the reader a very good framework from which to process further information. The first chapter, for example, gave a wonderful key for understanding the subsequent history that he presented. Additionally in this regard, the historian has a real challenge to include the important and relevant material. In this survey, Noll includes many details that other surveys have not. He often focuses on the history of women and minority groups, which, even in their own time, exerted much influence on the history of Christianity in America. Further, Noll includes a short, but pithy, treatment of the history of Mexican Christianity. This treatment is far too short, but at least it is present. For his audience, Noll has made the book very readable and has provided a very good set of footnotes and a good bibliography that will aid those wanting a good introduction to the history of Christianity in North America.

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"Democracy, I do not conceive that God ever did ordain as a fit government for church or for commonwealth" (John Cotton, 1636). Robert Kraynak, Professor of Political Science at Colgate University, places this quotation near the beginning of his book, for he also has his doubts. Modern liberals, he claims, and many modern Christians, "are in a state of denial about the predicament of liberal democracy" (45), which "proclaims in principle but subverts in practice the dignity of man" (29).

Kraynak’s complaint is that liberal democracy, together with its human rights stable-mate, is ideologically driven by a philosophy committed to a new notion of human dignity as autonomy of reason and will: a philosophy which aims at personal and political empowerment but produces a soul-less and often illiberal culture or political system. To this complaint he adds a Solzhenitsyn-like conundrum: "Modern liberal democracy needs Christianity to support its basic moral principles, but Christianity is not necessarily a liberal or a democratic religion" (269), nor indeed is it committed to the support of any particular political system. Given its Augustinian doctrine of the two cities, it is "transpolitical though not entirely apolitical" in nature, and ought to maintain a healthy scepticism about the democratic age and its human rights discourse (54; cf. 153).

What Christianity calls for is a stable constitutional order with modest (non-utopian) aspirations in the temporal realm and a willingness to facilitate, or at least not to hinder, the spiritual life of its people. For Kraynak such an order is best exemplified in a mixed regime, that is, in a constitutional monar-
chy with aristocratic and democratic elements. The hierarchical aspect of such an order is in keeping with Christian interests in an eternal world that transcends temporal existence. It is liberal democracy's doubt about the imago dei and its denial that knowledge of the highest good is attainable—its "culture of disbelief" in the transcendent—which undermines its foundational claims about the dignity of the person.

"My principal contention," says Kraynak (xv), "is that a Christian theory of constitutionalism, derived from the distinction of the Two Cities rather than from the liberal doctrine of private rights, is the best way to resolve the dilemma posed.... It provides a religious foundation for constitutional government, including certain forms of constitutional democracy, while protecting Christianity from the influence of liberalism and other political ideologies that threaten to turn a lofty spiritual tradition into nothing more than a mirror image of the modern world."

One might be tempted to dismiss Kraynak's book as quixotic. It is unlikely, I think, to persuade the garden-variety democrat or human rights advocate that his or her views are self-defeating. Many among his co-religionists will also be difficult to persuade, as he anticipates. Whether that will be more their fault, as dupes of democracy, than a fault of the book is difficult to say. The latter is readable and learned, often trenchant, but sometimes too hasty in its handling of concepts or texts to be convincing.

Take, for example, the crucial "two cities" doctrine. It is not clear whether in Kraynak's hands it is made to rest on a hierarchical distinction between spiritual verities and the material world—in which case Platonism might serve just as well, as per Allan Bloom's prescription, say—or whether it rests on a political distinction between communities formed respectively by the love of God—and of his Christ—and by the love of self in place of God. Indeed, it is not clear whether Kraynak would think the question significant. In this book Christology remains in brackets, so to speak. Christianity being "an otherworldly religion" (183), the political implications of the basic Christian confession, "Jesus is Lord," never really come up for consideration. So the two cities doctrine, though belaboured, never really comes into focus.

This explains why Kraynak's attempt to jettison Kant and return to Augustine is not entirely successful. Perhaps it also explains why he concludes rather lamely by speaking of the present age as a period in which "we are necessarily guided by prudence and the thought of hunkering down until the Second Coming" (272). The programmatic reference to prudence, and to the variety of prudential approaches that might be taken to constitutional politics, is unobjectionable. But "hunkering down"? Better the quixotic! Or, better yet, a less dualistic and more authentically Christian political theory, and doctrine of the imago, than Kraynak offers. (One could wish that he had read Oliver O'Donovan's The Desire of the Nations, to which he appeals, much more closely.)
On the other hand, it needs to be said that Kraynak has chosen a legitimate target, and has struck it some worthy blows. For modern liberal democracy is indeed in a dilemma over human dignity. There is no clearer sign of that than here in Canada, where democracy is increasingly in thrall to lobby groups and judicial activists, whose decadent and hollow view of human dignity does not even rise to the level of autonomy of reason and will. Having abandoned any philosophical or theological basis for human dignity, they are reduced to a purely subjectivist notion: the notion that dignity (in Justice Iacobucci’s words) “means that an individual or group feels self-respect and self-worth.” Against this decline—though curiously he shows no interest in this land of constitutional monarchy north of the border—Kraynak’s book protests. The protest, at least from where I sit, is welcome.

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The subtitle of this book could be slightly misleading if one expects an equal treatment of the trinitarian theologies of Barth, the Cappadocians and Zizioulas; this it is not. Perhaps a better subtitle would have been: “Can Barth’s Trinitarian theology be reconciled with Eastern communio theologies?” According to Collins, the answer is, “Explicitly, no. But implicitly, yes.”

Collins’ approach is to examine Barth’s trinitarian theology through three correlating concepts: event, revelation and Trinity. According to Collins, the concept of “event” is Barth’s attempt to speak of the “how” of revelation, “Trinity” as the concept of God’s self-interpretation, and “revelation” as a correlative concept that brings together event and Trinity. But ultimately, Collins’ goal is to show how Barth’s doctrine of the Trinity might be interpreted as a Westernized version of the communitarian ontology of the Cappadocian fathers in general and the theology of John Zizioulas in particular. Drawing upon a Jungelian interpretation of Barth which suggests that “God’s being in the Church Dogmatics is founded on the claim that God’s essence is act,” Collins attempts to show that the “act of God’s being is an event of communion: an event between the divine persons Father, Son and Holy Spirit” (101).

Central to Collins’ assessment is his attention to Barth’s preference for the phrase tropos hyparxeos over hypostasis to designate the “three” of the Trinity. Though both terms were Cappadocian in origin, Barth preferred the former term because he was convinced that it more accurately represented the Cappadocian intent than the latter. This consequently led Barth to use the term Seinsweise (“mode of being”) in the Church Dogmatics in favour of “Person” (=hypostasis) because Barth assumed that speaking of three Persons could