Simons calls "a whopping *non-sequitur*" (36). Now, one can certainly be a supporter of the Declaration and at the same time find the phrasing of this rationale wordy, impre-

cise, and less theologically complete than would be desirable; nonetheless, it is not the *non sequitur* Simons claims it to be.

The heart of the claim is that "sharing eternally in the divine fellowship" is somehow related to correctly naming God. To this Simons responds with a variety of comments: "To think that the triune God is truly confessed and worshipped only if the correct linguistic formula is used is not only to fail to appreciate the generosity of God's self-communication; it is to hold a particularly abstract notion of the church's trinitarian faith as the act of naming God" (30); sharing in the divine fellowship "does not entail the exclusive use of the classical name, or, for that matter, of any special name. It does entail baptism into Christ, discipleship, eucharistic fellowship..." (36-37).

Simons is of course quite correct in each of these comments, yet he appears to miss the two roles for naming identified above. First, the rationale is concerned with our participation in the divine fellowship as the other partners in that fellowship (i.e., the triune persons) wish to be related to—which includes, even though is certainly not limited to, how they are named. In other words, the axiom by which we determine how to name God is not "that which we ourselves find meaningful," but rather "that which God reveals about how God wishes to be named." So although Simons provides worthwhile discussions of the social misuses of the divine name, and of how the divine names "linguistically de-stabilise themselves" (28), he still does not really address the key question motivating the Declaration: Why does God ask humanity to name the Trinity this way, to relate to God through this name, despite its potential social and linguistic difficulties?

The second role, that of avoiding ambiguous or even false reference, is particularly important within contexts of religious pluralism. If our names for God are wrong or ambiguous, is it actually the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob we are glorifying? How do we distinguish between conflicting claims to revelation, or between conflicting identities claimed for God? In religiously pluralist contexts (including Canada today), this is a significant issue. Misnaming can lead to misidentifying the persons in the relationship, and hence to misunderstanding the desired relationship, which may even eventually lead to losing the relationship. This is not a *non-sequitur*.

Finally, a comment on Simons's remark that the Declaration "proscribes liturgical renewal." In fact it does no such thing. Here Simons shows a very restricted concept of what counts as liturgical renewal—as may be seen in the eucharistic life of Montréal Diocesan Theological College, which is generally limited to anglo-catholic styles of worship as shaped through the Liturgical Movement. For Simons, "liturgical renewal" seems to equal "Liturgical Movement." However, liturgical renewal takes numerous forms other than the Liturgical Movement.

For instance, St. Aidan's Church, Winnipeg, provides an example of a Declaration-affirming church in which worship has been renewed through integrating anglo-catholic, charismatic, and evangelical elements. Would Simons deny that this counts as liturgical renewal? Would he deny as liturgical renewal the work of the Episcopalian Robert Webber? Many Declaration-affirming

churches embrace such moves, but apparently Simons does not count these as legitimate forms of liturgical renewal.

Many of the issues addressed by Simons reappear, with different emphases, in the article by Susan Storey, entitled "Feminism and the Church." Here, Storey argues that "one of the essentials for the church at the end of the second millenium is to come to terms with the feminist critique in all its aspects" (19). Storey then provides a brief overview of this critique of traditional theology in three areas: gender-exclusive language (about both people and God), the nature of Scripture (what is the revelatory status of the Bible as a patriarchal and androcentric text?), and our ability to know God (since God is ultimately incomprehensible).

Storey sees the feminist critique as a grace-filled challenge, recalling the Church to two Christian essentials: "speaking rightly of God, insofar as we can, and promoting the dignity of women, as well as that of every other human person" (24). From this basis, Storey asserts that the Declaration has "simply dismissed and passed over in silence" the feminist critique (19), and that consequently, the issues of "speaking rightly of God" and "promoting dignity" are also "passed over in silence" by the Declaration, "because [these do] not fit easily within the vision of the Church that inspired the Declaration" (24).

In response, we may first note that the Declaration does not specifically identify *any* theological movements—whether feminist, womanist, liberationist, process, pentecostal, evangelical, anglo-catholic, et cetera. In other words, the Declaration does not even mention the movements which inspire it! The silence of not explicitly naming feminist thought is therefore hardly to be taken as "dismissing or passing over feminism in silence," it is, rather, an approach which attends to issues raised by movements.

Does the Declaration deal then with the issues Storey raises? Yes it does—perhaps not as adequately as might be optimal, but nonetheless more than she admits. For instance, the Declaration does accept the feminist critique of language about people; thus the words "human" and "human beings" intentionally appear where the word "man" would have been used in earlier generations. And the Declaration certainly does support human dignity, including that of women—not using Storey's particular wording perhaps, but certainly using terms and ideas throughout with this strong implication.

However, in her first endnote, Storey rightly implies that Article 15 is too weakly worded: it is not enough simply to identify social problems such as child abuse, domestic violence, pornography, sexist domination, and so forth, only with respect to "weakening of the family ideal." Any assessment of such social ills should indeed be put in much stronger language than this. Nonetheless, such social ills are also covered by strong and necessary implications in Article 13: "Christians must *exert* themselves in the cause of justice, and in acts of compassion."

On the other hand, the Declaration does not accept the critique made by many—though not all—streams of feminist theology about language for God. Thus, as we have already seen, Article 1 opposes "modifying or marginalising" Father, Son and Holy Spirit as the triune name. Clearly the writers of the Dec-

laration are aware of the feminist challenge about language for God. So the issue here is not one of avoidance, as Storey suggests, but rather of genuine disagreement.

Storey's article, unfortunately, simply rehearses what the framers already well know from feminist literature. Storey would have provided a much more helpful article if she had tried to address the theological concerns underlying Article 1, concerns identified in *Anglican Essentials*, but which she ignores; and if she had recognized that both sides are seeking to speak rightly of God, as far as we humanly can, and so to discuss possible ways forward from there.

Storey fears that feminist issues are supposedly passed over in silence because such issues do not fit easily within the vision of the church which inspired the Declaration. As we have seen, the issues Storey refers to are not passed over in silence, and some of them do in fact fit easily within that vision—though, true enough, others do not, and intentionally so. Furthermore, Storey paints feminism as much more homogenous than it really is, which consequently rules out forms of feminism that do not agree with hers.

Where I think Storey is closer to the mark is in her objection to the Declaration's statement that, "God helping us, we resolve to maintain our heritage of faith and transmit it intact." Storey responds: "A feminist vision of the Church would not be of an institution charged with transmitting intact what it has received from the past.... It would be, rather, a vision of a community that remembers its history, for better and for worse, and opens itself to the wind of the Holy Spirit..." (24).

Storey's point here is not exclusive to feminism, for it is simply the Reformation principle of *semper ecclesia reformatum*—the Church always ready to reform itself where God reveals reform is needed. However, in practice, the Declaration does reflect the traditional church reforming itself, for example, by: not using male language for people in general; welcoming missionaries to Canada from the traditional receiving countries; naming such social ills as child abuse, homophobia, and heterosexual hypocrisy; and acknowledging positively the *Book of Alternative Services* (a surprisingly strong affirmation, given the *Essentials* constituency—a point missed by all the contributors to this volume).

Yet, while practicing this principle of the need for the church to reform itself, the Declaration does not explicitly identify it. Furthermore, as Storey points out, the phrase "maintain our heritage of faith and transmit it intact" refers to the Thirty-Nine Articles and the Solemn Declaration. In other words, there appears to be an *a priori* prohibition against reforming either of these—contrary to the *semper ecclesia reformatum* principle! Indeed, are supporters of the Declaration really expected to hold that "Councils cannot be gathered together without Princes" (Article XXI)? Or that "the Bishop of Rome hath no jurisdiction in [the] Realm of England" (Article XXXVII)? And when was the last time any of the framers read out the Book of Homilies in church, as directed by Article XXXV?

Transmitting intact the faith of the past is not always a virtue, for the basis of doctrinal continuity with the past is not located in unchanging formulations, but rather in the mind and will of God. But as the Declaration implies,

the "theological climate" must be right for such changes. The *semper ecclesia re-formandum* principle, when applied to doctrinal statements, acknowledges that such statements arise in response to the issues of particular contexts, and so may need alteration in different contexts. So changing the formulations of the past can actually regain greater continuity with the mind and will of God.

On the issue of the nature of Scripture and scriptural interpretation, two quite similar articles appear in *Challenge*: "Towards a Biblical Church," by Paul Jennings, and "The Word of God and 'God's Word Written'," by Stephen Reynolds. For Reynolds, as for Jennings, "the issue is not whether the scriptures have or ought to have authority in the church...the real, fundamental question [is]... What kind of authority do scriptures have?" (73).

In a similar vein, Jennings says, "It seems to me that the Declaration in many places doesn't really say anything; that is, it uses traditional doctrinal language—language which most of us would agree with [e.g., 'God's Word written, inspired, and authoritative'], but which remains ambiguous because we mean different things by it" (54). This is an important and valid observation about many of the terms the Declaration uses.

Indeed, the Declaration's opening series of descriptions—"inspired and authoritative, true and trustworthy, coherent, sufficient for salvation, living and powerful for God's guidance for belief and behaviour"—can be affirmed by a wide range of both conservatives and liberals: within the Church, these terms are used with such broad ranges of meaning that they have lost much of their ability to delineate specific doctrinal positions. Observers such as Jennings and Reynolds may legitimately ask what meanings are intended for these terms.

Reynolds is concerned about the Declaration's statement that "Scripture under Christ judges the church," for, he argues, the ability to make judgements requires agency, and it is persons (divine or human), not texts, that possess agency. Therefore, "such authority as scripture has must be mediated, requiring the agency of living persons to interpret, proclaim, and apply their message" (74). The magisterial metaphor—attributing judgement to a text rather than an agent—occludes awareness of this unavoidable need for mediation. So Reynolds rightly asks, "What are we talking about when we refer to 'the Word of God'?" His answer is that the Word of God is first and foremost Jesus Christ; Scripture can therefore only be considered the Word of God in a secondary and derivative sense (Jennings [57] also makes this point).

Furthermore, Reynolds argues, not all parts of Scripture can be equally considered the Word of God, even in the secondary sense. Reynolds cites, for instance, Paul's well-known comments in 1 Corinthians 7 about giving his own, not the Lord's, word on aspects of marriage. "To say that everything in the Scriptures is equally and indifferently the Word of God is, in fact, to argue for a divine inspiration which 'transubstantiates' the inspired author, so that only the appearance of human authorship remains after its replacement (whether by conversion or annihilation) by the substance of the divine Word" (93).

We must accept the possibility that the Scriptures do not always and in all places communicate the primary Word of God which constitutes the Church. It is possible that, instead, the Scriptures communicate the prophets' or apostles' secondary interpretations of that primary Word. ...The canonical writings do indeed communicate the Word of God, which constitutes...the community of the church; but not everything contained in those canonical writings does so simply and without qualification. ...'All Scripture is inspired by God.' Yes—but is everything in the Scriptures *equally* inspired and thus *equally* binding? (90-91, italics in original).

One argument against this may be that its effect is to create canons-within-the-canon; yet, in fact, "a canon-within-a-canon is, in practice, unavoidable" for all Christians, regardless of theological stripe (91). Furthermore, such a view need not impugn one's orthodoxy: Luther's canon-within-the-canon (e.g., his low opinion of the Epistle of James) has certainly not eliminated Luther from the ranks of the Church's orthodox teachers.

As with all articles in the Declaration, Article 6 ("The Authority of the Bible") is followed by a series of scriptural references—eleven in this case—intended to support the claims of each respective article. Reynolds interprets each of the Scripture references for this article, and concludes: "the scriptural catena subjoined to the Declaration's sixth Article does not serve the Article's purpose, much less prove the metaphor of magistracy by which it contends that 'Scripture under Christ judges the church for its faithfulness to his revealed truth'" (84). Reynolds then asks why the catena does not cite John 12:48, Hebrews 4:12, or 1 Corinthians 7:10-12, 25, suggesting that these are not cited because they would actually undermine the Declaration's view of Scripture. He also suggests a means other than the judicial or magisterial metaphor by which to "maintain the legal bias of the Declaration's position and to uphold...the paramount authority of the Scriptures"—namely, what he calls the "constitutional" analogy (74). The constitutional role of Scripture is to set "the terms of [the church's] calling and existence...nothing less than God's own Word" (78).

Reynolds's approach will certainly evoke a negative reaction from many Declaration supporters, and he also makes some annoying caricatures of the Declaration (such as labelling the Scripture passages "proofs"). Yet, Reynolds provides a good example of Jennings's point that the terms used in Article 6 are too vague, too poorly-defined, to convey much doctrinal substance—for both the Declaration and Reynolds agree that Scripture is "inspired," yet one doubts that the Declaration's framers would want to allow for Reynolds's position.

Nonetheless, I would support Reynolds's degrees-of-inspiration theory—that some parts of Scripture are more inspired than others. One consequence of this is that the epistemological use of Scripture (i.e., by which we gain knowledge of God's character and will) unavoidably assigns greater epistemic priority to some parts of Scripture than to other parts, in effect creating intra-canonical canons. With Reynolds I would argue that it is impossible not to read Scripture without creating such layers of canon—if this were not the case, there would not be different doctrinal positions among different Christian bodies equally intent on being "scriptural."

The epistemological issue, then, is not to deny the unavoidability of canonical layers, nor to deny the prior degrees-of-inspiration theory, but rather to identify, and reassess if necessary, one's operative criteria for assigning epistemological priority within Scripture, along with their deductive consequences. This, though, does not prevent us from affirming (*contra* Jennings [61]) Peter Mason's comment in *Anglican Essentials* that as an exegetical axiom "we can assume a high degree of internal consistency within the whole range of scripture." (To see all this in recent exegetical practice, I would commend Richard B. Hays's *The Moral Vision of the New Testament* [San Francisco: Harper, 1996]).

The key article addressing the issue of homosexuality is by the Roman Catholic social theologian Gregory Baum. Entitled "Faithfulness and Change: Moments of Discontinuity in the Church's Teaching," this article contains two parts: the first part identifies fine "hermeneutical stages" by which churches change their beliefs; the second part applies these stages to the issue of homosexuality, identifying how a church can go through such change with regard to past teachings on homosexuality.

In principle, it is a worthwhile idea to bring in an "outsider"—perhaps a new voice will bring new insight. Yet, this is an extremely frustrating article. First, Baum makes no attempt to engage with the Anglican context—the paper is devoid of Anglican perspective or application. Second, one is left wondering what to do with this article. As a hermeneutical and psycho-social description of the process of ecclesial doctrinal change, it is very interesting—but so what? Perhaps the implication is that *Essentials* supporters have not changed on this issue, yet such an implication would be false. For instance, the rise of this debate in the church has led many *Essentials* supporters to move from supporting to opposing discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation (as distinct from practice). Baum's five-stage theory may very well describe this process. But the issue in the church is prescriptive, not descriptive—and one must be concerned that the purpose of this essay is to turn description into prescription.

Another problematic article is "Anglicanism and the Church's Global Mission," by Terry Brown. Indeed, this article is frustrating on so many fronts that it is hard to know where to begin. I will begin though with Brown's concern about "proselytisation," which raises four issues for him. First, he objects to the Declaration's Christology—a matter to which we will return in Part II below. Second, he juxtaposes personal-conversion evangelism (the "old model" of evangelism) to Jesus' love and social action (the "new model"). This contrast is so outdated that it is hard to believe he actually raises it. Nevertheless, we will return to this below too. Third, he sees personal-conversion as unavoidably aggressive (which he links with being "fundamentalist"). Brown ignores, though, the middle option—of wanting to introduce people to Jesus Christ in a winsome, personally-relevant, non-aggressive way. Fourth, Brown is concerned to avoid the cultural imperialism of some missions in the past. He is quite right to suggest that the Declaration could have more strongly identified the need to avoid the errors of the past. Nonetheless, he elaborates many of these past faults as if the framers of the Declaration are unaware of them, and implies a necessary link between personal-evangelism and cultural imperialism.

The link is always possible, and history certainly shows this—yet, it is not necessary, as history also shows.

Brown is also concerned that the Declaration (along with the article by Tyndale and Lewis on Mission in *Anglican Essentials*) undermines the principle of the primacy of the local church in missions. Brown is concerned about “visiting evangelism groups that have taken it upon themselves to do primary evangelism without consulting the local church. The Declaration’s silence on this issue should be a matter of concern” (132). It is perhaps unfortunate that this principle is not explicitly mentioned by the Declaration. Nonetheless, every Declaration-supporting mission body in the ACC abides by this principle in practice anyway—so who is Brown so concerned about?

Brown also addresses the Declaration’s comments on the *Book of Common Prayer* (BCP)—which he completely misunderstands. He states, “the document comes across more as a ‘circling of wagons’ around traditional English or Canadian BCP Anglicanism, and the way of life of those who practice it...” (116). From this and other comments, Brown seems completely unaware that many supporters of the Declaration rarely even use the BCP, and indeed some of the churches supporting it have liturgies which bear little resemblance to BCP worship—such as St. Stephen’s Anglican Church, Westmount, Quebec. Yet, if Brown’s interpretation of the Declaration on the BCP were correct, churches such as St. Stephen’s would not be supporting the Declaration.

He also suggests that the Declaration “requires Anglicans around the world to return to the BCP...” (123). In fact, the Declaration says no such thing. What it does say is that the BCP should remain the doctrinal standard for the Anglican Church of Canada, and “should not be revised in the theologically-divided climate of the contemporary [Canadian] church.” Brown then goes on to spend much effort indicating how Anglicanism around the world “has developed more culturally appropriate forms of worship, new forms of pastoral care necessitated by new cultural patterns...” (118). Most Declaration supporters are well aware of all this, and indeed rejoice in it. For instance, at Wycliffe College, Toronto, one of the faculty, the Rev. Grant LeMarquand (who contributed to *Anglican Essentials*), has on a number of occasions used the Kenyan communion liturgy in the Wycliffe chapel, even wearing Kenyan liturgical garb.

Two problematic threads run through Brown’s article. First, he misinterprets his audience: more than any other contributor, except perhaps Storey, Brown employs caricatures of the Essentials Movement, showing he does not really know who he is critiquing (which is somewhat surprising, given that Brown interacts with the relevant *Anglican Essentials* article more than any other contributor to *Challenge*). At times this even renders the tone of his article condescending. Second, he reinforces the ostracization that partly motivates the whole movement to begin with. For instance, he states “the Declaration appears to reject this well-established Anglican respect for a critical approach to the Bible” (120), and that the Lambeth Quadrilateral continues to offer a more than adequate summary of Anglican essentials (126). The implication of various of Brown’s comments is that Canadian Anglicans have no business reject-

ing mainstream positions—a right which he defends as acceptable for Anglicans in the South (or Two-Thirds World), but not, apparently, for Canadians!

II. Observations

The Challenge of Tradition is at times insightful and helpful, with many points worth hearing. Supporters of the Declaration risk losing constructive commentary if they just dismiss this work, as no doubt some will want to do. It is important not to exaggerate the differences between the content of Declaration and the opinions of several of the contributors to *Challenge*: in several cases the bifurcation between “liberal” and “conservative” is hard to maintain—particular contributors can be doctrinally liberal in some ways and yet doctrinally conservative in others. Most of these authors are themselves concerned to remain “orthodox,” even though this is not a popular label in today’s theological climate.

Nonetheless, it is important not to minimize the differences either, for important ones remain. Some of these are doctrinal, others methodological. Beginning with doctrine, we have already examined the issue of naming God. Just as important is the issue of Christology. Regarding Christology, several contributors label the Declaration “exclusivist.” However, many doctrinal conservatives are now rejecting the pejorative label “exclusivist” as having been imposed on them, and so prefer the label “particularist,” to reflect their position on the particularity of Jesus of Nazareth for eschatology, soteriology, ecclesiology, and so forth (see Tim Perry, “Beyond the Threefold Typology,” *Canadian Evangelical Review* 14 [Spring, 1997]:1-8).

It is apparent from *The Challenge of Tradition* that there remains a wide gulf between the Declaration and its critics on the particularity of Christ and the concomitant desire to invite non-Christians into relationship with Christ. And of course, differing Christologies result in different missiologies. Simons, for one, complains that the Essentials version of the Christian proclamation is “triumphalistic” (34). This old cliché-label is an easy one to pull out (and it often is)—but it gets tiring.

Those who testify to having been liberated by Jesus Christ from personal ills (e.g., addictive behaviours, depression, personal meaninglessness), may legitimately praise God for the divine triumphs in their life. Indeed, it is this element of personal transformation through faith in Christ that non-particularists (such as Brown) seem to miss in the Christian witness. In effect, the pejorative use of the term “triumphalism” loses the point that “new life in Christ” involves some degree of triumph over the “old life.” But the greater concern appears to be triumphalism over other people. Here, though, the response is the same as to the issue of male-gendered language for the divine names: the appropriate response to the misuse of something (in this case, certain methods of Christian evangelism) is to stop the misuse, not to abandon the thing being misused. The issue of homosexual sexual relations of course also remains a key area of doctrinal disagreement.

Regarding the methodological issues, there are several problems. For one, the contributors need help in interpreting the Declaration. This is a task which

requires close attention to the context in which it was formed, concerning which there are three factors to consider. First: *who*? The Declaration was formed by a large collective of Anglicans responding to decades of feeling ostracized or marginalized by their own Church, both doctrinally and within synodical and administrative structures. The groups which came together to produce the Declaration have historically experienced significant indifference and even animosity towards each other; for them to join together in this degree of unity indicates the extent to which they have felt marginalized. Second: *how*? Prior to the Montréal Conference, an initial draft of the Declaration was made by a drafting committee. Every day at the conference, the 700 participants gave verbal and written feedback in discussion groups. Every evening the drafting committee worked late into the night revising the Declaration to account for the suggested changes, providing their nightly revisions the next day for further comment and revision by the participants. The final, published version is very different from the original—the direct result of a process which was exceptionally open, though constrained by the pressures of time. Third: *where*? The Declaration is publicly issued in the book *Anglican Essentials*, which is a collection of the papers prepared for the conference.

As Simons states, “We all know that meanings are determined by contexts of use” (40), and so these three contextual factors are crucial to properly understanding the meaning of the Declaration—yet the articles in *Challenge* consistently fail to attend to these three factors. Failure to recognize the *who*? leads to several problems. To begin with, most of the contributors have little sense of the Declaration’s supporters. For instance, several articles repeatedly refer to “evangelicals” in a way that implies that the Declaration is the product solely of the evangelical wing of the ACC—which of course it is not.

Supporters of the Declaration, including the leadership of the Essentials Movement, are in many ways very diverse, yet the degree of heterogeneity within the movement is rarely recognized in *Challenge*: an assumption is almost always made that the Declaration’s supporters are only the most narrow-minded. To cite just one of countless examples, Brown complains that “the Declaration is not very clear on the definition of family” (134), and then goes on to say that “from a southern [i.e., Two-Thirds World] Anglican perspective, it would be helpful to clarify that ‘family’ is more than the twentieth century nuclear family.... Anyone who has spent time in non-Western cultures often finds himself or herself adopted into extended families and whole communities that function as families” (134).

There is nothing in the Declaration that opposes this. Indeed, the framers—a number of whom have lived in the Two-Thirds World—were precisely concerned not to imply the Western nuclear family: it is by *not* defining family that the Declaration remains intentionally open to such non-Western experiences of family. Yet, for some reason Brown just assumes that the narrowest interpretation of family is intended here. Of the contributors, then, only Jennings seems to show any nuanced sense of who the Declaration supporters are (with Simons and Taylor showing occasional signs of this, along with their misperceptions).

Challenge reveals that Anglicans on "both" sides do not understand each other very well. Yet, the "doctrinal conservatives" are a minority within the structures of the ACC (though probably not in the pews), and as such they have had to live with the majority for decades. Frequently then, though certainly not always, they have a more accurate view of the majority than the majority has of them. A parallel is found in the average Canadian who, though no expert on Americans, nonetheless probably knows much more about the United States than the average American knows about Canada.

The final article, "Reflections on the Anglican Ethos," by Eileen Scully, addresses the issue of how different Anglican positions can talk with each other with "reasonableness, tolerance, and openness." Scully does make helpful comments here, but it would have been even more helpful had she addressed the issue of how a dominant position (in this case, the "liberal" position within the ACC structures) can willingly hear and accommodate the weaker position (here, the diverse types of "conservatives"). Is the institutional majority listening with the intention of understanding, or simply to refute?

As for *where?*, most of the contributors consistently fail to address their topics with any extended interaction with the relevant articles from *Anglican Essentials*. Many needless misconceptions are promulgated, and many potentially worthwhile criticisms missed, because of this failure. We will examine a key one below.

Failure to recognize the *how?* leads to one of the biggest problems throughout *Challenge*, namely its lack of charity. The context of daily large-group input and late-night revisions over the period of just a few days is not reason to avoid theological critique such as *Challenge* offers, but it is reason to show some charity on interpretation, the lack of which shows up in two ways. First, the contributors, especially Simons and Taylor, on occasion seem to expect the exhaustiveness of systematic theology.

Second, and more importantly, the contributors consistently read the Declaration as narrowly as possible. An especially egregious example of this, and one which particularly grates numerous supporters of the Declaration, is criticism of the Declaration on social action. Typical of such criticism is Simons's statements that the Declaration "would seem to have no good news for the poor, nothing to learn from outsiders and sinners, and little serious interest in addressing the social and religious subordination of women. To what extent could such a church be said to enact, with the Son, the Son's glorification of the Father?" (33); and that the Declaration avoids "an active solidarity with human beings in their pain and passion" (35). Even more representative of this criticism, Andrew Taylor's article, "Humanity is One and History is One: Anglican Social Thought and the Montréal Declaration," charges that the Declaration "erodes the base for Christian social activism" (99).

Such charges are refuted simply by looking at the lives of people who affirmed the Declaration at the original Essentials '94 conference. Numerous people who were there are very active in social issues, including on behalf of women in society, the poor, the imprisoned, refugees, and so forth. Their activity extends to environmental issues as well. To cite only a few examples, two

people who affirmed the Declaration have been jailed for their efforts against old-growth logging in British Columbia, and another person has run in municipal elections for the Green Party (critics should also read the articles by Ron Dart and Elaine Pountney). Does this sound like a group unconcerned with social activism? Clearly not, yet on the reading of the Declaration that its critics make, such people should not even come close to affirming the Declaration.

Why then this misinterpretation on the issue of social action? In part, it is because important social concerns which should have been identified earlier in Article 13 were actually placed in Article 15, the effect of which was to weaken the force of Article 13. Nonetheless, commitment to such issues is there in Article 15. Here is where some contextual clarity on the *how?* would be appropriate. Yet, such generosity is not forthcoming from the critics. Why not? I think because—and here lies the greater responsibility for this misinterpretation—the critics have preconceived notions about what the Essentials Movement and the Declaration are about. They frequently appear to have their minds made up beforehand, squeezing all supporters of the Declaration into the narrow boxes that some supporters do happen to fit into. This is a problem that shows itself repeatedly throughout the book.

Undertaking a theological assessment of the Declaration is certainly a legitimate enterprise. Having critiqued the Declaration, though, it would have been very interesting to see what sort of doctrinal statement the contributors would have collectively come up with as their counter-proposal! Nonetheless, as an attempt at discussion within the ACC, the mere publication of this book is a positive sign. What we now have for the first time in years—perhaps even decades—is theological engagement between different theological communities within the ACC in published form (rather than just within Synods, etc.).

However, even after appreciating the positive contributions of this collection, the supporters of the movement will still have significant concerns about a range of doctrinal and institutional issues within the Anglican Church of Canada. Much more discussion is needed.

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