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
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Problematizing Religion in a Secular Age

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Book Reviews

Situating the Reasonable Accommodation Debates in Quebec's Contention for Sovereignty

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On 18 October 2017, amidst controversies, *Parti libéral du Québec* (PLQ) passed Bill 62 in Quebec's National Assembly with a vote of 66 to 51. Titled, "An Act to foster adherence to State religious neutrality and, in particular, to provide a framework for requests for accommodations on religious grounds in certain bodies," the new law sought to emphasise state neutrality towards religions, and to offer streamlined legal guidelines for reasonable accommodation requests in the province. What made the headlines, however, was its Section 10,[1] which stipulated that public employees, and persons receiving services from them, must have their faces uncovered. Although different interpretations have been suggested regarding its implementation, and reasonable accommodation requests could be made with regard to this clause, Section 10 effectively prohibited Muslim women wearing the burka or niqab from receiving public services, such as transportation, unless they be prepared to reveal their face at the time of service. Quebec, thus, became the first place in North America to restrict face veils in public, albeit in a more limited fashion than the comprehensive bans promulgated in Belgium (2010), France (2011), Austria (2017), and Denmark (2018).

Bill 62 was meant as a solution to the reasonable accommodation controversies that dominated the Quebecois sociopolitical scene over at least the last decade, yet it faced a strong backlash from two diametrically opposed positions. Liberal critics suggested that the bill infringed upon religious liberties as protected by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Federal politicians joined in with human rights associations and Muslim organisations to openly condemn the bill, while several public protests took place in Montréal and other cities in the immediate aftermath of the vote. Passing verdict on a filed legal challenge, the Quebec Superior

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1. The stipulation on face covering was in Section 9 in earlier drafts of the bill.

Court suspended Section 10 of the bill in December 2017, and once again in June 2018 soon after the government published guidelines for the bill's application.[2] On the other side of the spectrum, *Parti Québécois* (PQ) and *Coalition Avenir Québec* (CAQ) voted against the bill on the grounds that it did not go far enough. In its place, the two parties agreed on promulgating a revamped *Charte de laïcité* whereby face covering would be completely prohibited in public, and all religious symbols would be banned for public employees in positions of authority (e.g., police officers, judges, prison guards, teachers and daycare educators).[3] Following the bitter controversy triggered by Bill 62, the campaign for the provincial election of October 2018 featured heated discussions on immigration, Quebecois values, and the place of religion in the provincial public sphere.[4] François Legault, leader of the victorious CAQ, promised before the elections that his government would uphold Bill 62's restriction on face veils, and pass a state secularism bill in its first year to ban religious symbols for public employees in positions of authority.[5] According to survey data, 87% of Quebecois supported Bill 62, a figure that reached 91% among francophone citizens.[6]

A rich scholarly literature emerged in the last decade to make sense of the polemics on religion in the province. These focused, among other

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2. Guiseppe Valiante, "Quebec judge once again suspends application of province's religious neutrality law," *Global News*, June 28, 2018, https://globalnews.ca/news/4303643/quebec-judge-once-again-suspends-application-of-provinces-religious-neutrality-law/.

3. It should be noted that the CAQ's proposal does not include daycare educators, whereas that of the PQ does. See Catherine Lévesque, "Un gouvernement de la CAQ abolirait la loi sur la neutralité religieuse," *Huffington Post*, October 18, 2017, https://quebec.huffingtonpost.ca/2017/10/18/un-gouvernement-de-la-caq-abolirait-la-loi-sur-la-neutralite-religieuse_a_23247787/; Hugo Pilon-Larose, "Laïcité: le PQ présentera un projet de loi et ses sanctions," *La Presse*, October 25, 2017, http://www.lapresse.ca/actualites/politique/politique-quebecoise/201710/25/01-5141188-laicite-le-pq-presentera-un-projet-de-loi-et-ses-sanctions.php.

4. "Coalition's Francois Legault on hot seat over proposed French, values tests for newcomers," *National Post*, September 14, 2018, https://nationalpost.com/pmn/news-pmn/canada-news-pmn/coalitions-francois-legault-on-hot-seat-over-proposed-french-values-tests-for-new-comers.

5. Alain Laforest, "La laïcité de l'État imposée dès un premier mandat caquiste," *TVA Nouvelles*, August 19, 2018, https://www.tvanouvelles.ca/2018/08/19/la-laicite-de-letat-imposee-des-un-premier-mandat-caquiste.

6. Angus Reid Institute, "Quebec Politics: Major support for Bill 62," October 4, 2017, http://angusreid.org/quebec-provincial-issues-sept/.

things, on the reasonable accommodation disputes, the Bouchard-Taylor Commission (2007-8) and its aftermath, the Charter of Values bill (2013-14), and more recently, Bill 62, from legal, social, and political standpoints. To contribute to the conversation from a historical sociological perspective, the purpose of this article is to propose a working outline to situate the debates in the progression of Quebec's national identity and state building processes. The argument is that the reasonable accommodation controversies are closely related to the province's quest for sovereignty since the Quiet Revolution. The concept of sovereignty is used here not to denote political independence *per se*, as attempted in Quebec's 1980 and 1995 referendums. Instead, I subscribe to a more comprehensive understanding of sovereignty that includes economic-distributional, political-administrative, and cultural-ideological pillars of nation and identity building.[7]

Based on these three pillars, this article begins with an overview of Quebec's national transformation since the 1960s. It puts forward the thesis that the economic-distributional and political-administrative aspects of nation building during this period lost their primacy in the making of Quebecois identity due to neoliberal globalisation and failed independence attempts, respectively. This has led to greater emphasis on the cultural-ideological pillar, especially since the 1980s and 1990s, whereby, along with language, the issue of religion has gradually come to be at the forefront of identity discussions. Focusing on this phenomenon, this article then moves on to demonstrate that, especially in the face of newcomer religions, a unique and seemingly contradictory combination of *laïcité* as a more assertive approach of secularism on the one hand, and a "patrimonialised" understanding of Catholicism on the other, have increasingly been articulated as core values that define Quebec's cultural sovereignty within Canada today. Finally, a number of conclusions are drawn from this analysis,

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7. Jane Jacobs, *The Question of Separatism: Quebec and the Struggle for Sovereignty* (Montréal: Baraka Books, 2011), 134. Jacobs describes the three notions of sovereignty as follows: "Sovereignty is many-sided. Its various aspects overlap and interlock." Since the Quiet Revolution, we can think of the "proposals for a sovereign Quebec as falling into three broad groups: cultural sovereignty, economic sovereignty and political sovereignty" (134). This distinction is in line with scholarship on modern state formation, where political, economic, and ideological sources of social power are identified. See, for instance, Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1986); and Garry Runciman, *Treatise on Social Theory*, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1983).

particularly on how a historical sociological perspective may advance the contemporary debates on reasonable accommodation in Quebec.

Building Quebecois Sovereignty since the 1960s

The Quiet Revolution and its aftermath brought together economic-distributional, political-administrative, and cultural-ideological aspects of nationhood in the construction of Quebec. These three pillars developed in an interconnected and partly overlapping fashion with a view to ameliorating the situation of Quebecers of French-Canadian descent, especially vis-à-vis Anglophones. The multifaceted trajectory towards building a distinct nation within Canada in the 1960s rested primarily on a firm ideal of economic-distributional development. Among the poorest social groups in Canada prior to the Quiet Revolution, French-Quebecers embraced the notion of *rattrapage* ("catching up") to break free from the state of underdevelopment and reach the socio-economic levels of contemporary advanced nations. Inspired by the postcolonial spirit of the time, and encapsulated in the slogan "maîtres chez nous," a policy of economic nationalism was envisaged by the PLQ's Jean Lesage government from 1960 onward. This policy was characterised by state-led development, high economic regulation, and protectionism. Under the leadership of René Lévesque, then the Minister of Natural Resources, all private hydroelectric companies were nationalised in 1963 under *Hydro Québec*, representing the second major wave of nationalization since its founding in 1944. Public enterprises, SIDBEC (iron and steel), SOQUEM (mining), REXFOR (forestry) and SOQUIP (petroleum) were founded to tap into the province's natural resources. Towards building a Quebec-based integrated national market, interest rates were standardised across the province, investments were coordinated, the Labour Code was modernised in 1964, and a protectionist "buy-Quebec" policy was implemented. In 1961, a public hospital network was established, and *Société générale de financement* was founded the next year. In 1965, *Caisse de dépot et placement du Québec* was created, which undertook the administration of the assets of *Régie des Rentes du Québec* (RRQ, Quebec Pension Plan, founded in 1963). In the eyes of the key actors of the period, as summarised in the words of Premier Jean Lesage in 1962, "the era of

economic colonialism" was now "over."[8]

The economic-distributional component of nation building went hand in hand with Quebec's political-administrative empowerment. Self-identifying as a distinct nation, Quebec began reaching out to other nations through diplomacy. Delegations (*Maisons du Québec*) were opened in Paris and New York in 1961-2. At home, the government took on and refined various administrative tasks through the newly founded ministries of Education, Cultural Affairs, Immigration, Federal-Provincial Relations, and Social Affairs (precursor to the Ministry of Health and Social Services). Followed by the Commission of Inquiry on Education, the 1964 report by Mgr. Alphonse-Marie Parent outlined the need for a harmonised, more accessible education system in the province, which was acted on by the new Ministry of Education. In a series of reforms, while the confessional character of education was upheld (schools were divided along Catholic and Protestant lines), the Catholic Church's virtual monopoly on education was broken by the Ministry. The number of Catholic school boards was reduced from 1,500 to 55, curriculums were standardised across the province, and the salaries and working conditions of teachers were improved.[9] "Qui s'instruit s'enrichit" became the adage of the day. Along with education, health and social welfare services also went through secularisation and nationalisation through a transfer of authority from the Catholic establishment to the secular provincial administration. Secularisation was, therefore, a key component of Quebecois state building. From 1962 to 1966, employment in the public sector grew by 53% each year, and public spending by 21%. In total, health, social welfare, and education constituted almost 70% of Quebec's total spending during these years. And whereas state expenditure was $598 million in 1960, it was $4.5 billion in 1972.[10]

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8. Louis-Gilles Francoeur, "Les grands débats – Un néocolonialisme à la québécoise?" *Le Devoir*, April 2, 2011, https://www.ledevoir.com/societe/environnement/320240/les-grands-debats-un-neocolonialisme-a-la-quebecoise. For a more extensive discussion on the Quiet Revolution's economic reforms, see Pierre Godin, *La r*évolution *tranquille*, 5 vols. (Montréal: Boréal, 1991); Gérard Tremblay, *La révolution tranquille*, 2 vols. (Sainte-Anne-de-Beaupré: La Revue Sainte-Anne, 1999); and John A. Dickinson and Brian Young, *A Short History of Québec* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's UP, 2008).

9. Claude Corbo, *Le Rapport Parent, 1963-2003 : Une tranquille révolution scolaire?* (Montréal: L'Association québécoise d'histoire politique, 2004).

10. Denis Monière, *Ideologies in Québec: The Historical Development* (Toronto: University of

At the cultural-ideological level, the institutional weakening of the Catholic Church (which, it should be added, also experienced profound internal divisions and transformations itself[11]) was paralleled by the diminishment of its influence on Quebecois. Church attendance rates plummeted almost overnight, and especially in the 1970s, fertility rates dropped as oral contraception became widespread, and sexual liberation ensued. The first female deputy was elected in 1961. Accompanying women's liberation vis-à-vis the Church, Bill 16 lifted judicial restrictions to a married woman's legal status in 1964. For secular movements, such as the association *Mouvement laïque de la langue française* (founded in 1961) and others, the liberal reforms of the Second Vatican Council (1962-65) further confirmed the need to unravel the Church's hold on social and political affairs.[12] Although blatant anticlericalism or the French conception of *laïcité* were never embraced as mobilizing discourses in this process (as they had been in late nineteenth century France), "during the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s, the Québécois rid themselves of Catholicism" as a possessor of public power, which they saw as "a gangrenous limb poisoning the national body."[13] Meanwhile, Expo 67 showcased Quebec's development and boosted national pride. Charles de Gaulle's famous "Vive le Québec libre" speech of the same year confirmed and further inspired the national awakening. The promotion and flourishing of the French language in all aspects of social life was a key cultural constituent of building the nation. Quebecois literature, theatre, music, cinema, and overall artistic life went through a renaissance from the 1960s onward, catering towards a blossoming national identity. Legislation on French language further emboldened this trend. PLQ passed

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Toronto Press, 1981), 252.

11. For more on the Catholic Church, its divisions and transformations before and during the Quiet Revolution, see Michael Gauvreau, *Catholic Origins of Quebec's Quiet Revolution, 1931-1970* (Montréal: McGill-Queen's Press, 2005); David Seljak, 'Why the Quiet Revolution was "Quiet": The Catholic Church's Reaction to the Secularization of Nationalism in Quebec after 1960,' *Historical Studies* 62 (1996): 109-124; and Gregory Baum, *The Church in Quebec* (Ottawa: Novalis, 1991).

12. Gilles Routhier, *L'Église canadienne et Vatican II* (Saint-Laurent: Éditions Fidès, 1997).

13. Geneviève Zubrzycki, *Beheading the Saint: Nationalism, Religion, and Secularism in Quebec* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016), 2. As will be discussed later in this article, despite the institutional decline, Quebecers' relationship with Catholicism as it relates to their identity remains more complicated.

Bill 63 in 1969 to promote French and Bill 22 in 1974 to make it the official language. In 1977, finally, Lévesque's PQ passed the central legislative piece on the matter, Bill 101, which secured the primary status of French in law, administration, labour relations, commerce and business, education, and other spheres of public life.[14]

The Neoliberal Challenge and Failed Separatist Efforts

The tremendous achievements of the economic-distributional, political-administrative, and cultural-ideological pillars in transforming the French-Canadian identity into Quebecois nationhood cannot be overstated. The Quiet Revolution set the foundations for a fast-track progression into sub-state building for French-Quebecers in these three spheres, and created an economically rich, politically robust, and culturally distinct entity within Canada. "The project in this era was social and economic development … driven by the basic assumption that Québec is a Francophone nation, but one rooted solidly in a statist, Keynesian/social democratic model."[15] In the following decades, however, the first two of these pillars began losing their centrality in the making of Quebecois identity. While the nationalist economic-distributional paradigm was weakened by Quebec's integration into the global neoliberal economy, the ideal of political-administrative autonomy received major blows by the two failed referendums on independence.

First, the idea of economic sovereignty lost ground. Prevalent in the 1960s and 1970s, Quebec's nationalist economic principles were challenged by neoliberal globalization,[16] which diminished the state's protectionist

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14. For an overview of Quebec's cultural and linguistic politics, see Richard Handler, *Nationalism and the Politics of Culture in Quebec* (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988); and Richard Y. Bourhis, ed., *Conflict and Language Planning in Quebec* (Clevedon: Multilingual Matters, 1984).

15. Cory Blad, "Globalization and the Efficacy of National Culture: A Methodological Framework for Analyzing the Neoliberal State," *International Journal of Social Inquiry* 1, no. 2 (2008): 60; see 37-67.

16. Following Harvey, I define neoliberalism as a theory and policy framework of political economic practices holding that "human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade." It is a political economic project that characterized and directed the post-1980s wave of globalization (David Harvey, *A Brief History*

capacity as "neoliberal reforms began to erode traditional state supported services throughout the province."[17] Bill 75 in 1984 deregulated the financial infrastructure. Trade balance deficit grew significantly after 1980. Especially since the 1990s, precarious employment increased, while job security diminished in the province. Purchasing power did not increase after 1975, several national companies outsourced to other countries, government spending on social programs has been reduced, and foreign trade and circulation of capital were liberalised.[18] Although it may seem counterintuitive, sovereigntist leaders promoted policies to attract foreign direct investment and deregulated finance as a way of empowering Quebec's autonomous relationship with trade partners (especially US businesses) independent of federal Canadian intervention.[19] Quebec has, thus, been a keen supporter of NAFTA and WTO negotiations in order to carve out its own path for global integration. This "pro-business environment," which prioritised investment and limited the power of labour unions, "represented a major shift in the political culture of Quebec, which, since the Quiet Revolution, was dominated by the idea that government intervention in the economy was the most important strategy of national and social development."[20]

Second, in terms of political sovereignty, referendums on independence in 1980 and 1995 did not bear fruit. As a modern political project, Quebec's sovereignty movement dates back to *Rassemblement pour l'indépendance nationale* (RIN), a society founded in 1960, and which became a provincial

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of Neoliberalism [Oxford: Oxford UP, 2005], 2). It should be noted that neoliberalism does not mean the retreat of the state; instead, it reconfigures the state in line with market priorities often at the expense of social protection networks. Neoliberal transformations are not uniform around the globe; they present themselves in "variegated," geographically specific forms across different polities (Neil Brenner, Jamie Peck, and Nik Theodore, "Variegated Neoliberalization: Geographies, Modalities, Pathways," *Global Networks* 10, no. 2 [2010]: 182-222).

17. Blad, "Globalization and the Efficacy of National Culture," 60.

18. Gérard Bouchard, "Neoliberalism in Québec: The Response of a Small Nation under Pressure," in *Social Resilience in the Neoliberal Era*, eds. Peter A. Hall and Michèle Lamont (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2013), 268; see 267-292.

19. Cory Blad, *Neoliberalism and National Culture: State-Building and Legitimacy in Canada and Québec* (Leiden: Brill Publishers, 2011), 147.

20. David Seljak, "Resisting the 'No Man's Land' of Private Religion: The Catholic Church and Public Politics in Quebec," in *Religion and Canadian Society: Traditions, Transitions, and Innovations*, ed. Lori G. Beaman (Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press, 2006), 41; see 39-53.

political party in 1963. Through a merger of RIN and *Mouvement souveraineté-association*, the PQ was founded in 1968 as a centre-left sovereigntist party. They came to power in 1976 and held a referendum on 20 May 1980 requesting a mandate to negotiate sovereignty-association with Ottawa. 60% of Quebecers rejected the proposal, yet the PQ was re-elected in 1981.[21] Meanwhile, Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau introduced the Constitution Act in 1982, although Quebec never signed this document. An attempt at reconciliation with the Meech Lake Accord failed in 1990, as did the Charlottetown Accord in 1992. The next year, led by Lucien Bouchard, the separatist *Bloc Québécois* (established in 1991 as a federal party) won almost 50% of the votes in Quebec to become Canada's official opposition.[22] The PQ organised a second referendum on 30 October 1995 at which time the sovereignty option lost narrowly (49.4% yes to 50.6% no),[23] and after which Premier Jacques Parizeau notoriously blamed "money and the ethnic vote" for the defeat. Since then, political sovereignty has been on the backburner of Quebecois politics, especially as younger generations feel less and less passionate about separation. In a 2016 survey, three-quarters of Quebecers said the province should now remain within Canada.[24]

The argument supported here that economic-distributional and political-administrative pillars of sovereignty weakened over the past few decades does not imply that these have been completely erased from the picture. Indeed, social democratic protectionism still presents itself in the organisation of Quebec's economy, and political autonomy continues to be a core value in the province. For instance, despite neoliberalism, Quebec has managed to comparatively maintain important aspects of its social protection regime. Its unionisation rates remain the highest in Canada. Quebec resisted the strong wave of privatisation in sectors such as electricity, alcohol, lottery, insurance, and water supply. Hydro-Québec continues to be a source of national pride, Bombardier makes headlines frequently, and the protection

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21. Alain-G. Gagnon and Guy Lachapelle, "Québec Confronts Canada: Two Competing Societal Projects Searching for Legitimacy," *The Journal of Federalism* 26, no. 3 (1996): 179.
22. Gagnon and Lachapelle, "Québec Confronts Canada," 180.
23. Gagnon and Lachapelle, "Québec Confronts Canada," 179.
24. Angus Reid Institute, "What makes us Canadian?" October 3, 2016, http://angusreid.org/canada-values/.

and subsidising of – especially francophone – private companies continues. In Canada, Quebec provides the highest level of subsidies to companies, and its personal income tax is among the highest compared to other provinces.[25] In the words of Gérard Bouchard, "Québec society has … managed to resist many changes induced by neoliberalism," and "according to numerous polls … social-democracy (state intervention, egalitarianism, networking, and social participation) is deeply rooted in the Québec psyche."[26] Likewise, despite the failure of various attempts at full political sovereignty, the idea of Quebec as a distinct political entity lives on. Although binding, the 1982 Canadian Constitution was never ratified by Quebec, which holds dear its own 1975 Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms as a semi-constitutional document. Especially in immigration and cultural policy, Canada devolves a considerable amount of authority to Quebec. After 1995, "the Supreme Court has rendered decisions recognizing the uniqueness of Québec, its social values, and its distinct civil law characteristics."[27] The Canadian parliamentary motion of 2006 recognised that Quebec and the Quebecois form a nation within a united Canada.[28] Within the province, even federalist parties, such as the PLQ, campaign for a constitutional recognition of Quebec's distinct nationhood, and a "greater asymmetry" within Canada whereby "the concept of equality between provinces" should be challenged.[29] In addition to immigration and cultural policy, demands for further autonomy concern federal spending power, a provincial right to veto, and appointment of Quebec judges to the Supreme Court.[30]

Overemphasis on the Cultural: The Rise of Catho-*Laïcité*

Despite their ongoing residual relevance, however, the sway of economic-distributional and political-administrative pillars is no longer as

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25. Bouchard, "Neoliberalism in Québec," 270-278.

26. Bouchard, "Neoliberalism in Québec," 272.

27. Secrétariat aux affaires intergouvernementales canadiennes, *Quebecers, Our Way of Being Canadians: Policy on Québec Affirmation and Canadian Relations* (Québec: Gouvernement du Québec, 2017), 43; see 46-47.

28. "House passes motion recognizing Quebecois as nation," *CBC News*, November 27, 2006, https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/house-passes-motion-recognizing-quebecois-as-nation-1.574359.

29. Secrétariat, *Quebecers*, 44.

30. Secrétariat, *Quebecers*, 48-54.

dominant as that of cultural-ideological sovereignty. Since 1971, Canada has subscribed to a policy of multiculturalism, in part as a way to deal with the burning national question in Quebec;[31] such became official federal policy with the integration of the concept in the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and the 1988 Multiculturalism Act. These steps were seen in Quebec as federal Canada's attempt to deemphasise French-Canadians as a founding nation and dilute them as one culture among others. As Kymlicka notes, they "have opposed the 'multiculturalism' policy because they think it reduces their claims of nationhood to the level of immigrant ethnicity."[32] Following the Quiet Revolution, and partly in response to federal Canada, Quebec had been developing its own *de facto* diversity management model, namely interculturalism. Although it was not theorized nor featured in official documents until relatively recently, Quebecois interculturalism has come to be defined in opposition to Canadian multiculturalism; particular emphasis has been placed on the perpetuation of French language-culture, and increased provincial jurisdiction over immigration, along with pluralism and intercommunity exchange as a way to enable the integration and participation of newcomers within a common identity.[33] Whether there are substantial differences between multiculturalism and interculturalism continues to be a matter of academic discussion, yet there is no disagreement that the distinction is real in terms of its consequences for political debates and identities in Quebec.[34]

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31. Eve Haque, "Multiculturalism within a Bilingual Framework: A Retrospective," *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 46, no. 2 (2014): 119-125.

32. Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 17.

33. Gérard Bouchard and Charles Taylor, *Building the Future: A Time for Reconciliation* (Québec: Gouvernement du Québec, 2008), 111-130.

34. See, for instance, Geoffrey Brahm Levey, "Interculturalism vs. Multiculturalism: A Distinction without a Difference?" *Journal of Intercultural Studies* 33, no. 2 (2012): 217-224; Charles Taylor, "Interculturalism or Multiculturalism?" *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 38, no. 4-5 (2012): 413-423; Daniel Weinstock, "Interculturalism and Multiculturalism in Canada and Quebec: Situating the Debate," in *Liberal Multiculturalism and the Fair Terms of Integration*, eds. Ayalet Banai et al. (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013), 92, see 91-108; Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood, "How does Interculturalism Contrast with Multiculturalism?" *Journal of Intercultural Studies* 33, no. 2 (2012): 175-196; Will Kymlicka, "Defending Diversity in an Era of Populism: Multiculturalism and Interculturalism Compared," in *Multiculturalism and Interculturalism: Debating the Dividing Lines*, eds. Nasar Meer, Tariq Modood, and Ricard

The sharp decline in birth rates (falling to 1.37 per woman in 1986) further exacerbated fears as to the extinction of French Canadian culture, as speculated in mainstream productions, such as the 1989 Radio-Canada documentary *Disparaître : le sort inévitable de la nation française d'Amérique?* Quebec's turn towards Francophone immigrants – including those from former French colonies – to protect the French language against English eventually paid off. In 2016, 78.1% of Quebecers were native French speakers (versus 7.7% English; the latter had been 13.3% in 1961). French is overwhelmingly dominant in contemporary Quebec's cultural consumption preferences. For instance, more than 90% of the most-watched TV programs are provincially produced, and only 1% of Francophone Quebecers favour films made in English Canada.[35] Yet an unintended consequence of linguistic success has been a new cultural challenge since the 1980s and 1990s, this time coming from religion. Although newcomers to Quebec continue to be predominantly Christian (and in particular Catholic),[36] many new Francophone immigrants have also been non-Christian, which "has made religion once again a matter of public discourse."[37] In short, although economic protectionism and political independence are no longer powerful mobilizers of Quebec identity today, cultural autonomy continues to be a key national marker. And within the cultural domain, the religious difference of many immigrants is increasingly overtaking the linguistic anxieties of the past, which is in line with a larger trend around the world where "religion has turned into the main category of globalized identity politics," and "governmental attempts at integration have been recast in religious idioms, largely redefining issues of [diversity] … in terms of religious pluralism."[38] In a 2013 survey, 77% of Quebecers responded that "the values of Quebec's identity are at risk due to reasonable accommodation"; 64% thought

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Zapata-Barrero (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2016), 158-177.

35. Jean-Marc Léger et al., *Le Code Québec : les sept différences qui font de nous un peuple unique au monde* (Montréal: Les Éditions de l'Homme, 2016), 143.

36. Gouvernement du Québec, *Recueil de statistiques sur l'immigration et la diversité au Québec* (Québec: Bibliothèque et Archives nationales du Québec, 2014), 9. Available at: http://www.midi.gouv.qc.ca/publications/fr/dossiers/STA_ImmigrDiversite_Politique.pdf.

37. Zubrzycki, *Beheading the Saint*, 15.

38. Marian Burchardt, "Religion and Secularism in Neoliberal Capitalism," in *Beyond Neoliberalism: Social Analysis after 1989*, eds. Marian Burchardt and Gal Kirn (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 136, 144.

Quebec was already doing too much to "accommodate differences in culture and religion";[39] 86% were convinced that religious "minorities need to do more to fit in with the mainstream"; and 86% of Quebecers agreed with the statement that "Quebec culture needs protection."[40]

Quebec's identity anxieties regarding "newcomer" religions (such as Islam, Orthodox Judaism, and Sikhism) have greatly deepened, especially since 2006-7, when the reasonable accommodation debates intensified exponentially (so much so that the Bouchard-Taylor Report referred to the March 2006-June 2007 interval as "a time of turmoil").[41] In March 2006, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal on the "Multani Affair," thereby authorizing the carrying of the *kirpan* (ceremonial dagger of orthodox Sikhs) in schools. The same month, at the request of the Orthodox Jewish community, a YMCA in Montréal replaced the regular glass windows in one of their exercise rooms, which had blinds, with frosted glass to further obscure the view of women in exercise clothes. Later in the year, a Muslim father filed a complaint against a childcare centre in Montréal, demanding that they serve halal food for his sons. In the course of about a year, some forty other cases were picked up (and often sensationalized) by the media, all of which concerned the accommodation of religious minorities. The issues ranged from practices involving the turban, *hijab*, and kosher food to requests for gender-based separation, blood transfusion, and exemption from music classes.[42]

As accommodating religious minorities became a widespread concern, other developments in the early 2000s witnessed the questioning of Catholicism's lasting influence in public institutions. With a series of reforms between 1997 and 2008, the confessional education system put in place during the Quiet Revolution was completely secularized. School boards were redefined along linguistic rather than confessional lines, meaning that the Church and state no longer shared responsibility for education. Confessional religious education, moreover, was replaced by a mandatory

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39. Angus Reid Institute, "Quebecers say they're too accommodating," September 16, 2013, http://angusreid.org/quebecers-say-theyre-too-accommodating-other-canadians-disagree/.

40. Angus Reid Institute, "Quebecers, Canadians split on proposed Charter of Values," September 10, 2013, http://angusreid.org/quebecers-canadians-split-on-proposed-charter-of-values/.

41. Bouchard and Taylor, *Building the Future*, 53.

42. Bouchard and Taylor, *Building the Future*, 48-58.

ethics and religious culture program.[43] In September 2006, the city of Laval was ordered by the Quebec Human Rights Tribunal to halt the practice of reciting Catholic prayers at their municipal council meetings. The same issue inaugurated a decade-long legal battle in the same year in Saguenay, repeating a similar controversy in Outremont in 1999. Another recurring debate was on the acceptability of installing Christmas trees in public buildings, and whether "happy holidays" should be preferable to "Merry Christmas." Likewise, the appropriateness of maintaining the crucifix hanging in the provincial legislature became a point of heated discussion. For some Quebecers, these instances created the impression that Canadian multiculturalism (and the federal government in general) was forcing Quebec to scrap its Catholic heritage while giving too many concessions to religious minorities.[44] The open letter of Mario Dumont in January 2007, then leader of the political party *Action démocratique du Québec*, hoped to capitalize on such sentiment, denouncing the provincial government for failing to assert national values, and giving in to minority pressures. The same month, the small town of Hérouxville made international news when it passed a reactionary code of conduct, rejecting various reasonable accommodation practices for religious minorities, despite provincial and federal laws protecting them.[45]

With a view to protecting cultural sovereignty, Quebec's response to the controversies on religion, immigration, and reasonable accommodation has involved two tendencies that are *prima facie* in opposition. On the one hand, the concept of *laïcité* has gained a greater emphasis in public discourse as a philosophical outlook and policy framework to address the issue of religious diversity. On the other hand, a novel appreciation for Catholicism as a nationalised identity marker has emerged through what has been termed the "patrimonialisation" of religion. The unlikely combination that makes up this Catho-*laïcité*,[46] or secularism with Catholic partialities, demonstrates the

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43. Micheline Milot, "Ecole et religion au Québec : une laïcité en tension," *Spirale - Revue de recherches en education* 39 (2007): 165-176.

44. Louis-Philippe Lampron, "The Quebec Charter of Values: Using the French Concept of Laïcité to Create a Clash with the Canadian Multiculturalism," in *Politics of Religion and Nationalism: Federalism, Consociationalism and Secession*, eds. Ferran Requejo and Klaüs-Jurgen Nagel (London: Routledge, 2015), 141; see 137-150.

45. Bouchard and Taylor, *Building the Future*, 56.

46. Jean-Yves Pranchère, "Catho-laïcité," *Revue des deux mondes*, April (2011): 109–32; Jean-

cultural uniqueness of Quebec in different ways. While *laïcité* is presented as a buffer against Canadian multiculturalism, Catholicism highlights the Quebecois heritage on a predominantly Protestant continent with new and growing religions. In either case, the cultural sovereignty of the province is underscored.

The French conception of *laïcité* began appearing in public discourse and official policy documents in Quebec in the 1990s. Reports of *Conseil du statut de la femme* in 1995 and 1997, as well as the 1997, 1999, and 2004 publications of *Conseil des relations interculturelles*, exemplify this turning point.[47] Since then, despite the Bouchard-Taylor Report's call for *laïcité ouverte*, or a more inclusive form of secularism, a more absolutist and often oversimplified interpretation of the French concept has been championed in some Quebecois intellectual circles, as well as legislative documents.[48] For instance, multiple books have been published on why Quebec needs a more assertive form of secularism to clear the public space of religious representations;[49] also, the PQ's Charter of Values (2013-14) included the word *laïcité* in the bill's title and justified its will to ban the wearing of religious symbols by public workers with this concept. Emphasising *laïcité* as an inspirational model of integration, then Premier Pauline Marois uttered that "the best example, in my opinion, is France."[50] This "*laïcité* narrative," which is more a constituent of a nationalist discourse

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Paul Willaime, "La religion civile à la française et ses métamorphoses," *Social Compass* 40, no. 4 (1993): 571–80.

47. Pauline Coté, "Québec and Reasonable Accommodation: Uses and Misuses of Public Consultation," in *Religion and Diversity in Canada*, ed. Lori Beaman (Boston: Brill Publishers, 2011), 41-66. It should be noted, however, that the word *laïcité* was missing in the secularising education acts of 2000 and 2005, as well as the ensuing ministry guidelines.

48. David Koussens and Valérie Amireaux, "Du mauvais usage de la laïcité française dans le débat public québécois," in *Penser la laïcité québécoise : Fondements et défense d'une laïcité ouverte au Québec*, ed. Sébastien Lévesque (Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 2014), 55-75.

49. See, for instance, Daniel Baril and Yvan Lamonde, eds., *Pour une reconnaissance de la laïcité au Québec: Enjeux philosophiques et politiques* (Laval: Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 2013); Louise Mailloux, *La Laïcité ça s'impose: La laïcité québécoise, un projet inachevé et menace* (Montréal: Renouveau Québécois, 2011); Caroline Beauchamp, *Pour un Québec laïque* (Laval: Presses de l'Université Laval, 2011).

50. Geneviève Lavoie, "La laïcité française inspire Marois," *Journal de Québec*, December 13, 2013, https://www.journaldequebec.com/2013/12/13/la-laicite-francaise-inspire-marois.

of mobilization than based on legal precedents,[51] has often been used to "create a clash with … Canadian multiculturalism" and assert Quebec's own vision of national cohesion.[52] Representing a transition from "linguicism to secularism" as the key issue of cultural anxiety, the *laïcité* narrative seeks to "reclaim the cultural prominence of the French Canadian majority" while also "enhancing Quebec's distinctiveness and autonomy within the Canadian institutional framework."[53] In the process, this discourse also taps into Quebec's secularising heritage and the religious scepticism since the Quiet Revolution, which aims to create an image of continuity with the province's past (although *laïcité* was not a commonly known or used concept in Quebec society during that period). In this sense, the *laïcité* narrative has often undermined the notion of open secularism combined with interculturalism, as defined and suggested in the Bouchard-Taylor Report.[54]

Concurrent with the rising prevalence of *laïcité*, Catholicism has also been gaining emphasis as a cultural asset unique to Quebecers, although in novel and secularised forms, whereby it is embraced not as "religion," but as "religious tradition." According to Riesebrodt, while religious actions refer to "those whose meaning is defined by their reference to personal or impersonal superhuman powers," religious tradition is "the historical continuity of systems of symbols" that derive from religion, and which often gets intermingled with ethnicity, nationalism, and the larger cultural framework in which it has historically grown.[55] Some survey data might help

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51. Leila Benhadjoudja, "Laïcité narrative et sécularonationalisme au Québec à l'épreuve de la race, du genre et de la sexualité," *Studies in Religion* 46, no. 2 (2017): 272-91.

52. Lampron, "The Quebec Charter of Values," 147.

53. Daniel Weinstock, "Laïcité et multiculturalisme : même combat ?" in *Penser la laïcité québécoise : Fondements et défense d'une laïcité ouverte au Québec*, ed. Sébastien Lévesque (Québec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 2014), 21-30.

54. Interculturalism, according to these authors, favors an inclusive form of *laïcité*, as opposed to an absolutist version that prohibits the existence of religious representations in the public sphere. In addition to the Bouchard-Taylor Report, they expanded on these ideas separately. See, for instance, Gérard Bouchard, *L'interculturalisme : Un point de vue québécois* (Montréal: Les Éditions du Boréal, 2012); and Jocelyn Maclure and Charles Taylor, *Laïcité et liberté de conscience* (Montréal: Les Éditions du Boréal, 2010).

55. Martin Riesebrodt, *The Promise of Salvation: A Theory of Religion* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 76, xii; cited in Geneviève Zubrzycki, "Religion, Religious Tradition, and Nationalism: Jewish Revival in Poland and 'Religious Heritage' in Québec," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 51, no. 3 (2012): 442. The distinction is in line with Demerath's

demonstrate the validity of the distinction for the Quebecois population. Quebecers are "neither practising nor believing, but Catholic even so." Only 6-8% attend Mass weekly, and belief in every article of faith (such as in God/higher power, Hell, Heaven, life after death) is without exception the lowest in Canada, but about 80% declare themselves Catholic.[56] Supporting these general trends, more recent survey data further suggests that having French as a mother tongue is the most important factor in predicting Catholic affiliation, confirming the link between national and religious identities.[57] 88% of Quebecers, moreover, continue to identify as Catholic if they were brought up in a Catholic household.[58] Quebec's religious landscape, in short, represents the opposite of what sociologist Grace Davie calls "believing without belonging."[59] Despite low levels of belief and practice, the ongoing significance of Catholic tradition and identity for Quebecers is beyond

concept of "cultural religion," which is "an identification with a religious heritage without any religious participation or a sense of personal involvement per se" (N. Jay Demerath III, *Crossing the Gods: World Religions and Worldly Politics* [New Brunswick: Rutgers UP, 2001], 59); or Gans's notion of "symbolic religiosity," which designates "an attachment to a religious culture that does not entail regular participation in its rituals or organizations" (Herbert J. Gans, "Symbolic Ethnicity and Symbolic Religiosity: Towards a Comparison of Ethnic and Religious Generation," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 17, no. 4 [1994]: 577-92; cited in Claire Mitchell, *Religion, Identity and Politics in Northern Ireland: Boundaries of Belonging and Belief* [Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005], 6). It is also in line with Charles Taylor's notion of "Neo-Durkheimian" religion in which, instead of belief, religion offers an implicit core for national identity (Taylor, *A Secular Age* [London: Harvard UP, 2007], 455-459).

56. These statistics are, respectively, from the following: Konrad Yakabuski, "Neither practising nor believing, but Catholic even so," *Globe and Mail*, August 14, 2009, https://beta.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/neither-practising-nor-believing-but-catholic-even-so/article4329828/; Randy Boswell, "Religion not important to most Canadians," *National Post*, April 7, 2012, http://nationalpost.com/holy-post/religion-not-important-to-most-canadians-although-majority-believe-in-god-poll; and Angus Reid Institute, "A spectrum of spirituality: Canadians keep the faith to varying degrees, but few reject it entirely," April 13, 2017. For the detailed report: http://angusreid.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/2017.04.10_FaithContinuum-Demos_releasetables.pdf.

57. Jean-François Nault and E.-Martin Meunier, "Is Quebec Still a Catholically Distinct Society within Canada? An Examination of Catholic Affiliation and Mass Attendance," *Studies in Religion* 46, no. 2 (2017): 237; see 230-248.

58. Reginald Bibby and Angus Reid, *Canada's Catholics: Vitality and Hope in a New Era* (Ottawa: Novalis, 2016).

59. Grace Davie, "Believing without Belonging: Is This the Future of Religion in Britain?" *Social Compass* 37, no. 4 (1990): 455-469.

doubt.

To be sure, Quebec's twofold relationship with Catholicism is not new; it has a long history. On the one hand, as discussed in previous sections, nationalism since the 1960s developed in large part as a rejection of the Church's authority in public life. The Church came to be seen as a backward force that stood in the way of Quebec's sovereign nation building since the Quiet Revolution, and a detriment to the social and economic modernisation of the territory. The Church's hold on gender relations, education, culture, social services, and labour unions was broken; religious scepticism became a constitutive element of modern Quebecois nationalism. On the other hand, Catholicism has always represented a distinctive cultural marker to hold on to against largely Protestant English Canada. After the British conquest of New France, the Church played a key role in the demographic and cultural survival of the French colonists. As the latter feared assimilation in the Act of Union (1841) and the Constitution Act (1867), the Church became the unifying institution and symbol for the maintenance of a distinct French identity throughout the nineteenth century and onwards.[60] And since the reasonable accommodation debates, Catholicism has been becoming a cultural marker in the face of newcomer religions. *Québécois de souche*, although often not religious themselves, and often strongly loyal to the province's secularising spirit since the 1960s, fear that the complete undermining of Catholicism may be equivalent to the undermining of the French-Canadian culture in North America, as religion and ethnicity have been inseparable to them for centuries.

Catho-*laïcité* in today's Quebec presents itself through the "patrimonialisation" of the religious tradition, which is "the discursive, material, and legal ways in which religious symbols, artifacts, and practices are sacralized as secular elements of the nation and its history."[61] In this formula, the crucifix hanging in the Quebec provincial legislature since 1936, for instance, does not represent religion, but heritage. The immediate response of Quebec's politicians to the Bouchard-Taylor Report in 2008 was to pass, on the same day as the report's publication, a unanimous parliamentary

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60. Fernand Dumont, "Histoire du catholicisme québécois, histoire d'une société," *Recherches sociographiques* 27, no. 1 (1986): 115–25.
61. Zubrzycki, *Beheading the Saint*, 164.

motion to protect the crucifix.[62] Then Premier Jean Charest defended his government's proposition by asserting that "the crucifix is about 350 years of history in Quebec that none of us are ever going to erase."[63] Similarly, days after passing Bill 62 on religious neutrality, the PLQ rejected a motion to remove the crucifix, and the Minister of Culture, Marie Montpetit, said that the crucifix "is above all a patrimonial symbol … There's a history behind it."[64] Bill 62 itself, although promoting "religious neutrality," clarified in its introduction and Section 16 that "the measures introduced in this Act must not be interpreted as affecting the emblematic and toponymic elements of Québec's cultural heritage, in particular its religious cultural heritage, that testify to its history."[65] The PQ's Charter of Values in 2013 contained similar language to preserve Catholic symbols (including the crucifix in the parliament and the 100-foot cross on Mount Royal, Montréal), and as many commentators have pointed out, its suggested ban on religious garments for public workers "inherently favoured Christians, who are not required to wear religious symbols or specific forms of clothing."[66] Since 1995, moreover, the government spent close to $300 million through the *Conseil du patrimoine religieux du Québec* to preserve and maintain Catholic-patrimonial buildings and artefacts. Though overturned by the Supreme Court of Canada two years later, in 2013 the Quebec Court of Appeal upheld Catholic prayers in Saguenay's municipal council meetings as compatible with secularism, as it was deemed to represent a patrimonial (and not religious) practice. The judge's opinion stated that "the state is supposed to defend the common good – including the safekeeping of its cultural heritage," and that "we still cannot ignore the patrimonial reality without risking that [Quebec] cut

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62. "Québec garde le crucifix," *Radio-Canada*, May 22, 2008, https://ici.radio-canada.ca/nouvelle/397862/reax-bt-politique.

63. "Crucifix stays in legislature, Charest says," *Hamilton Spectator*, May 23, 2008, https://www.thespec.com/news-story/2111583-crucifix-stays-in-legislature-charest-says/.

64. Martin Croteau, "Le gouvernement libéral refuse de retirer le crucifix à l'Assemblée nationale," *La Presse*, October 24, 2017, http://www.lapresse.ca/actualites/politique/politique-quebecoise/201710/24/01-5141100-le-gouvernement-liberal-refuse-de-retirer-le-crucifix-a-lassemblee-nationale.php.

65. R-26.2.01, "Act to foster adherence to State religious neutrality and, in particular, to provide a framework for requests for accommodations on religious grounds in certain bodies," 2017, http://legisquebec.gouv.qc.ca/en/ShowDoc/cs/R-26.2.01.

66. Zubrzycki, *Beheading the Saint*, 162.

itself off from the bases that shaped its evolution."[67] These are but a few examples that speak to the patrimonialisation of Catholicism, which, much like the simultaneous rise of the *laïcité* narrative, helps bring forth and aims to safeguard Quebec's cultural uniqueness.

Conclusions: Sovereignty by Other Means

Studying Quebec's complex history, which witnessed the construction of national sovereignty in its economic-distributional, political-administrative, and cultural-ideological pillars, may advance our understanding of the reasonable accommodation debates that dominated the province's last decade. As the first two of these pillars weakened due to neoliberal globalisation and failed independence referendums, the cultural-ideological pillar has come forward to be the core asset marking Quebecois specificity. The case of Quebec is not an outlier; it is part of a larger, global neoliberal trend whereby "the erosion of traditional legitimacy strategies," such as economic and political sovereignty, is commonly observed. In response, many states today seek "legitimacy through increasingly cultural means," which is all the more true for sub-state entities that are particularly "reliant on culture/ national identity for legitimation purposes."[68] And within the cultural domain in Quebec, given the relative security of the French language, the religious component of culture evolved to be crucial. Quebec's unique response to the reasonable accommodation debates, which amalgamated a rising emphasis on a *laïcité* narrative with a "patrimonialised" rendition of Catholicism, serves to highlight its cultural-ideological exceptionality vis-à-vis two different groups at the same time: religious minorities at home, and the largely Protestant, multiculturalist English Canada. The Bouchard-Taylor Report highlighted that "Quebecers of French-Canadian ancestry are still not at ease with their twofold status as a majority in Quebec and a minority in Canada."[69] Embracing the Catholic heritage while retaining allegiance to *laïcité* helps affirm the sovereignty of Quebec, and this time it is cultural. A longer-term, historical sociological perspective crystallises the

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67. *Saguenay (ville de) c. Mouvement laïque québécois*, [2013] QCCA 936. Greffe de Québec 200–09–007328–112 (150–53–000016–081), https://www.canlii.org/fr/qc/qcca/doc/2013/2013 qcca936/2013qcca936.html.

68. Blad, *Neoliberalism and National Culture*, 16-17.

69. Bouchard and Taylor, *Building the Future*, 18.

link between these two seemingly separate phenomena, namely Quebec's contention to be a sovereign nation and pursue identity building, and its more recent reasonable accommodation controversies. The working outline laid out in this paper could be enriched with the inclusion of multiple other explanatory variables, such as the changing dynamics of social class in the province, the altering relationship between urban and rural Quebec, as well as comparative-historical analyses that involve culturally similar cases, such as France and Belgium, and struggles for independence, such as in Scotland, Ireland, and Catalonia. The tools and methodologies of historical sociology have a lot to offer to further the conversation.

Politics or Piety? Debating the Function and Meaning of Religious Symbols in Quebec

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In many liberal democratic states, the presence of religious symbols in the public sphere has become a highly contentious issue. Since the 1980s, political and legal attempts to define the boundaries of religious freedom have increasingly centred on the right of citizens to wear religious symbols. In Canada, both provincial and federal courts have routinely upheld the rights of citizens to do so in the public sphere as a form of religious freedom,[1] and policy makers have generally refrained from introducing legislation that would curtail this right.[2] With the proposal of Bill 60 – commonly known as the "Charter of Values" – in 2013, the Quebec government broke with convention.[3] Bill 60 was introduced with the aim of officially declaring Quebec a secular state. As a corollary, the bill proposed that all employees of public institutions and organizations – including medical staff, teachers, and university professors – be required to abstain from wearing religious symbols, such as clothing, headgear or large jewelry, in the workplace.

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1. Well known cases on religious accommodation include *Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem*, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551, and *Multani v. Commission Scolaire Marguerite Bourgeoys*, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256. There are a few exceptions to this generalization: most notably, the 2008 Ontario Court of Justice ruling *R. v. Badesha*, [2008] O.J. Nº. 854 (Ont. C.J.), which denied a Sikh motorcyclist's claim that the motorcycle helmet provision of the province's Highway Traffic Act was discriminatory.

2. There are important exceptions. For instance, in 2011, the federal government of Canada amended citizenship regulations to require individuals taking the oath of citizenship to do so with their face uncovered. The policy was overturned in 2015 after the Federal Court of Appeals ruled that the requirement was not legally enforceable. See *Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Ishaq*, 2015 FCA 194.

3. See Quebec, *Bill n.60: Charter affirming the values of State secularism and religious neutrality and of equality between women and men, and providing a framework for accommodation requests*, 1st Sess., 40th Legs. (Éditeur officiel, 2013), http://www.assnat.qc.ca/en/travaux-parlementaires/projets-loi/projet-loi-60-40-1.html.

Despite strong support from the public,[4] the bill failed to pass into law. The ruling party – the *Parti Quebecois* (PQ) – lost their bid for re-election a few months after introducing the Charter as legislation.

While ultimately unsuccessful, the Charter remains a topic of popular debate and continues to influence public policy reforms in Quebec and Canada.[5] Its lasting significance stems in large part from the immense volume of media attention Bill 60 received. Attracting the attention of the media was a deliberate strategy employed by the government, which released a preliminary draft of the Charter in September of 2013 as part of an extensive publicity/information campaign intended to stir up public debate two months before Bill 60 was officially introduced at the National Assembly. The publicity campaign included press conferences, the creation of a website,[6] and numerous advertisements that appeared on television, social media platforms, newspapers, and in buses and metros. Throughout the campaign, the government promised to hold public consultation hearings on the proposed bill and strongly solicited individual citizens, public institutions, and community organizations to submit their comments. These hearings – which began in January 2014 – were broadcast live on television and over the internet, and were heavily commented on by the media, shaping the way Quebecers envision the role of religious symbols in the public sphere to this day.

This paper presents a lexicographic analysis of the discourse on religious symbols that developed within the public consultation hearings on Bill 60. I demonstrate that, during these hearings, government representatives used particular understandings of the function and meaning of religious symbols to justify the legality and necessity of Bill 60's controversial proposals. I argue that, by privileging the "sign-function" of a religious symbol over and against other functions of the symbol – namely the "participation-function"

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4. See Charles Tessier and Éric Montigny, "Untangling Myths and Facts: Who Supported the Québec Charter of Values?" *French Politics* 14, no. 2 (2016), 272-285.
5. In 2015, the Quebec government, under the leadership of the *Parti Libéral du Québec,* introduced new legislation on the religious neutrality of the state in the hopes of putting to rest the debate over religious symbols in the public sphere. The Bill was formally accepted in October 2017. See Quebec, *Bill n.62: An Act to foster adherence to State religious neutrality and, in particular, to provide a framework for requests for accommodations on religious grounds in certain bodies,* 1st Sess., 41st Legs. (Éditeur officiel, 2015).
6. The web site was http://www.nosvaleurs.gouv.qc.ca.

and the "practice-function" – politicians were able to defend their position that the presence of religious symbols compromises the religious neutrality of the state. This paper further discusses how an overemphasis on the sign-function supressed an understanding of religious symbols as objects of devotion or piety.

1. Religious Symbols and the Public Sphere in Quebec

The contemporary dispute over religious symbols is part of a much larger debate that has occupied Quebec since the 1960s concerning the role of religion in the public sphere. Prior to the 1960s, the Catholic Church functioned as the largest provider of social services in Quebec, overseeing areas that had been designated provincial responsibilities, such as education and healthcare. By the end of WWII, however, decades of poor investment in education by the Catholic Church and the provincial government had taken its toll. French-Catholic Quebecers were graduating high school and university at much lower rates than their English-Protestant counterparts. Women, in particular, were negatively affected by the Church's paternalist stance on female education and employment. The economic prosperity that characterized the post-war period in Canada and the United States was not felt by French-Catholic Quebecers, who began to resent the close association between the Catholic Church and the provincial government. By 1960, the Catholic Church was widely perceived as a corrupt, incompetent, and meddling force that sought to repress social progress and politically disenfranchise French-Canadians.[7]

In response to mounting public criticism of the province's institutions and infrastructure, newly elected premier Jean Lesage (1912-1980) embarked on a mission to modernize the state.[8] During the 1960s – a period known as the Quiet Revolution – efforts to secularize Quebec's public institutions centred on redefining the role of religious organizations in the

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7. Geneviève Zubryzcki, "Religion, Religious Tradition, and Nationalism: Jewish Revival in Poland and 'Religious Heritage' in Québec," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 51, no. 3 (2012): 442-455.

8. Jean Lesage and the *Parti Libéral du Québec* came into power in 1960, replacing *Union Nationale*, a conservative, nationalist provincial party. Under the leadership of Maurice Duplessis (1890-1959), *Union Nationale* held power in Quebec from 1936-1939 and again from 1944-1959.

administration, management and dissemination of public services. Despite the relatively high degree of anti-clericalism in popular society, there was no outright rejection of religion at the governmental or political level; rather, the government sought to maintain a cooperative relationship with local religious organizations while assuming control over public services that were traditionally viewed as belonging to the religious sphere.[9] Not all religions in Quebec were affected in the same way by these changes; while the Catholic Church lost considerable political and social power as a result of secularization, other religious communities benefited. For example, under the province's new policies, public funding was made available to Jewish private schools and the Montreal Jewish General Hospital.[10] Secularization during the Quiet Revolution can, thus, be described as a top-down, internal process of institutional reform aimed at modernizing the state and reinforcing the self-determination of Quebecois society.

1.1 Religious Symbols and the Quiet Revolution

In 1936, Maurice Duplessis – then Premier of Quebec – installed a crucifix above the speaker's chair in Quebec's National Assembly. The crucifix represented the strong relationship between the Catholic Church and the Quebec government, which thrived under Duplessis' leadership.[11] During the Quiet Revolution, the Duplessis era came to symbolize Quebec's ignorant past – even earning the moniker "La Grande Noirceur." However, Duplessis' crucifix received little attention from the public and politicians alike.[12] Ultimately, the state's project of secularizing Quebec's institutions

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9. The secularization of education in Quebec is a strong example of this collaborative approach. In 1961, the government appointed a member of the Catholic clergy – Msgr. Alphonse-Marie Parent (1906-1970) – to head a commission and produce a report on the state of education in Quebec. Based on the report, a new Ministry of Education was established in 1964, which devised a way to maintain a place for religion in schools. The Ministry established religious schoolboards and collaborated with Protestant and Catholic advisory committees to create curriculums with religious and secular components.

10. Pierre Anctil, *Trajectoires Juives au Québec* (Québec, QC: Université de Laval Press, 2010), 64.

11. Gerard Bouchard and Charles Taylor, *Building the Future: A Time for Reconciliation* (Québec, QC: Commission de consultation sur les pratiques d'accommodement reliées aux différences culturelles, 2008), 152.

12. Geneviève Zubryzcki, *Beheading the Saint: Nationalism, Religion and Secularism in Que-*

during the Quiet Revolution did not include the removal of religious symbols.[13]

While the state may have been ambivalent towards the presence of Catholic religious symbols in the public sphere, a growing and vocal segment of Quebec's society was not. Genevieve Zubryzcki argues that an "aesthetic revolt" against symbols of Quebec's Catholic-national identity led by left-wing nationalists was a core feature of the Quiet Revolution.[14] In response to this revolt, both the Church[15] and the government[16] reworked and reinterpreted public religious symbols, such as the St. Jean-Baptiste Parade. Instead of rejecting the parade, the state conscientiously and deliberately secularized it, stripping it of religious meaning and imbuing it with civic meaning. In the decades following the Quiet Revolution, this response became enigmatic of Quebec's approach to contested Catholic symbols in the public sphere.

1.2 Religious Symbols Today

In 1997, the Ministry of Education began a decade long project of educational reform to gradually replace its confessional school system with a linguistic model.[17] A major feature of this project was the replacement

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bec (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2016), 176.

13. In 1961, Jean Lesage rejected rumours that the secularization of Quebec's schools would result in the removal of crucifixes and catechism classes (Michel Gauvreau, *Catholic Origins of Quebec's Quiet Revolution* [Montréal: McGill-Queen's UP, 2014], 280).

14. Zubryzcki, *Beheading the Saint*, 18. Zubryzcki defines an aesthetic revolt as "a dual process whereby social actors contest and rework iconic symbols in the public sphere. Through those material manipulations, symbols acquire significations that lead to the articulation of new identities and provide momentum for institutional reforms" (Zubryzcki, *Beheading the Saint*, 22).

15. In response to criticisms that the traditional childish representation of St. Jean-Baptiste (the patron saint of Quebec) at the annual St. Jean-Baptiste Parade served to infantilize Quebec as a nation, the Catholic Church reworked the visual elements of the parade to "emphasize the saint's virility and strength of character" (Zubryzcki, *Beheading the Saint*, 85).

16. The St. Jean parade was rebranded in 1977 as "La Fête nationale" by the Quebec government, which also removed references to the parade's Catholic origins in its publications (Zubryzcki, *Beheading the Saint*, 116-118).

17. In the late 1990s, the Ministry of Education deconfessionalized the school system; reorganizing education on the basis of language rather than religion. Through this transition, Catholic and Protestant schools maintained their names and any religious symbols that were part of the

of religious education with a program designed to simultaneously educate students on religious diversity and cultivate a shared, secular civic identity; it was brought into effect in 2008.[18] Architects of the education reform argued that, despite Quebec's Catholic and Protestant heritage, confessional education was incompatible with the modern values of Quebec's secular society.[19] Unexpectedly, a large percentage of Quebecers did not support deconfessionalization. Whereas previous efforts to increase the integration of cultural minorities through legislation, such as Bill 101,[20] compelled minorities to adopt aspects of the majority culture, deconfessionalization, on the other hand, was widely perceived as altering the majority culture to satisfy the demands of cultural minorities.[21]

In the decade following deconfessionalization, resentment towards religious and cultural minorities for seeking legal accommodations from the state increased dramatically. Between 2006 and 2007, stories about religious minorities making unreasonable demands of public institutions and local businesses began circulating in the media, prompting public outrage.[22] In 2007, the government of Quebec appointed Charles Taylor and

building. These changes were implemented gradually over a 10-year period, which culminated in the replacement of religious instruction and pastoral care by the Ethics and Religious Cultures program and a new spiritual animation service that provides areligious support and guidance for students.

18. Spencer Boudreau, "From Confessional to Cultural: Religious Education in the Schools of Québec," *Religion & Education* 38, no. 3 (2011): 212-223.

19. Jean Pierre Proulx, *Laïcité et religion: Perspectives nouvelles pour l'école Québécoise* (Québec, QC: Groupe de travail sur la place de la religion à l'école, 1999).

20. Bill 101, Quebec's infamous Charter of the French Language, was introduced in 1977 to protect the French language from the threat of English assimilation. One of the key provisions of the bill enshrined French as the primary language of instruction from kindergarten to secondary school and restricts primary instruction in English to the children of parents who received English education in Canada. This provision was widely deemed necessary to ensure the integration of non-French speaking immigrants in Quebec.

21. On the reaction of Catholics to deconfessionalization, see Solange Lefebvre, "Neutralité, religion et éducation au Québec: Les réactions des catholiques," in *Trajectoires de la neutralité*, eds. Valerie Amireaux and David Koussens (Montréal: Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 2014), 85-99.

22. In 2006, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that a Quebec school board could not prohibit a Sikh student from wearing their *kirpan*, a ceremonial dagger, in schools, emphasizing the duty of public institutions to accommodate religious minority practices and symbols (*Multani v. Commission Scolaire Marguerite Bourgeoys*, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256). The Multani verdict

Gérard Bouchard to head a Consultation Commission to study the so-called "crisis of accommodation." In their final report, the commissioners made 37 recommendations, two of which pertained to the presence of religious symbols in the public sphere. The commissioners recommended that (1) "with regard to the wearing by government employees of religious signs:

- judges, Crown prosecutors, police officers, prison guards and the president and vice-president of the National Assembly of Québec be prohibited from doing so;
- teachers, public servants, health professionals and all other government employees be authorized to do so."

And (2) "the crucifix above the chair of the president of the National Assembly be relocated in the Parliament building in a place that emphasizes its meaning from the standpoint of heritage."[23]

These two recommendations drew the strongest reaction from the public and government alike. The latter was not pleased with the conclusions reached by the commissioners, who held politicians and the media responsible for stirring up controversy over cultural and religious accommodation. Within minutes of the report's publication, the government passed a resolution affirming that the crucifix should not be removed from the National Assembly. Despite the government's cold reception, a number of the report's recommendations to promote cultural and linguistic integration of minorities in Quebec were quietly enacted between 2008 and 2012.[24]

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was highly controversial and generated a lot of media attention. Following its publication on March 2, 2006, reporting of other cases of "unreasonable accommodation" became a regular occurrence in the news media (see Bouchard and Taylor, *Building the Future*, 53-58). In their analysis, Bouchard and Taylor found that "55% of the cases noted over the past 22 years, i.e. 40 cases out of 73, were brought to the public's attention during the period March 2006 to June 2007 alone. The investigation of the cases that received the most widespread media attention during this period of turmoil reveals that, in 15 of 21 cases, there were striking distortions between general public perceptions and the actual facts as we were able to reconstitute them" (Bouchard and Taylor, *Building the Future*, 18).

23. Bouchard and Taylor, *Building the Future*, 271.

24. In his detailed analysis of the government's response to the report, François Rocher notes that, though public officials did take some action on 28 of the 37 recommendations made in the report, most of these were only partially enacted. He concludes that only 36% of all recommendations were actually put in place and of those considered high-priority by the commis-

In 2013, after campaigning on a promise of ending the crisis over reasonable accommodation by applying the recommendations of the commissioners, the PQ government introduced Bill 60, entitled *Charter affirming the values of State secularism and religious neutrality and of equality between women and men, and providing a framework for accommodation requests*. Bill 60's main objectives were to establish the secular and religious neutrality of the state, while preserving "the emblematic and toponymic elements of Québec's cultural heritage that testify to its history."[25] In the pursuit of this goal, the bill imposed three obligations on personnel members of public bodies:[26]

1. To "maintain religious neutrality" and "exercise reserve with regard to expressing their religious beliefs."
2. "[N]ot [to] wear objects such as headgear, clothing, jewelry or other adornments which, by their conspicuous nature, overtly indicate a religious affiliation."
3. To "exercise their functions with their face uncovered, unless they have to cover their face in particular because of their working conditions or because of occupational or task-related requirements." This requirement also applied to non-personnel seeking services from the state.[27]

Bill 60 was subject to intense debate in the media and National Assembly. The *Parti Libéral du Québec* (PLQ) opposed the bill's blanket restriction on religious symbols, while the *Coalition Avenir Québec* (CAQ) suggested amending the restriction to apply only to personnel members in positions of coercive authority, as suggested by Bouchard and Taylor. Hoping to capitalize on public support for the bill and earn a majority government, the PQ called an election in May 2014. However, their strategy did not pay

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sioners, only 28% were enacted (François Rocher, "La mise en œuvre des recommandations de la Commission Bouchard-Taylor," in *L'Interculturel au Québec: Rencontres historiques et enjeux politiques [online]*, eds. Lomomba Emongo and Bob W. White [Montréal: Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 2014]).

25. Quebec, *Bill n.60*, 5.

26. The definitions of "public bodies" and "personnel members of public bodies" were deliberatively broad and included professionals, such as health-care physicians and dentists, who are self-employed yet receive payment for their services from the state.

27. Quebec, *Bill n.60*, 6.

off. The PLQ was elected to power in May 2014, putting an end to Bill 60.

2. Corpus Analysis of the Hearings

In response to the Charter of Values, the Quebec National Assembly received over 200 briefs from private citizens, non-governmental organizations, and public institutions. Public consultation hearings began in January 2014 and ended in late-February with the dissolution of the provincial parliament. Of the 200 briefs submitted, 69 briefs were presented before the Committee on Institutions in the National Assembly in 13 separate sessions. The Committee on Institutions – a multiparty committee comprised of representatives from all elected parties – selected the order in which the briefs would be heard. A high proportion of notable Quebec intellectuals and political figures were invited to present their briefs in these 13 sessions, including representatives from various public institutions, such as universities and hospitals. Each brief was allotted a time-slot of 1 hour: 10 minutes for the authors to summarize the main arguments of their brief, 25 minutes for an exchange with Bernard Drainville, the Minister of Democratic Institutions and Active Citizenship, and another 25 minutes for other members of the committee to voice their comments or questions.[28] Due to the format, Drainville's voice and perspective dominated the hearings; his lengthy exchanges with the presenters often determined the tone and content of the questions raised by the other members of the Committee.

I used concordance software to analyse the transcripts of the hearings in order to identify broad discursive patterns. Through this method, I was able to determine how often a particular religious tradition was mentioned; how often a particular religious symbol was mentioned; and how often negative terms, such as "radicalization" or "extremism," were mentioned versus neutral or positive terms, such as "spirituality," "devotion," or "piety."

3. Results

Despite claims that Bill 60 was not intended to target any particular religious group, the hearings focused disproportionate attention on Islam

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28. Some of the MNAs who sat on the Committee on Institutions include, Marc Tanguay (PLQ); Daniel Ratthé (Indépendent); Nathalie Roy (CAQ); Kathleen Weil (PLQ); Rita de Santis (PLQ); and Françoise David (QS).

and Islamic symbols. There were 694 unique mentions of Islam compared to 416 mentions of Christianity, 179 mentions of Judaism, 42 mentions of Sikhism, 14 mentions of Buddhism and 13 mentions of Hinduism (see Fig. 1).[29]

Figure 1

Religious symbols associated with Islam were also mentioned more frequently than the religious symbols of other traditions. There were 1078 unique mentions of Muslim symbols compared to 328 mentions of Christian symbols, 142 mentions of Jewish symbols and 84 mentions of Sikh symbols (see Fig. 2).[30]

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29. The following words were used as identifying terms for the institutions, traditions, and adherents of each religion: Islam - *Islam, islamique(s), islamiste(s), islamisme, musulman(s),* and *musulmane(s)*; Christianity - *chrétien(s), chrétienne(s), christianisme, catholique(s), catholicisme(s), protestant(s), anglicane, pentecôtiste,* and *Grec orthodox*; Judaism - *judaïsme(s), juive(s), hassidique(s)* and *juif(s)*; Sikhism - *sikh(s), sikhe(s),* and *sikhisme(s)*; Buddhism - *Bouddhiste(s)* and *Bouddhisme(s)*; Hinduism - *Hindou(s), hindousime,* and *hindouiste(s)*.
30. The following religious symbols are represented in these figures: Islam - *voile/voile, foulard, hidjab, niquab, burka/burqa, tchador,* and *barbe des intégristes*; Christianity - *croix, crucifix, col romain, coiffes des soeurs,* and *soutane*; Judaism - *kippa* and *calotte*; Sikhism - *turban, kirpan,* and *patka*.

Figure 2

Bill 60: Mentions of Religious Symbols by Tradition

Although the bill did not address religious violence or extremism directly, related words – such as *violence*, *intégrisme, fondamentalisme, radiacalisme,* or *extrémisme* – were mentioned 380 times during the hearings; in contrast, non-violent terms – such as *paix religieuse*, *spiritualité*, *dévotion*, or *piété* – were only mentioned, in total, 36 times (see Fig. 3).

Figure 3

Word	Number of Occurrences
Violence	45
Intégrisme(s)/Intégriste(s)	274
Fondamentaliste(s)/Fondamentalisme(s)	22
Extrémiste(s)/Extrémisme(s)	8
Radical/Radicalisme(s)/Radicalise(s)	31
Paix religieuse	10
Spiritualité(s)	23
Dévotion(s)	1
Piété(s)	2

The preoccupation with religious violence is a reflection of the disproportionate focus on Islam at the hearings. Edward Said and Marc Juergensmeyer note that, in the West, *fundamentalism* has become synonymous with *Islamic fundamentalism*.[31] This association became very pronounced during the Bouchard-Taylor Commission; in the media and at the Commission, religious minorities, especially Muslims and Sikhs, were frequently described as "extremists," "fundamentalists," and "radicals."[32] Furthermore, these discursive trends demonstrate that, despite claims to the contrary by authors of Bill 60, the Charter was popularly perceived as an attempt to limit the visibility of Islam in the public sphere.

4. The Function of Symbols

When looking at the transcripts of the hearings, the absence of terms, such as piety and devotion, which are very commonly used to explain the significance of religious symbols for believers in religious studies and theology, is striking. I argue that the eclipse of piety can be explained as a consequence of how the functionality of religious symbols was framed during the hearings.

In their study of the European legal debates on religious symbols, Daniel Hill and Daniel Whistler identify two functions that religious symbols serve in the public sphere: the sign-function – "the way in which, and the extent to which, the symbol expresses a belief" – and the participation-function – the way in which a religious symbol provides entry into a community of believers.[33] When considered for its sign-function, the religious symbol is understood as the expression of a particular religious belief; its authenticity and legitimacy is measured in terms of its connection to the official doctrine of a given tradition. However, when considered for its participation-function, "the community, rather than a private belief, becomes the referent

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31. Mark Juergensmeyer, "Religion as a Cause of Terrorism," in *The Roots of Terrorism* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 139. Also see Edward W. Said, *Covering Islam* (New York: Vintage, 1997), xix.

32. Solange Lefebvre and Jennifer Guyver, "Media and religion in Quebec's recent debates," in *Proceedings from Cultural Dialogues, Religion and Communication*, eds. Isaac Nahon-Serfaty and Rukhsana Ahmed (Ottawa: University of Ottawa, 2009), 129.

33. Daniel Hill and Daniel Whistler, *The Right to Wear Religious Symbols* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 6-7.

of one's symbol"; the authenticity of a symbol is evaluated in terms of its efficacy as a token of membership.[34]

Hill and Whistler observe that in the European debates on religious symbols in the public sphere, there is a "sharp focus" on the sign-function.[35] As a result, practices that cannot demonstrate a strong connection to a recognized religious belief or doctrine are less likely to be considered necessary or obligatory by governments.[36] However, Hill and Whistler propose that the emphasis on expression may be waning; since 2004, judgements made by the European Court of Human Rights on cases involving the right to wear religious symbols have taken a "practical-turn." They write: "what now matters is whether the use of a symbol is a genuinely recognized practice, rather than a manifestation of a belief. This is a shift away from treating the use of a symbol as derivative from a high-level belief towards treating it as a practice."[37] Hill and Whistler attribute the turn towards practice to a growing recognition of the participation-function of religious symbols.

I argue that the practical-turn, observed by Hill and Whistler, can be taken a step further; religious symbols not only signify meaning or membership, but also serve a practical function that is distinct from doctrine or community. The practice-function refers to the act of wearing a symbol as an end in itself. Canadian courts have recognized the practice-function of religious symbols. In *Multani v. Commission Scolaire Marguerite Bourgeoys*, the Supreme Court established that the legitimacy of a religious symbol, such as the *kirpan*, can only be assessed by examining the sincerity of a believer's conviction that the symbol is necessary for the practice of their religion. In theory, both the religious community and religious doctrine are excluded as means of verifying the believer's sincerity; the majority judges state, "the fact that different people practise the same religion in different ways does not affect the validity of the case of a person alleging that his or her freedom of religion has been infringed…In assessing the sincerity of the belief, a court must take into account, *inter alia*, the credibility of the testimony of the person asserting the particular belief and the consistency of

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34. Hill and Whistler, *The Right to Wear Religious Symbols*, 80.
35. Hill and Whistler, *The Right to Wear Religious Symbols*, 5.
36. Hill and Whistler, *The Right to Wear Religious Symbols*, 67.
37. Hill and Whistler, *The Right to Wear Religious Symbols*, 55.

the belief with his or her other current religious practices."[38] When viewed in terms of its practice-function, practice *qua* practice is the measure of the authenticity of a religious symbol.

Hill and Whistler isolate the function of a religious symbol from its meaning: a given symbol might perform the same function over a long span of time or for different communities, yet its meaning may change or be interpreted differently.[39] In other words, a symbol may hold multiple – even conflicting – meanings yet remain static in terms of its function. In addition to holding multiple meanings, a symbol can also perform multiple functions; however, what a symbol *does* is a far narrower category than what a symbol *means*.

While function and meaning are distinct, I argue that these two categories are nevertheless connected. In discourse, the understanding of a symbol's function limits the understanding of the symbol's meaning. For instance, if a symbol's function is to express a belief, by necessity of its function the symbol's meaning must be both comprehensible and expressible to those who witness it. If a symbol's function is to provide entry into a community, its meaning must be collectively shared and understood by those in the community. However, in this case, the symbol need not have a meaning that is readily expressible; its meaning may only be apprehensible in the action of wearing the symbol or in the moment when a person is transformed into a member of the community. Moreover, the meaning of the symbol may be kept secret from uninitiated individuals. Finally, if a symbol's function is to enable an individual to perform a religious practice, its meaning need not be collectively shared or expressible; the symbol may have a strictly performative meaning that is apprehensible only to the individual agent in the act of their religious practice. As I demonstrate in the next section, this relationship between the function and the meaning of the symbol helps to explain the lack of references to piety or devotion at the hearings for Bill 60.

4.1. Essentializing the Sign-Function

In this section, I demonstrate that, like in Europe, the Quebec debate is

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38. *Multani v. Commission Scolaire Marguerite Bourgeoys*, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256.
39. Hill and Whistler, *The Right to Wear Religious Symbols*, 27.

characterized by a sharp focus on the sign-function of religious symbols. To some degree, in the context of the Charter of Values, this was predetermined by the language chosen for the bill. While the English version referred to "religious symbols," the French version of the bill spoke exclusively of "les signes religieux." The term *symbols religieux*, which was used in earlier government publications, was absent from the bill.[40] Moreover, the bill specifically prohibited the wearing of "conspicuous" or "overt" religious symbols, meaning those that are both commonly recognizable and prominently displayed.[41] Unsurprisingly then, there were 1144 unique mentions of *signes religieux* during the public hearings, compared to only 250 mentions of *symboles religieux* and, likewise, 104 references to *pratiques religieuses* (see Fig. 4).

Figure 4

40. See Québec, Ministre de l'éducation, *Rites et symboles religieux à l'école: Défis éducatifs de la diversité*, 2003. Available at: http://www.education.gouv.qc.ca/fileadmin/site_web/documents/PSG/aff_religieuses/Avis_ RitesSymbolesReligieuxEcole_f.pdf.
41. In promotional materials introducing Bill 60, discrete religious symbols worn as jewelry, such as crescent moon stud earrings, a Star of David ring, and a small cross pendant, were exempted from the ban, suggesting that there could be some flexibility in the interpretation of the bill that would allow for minor displays of religious identity.

While implicit in the Charter itself, Bernard Drainville – the minister responsible for Bill 60 – repeatedly defined the function of religious symbols as the transmission of a religious message that is founded in doctrine:

> So, evidently, when we wear a religious sign, we send a religious message [that] goes from the self and as you know, religions are not neutral, religions have a moral code, they have ideas, precepts, positions that are well defined on a certain number of subjects at stake. We can talk for instance of homosexuality, of rights for women, of the concept of marriage, of contraception, of abortion. On all these issues at stake, religions have positions.[42]

Drainville is adamant that nearly all religious symbols perform a sign-function – he makes an important exception to this generalization that I will discuss below. On 14 separate occasions, Drainville tries to persuade presenters to agree with his view, and repeatedly raises examples wherein which the presence of a symbol acts as a sign of a particular set of beliefs. Several of these exchanges occur with notable Quebec intellectuals – such as Michel Seymour, a professor of philosophy at Université de Montreal; Micheline Milot, a sociologist at UQAM; and Jean Duhaime, a theologian at Université de Montreal – who argue against Drainville's reductionist arguments.

Drainville's arguments are not only reductive because he reduces religious symbols to their sign-function; he also presumes that religious traditions hold uniform and unchanging positions on issues like homosexuality, marriage, or reproductive rights – a claim he uses to defend his suggestion of banning religious symbols. According to Drainville, religious symbols are inherently problematic, because they communicate religious beliefs that may conflict with positions taken by the state. The casual observer, Drainville insists, cannot ignore the beliefs transmitted by the symbol. In an exchange with members of a local organization that works to promote cultural diversity, Drainville highlights why this is a problem:

> But, when, for example someone tells us: Me, as a homosexual person, I have a profound discomfort with accepting an agent of the state, be it a nurse, doctor, whatever, who transmits their religious belief while I'm asking as a citizen to receive a service, because, very often, religion, religions subject me, as a

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42. Québec, Assemblée Nationale, *Journal des débats de la Commission permanent des institutions*, vol. 43, n. 125, February 12, 2014, 28.

homosexual, to scrutiny, they condemn me. And so, I don`t want as a citizen, I won't accept as a citizen to find myself in front of this message, because this religious message has judged me and has condemned me in my sexual orientation, which in passing, is not something I've chosen.… If you ask us to accept the premise that a person who wears a religious sign does not choose to wear it, we have to also accept the good faith and sincere belief of the person, this homosexual woman who says to us: Me, as a citizen, I have rights and I don't accept in a certain sense to be judged by the religion that is manifested.[43]

The above scenario – in which a hypothetical gay or lesbian citizen encounters a religious symbol and is made the recipient of a religious belief while seeking public services – is brought up repeatedly by Drainville and other members of the Committee on Institutions, in order to demonstrate that Bill 60 is necessary to protect the rights of marginalized individuals in Quebec. Regardless of the intention of the person who wears a religious symbol, Drainville concludes that religious symbols transmit messages that negatively affect the mental wellbeing of those who view them. In other words, the sign-function is too strong for wearers of religious symbols to overcome; the wearer does not have to act or behave in any particular way for there to be a transmission of belief.

4.2 Dismissing the Practice-Function

While emphasizing the sign-function, Drainville ignores or denies the practice-function of a symbol. In his opening address on the first day of the hearings, he insists that the new bill "will impede absolutely no one from practicing their religion."[44] According to some members of the Committee, wearing a religious symbol is not a religious practice. Religious practices correspond to a certain kind of activity or behaviour, such as going to church. The notion that, in adopting a certain way of dress, a person might be performing a sort of ritual is neither understood nor seen as something protected by law. This understanding is exemplified in the testimony of Richard Rousseau, a representative for Citizens against the Ritual Slaughter of Animals of Quebec, who states that:

Article 18 [of the UDHR] declares: 'All persons have freedom to manifest

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43. Québec, *Journal des débats*, vol. 43, n. 118, January 30, 2014, 31.
44. Québec, *Journal des débats*, vol. 43, n. 110, January 14, 2014, 2.

their religion … in public and in private by education, practices, worship, and rituals.' Religious symbols don't enter into any of these categories. The article of the UDRH declares – I repeat – that 'all persons have the right to manifest their religion by education, practices, worship and rituals,' and not by wearing religious symbols that individuals decide based on personal whims.[45]

There is an obvious denial throughout the hearings that wearing specific clothing might be considered a practice or a form of worship. Worship, devotion and piety are described as activities or attitudes that are personal, internal, or private. Visible religious symbols are not necessarily compatible with this personalized view of religion; as one presenter states: "Religion is a personal affair and flaunting a religious symbol in schools, universities, or at work does not necessarily demonstrate piety or devotion."[46]

Wearing a religious symbol is repeatedly described as a personal, and largely insignificant, choice. This perception is exemplified in an exchange between Drainville and Michel Gauthier, the one-time leader of the federal *Bloc Québecois* party. Based on his observations of prior testimony, Gauthier argues that wearing a *hijab* is not necessary for someone to practice Islam: "…if she does not wear her *hijab*, she doesn't stop being Muslim, she doesn't become a bad Muslim, she will not be excluded from the Muslim religion. Her fundamental right, it's to practice her Muslim religion. The manner which she practices, it's not part of the fundamental rights, excuse me."[47] Throughout the hearings, non-Muslims, like Gauthier, frequently delineate between trivial and significant religious practices. Supporters of the bill often conclude that, if wearing a religious symbol does constitute a religious practice, it is a minor or inconsequential one. To support their view, they sometimes use the testimony of religious practitioners who maintain that wearing religious clothing is a voluntary choice, rather than a coercive dogmatic prescription. If wearing a religious symbol is not mandatory, Drainville and others conclude, removing it should not pose a problem.

4.3 Problematizing the Participation-Function

Drainville and other supporters of the bill readily acknowledge the

45. Québec, *Journal des débats*, vol. 43, n. 116, January 23, 2014, 6.
46. Québec, *Journal des débats*, vol. 43, n. 110, January 14, 2014, 69.
47. Québec, *Journal des débats*, vol. 43, n. 112, January 16, 2014, 24.

participation-function of religious symbols, which they use to support their proposed ban. In a discussion with Quebec philosopher Michel Seymour, who brought up the participation-function in his written brief on the bill, Drainville states that:

> Elsewhere, in your brief that is, you say '…the relation to religion is a matter of belonging to a community. It's the reason why signs are required. They mark to others their ties to a sole shared community of belonging.' I, I think that we're at the heart of the issue because the question that is raised, exactly, it's: from the moment when a person signals by their symbol their belonging to a community, isn't there a risk, a danger, that when working for the state, their sense of community belonging will take precedence over their sense of civil belonging and thus their decisions will be guided by their sense of community belonging, which is manifested by wearing the symbol, more so than by their public duty?[48]

Here the symbol acts not only as an indicator of the religious identity of a believer, but also compels the believer to act in a certain way. Drainville suggests that removing the symbol also removes the risk that a person might act based on their religious identity or beliefs. The symbol is like a Machurian Switch, capable of transforming the most dedicated civil servant into an enemy of the state.

This suspicion of the participation-function stems from a widespread expectation that authentic religion should be individualistic and interior. Sectarian or communitarian religions – in which an important part of the religious experience is both visible and lived through the community – are thereby regarded as distinctly other.[49] In several discussions throughout the hearings, communitarian religion is portrayed as an antiquated form of religious life, which Quebec has surpassed in its self-conscious quest for modernization and secularization. Consequently, communitarian religion is largely associated with examples of bad-religion; radicalism, fundamentalism, and intolerance; whereas private, personal religion is held up as good-religion. Religious symbols that serve a participation-function by indicating a religious belonging, such as the Sikh turban, Muslim *hijab*, and Jewish *kippa*, are viewed negatively, because they represent a

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48. Québec, *Journal des débats*, vol. 43, n. 111, January 15, 2014, 36.
49. Solange Lefebvre, "Les Dimensions socioreligieuses des débats sur les accommodements raisonnables," in *L'Accommodement raisonnable et la diversité religieuse à l'école publique. Normes et pratiques* (Montréal: Fides, 2008), 113-33.

communitarian form of religious life that makes its presence known in the public sphere. These symbols cannot help but be "overt" (*ostentatoire*) in their appearance, because their purpose is to be seen.

In dismissing the practice-function and over-emphasizing the participation-function and the sign-function of a symbol, the discourse on symbols remains centered on the issue of visibility. Piety and devotion, which are associated with personal and private religious practice, are not given a place in the discussion of a symbol's function. The result is a political discourse that continuously evokes terms such as "obligation," "requirement," "prescription" and "choice," instead of "devotion" or "piety."

5. Constraining Meaning through Function

The absence of terms such as "devotion" or "piety" becomes even more apparent when presenters and religious believers attempt to convey the meaning of religious symbols during the hearing. There are two factors that can account for why such terms are absent: (1) the emphasis on the sign-function, and (2) the secularist context of the hearings. To demonstrate how these factors influence the discussion of meaning, this section examines various descriptions of the Muslim veil – the most frequently mentioned religious symbol – presented by both supporters and critics of the bill.

The sharp focus on the sign-function limits how presenters describe the meaning of symbols, such as the veil. If a symbol's primary function is to communicate a message, it follows that the primary meaning of the symbol must be communicable to others. In prioritizing the sign-function, other kinds of meaning that may be related to other functions of the symbol – such as a symbol's transformative meaning or performative meaning – are ignored or dismissed. Thus, the sign-function strongly influenced how supporters of the bill, none of which personally wear religious symbols, describe the meaning of the veil. Supporters commonly relate the meaning of the veil/*hijab* to Muslim beliefs, specifically those having to do with female sexuality or gender norms. Many supporters argue that the veil is not a legitimate symbol of Islam, citing the lack of Islamic scriptural support for these beliefs.[50]

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50. Québec, *Journal des débats*, vol. 43, n. 110, January 14, 2014, 71; vol. 43, n. 114, January 24, 2014, 74.

In describing the meaning of the veil, critics of the bill were also influenced by the context of the hearings, in addition to the sign-function. In the immanent, secular space of the hearings, there is no place for the transcendent. The context necessitates that believers translate the meaning of their religious symbols into terms that are understandable to outsiders of their faith. Believers, thus, tend to evoke general and vague concepts – such as "community," "identity," "choice" or "faith" – to explain the meaning of their symbols, eschewing references to theology or scripture.

Speaking of the veil, Samira Laouni – a representative for the organization C.O.R. (*Communication pour l'Ouverture et le Rapprochement interculturel*) and a practicing Muslim woman who wears a veil – states:

> …asking a person to take off their religious symbol while at work, that, I find to be odious, because it sets before them a heart-wrenching choice: either she accepts to work and renounces her identity, or she holds on to her identity and she loses her earnings to feed her children or feed herself. And in the name of what? In the name of the equality of men and women, which we all cherish?[51]

In her criticism of the bill, Laouni alludes to a feminist interpretation of the veil. This feminist interpretation is also raised by Diedre Meintel, co-director of CEETUM (*Centre d'études éthniques des universités montréalaises*), who presented the following testimony at the hearings:

> To speak of the women who wear the scarf, or the veil, my colleague Géraldine Mossière conducted a study of women who are Quebecoise by birth that have converted to Islam. Those who have chosen to wear the scarf say that they have taken this decision…freely and without pressure, and that for them it represents a resource that allows them to valorize their intellect, their personalities, and not their physiques. And, even more, other Muslim women interviewed said pretty much the same thing; that it represents a personal choice, their personal faith, and it is absolutely not a means of proselytism.[52]

The feminist interpretation found in the testimony of Laouni, Meintel and others relates the veil to an Islamic belief in the equality of men and women. Casting the veil as a symbol of identity, choice, or personal faith places the meaning of the veil in the personal sphere, where it can be related to the civic ideals of individual liberty and moral autonomy.

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51. Québec, *Journal des débats*, vol. 43, n. 110, January 14, 2014, 47.
52. Québec, *Journal des débats*, vol. 43, n. 116, February 13, 2014, 126, 4.

While many critics of the bill present strong evidence to support their interpretation of the veil, their voices are marginalized. Due to the format of the hearings, Drainville is able to exert control over the discourse. Believers are rarely given the opportunity to elaborate on the personal meaning of the veil. Moreover, Drainville repeatedly challenges the testimony of presenters who maintain that the veil is not an obligation, but a free choice; he cites anonymous examples of young women who are forced by their families to wear the veil, contradicting the testimony of practicing Muslim men and women who insist that the veil is never coerced. However, as an outsider, Drainville is unable to fully refute the Muslim women's own interpretation of the veil. He therefore subtly demonstrates his skepticism by suggesting that while a woman may "believe" that she is wearing a symbol voluntarily, she is actually being coerced. He questions:

> …a person can wear it by choice; in any case, she has the belief that she wears it by choice, so she is exercising her freedom by wearing the veil. But the veil itself can signify something else in the eye of the person who sees the veil; can it have a meaning other than the meaning that is ascribed to it by the person who wears the veil?[53]

Failing to discount believers' testimonies completely, Drainville repeatedly brings the discourse back to the sign-function.[54] He argues that perceiving a discriminatory message in a religious symbol justifies its exclusion from the public sphere, and rejects any critiques of the bill that stem from the symbol's participation-function. For Drainville, the only meaning that matters is in the eye of the beholder.

Drainville also relies on the sign-function to justify the legality of Bill 60. Equating religious symbols to political emblems on the basis of their shared expressive function, he argues that a ban of religious symbols is no different from existing laws that prohibit employees of the state from expressing their political affiliations in the workplace.[55] The effects of the bill on personal freedom are thus minimal. The logic of Drainville's legal

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53. Québec, *Journal des débats*, vol. 43, n. 129, February 18, 2014, 33.

54. Drainville poses a similar question to Samira Laouni, who strongly criticizes Bill 60: "But, if you recognize that a citizen could see a religious message in a religious symbol, do you recognize, that in this moment, the citizen could feel like their freedom of conscience is being infringed upon?" (Québec, *Journal des débats*, vol. 43, n. 110, January 14, 2014, 49).

55. Québec, *Journal des débats*, vol. 43, n. 110, January 14, 2014, 48.

justification, however, depends on his reductive portrayal of the function of religious symbols. His comparison between religious symbols and political emblems becomes less apparent when other functions of the symbol are given equal importance. For example: wearing a religious symbol can be a requirement for membership in some religious communities and removing said symbol can result in expulsion from one's religious community.[56] Political emblems, on the other hand, do not perform a participation-function to the same degree. To be a member of a political party in Quebec, one is not required to wear a visible token of the party. The participation-function of a political pin is much weaker than that of a *kirpan*.

Conclusion

The results of this study of the public hearings on Bill 60 demonstrate that the Quebec political discourse conforms to the pattern that Hill and Whistler observed in the early European debates on the right to wear religious symbols. The sign-function of said symbols was overemphasized at the hearings. Furthermore, the symbol's other functions – the participation-function and practice-function – were either dismissed as insignificant or cast as problematic for ensuring the religious neutrality of the state. Politicians argued throughout the 13 days of testimony that believers – regardless of their intentions – were necessarily transmitting their beliefs to members of the general public without their consent simply by wearing a visible religious symbol.

In essentializing the sign-function of symbols, the meaning of religious symbols was reduced to beliefs rooted in doctrine or scripture. Believers testifying at the hearings were required to frame their own understanding of their religious practices in terms comprehensible to government officials, who demonstrated consistent skepticism of the believers' testimony. Female participants who wore religious symbols bore the brunt of such treatment. These women – such as Samira Laouni – were not granted the ability to speak with authority about their own religious practices. Their testimony

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56. *Khalsa* Sikhs are required to wear 5 symbols – ceremonial dagger (*kirpan*), comb, uncut hair (*kesh*), underwear, and bracelet (*kara*) – at all times in order to maintain their belonging in the Khalsa community. Orthodox Jewish men are required to wear the prayer shawl (*tallit*) and skullcap (*kippa*). In these religions, the absence of certain prescribed symbols places their status as members of the community in question.

was discounted or contradicted with accounts offered by male participants at the hearings, who did not wear religious symbols themselves. As a result, there was little discussion of the significance such symbols actually have in the lives of religious practitioners; the symbols' connection to personal piety or devotion was altogether ignored.

The lexicographic analysis conducted in this paper demonstrates there was a disproportionate focus on Islam and Islamic symbols at the hearings. There was also significant discussion on issues related to religious violence or extremism. These findings suggest that, despite government claims to the contrary, the bill was widely perceived as a ban on Muslim symbols in the public sphere and that these symbols are commonly associated with religious extremism. As discussed earlier in this paper, many Quebecers adhere to a perception of authentic religion as individualistic and interior. This results in widespread suspicion of traditions that emphasize the communitarian dimension of religious life. The inability of Bernard Drainville, and other participants at the hearings, to accept Islamic symbols as manifestations of personal piety, in addition to their willingness to discount the testimony of Islamic practitioners, highlights the extent to which Islam is perceived as an "outsider" religion in Quebec.

Time of Origins: Charles Taylor, Mircea Eliade, and Sacred Time

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In 2007, following the release of his book, *A Secular Age* (ASA), Charles Taylor was awarded the Templeton prize, a prize that "honors a living person who has made an exceptional contribution to affirming life's spiritual dimension."[1] In Taylor's acceptance speech for the award – the award value totaling around 1.5 million dollars[2] – he made the following observation:

> There is a tremendous capacity in human life to forget things that we somehow deep-down know, I think there is a kind of forgetfulness that we fall into. And, in particular, there is a set of "forgettings" that are very very central to the modern world…[3]

Taylor continued by arguing that one of the central "forgettings" particular to the modern world is its propensity to neglect its inherited spiritual or sacred foundation. Indeed, throughout ASA – and many of his other publications – Taylor tracks the social, cultural, economic, philosophical, and scientific processes that led to the state of "forgettings" relating to spiritual and religious matters. Key to Taylor's conception of forgetfulness is his belief (hope?) that humans can both remember their spiritual past and find ways to productively reencounter the spiritual dimension in both their present and future lives. This temporal – i.e. past, present, and future – backdrop figures prominently in Taylor's analysis, and will serve as the analytical focus of this paper.

Specifically, below, I examine a phrase that is repeated in four of Taylor's books and a number of his published articles and essays; the phrase being: "'A time of origins' in Eliade's sense." This phrase occurs in several

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1. "Templeton Prize: Purpose," *Templeton Prize*, accessed June 14, 2017, http://www.templetonprize.org/purpose.html.
2. Connie Kang, "Canadian philosopher wins $1.5-million Templeton Prize," *Los Angeles Times*, March 15, 2007, http://articles.latimes.com/2007/mar/15/world/fg-taylor15.
3. John Templeton Foundation, Clip 1: The case for spiritual rediscovery (Templeton Foundation), *YouTube*, 5:09, May 27, 2009, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b4Y0KL56GwU.

different variations throughout Taylor's work, but it is always used to signify a ritualized "higher-time" that connects the individual to the sacred; this is in contrast to a profane or mundane temporal order.[4] In this paper, I show that this "time of origins" phrase is instructive for both how Taylor understands religion, as well as time and the theme of renewal. Indeed, as I argue, what religion *is* for Taylor is the engagement with rituals so as to produce moments of time that give human life "depth" and "fullness."[5] Thus, one of modern society's "forgettings" is how to encounter religious time in a deep and fulfilling manner.

What, though, is the ideational genealogy of this "temporal" emphasis for Taylor? First, and obviously, there is his biographical context: Taylor is a Catholic and he brings his Catholic spirituality into his analysis – i.e. his Catholicity informs the hermeneutic horizon within which his studies emerge. That being said, for the present analysis, this biographical feature will be set-aside. Instead, in order to trace this genealogy, I will focus on Taylor's intellectual connection with Mircea Eliade, the religious studies scholar from whom the "time of origins" phrase is taken. For, although Taylor attributes much to Eliade's scholarship on religion and time, he devotes very little space to actually engaging with Eliade's thought – indeed he only provides one paragraph in ASA to explaining Eliade's notion of time. Taylor's general silence about what exactly it is that Eliade means by "time of origins" is noteworthy given that the phrase is used over 22 times throughout Taylor's writing. The present paper has been prompted by that silence.

In order explore the above stated questions and tensions, this essay will unfold as follows: first, I provide a brief outline of Taylor's ASA; as it is in ASA that Taylor most cogently and thoughtfully confronts the issue of secularity, religion, and spiritual experience. Additionally, in this first section, I lay out the topic of time and religion insofar as it relates to Taylor's overall project. Second, I turn to Eliade and examine how he discusses time and religion in his book *The Sacred and the Profane* (1959) – the text which Taylor cites when he first uses the term "time of origins" in ASA. Finally, I return to Taylor and reflect upon the meaning of time and its relation to religion via the terms "depth" and "fullness," and compare this analysis with

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4. Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 57.

5. Cf. Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 5, 9, 16, 26, 36, 38, 138, 310, 318, 501, 597, 672.

Eliade. I end by considering the idea of "forgettings" that Taylor alluded to in his Templeton speech and reflect on what time, and the remembrance of time, means for Taylor as a religious act in the modern world.

Taylor: A Secular Age, Religion, and Time

A Secular Age

The prompting question that motivates Taylor's discussion throughout ASA is "why was it virtually impossible not to believe in God in, say, 1500 in our western society, while in 2000 many of us find this not only easy, but even inescapable?"[6] Taylor's project in ASA is thus primarily interested in looking at the movement and development of an idea over a period of time. That said, Taylor's analysis of time is largely anthropological in scope, as what generates his temporal analysis is the subjective shift from what he calls the "porous-self" to the "buffered-self." The porous-self describes that state of relating to the world which is open and "vulnerable to a world of spirits and powers," i.e. to those forces outside the mind.[7] In contrast, the buffered-self is a modern phenomenon and designates a bounded or self-enclosed mode of personal relationality whose "ultimate purposes are those which arise within me."[8] Thus, the buffered subject does not expose itself to, or recognize the existence of, spiritual forces. For Taylor, the porous-self best describes those who lived in the 1500s while the buffered-self refers to the modern subject of the 2000s. In order to illuminate this historic shift, Taylor chiefly traces the theological and metaphysical changes that, he argues, are causal factors in the movement from the porous to the buffered-self – a process he calls, echoing Max Weber, disenchantment.[9]

One example that sheds light on this buffered/porous dynamic is Taylor's analysis of the protestant Reformation. The Reformation, according to Taylor, was historically unique because it privileged a self-reliance that was new to European religiosity – as, in this period, one's personal devotion to God became paramount to religious activity.[10] This inward turn is exemplified by the Reformation's rejection of the ritualized

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6. Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 25.
7. Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 27, 38.
8. Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 38.
9. Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 28.
10. Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 75.

and clergy-centric spirituality of its Catholic antecedent. The Reformation, then, signaled a shift to a faith-centered religiosity in which the subject and their own convictions dominated.[11]

Key to Taylor's discussion of the Reformation is his contention that this new way of relating to God affected subjective conceptions of time. Prior to the Reformation church services and events were indicators of a sacralized-time that was qualitatively and obviously distinct from profane time.[12] When one went to Church to watch the Mass being performed, Taylor argues, one engaged in an event that was specifically unique from all other activities in one's day. In contrast, the Reformation demanded that the individual be engaged in a perpetual state of sacred openness in which faith and religious observation were ubiquitous – i.e. the duty to be religious was no longer tied to a specific spiritual event.[13] Instead, *everyone* became responsible for their own spiritual work *all* of the time. The result, as becomes vital to Taylor's latter discussion in ASA, is a sort of "flattening" experience in which the once sacred event and time (e.g. the Mass) became the norm in all facets of life;[14] consequently, Taylor argues, there was a loss of a discernably sacred time.

What Taylor wants to highlight with his study of the Reformation is the movement towards social homogeneity that he argues is central to modernity.[15] As he writes, "The Reformation is the ultimate fruit of the Reform spirit, *producing for the first time a true uniformity of believers, a levelling up which left no further room for different speeds*."[16] Note, then, Taylor's argument here: in examples such as the Reformation we see instances in which individuals relate to the sacred and time in a uniform manner; the by-product of this relational dynamic is that individuals no longer feel connected to a sacred time, they instead become disconnected from their cultural and social milieu. For Taylor in ASA, this is the first stage of the buffered-self.

The example of the Reformation is but the first of many for Taylor in

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11. Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 76.
12. Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 76.
13. Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 78.
14. Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 371.
15. Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 77.
16. Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 77 (emphasis added).

ASA in which he traces how modalities of individuation become expressed, refined, and ultimately legitimized as normal public behaviour. Indeed, Taylor's historical study traces the emergence of the buffered-self through the Renaissance, the religious movements in Deism, Romanticism, and in the 1960s "urge to authenticity." In each stage, similar to the example of the Reformation, Taylor describes how certain (theologically motivated) conceptual shifts resulted in a change of attitude towards time – the key idea being that people related to time more and more as if it were a constant unchanging "flat" dimension of life. This "flatness" is the experience of the buffered-self.

Importantly, Taylor does not describe the above process as a loss *per se*. For Taylor, the movement from the porous-self of the 1500s to the buffered-self of the 2000s is not the movement of the *loss* of the porous-self. Instead, as the example of the Reformation suggests, an individual in the Reformation gained a new way of relating to the world – i.e. an individuated relationality. However, the consequence of this new mode of relating – Taylor wants to emphasize – was one in which, a) an experience of the sacred as a disruptive element in the normal flow of temporal order (i.e. "this time" is sacred but "that time" is not) was replaced with the experience that all time was seen as latently potentiating an engagement with the sacred; and b) this new form of relating to time in a homogenous manner was a development over the previous custom. Thus, modernity, and the movement towards the "secular" was not a loss as such. Instead, it signifies a shift in how religion was lived, and therefore, how time was experienced.

Time and Religion

As the above analysis makes clear, the experience of time, according to Taylor, is demonstrably linked to the experience of God. For Taylor, time simply is the means by which the sacred is experienced. By the "sacred" Taylor means "certain places: like churches, certain times: high feasts, certain actions: saying the Mass, in which the divine or the holy is present. As against these, other places, times, actions count as profane."[17] With that in mind, Taylor argues, the modern buffered-self has no functional

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17. Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 446. Though tertiary to this essay's focus, the obvious western and thus "Christian" elements of Taylor's definition of the sacred should not go unnoticed by the reader.

techniques by which to engage in sacred time and events, something his analysis – I argue – hopes to ameliorate. One way he does this in ASA is by exploring premodern conceptions of time. According to Taylor, premodern societies were structured around more rigid understandings of profane time and sacred time. Sacred time disrupted profane time, while "profane time existed in relation to higher times."[18] Taylor divides premodern conceptions of time into three distinct categories. First, there is the higher time of the Platonic mindset (T1). In the Platonic model, sacred time is utterly beyond the flux of the profane world. Time, in this sense, is pictured as an impassible space unaffected by the world as such.[19] Second, there is God's time as expressed in the biblical tradition (T2). The idea here being that God fashioned the universe and created time in order to fulfill specific eternal plans (e.g. the crucifixion).[20] Taylor describes this God-ordered eternal time schema as "the gathering together of past into present to project a future."[21] What Taylor seems to suggest here is that God's eternal time in T2 slips into and effects profane time; stated otherwise, this is teleological time.

The third type of time that Taylor argues premodern societies imaged is "following Eliade, a 'time of origins'" (T3).[22] Taylor notes that this type of time, unlike the first two, was not the product of either a philosopher (T1) or of a theologian (T2). Instead, this third type "belongs to the folk traditions of peoples, and indeed, not only in Europe, but almost everywhere."[23] What exactly then, does Taylor mean by this Eliadean third type? By "time of origins," he is referring to a time "when the order of things was established – either via a primal law, or primordial creation. These acts were accomplished either by gods or "at least heroes" and were seen as creative moments undertaken at a "time out of mind"; thus, they were dirempt of the profane ordering of things.[24] That being said, Taylor writes, "it is not simply in the past, because it is also something that we can re-approach, can get

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18. Charles Taylor, *Modern Social Imaginaries* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004), 97.
19. Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 56.
20. Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 56.
21. Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 56.
22. Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 57.
23. Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 57.
24. Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 57.

closer to again" through ritualistic acts.[25] The performed ritual has the effect of shrinking the "time of origins" and making its past-otherworldliness present and directly accessible to those who perform the ritual. Importantly, Taylor argues that the community is renewed by its perceived connection to this primordial act. Taylor sums up his analysis of Eliade by writing:

> The Great Time is thus behind us, but it is also in a sense above us. It is what happened at the beginning, but it is also the great Exemplar, which we can be closer to or farther away from as we move through history.[26]

Central, then, to Taylor's discussion of the "time of origins" – or of time in general – is the dialectical relationship that he suggests links sacred time with profane time. It is precisely the designation of the sacred as a temporal "other" from which the profane of *this* world surfaces.

Notice that in each description of time discussed above, the profane is described as an order of existence that is affected by, or responsive to, the impact of eternal time – whether it be by the philosophical conjecture of T1, God's ordering of the universe in T2, or human attempts to recreate and symbolically link with this sacred time in T3. In each stage, Taylor is arguing, a higher vertical sacred time was perceived to *act* upon a lower horizontal profane time.

Taylor concludes ASA by arguing that in modern society – one dominated by secular time – the vertical heights of eternal time have become erased from our collective "imaginaries." The result, much like the example from the Reformation, is a "flattening" of experience in which the buffered-self reigns supreme and the porous-self is pictured as a mere primitive stage in human psychological development. As he writes:

> A purely secular time understanding allows us to imagine society "horizontally," unrelated to any "high points" where the ordinary sequence of events touches higher time, and therefore without recognizing any privileged persons or agencies… This radical horizontality is precisely what is implied in the direct-access society, where each member is "immediate to the whole."[27]

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25. Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 57.
26. Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 57.
27. Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 713.

We are, Taylor is claiming, completely gripped by the disenchanted buffered-self's mode of being.[28] This is further evidenced in Taylor's description of the "direct-access society" in the quote above, a concept that signals the state in which one's "membership" to society at large "is unmediated by any partial group," therein allowing for the continual production of "new associations."[29] The effect of the direct-access society on individuals, as Ruth Abbey notes, results in social, political, and religious relationships formed around "primarily horizontal" rather than "traditionally hierarchical" or "vertical" manners of socially relating.[30] The underlying idea being that individuals should all be served "equally" by systems of power, therein negating a presumed "*a priori* privilege" that organized pre-modern society.[31] The result of these processes is a homogenized experience in which secular homogeneous time and events become the only, and thus the normalized, temporal experience.[32]

This unquestioned and entrenched time of the buffered-self for Taylor is problematic. He argues that the spiritual world is something that continues

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28. For Taylor, as he argues further, this experience of time is both a subjective as a well as a socially experienced phenomenon (Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 714, cf. 55, 209, 344, 542). Taylor specifically links the experience of "disenchantment" to the temporal experience of secular time – an experience of time that leads to the instrumentality of time, wherein time is conceived of as a "resource to be managed" by both individuals and society (Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 714).

29. Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 107.

30. Ruth Allen, *Charles Taylor* (Teddington, UK: Acumen, 2000), 208. It is perhaps noteworthy here to expand on this apparent division between the idea of the buffered-self and the idea of direct-access society. The buffered-self implies that the subject is indifferent to external forces while the direct-access society notion signifies an immediate access to the whole by the subject. Both of these dispositions, for Taylor, demarcate modern subjectivity as both simultaneously closed (to the infinite) and radically open (to social realms). Hence, one would be correct in seeing a paradox here. However, for Taylor, what is key is that the modern social imaginary that propels the modern subject and the entities that compose the modern social order i.e. "nations, states, churches" are no longer grounded in "something higher than common action in secular time" (Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 713). In this way, the buffered-self is precisely how it is that Taylor argues one mediates with the direct access society: for the buffered-self is the name for that mode of being that does not see transcendent forces governing social and phenomenal experience, a mode of being that, therefore, is required so as to act in and be motivated by the direct-access society (Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 713).

31. Allen, *Charles Taylor*, 208.

32. Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 714.

to shape and affect us, and that we *must* find ways to reengage it. However, he is not advocating a retreat into the past to engage this lost time. Instead, Taylor wants to find new ways to encounter the transcendent that still acknowledges our present condition (i.e. the buffered-self). One way that Taylor suggests this can be done is via a full engagement with the "cycles of time" that punctuate modern society with repeated celebrations, i.e. "the 4th of July, the 14th of July, the 3rd of May" or New Year's Eve.[33] As Taylor writes, these "repeatable cycles of life" demonstrate both our continued desire to connect events over time and our attempts to find meaning in that continuity.[34] Thus, interestingly, Taylor's prescription to a recovery of meaning and an engagement with the porous-self via the modern entrenched buffered-self, is through a mode of being that exhibits the structure of T3 – i.e. Eliade's "time of origins." It is with the above in mind that I now turn to Eliade and briefly consider his description of the "time of origins."

Eliade and the "Time of Origins"

Mircea Eliade (1907-1986) has the curious distinction of being simultaneously a respected voice in the history of western religious studies, as well as a much derided and criticized theorist.[35] Eliade's esteem surfaces, first, from the vast historical research that underlies his thought; and, second, because he has provided religious studies with a host of conceptual tools that have aided scholars in their understanding of religion as a category.[36] However, he is often disparaged in modern scholarship for the essentialism and broad generalizations that his research produced.[37] Indeed, even terms such as "time of origins" have been largely rejected in modern religious studies scholarship precisely due to the unexamined essentialism that this

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33. Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 716.
34. Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 716.
35. Robert Ellwood, "Eliade: Essentialist or Postmodern? The Sacred and the Unseen Order," in *Mircea Eliade: Myth, Religion, and History,* ed. Nicolae Babuts (London: Transaction Publishers, 2014), 1.
36. Douglas Allen, "Eliade's Phenomenological Approach to Religion and Myth," in *Mircea Eliade: Myth, Religion, and History,* ed. Nicolae Babuts (London: Transaction Publishers, 2014), 85-86.
37. E.g. Russell McCutcheon, *Manufacturing Religion: The Discourse on Sui Generis Religion and the Politics of Nostalgia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 13; Tony Stigliano, "Fascism's Mythologist: Mircea Eliade and the Politics of Myth," *ReVision* 24, no. 3 (2002): 37.

phrase carries.[38] I raise these points now, before I examine Eliade in greater detail, as I feel it is important to instigate this analysis by acknowledging that Taylor's unremarked-upon use of Eliade unwittingly places him within a charged debate that currently marks religious studies scholarship.

What then is Eliade's religious studies project? And, specifically, what assumptions and implications do terms like "time of origins" carry in Eliade's work? The ensuing analysis will seek to briefly resolve these questions by situating "time of origins" within Eliade's understanding of religion, ritual, and time – clarification of which will serve as a helpful contrast to further my analysis of Taylor's use of the phrase.

Time as Re-collection

Eliade's most sustained treatment of the "time of origins" occurs in his book *The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion*. The phrase develops out of a chapter entitled "Sacred Time and Myths," and is preceded by the section "Profane Duration and Sacred Time."[39] Eliade argues that, for "religious man, time was neither homogenous nor continuous," as periodical events like "festivals" interrupted the "ordinary temporal duration" of profane time.[40] There is, then, a dual experience of time for "religious man."[41] Central to this experience of sacred time, Eliade argues, is a participation in the "annual repetition of the creation" of order and/or the world.[42] These rituals involved the participants acting out the destruction of the world, and the re-creation of the world in a repetitive yearly ritual.[43] The engagement with repetition and re-creation was, Eliade writes, grounded in the assumption that "by symbolically participating in the annihilation and re-creation of the world, man too was created anew; he was reborn, for he

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38. McCutcheon, *Manufacturing Religion*, 79.

39. Mircea Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion*, trans. Willard R. Trask (New York: Harcourt, Inc., 1987), 68.

40. Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane*, 68. This is a theme that Eliade touches upon throughout his work; see, e.g., Mircea Eliade, *The Quest: History and Meaning in Religion* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 79, 86-87; Mircea Eliade, *Cosmos and History: The Myth of the Eternal Return* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1959), 22-27; Mircea Eliade, *Myth and Reality* (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), 18-20.

41. Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane*, 68.

42. Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane*, 78.

43. Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane*, 79.

began a new life."[44] The central assumption that orients Eliade's analysis, then, is a claim regarding "religious man" and his capacity to be renewed by ritually participating in the symbolic destruction and renewal of the mythological time within which he is a part.[45]

A key aspect of the above account concerns Eliade's notion of an original time, what he called an *illud tempus* – i.e. "that time."[46] Indeed, what the "time of origins" signifies is "the stupendous instant in which reality was created, was for the first time fully manifested"; and by creating rituals to encounter this *illud tempus* humans "*return to that original time*."[47] Importantly, for Eliade, these rituals are not simply a "commemoration of a mythical event," rather the ritual "reactualizes the event"; that is, the ritual symbolically constructs the sacred event, uniting therein the ritual performers with a primeval sacred time. Hence, for Eliade, a deep connection links time, religion, and spiritual experience. Eliade's "religious man," then, surfaces only insofar as he is able to connect with a "time of origins" – a time that interrupts the profane ordering of things and reconnects the subject with "the instant that saw the appearance of the most immense of realities."[48]

Time and Religion

One way to conceptualize Eliade's time/religion dialectic concerns a presumed anxiety that he argues haunts humanity: the capacity to forget.[49] That is, humankind's propensity to forget the past and thus to forget how to renew the present and thus engage with the future, propels this "time of origins" concept.[50] Indeed, as Nicolae Babuts notes, Eliade's hermeneutic awakens modern scholars to the notion that "among the primitives [the "time of origins" ritual] was part of a *nostalgia* for the lost paradise."[51] Eliade's

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44. Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane*, 79.

45. Eliade, *Myth and Reality*, 35. See also Mircea Eliade, *Patterns in Comparative Religion* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1958), 388-392.

46. Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane*, 81.

47. Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane*, 81 (emphasis added).

48. Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane*, 81.

49. See, e.g., Eliade, *Myth and Reality*, 107; Eliade, *Cosmos and History*, 121.

50. For an excellent analysis of the idea of "forgetting" in relation to Eliade's work, see: Mac Linscott Ricketts, "On Reading Eliade's Stories as Myths for Moderns," in *Mircea Eliade: A Critical Reader*, ed. Bryan Rennie (Oakville, CT: Equinox Publishing, 2006), 364-378.

51. Nicolae Babuts, "Introduction," in *Mircea Eliade: Myth, Religion, and History,* ed. Nicolae

conception of time, then, is deeply embedded within an anthropological assumption that emphasizes the human need to commune with and be redeemed by a lost part of its primordial past.[52] Thus, like Taylor, Eliade is suggesting that engaging fully in sacred time and bringing it to the present is key to religious activity.

Additionally, Eliade is arguing that religion is emergent from the material and social conditions of the world. Religion is something that arises from human needs (i.e. in the desire to commune with the past and quell a basic anxiety) and is constructed to meet those needs (i.e. through "time of origins" rituals). Importantly, then, for Eliade the sacred is both "out there" *sui generis* as well as "an element in the structure of consciousness" and human finitude.[53]

What then does this tell us about Eliade, religion, and time – especially Eliade's "time of origins"? First, Eliade's analysis, is rooted within a hermeneutic that acknowledges the legitimacy of religious experience as such. In this way, Eliade's "time of origins" phrase references humanity's connection and construction of the infinite via our finite material resources.[54] And, here, following the work of Douglas Allen, we should see Eliade as a "normative" thinker whose understanding of religion departs from mere descriptive claims; for Eliade, Allen correctly claims, themes of "elevated times" saturate his work.[55] Second, then, Eliade's account of religion is underscored by a normative claim regarding the capacity of rituals and symbols to alter human experience and shape society. Hence,

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Babuts (London: Transaction Publishers, 2014), xxiv.

52. Douglas Allen, *Myth and Religion in Mircea Eliade* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1998), 65-66. As Allen writes, "the mythic structure of sacred and history orients" individuals so that they can "return mythically to the fullness of mythic origins" and thereby find regeneration (Allen, *Myth and Religion*, 65-66).

53. Quoted in Ellwood, "Eliade: Essentialist or Postmodern?" 5; see also Bryan Rennie, "The Life and Work of Mircea Eliade," in *Mircea Eliade: A Critical Reader*, ed. Bryan Rennie (Oakville, CT: Equinox Publishing, 2006), 13. Here Rennie helpfully draws a parallel between Eliade's conception of the sacred and Immanuel Kant's "*a priori* postulates of the understanding" – which is to say, for example, a hierophany for Eliade signals the transcendental structure "of consciousness" itself.

54. This position is developed from Douglas Allen, "The Dialectic of the Sacred," in *Mircea Eliade: A Critical Reader*, ed. Bryan Rennie (Oakville, CT: Equinox Publishing, 2006), 96-101.

55. Douglas Allen, *Structure and Creativity in Religion: Hermeneutics in Mircea Eliade's Phenomenology and New Directions* (New York: Mouten Publishers, 1978), 221-222.

"time of origins" rituals are akin to the material "transcendental conditions for the possibility" of spiritual renewal and temporal recollection – rituals connect individuals with their past, present, and future, which, for Eliade, is fundamental to "religious man" as such.[56]

Taylor, Time, and Eliade

The above two analyses have had two overarching objectives: a) to situate Taylor's conception of religion within his understanding of time, specifically, what Eliade's "time of origins" means for Taylor, and b) to analyze Eliade's own conception of "time of origins," and to highlight some of the complexities and tensions that accompany his theory. In what follows, I extend the above discussion by comparing and contrasting Taylor's understanding of "time of origins" with Eliade's. I will reflect upon what the similarities and differences that exist between Taylor and Eliade tell us about Taylor's conception of the sacred. However, I begin this section by examining some of the ways in which Taylor uses his "time of origins" phrase throughout his writing.

Taylor, Time, and Repetition

Taylor's repetitive use of Eliade's "time of origins" phrase in his work, far from being a mere incidental habit, is both instructive regarding Taylor's conception of what religion is, and how he feels one can reencounter the sacred in modernity. But in what ways has Taylor actually used this phrase, and are there variations in Taylor's use? Taylor uses the phrase "time of origins" twelve times in ASA both with and without a reference to Eliade.[57] The phrase is first used on page 57 and its final use is on page 713 – it thus has considerable relevance throughout the text. In every single use of the phrase in ASA, Taylor deploys it to signify how people have connected with something higher and/or immaterial, whether in a religious or in a political sense.[58] As noted previously, Taylor only devotes a single paragraph to

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56. For Further clarification on this point, see Allen, *Myth and Religion*, 4, 66-67, 182; and Rennie, "The Life and Work of Mircea Eliade," 13.

57. Pages with references to Eliade can be found in Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 57, 195, 197, 208, 446, 713. Pages without references to Eliade can be found in Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 58, 96 (3 references on this page), 209, 413.

58. Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 57, 197.

explaining how he actually interprets the phrase "time of origins." It is noteworthy that Taylor sees very little reason to expand upon what the phrase means other than the additional "in Eliade's sense."[59] Indeed, Taylor seems to simply imbue Eliade's phrase with implicit authority, therein removing the need for exposition on either the positives or negatives of the theory.

Aside from ASA, Taylor also uses the "time of origins" phrase in his 2002 book *Varieties of Religion Today: William James Revisited* as well as his 2004 book *Modern Social Imaginaries*. In *Varieties,* he uses the term only once, and in the same way that he does on page 57 of ASA,[60] while, in *Social Imaginaries*, the phrase appears six times, three cases of which have no reference to Eliade.[61] In *Imaginaries*, the term is used to signify both spiritual as well as political order.

Aside from Taylor's own books, the phrase also appears in several collections of essays in which he is published. For example, the books *Theorizing Nationalism, The Morality of Nationalism*, and *The State of the Nation* all contain the same essay entitled "Nationalism and Modernity." In this essay, the term "time of origins" is deployed so as to suggest that the modern subject no longer relates to the political state as if it were imbued with a sense of transcendent excess or authority – a precondition for the "direct access society."[62] Taylor also has a 2006 essay entitled "Religious Mobilizations" in which he uses the term. Here, though, it is used in the same way as in ASA on page 57. This essay was also published in Taylor's 2011 book *Dilemmas and Connections*.[63] Finally, on a German website for the *Institute for Human Sciences*, Taylor has an article in which he discusses religion in modernity. Here, too, Eliade is invoked to aid Taylor's discussion

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59. Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 208.

60. Charles Taylor, *Varieties of Religion Today: William James Revisited* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 66.

61. Taylor, *Modern Social Imaginaries*, 97, 110, 155, 156, 157, 175.

62. Charles Taylor, "Nationalism and Modernity," in *Theorizing Nationalism*, ed. Ronald Beiner, (New York: State University of New York Press, 1999), 226; Charles Taylor, "Nationalism and Modernity," in *The Morality of Nationalism*, eds. Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 37; Charles Taylor, "Nationalism and Modernity," in *The State of the Nation: Ernst Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism*, ed. John A. Hall (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 198.

63. Charles Taylor, "Religious Mobilizations," *Public Culture* 18, no. 2 (2006): 283; Charles Taylor, *Dilemmas and Connections: Selected Essays* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 148.

of the shifting connection of time, religion, and the sacred in modernity.[64]

Interestingly, then, in each example raised above, Taylor uses Eliade in two senses. The first, to talk specifically about religion; the second, to talk about politics and the direct-access society. In both cases, Taylor uses Eliade's "time of origins" phrase to denote how people ritually engage with a perceived higher-order via time. As I have suggested above, Eliade's notion of a renewal-in-the-present by ritualistically engaging with a higher sense of time is key to Taylor's prescription for the modern malaise.[65] For, although Taylor is using Eliade's phrase in a descriptive manner throughout his works, he seems, nonetheless, to deploy Eliade's "time of origins" prescriptively, i.e. as a potential corrective to the modern "flatness" of the buffered-self – a point to which I will return below.

Taylor and Eliade: Time, Loss, and the Sacred

Taylor's use of Eliade's "time of origins" is a fairly accurate application of Eliade's theory. For, as was shown above, Taylor argued that in its basic structure the "time of origins" signified the ritualized attempt to unify the present moment with a perceived sacred *illud tempus* – i.e. to make the "present" holy by uniting it with a sacred past event.[66] And, as my discussion on Eliade indicated, this is also how Eliade deploys "time of origins" in his own writing.

Regarding the use of the term by both thinkers, I would argue that there is an anthropological assumption concerning an anxiety about "forgetting the past" that they share. In reactualizing the sacred time of "back then" now, they are both suggesting that humans become grounded in the present social and religious order to be better fixed or "located" within the world. As such, for Taylor and Eliade, to forget the past is to lose an understanding of the present.

Additionally, though associated with remembrance, both Eliade and Taylor emphasize the capacity of an individual to engage in an experience of fullness and depth via the religious and/or ritual act. Taylor stresses this point at the beginning of ASA via his example of the Catholic thinker Bede

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64. Charles Taylor, "Religion Today," *Institute for Human Sciences*, 2016, accessed on December 2, 2017, http://www.iwm.at/transit/transit-online/religion-today/.

65. Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 716.

66. Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 57.

Griffiths' (1906-1993) spiritual experience, an example that repeats itself throughout the text. Taylor writes that "in [Griffiths'] case, the sense of fullness came in an experience which unsettles and breaks throughout our ordinary sense of being in the world, with its familiar objects, activities, and points of reference."[67] Griffiths' experience, was marked by a mystical encounter which, for Taylor, signified the capacity of the spiritual to disrupt and alter one's life – a disruption that rituals in the "time of origins" sense denote.[68] Likewise, with Eliade, the "time of origins" is the ritualized breaking through of the "most immense of realities," the "fullness" of life into the subject's experience – the same descriptive experience that Taylor ascribes to Griffiths.[69] This process, what Allen calls the "dialectic of the sacred" in Eliade's work, echoes Eliade's notion of the hierophany, a paradoxically transcendent process whose "wholly other" and "infinite" nature "limits itself by manifesting itself in some relative, finite, historical thing."[70]

Central though, for both Taylor and Eliade, is the emphasis not simply on the "spiritual" or the ritual as such, but on the potential of time to reveal this spiritual dimension. That is, there is a latent supposition to both thinkers writing that certain "times" are infused with an evocative "excessive quality" that awakens the subject to the possibility of a "more than" – i.e. a sense of the infinite.[71] Rituals, as it were, direct the gaze and the focus of the subject to a presumed numinous time; this re-focused attention dissolves the temporal boundary between "past" and "present" and creates a unified experience in which the ritual participant exists in both time periods at once – i.e. Taylor's "experience of fullness"[72] or Eliade's "experience of the sacred."[73] This description runs through both Taylor's as well as Eliade's work whenever the phrase "time of origins" is discussed.

Thus, just as Eliade is normatively accounting for the way in which

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67. Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 5.
68. Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 252.
69. Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane*, 81.
70. Allen, *Mircea Eliade: A Critical Reader*, 99.
71. Eliade, following Rudolf Otto, will call this "numinous present" the "*Ganz Andere*," i.e. the experience of "something basically and totally different" (Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane*, 9-10).
72. Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 10.
73. Eliade, *Patterns in Comparative Religion*, 2; Eliade, *Myth and Religion*, 139-140.

"religious man" is connected to a dimension of "depth" and "the spiritual" via rituals,[74] Taylor's account, too, is normatively *prescriptive* in intent. That is to say, Taylor is not simply noting how it is that rituals function in society – as he sometimes seems to imply; nor is he merely documenting the manner in which rituals have functioned. Instead, he is implying that we (moderns) *need* to engage in these rituals, in a "time of origins" sense, so as to confront modern ills.[75] For example, despite Taylor's claim that his analysis is not oriented around what he calls the "subtraction hypothesis" of modernity, i.e. that a "loss" marks the experience of the modern buffered-self, his overall position in the ASA would seem to complicate that assertion. For instance, consider the following quote:

> Modern "secularization" can be seen from one angle as the *rejection of higher times, and the positing of time as purely profane*. Events now exist only in this one dimension, in which they stand at a greater and lesser temporal distance, and in relations of causality with other events of the same kind. The modern notion of simultaneity comes to be, in which events utterly unrelated in cause or meaning are held together simply by their co-occurrence at the same point in this single profane timeline.[76]

We see here the issue of "flattening" that was raised in the discussion of the Reformation above – for Taylor, time, in modernity, is the homogenization of experience into one flat "profane timeline." But, continuing on in a paragraph just below the one quoted above, Taylor writes:

> Now the move to what I am calling "secularity" is obviously related to this *radically purged* time-consciousness. It comes when associations are placed firmly and wholly in homogenous, profane time, whether or not the higher time is negated altogether, or other associations are still admitted to exist in it.[77]

Note, then, Taylor's claim here: secularity "purges" the recognition of the experience of a higher time-consciousness, whether or not that higher "time-consciousness" is real or not. I would argue that passages like the ones just

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74. Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane*, 82.
75. Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 716.
76. Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 195 (emphasis added).
77. Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 196 (emphasis added).

quoted imply that central to Taylor's assumptions in ASA is that the modern buffered-self has *lost* the capacity to engage in a higher time, a loss which for Taylor is harmful. Simply stated, Taylor is advocating a subtraction hypothesis regarding the experience of higher times in modernity – a subtraction that he argues requires remedying.

Retrieving Sacred Time

To further the above argument, consider Taylor's 2016 interview with the philosopher Richard Kearney. Here, Taylor notes the loss of the spiritual in modernity, and the role that "grace" can play in inspiring modern thinkers to see a place for "something more" in the world than just the profane.[78] This spiritual dimension, Taylor argues, necessarily leads one to "need and want to get closer to [transcendent grace] through prayer and a certain faith practice."[79] Moreover, as Taylor notes, the recognition of the infinite comes about only via a rejection of the buffered or disenchanted self.[80] Taylor, replying to Kearney, notes:

> Yes, all of this [i.e. the "hunger" to return to spirituality] is deeply related to a response to the modern disenchantment of the world, which coincides with the strict and often legalistic codes of the modern moral order. Max Weber was right about the [disenchantment] of our secular time, with its occlusion of any notion of higher times or sacred places. This is a fact, though I think Weber used the term too loosely. *It is precisely after having gotten rid of the spirits that a number of people in the west today… are interested in retrieving something that was lost* but may be rediscovered in new ways, in terms of what I call *reconversions to something new from our past*.[81]

Note the use of the idea of retrieval and return that Taylor speaks of here. For we have, Taylor says, lost something in modernity; and, in order to move forward as a society, we need to look to the spiritual foundations of the past in order to ameliorate this loss.

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78. Richard Kearney and Charles Taylor, "Transcendent Humanism in a Secular Age," in *Reimagining the Sacred: Richard Kearney Debates God*, eds. Richard Kearney and Jens Zimmermann (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 79.
79. Kearney and Taylor, "Transcendent Humanism," 79.
80. Kearney and Taylor, "Transcendent Humanism," 83.
81. Kearney and Taylor, "Transcendent Humanism," 84 (emphasis added).

I would suggest that Taylor's argument from ASA and expressed in his interview with Kearney, can be interpreted in the following way: modern individuals need to undergo their own "time of origins" experience in order to recover what has been lost in modernity; they need to retrieve those past times and spaces in which the sacred was fully present. Taylor's claim is that once we re-learn how to engage the transcendent "time of origins" of the past within the present moment, then we can more fully and deeply encounter the modern world and our future. Simply stated, Taylor is suggesting that a) a deep and profound sacred "time of origins" marks our cultural landscape; b) this sacred depth has been lost to, or forgotten by, the buffered-self; and c) the modern subject *needs* to find ways to remember the past sacred "time of origins" in ways that speak to present society.

Conclusion

This essay began by noting Taylor's Templeton award speech, a speech that underscored his anxiety regarding the "forgettings" of modernity; specifically, the forgotten capacity to engage with the sacred. And as was shown in this essay, the inability to engage with and fully encounter the sacred is a hallmark of the modern experience, a claim made throughout Taylor's work. I proposed that one way to better understand exactly how it was that Taylor's project conceived of the spiritual or sacred features of human experience was via the theme of time – specifically via the loss of a higher-time as a signifier of the sacred. In order to think through Taylor's understanding of time, I examined the repetitious phrase "'time of origins' in Eliade's sense" that Taylor uses in many of his published works. This phrase, I argued, provides a helpful way to think through Taylor's notion of time, religion, and the "forgettings" of modernity.

The "time of origins" phrase, as I have argued throughout this paper, shows us that Taylor conceives of sacred time – and therefore religion – as an attempt to recapitulate a past time that was infused with an excess of "transcendent" quality. Sacred time, for Taylor, is not simply a descriptive account of religious phenomena, instead it also functions as a prescriptive and normative corrective to the homogeneity of modern time and the malaise of the buffered-self. Indeed, for Taylor, it is the slow encroachment of the uniform experience of time that led to the buffered-self, the loss of the porous-self, and, thus, the loss of the sacred that he laments with Kearney.

This occurs, according to Taylor, because the experience of time as uniform results in a subjective and social disposition in which the possibility of a "sacred" time – a breaking-through – seems foreign at best and impossible at worst. Taylor thus argues that the modern subject, in order to experience the sacred and forgo the forgettings of the contemporary world, needs to experience these disruptive moments of time – this is the anthropological assumption that undergirds Taylor's "time of origins" claim. Indeed, as Nicholas Smith insightfully notes, for Taylor "self-understanding inescapably occurs in time, it requires some synthesis of the present, past and future" – the "time of origins" I have shown in this essay, is one way in which that synthesis occurs for Taylor.[82] Hence, Taylor's depiction of the buffered-self is a portrayal framed around a lamentation of the loss of the sacred for the modern subject – and a hope of its retrieval via the remembrance of the "time of origins" in Eliade's sense.

How we reimagine and reengage the "sacred" – via the buffered-self – is what Taylor is fundamentally concerned with. For these reasons, as I have argued, Taylor's understanding of this re-engagement with a lost sacred time mimics Eliade's "time of origins" idea. For, what Taylor ultimately prescribes is that "through prayer and a certain faith practice" the modern subject relearns to bring to life the "lost" sacred past, uniting the modern individual with the primal sacred "time of origins," thereby undoing the "forgettings" that Taylor sees haunting modernity.[83]

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82. Nicholas Smith, *Charles Taylor: Meaning, Morals, and Modernity* (Malden, MA: Polity, 2002), 97.
83. Kearney and Taylor, "Transcendent Humanism," 79.

Non-Liberal, Antitotalitarian Catholic Thought in Twentieth-Century Germany

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Binary choices have always been part of political strategy. The rhetorical reduction of political identities as liberals and conservatives, moderns and reactionaries, West and East, helps us organize political issues, at the cost of missing the nuances and subtleties of political life. They simplify what is originally complex and diverse in political life, making decisions manageable – for example, through political parties. They often present the differences between "us" and "them" as irreconcilable. However, this simplification, which by its very nature implies some degree of *exclusion*, becomes problematic when contrasted with the democratic claim that pluralism is the necessary outcome of a society in which individuals are considered free and equal.

Isaiah Berlin's distinction between negative and positive liberty illustrates the dangers of binary oppositions.[2] In Berlin's opinion, positive liberty, beginning as a desire for self-mastery, degenerates into coercion, authoritarianism, and even totalitarianism when confronted with the question of the social implementation of the good life or the just order. Against this rather dire picture, Berlin asserts that only negative freedom – which asserts that I am free "to the degree to which no man or body of men interferes with my activity"[3] – is compatible with a democratic regime, i.e., with a society composed of free persons. But we must ask: Is it really the case that negative liberty is the only, or the best solution to the problem of the diversity of human goals? Or even the only way to escape the terrors of

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2. Isaiah Berlin, *Liberty* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 166-217.
3. Berlin, *Liberty*, 170.

totalitarianism? If Berlin were right – I think he is not[4] – then Catholicism, and many other religious and spiritual traditions, would have to renounce its claim that truth, which human beings don't create but *receive*, is the precondition of freedom.

In this work, I question the liberal rhetoric that suggests that liberalism is the condition *sine qua non* of antitotalitarian politics. I study a tradition of non-liberal, antitotalitarian Catholic[5] political thought in Germany. The thinkers reviewed here reject *both* liberalism and totalitarianism; they oppose the utopia of a perfect world achievable by human efforts, but at the same time warn us against the dismissal of Christian culture and its importance for political life. It is my conviction that if we abandon the logic of binary oppositions, their insights can stimulate a fruitful discussion about liberalism, political theology, and the modern world.

In the first section I study nineteenth-century Catholicism in Germany, focusing on the phenomenon known as *Kulturkampf*,[6] in order to understand the ideological environment that surrounded the lives of Erik Peterson, Eric Voegelin,[7] and Joseph Ratzinger. The historical record shows that liberalism resorted to binary oppositions to confront not only the Catholic Church, but also the women's movement. It also helps us understand why German Catholics became suspicious of liberalism after the Kulturkampf. The rest of the paper develops the thought of the three German thinkers, with two goals in mind. First, I suggest that liberalism is not the condition *sine qua non* of antitotalitarian politics; and secondly, I present both Peterson and

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4. A solid critique of Berlin's doctrine of liberty is found in Charles Taylor's article, "What's Wrong with Negative Liberty," in *Philosophy and the Human Sciences. Philosophical Papers 2* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 211-229.

5. It is important to note here that the roots of this thought must be traced back to Patristic thought. Erik Peterson's argument is dependent on Gregory of Nazianzus (329-390 CE), and Augustine (354-430 CE). Joseph Ratziger has adopted Henri de Lubac's approach to theology as being the "echo" of Tradition. Both Peterson and Ratzinger understand themselves in a dialogue with the Church Fathers. I am indebted to the anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.

6. See Michael B. Gross, *The War Against Catholicism. Liberalism and Anti-Catholic Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Germany* (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2005), 253-254.

7. I am aware that the inclusion of Eric Voegelin among "Catholic thinkers" is problematic. Voegelin was not a Catholic, he was rather an unclassifiable Christian. However, as I will show, there is an intellectual affinity (based on shared Catholic ideas) between Voegelin and these two Catholics, important enough to treat him as a companion to the other two.

Voegelin as strong influences in the political thought of Joseph Ratzinger, suggesting that this tradition is alive and active in the thought of one of the most important Catholic theologians of our time.

<div align="center">I</div>

In *The War Against Catholicism*, Michael B. Gross provides a detailed, thoroughly documented history of the second half of the nineteenth century in Germany, which was marked by a cultural war against Catholicism. The (failed) liberal revolution of 1848 became a fertile soil for a Catholic counterrevolution. In the bishops' opinion, "people had been 'blinded' and 'bewildered,' 'bewitched' and 'bedazzled' by modern and fashionable philosophies: materialism, rationalism, liberalism and democracy.'"[8] Against the powerful impetus of modernity, the Catholic Church organized a missionary crusade designed to rekindle piety and reinvigorate morality. These crusades began in 1849, and remained active until 1872, when the Jesuits and other religious orders were banned during the Kulturkampf. The missions' dynamics disrupted everyday routines in the cities and the country, to the point where most activities were suspended so as to free time to hear the sermons,[9] which called people to convert in the hope of receiving the gift of everlasting life and avoiding damnation, and insisted on a moral renovation, emphasizing sexual morals and alcoholism. Missions were efficacious especially among the lower socioeconomic strata, although many aristocrats and bourgeois joined the crowds to hear the sermons and waited in line for confession.[10] The conservative tone of missionary rhetoric was looked upon favorably by the state, although the power and influence of the missionaries, especially the Jesuits, triggered a cautious attitude, if not plain suspicion.[11]

Outside Germany, conservatism was also the dominant tone in ecclesiastical matters. In 1832, Pope Gregory XVI issued his encyclical letter *Mirari Vos*, denouncing a world covered in darkness where "[d]epravity exults; science is impudent; liberty, dissolute. The holiness of the sacred

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8. Gross, *The War Against Catholicism*, 31.
9. Gross, *The War Against Catholicism*, 39-41.
10. Gross, *The War Against Catholicism*, 57.
11. Jesuits were deemed an economic threat because of their exploitation of women (Gross, *The War Against Catholicism*, 112), as well as enemies of Enlightenment (*ibid*., 94).

is despised; the majesty of divine worship is not only disapproved by evil men, but defiled and held up to ridicule."[12] He denounced "indifferentism," freedom of conscience (an "absurd and erroneous presupposition," §14), and the freedom of the press. More important for our purposes, however, is Pius IX's *Syllabus* of 1864, which anathematized eighty doctrinal mistakes, including various condemnations against nineteenth-century liberalism.[13]

In their fight against Catholicism, liberals in Germany adopted binary oppositions, such as sloth/industry, obsolescence/progress, fanaticism/reason, celibacy/family, and medieval/freedom.[14] They sided with Protestants, whom they associated with rationalism, freedom (from the institution, to interpret Scriptures, etc.), and an aversion to authority. In the liberal mind there wasn't any room for compromise: it was progress or backwardness, light or darkness. Moreover, liberals also gendered their attacks on Catholicism: the Church was identified as "feminine" while the state was considered "masculine." Liberals opposed both the Catholic Church – symbolized by the "effeminate" priest[15] – as well as the women's movement for social and political emancipation: "Liberal men from the left to the right… overwhelmingly rejected outright the notion that women were autonomous individuals, defined not simply by marriage and the family but entitled to equal social, legal, political, and citizen rights."[16] Liberals saw a correspondence between the public/private division and gendered roles, where males were naturally fit for public service, politics, and the economy, and females were oriented towards the family and piety. While the Church was in no way the vanguard of gender politics, Catholic women took part in the German society – through groups, associations, charities, etc. – creating spaces for the development and autonomy of women as nurses, teachers,

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12. Gregory XVI, *Mirari Vos* (1832), §5, available at http://www.papalencyclicals.net/greg16/g16mirar.htm (accessed on Dec. 5, 2017).

13. Especially important are the condemnation of claims such as: "in the present day it is no longer expedient that the Catholic religion should be helda as the only religion of the State" (§77), "persons… shall enjoy the public exercise of their own peculiar worship" (§78), and "the Roman Pontiff can, and ought to, reconcile himself, and come to terms with progress, liberalism and modern civilization" (§80). Pius IX, *Syllabus of Errors* (1864), available at http://www.papalencyclicals.net/pius09/p9syll.htm (accessed on Dec. 5, 2017).

14. Gross, *The War Against Catholicism*, 181, cf. 102.

15. Gross, *The War Against Catholicism*, 143.

16. Gross, *The War Against Catholicism*, 195.

welfare workers, and administrative personnel.[17]

In 1870, with the German victory over France and the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, liberals sided with Bismarck and proposed a series of anti-Catholic legislation. In 1871 a law made "public discussion of matters of state by clerics 'in a manner endangering public peace' a criminal offense."[18] In 1872, supervision of the schools by the churches was abolished, and the Society of Jesus and other religious orders were banned. In 1873, the May Laws "provided for the state examination of clerics and state approval of all clerical appointments."[19]

The reaction of the Catholic population against the Kulturkampf was energic. The 1874 election made clear that the people were with the Jesuits and against the Kulturkampf: many Catholic members of the Liberal party who had sided with the Kulturkampf lost their seats.[20] It became clear that "most of the Catholic voting population decided that it was impossible now to be both Catholic and liberal."[21]

Four decades later, the Weimar republic was "Germany's first democratic republic, which came into being as a result of unprecedented global war and global defeat after the moral and political bankruptcy of its predecessor, Imperial Germany, became palpably indefensible."[22] Eric D. Weitz divides Weimar's political history into three periods: one dominated by the left and center (1918-1923); another where the center right predominated (1924-1929); and the last one under the control of the authoritarian rule (1930-1933). It is telling that, in the first period, the coalition that "took up the cause of liberal political reform" included the Catholic Center Party, which was deeply influenced by bishops and clergymen.[23] However, and "[d]espite its very prominent role in the republic… Catholics retained in the 1920s their sense of grievance in a Protestant-dominated country… Catholic memories of the Kulturkampf… were long."[24] On the Protestant side, on the

17. Gross, *The War Against Catholicism*, 215-219.
18. Gross, *The War Against Catholicism*, 255.
19. Gross, *The War Against Catholicism*, 252.
20. Gross, *The War Against Catholicism*, 275.
21. Gross, *The War Against Catholicism*, 277.
22. Rudy Koshar, "Introduction," in *The Weimar Moment: Liberalism, Political Theology, and Law*, eds. Leonard V. Kaplan and Rudy Koshar (Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2012), xi.
23. Koshar, "Introduction," xiv.
24. Eric D. Weitz, *Weimar Germany: Promises and Tragedy* (Princeton: Princeton University

other hand, the separation between "throne and altar" was felt as a loss of the influence it had had during the Kulturkampf years. Just as Catholics had done decades before, Protestants distanced themselves from liberals.

The shadow of the Kulturkampf made Catholics suspicious of Weimar politics: they rejected liberal programs, reaffirming instead "traditional Christian teachings on the close link between church and state,"[25] but they didn't unreflexively join the Nazi party.[26] As Weitz claims, both Protestants and Catholics "kept their options open."[27] The lack of support of important sectors of the German society, as well as the constant attacks from the radical right, led to the fall of Weimar society and the rise of Hitler and Nazism. However, while many Christians sympathized with them – like the prominent Protestant theologians, Paul Althaus and Emanuel Hirsch, and the Catholic jurist, Carl Schmitt – many others opposed the totalitarian regime, like Joseph Pieper, Romano Guardini, Dietrich von Hildebrand, and Cardinals Clemens August von Galen and Michael von Faulhaber.

II

In *Monotheism as a Political Problem,* Erik Peterson studied the theologico-political imagination of early Christianity. His book, published in 1935, was intended as "a blow to *Reichstheologie.*"[28] His starting point is a quote from the Iliad, at the end of book XII of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* – "the rule of many is not good, let one be ruler"[29] – the development of which he follows in the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise *De mundo* and in the Jewish philosopher Philo. While Aristotle presents god as the transcendent goal (*telos*) and Prime Mover, the author of *De mundo* understands the divine Being as the "presupposition for the existence of *potestas* (*dynamis*)," thus

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Press, 2007), 94.

25. Weitz, *Weimar Germany*, 340. See Klaus Tanner, "Protestant Revolt against Modernity," in *The Weimar Moment*, eds. Kaplan and Koshar, 10.

26. See Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, "German Catholicism in 1933," *Cross Currents* 11, no. 3 (1961), 283-304.

27. Weitz, *Weimar Germany*, 340.

28. Peterson's letter to Friedrich Dessauer, quoted in Artur Mrówczyński-Van Allen, "Beyond Political Theology and its Liquidation: From Theopolitical Monotheism to Trinitarianism," *Modern Theology* 33, no. 4 (2017): 579.

29. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 12.1076a 3ff, quoted in Erik Peterson, *Theological Tractates*, trans. Michael J. Hollerich (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 69.

transforming a metaphysical argument into a political one. Philo applied the term "monarchy" to Israel: since the God of the Jews is not one god among many, but the only God, creator of the universe, i.e., the cosmic monarch, then his people, Israel, "become priests and prophets for the whole human race."[30] He then reviews the works of Justin, Cyril of Jerusalem, Tartan, Theophilus of Antioch, and Tertullian in order to show how the notion of "monarchy" was introduced in Christian thinking. Tertullian, for example, refuted Praxeas' identification of the Son with the Father through the term "monarchy," defending the possibility of a non-divided divine Monarchy: "if the son should also be appointed to participate in it… it is still a monarchy, which is held jointly by the two as unified."[31]

Peterson notes that "the same argumentation that Tertullian uses to define the relation of the Son and the Holy Spirit was used outside of the Church as a justification for polytheism."[32] The idea of a monarchy composed of many persons could suggest, polytheists had argued before him, a hierarchical heaven populated by major and minor gods, where the *one*, great god rules over them. This was the basis for Celsus' attack on Christianity for revolting against the theologico-political order of polytheism.

Many Christian thinkers saw the emergence of the Roman Empire, as well as the peace brought by it, as a providential design for the Christianization of the world. Origen read Psalm 72:7 as a prophecy referring to Rome, and Eusebius linked together the end of Jewish kingship, Augustus' monarchy, and the birth of the Messiah.[33] His work served two goals: it refuted Celsus' attack on Christianity as a cause of disorder and rebellion, and created a Christian political theology. By joining the Roman Empire and Jesus' redemption together, Eusebius linked God's monarchy and earthly political authority. The Roman Empire was God's plan, and its authority was willed by the Lord of History.[34]

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30. Peterson, *Theological Tractates*, 73.

31. Peterson, *Theological Tractates*, 82.

32. Peterson, *Theological Tractates*, 82.

33. Peterson, *Theological Tractates*, 92.

34. "For Peterson, monotheism denotes the false alliance of church and state first established in the realm of Christendom by emperor Constantine and theorized by his biographer Eusebius. In essence, however, the doctrine of cesaro-papism, as it came to be called, is to Peterson a Jewish heresy" (Michael Zank, "Strauss, Schmitt, and Peterson, or: Comparative Contours

Peterson contends that "the phrase ['Divine Monarchy'] loses its political-theological character alongside the orthodox dogma."[35] He stresses the impossibility of any Christian political-theology by leaning on Gregory of Nazianzus, for whom the unity of the triune God "doesn't find correspondence in the created order,"[36] and Augustine, who opposed the identification of the Pax Romana with the peace announced in the psalms. György Géreby concludes from Augustine that "a thoroughly eschatological view of the church cannot look on *any* existing political order as fulfilling the promise of the heavenly Jerusalem and the *coming* kingdom of God."[37]

In his article, *The Church*, written amid his conversion to Catholicism, Peterson interprets the eleventh chapter of Paul's Epistle to the Romans as a presentation of his "Doctrine of the Last Things." Paul's eschatology (Rom 11:25) reveals that the kingdom of God will come when the Gentiles, and *after* them, the Jews, convert. Since the Jews, the people of God (Ex 6:7; Jer 30:22) hardened their hearts and refused to believe (Acts 13:26), God had mercy on the gentiles (Hos 1:10), without forgetting his promise to the chosen people, which will be fulfilled in the end of times (Is 59:20-21). The time of the Church exists since Pentecost (Acts 2:4) – wherein the gift of tongues signalizes the abandonment of Hebrew as the holy language and the time of the gentiles – and until Christ returns and the kingdom of God comes.[38] The Church, thus, exists to fulfill the eschatological itinerary that

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of the 'Theological-Political Predicament,'" in *German-Jewish Thought Between Religion and Politics*, eds. Christian Wiese and Martina Urban [Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012], 324).

35. Zank, "Comparative Contours," 103.

36. Zank, "Comparative Contours," 103. Arthur Mrówczyński-Van Allen points out an inconsistency in Peterson's thought. Peterson, he claims, incorrectly identified monotheism with Monarchianism, misreading Gregory of Nazianzus – his main source for advocating the end of political theology – and thus failing to land his blow (Mrówczyński-Van Allen, "Beyond Political Theology," 11).

37. György Geréby, "Political Theology versus Theological Politics: Erik Peterson and Carl Schmitt," *New German Critique* 7, no. 33 (2008): 20. Elshtain claims that, for Augustine, "any identification of the city of God with an earthly order invites sacralization of human arrangements and a dangerous idolatry" (Jean Bethke Elshtain, "Augustine," in *The Blackwell Companion to Political Theology*, eds. Peter Scott and William Cavanaugh [Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004], 42).

38. In *Divine Monarchy* Peterson quotes Gregory of Elvira: "Whoever would want to realize the divine monarchy on earth would be like the Antichrist, for it is him who alone will be the monarch of the whole earth [*ipse solus toto orbe monarchiam habiturus est*]," quoted in Geréby,

will end with the conversion of the Jews.

From all this Peterson deduces that political theology, that is, investing a concrete political form with a theological justification, amounts to an undue immanentization of the notion of "God's kingdom," which can only be understood eschatologically. This is consistent with Peterson's article *Christ as Imperator,* where he emphasizes that "Christ is… king, and not emperor, of the *coming aeon*,"[39] and with his claim, in *The Book of Angels*, that Christianity implies the abandonment of the earthly Jerusalem: "The earthly Jerusalem, with the Temple cult, is clearly the point of departure for the ideas and images of early Christian literature, though this point of departure has now been left behind and Jerusalem as a political entity, city as well as place of worship, is no longer found on earth but in 'heaven,' to which Christians' eyes are turned."[40]

Peterson's attempted blow to *Reichstheologie* was also an attack on Carl Schmitt's political theology, first developed in his 1922 book *Political Theology*, wherein Schmitt famously declared that "all significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts not only because of their historical development…but also because of their systematic structure."[41]

Schmitt, a conservative jurist, saw the emergence of the sovereign state in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as the great European achievement. However, the modern, secular, and liberal eighteenth century opted for a separation of orders and, worse, for the emphasis on the economy over the political.[42] To the economic world of the modern bourgeoisie Schmitt juxtaposed the Catholic Church as an institution. The political importance of the Catholic Church is its ability to "represent" the *civitas humana*, to be

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"Political Theology versus Theological Politics," 20-1.

39. Peterson, *Theological Tractates*, 149, emphasis is mine.

40. Peterson, *Theological Tractates*, 107-108. Cf. Mrówczyński-Van Allen, "Beyond Political Theology and its Liquidation," 3-4.

41. Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology*, trans. George Schwab (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), 36.

42. "The world-view of the modern capitalist is the same as that of the industrial proletarian, as if the one were the twin brother of the other… The big industrialist has no other ideal than that of Lenin – an 'electrified earth.' They disagree essentially only on the correct method of electrification" (Carl Schmitt, *Roman Catholicism and Political Form*, trans. G. L. Ulmen [Westport: Greenwood Press, 1966], 13).

the connecting aeon between Pentecost and the Second Coming,[43] and for that very reason, a specific kind of authority that is nowhere to be found in modern societies. The pope, as the vicar of Christ, represents God's authority, which is reflected in juridical form (canonical law), but more important, he brings back the notion of "sovereign," who in Schmitt's political theory is the one who decides on the exception.[44] The modern bourgeoisie, on the contrary, is unable to create representation, contenting itself, instead, with "the fateful dualism of the age" and its "polarities."[45]

The questions that the Catholic Church solves, unlike liberalism, are two: *Quis judicabit?* and *Quis interpretatur?*[46] In the interim between Pentecost and Christ's return, the Church solves the *political* problem of decision and interpretation in a way that the secularized theory of the sovereign state will resemble: sovereignty corresponds to God's omnipotence, exception to the miracle, and so on. That the sovereign is "he who decides on the exception"[47] tells us that, for Schmitt, the important question about law is not primarily its content, but its "adscription" or "competence," which is "a question that cannot be raised by and much less answered from the content of the legal quality of a maxim."[48]

Schmitt's answer to Peterson was written thirty-five years later. In *Political Theology II*, he addressed Peterson's two claims for rejecting political theology: first, that the Trinitarian God of Christianity finds no correspondence in the natural world; and second, Peterson's rejection of the Pax Romana as an eschatological sign. He left aside the argument on the nature of the kingdom. Against these claims, Schmitt argues, first, that Peterson's article focuses on monarchy: "the accurate, central, and systematic concept for the politico-theological problem that Peterson discusses cannot be oriented towards monarchy, but has to be oriented towards political unity

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43. Schmitt, *Roman Catholicism*, 19.

44. See Roberto Esposito, *Two: The Machine of Political Theology and the Place of Thought* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), 42-44.

45. Schmitt, *Roman Catholicism*, 20.

46. Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology II*, trans. Michael Hoelzl and Graham Ward (Malden: Polity, 2008), 115; cf. Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, trans. George Schwab (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007), 43.

47. Schmitt, *Political Theology*, 5.

48. Schmitt, *Political Theology*, 33.

and its presence or representation."[49] This move allows Schmitt to introduce the Hobbesian sovereign, who can be a person or an assembly, making room for non-monarchical political theologies, such as democracy.[50] Secondly, he criticizes Peterson's highly abstract separation between "pure theology" and "impure politics."[51]

Schmitt's understanding of "political theology" is more complex than Peterson's. For the former, political theology refers *only* to the use of Christian theology as the form of a regime; it implies the claim that the human (political) society somehow *reflects* the divine essence. In Schmitt's work, the concept is stretched to include people's reading of human history as the work of divine providence.[52]

On another level, Jesus' hypostatic union makes the tension between *logos* and *sarx* inescapable. In the words of Roberto Esposito, "the basic problem posed by Schmitt is the inevitable presence of the Two in the figure of the Incarnation, with which the Trinitarian principle is closely connected in Christian dogma."[53] The Church exists in this world while at the same time escaping it, as a pilgrim that knows that the earth her feet touch is transient, that it can only use what it possesses to prepare what will come.[54] Peterson is aware of this tension. The Church, he admits, "is not in a univocal sense a religious-political entity such as was the messianic Kingdom of the Jews.

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49. Schmitt, *Political Theology II*, 72. Representation is the central feature that Schmitt finds praiseworthy in the preconciliar Catholic Church. Following Hans Barion's criticism of the constitution Gaudium et Spes (§74), he laments that the council "has taken away the basis for the eulogy" he tried to make in *Roman Catholicism and Political Form* (Schmitt, *Political Theology*, 46-47).

50. See Schmitt, *Political Theology*, 54-55, 74.

51. "Peterson's argument revolves around a distinction between the purely theological and the impurely political, in an abstract and absolute disjunction which enables him to circumvent the mixed nature of the spiritual-secular combination of any specifically historical event" (Schmitt, *Political Theology*, 92).

52. Schmitt, *Political Theology*, 87.

53. Esposito, *Two*, 62.

54. A radical (condemned as heretical) interpretation of this tension is found in Ticonius, the African Donatist who lived in the fourth century. Ticonius proposed the doctrine of the Church's "corpus bipartitum," stating that "the Church's one body has two sides: the left and the right, the first a sinner and the latter filled with grace; but both belong to the one and only body" (Joseph Ratzinger, *El Nuevo Pueblo de Dios* [Barcelona: Herder, 1972], 22). Translation is mine.

But she is also not a purely spiritual entity, in which such concepts as politics and sovereignty may not, as such, appear, as though she were restricted to 'service.'"[55] What Peterson emphasizes is the absolute otherness of God's kingdom, the impossibility to fulfil, here and now, this new era.

The tension becomes explicit at this point. Contrary to civil religions, for Christianity it is God who comes to humanity and starts the dialogue. Theology thus abandons the political, first, because the form of communication unveils the infinite distance between the interlocutors (a distance the political cannot mirror); and second, because of the message itself: divine *economy* is inimitable by human politics, the kingdom is not of this word, etc.[56] At the same time, revelation must be interpreted. But even when Christ solved the problems of decision and interpretation (Mt 16:13-20), the Christian message, which starts with Christ's hypostatic union, breaks the infinite distance, joins together *logos* and *sarx*, and reconceptualises human existence eschatologically. Consequently, all human history is theologically informed, *including politics*. This brings back Schmitt's questions, forcing new decisions and interpretations that inevitably fall under the field of political theology.[57]

Schmitt accused Peterson of ignoring "the crisis of the modern problematic of church/state/society,"[58] thus failing to establish why the case of Eusebius and the Roman Empire is exemplary,[59] and of not seeing that "you cannot compare the context of a Greek church father of the Nicaean Council with that of a Latin church father under the rule of the Vandals."[60] However, Jacob Taubes read Peterson's article and, particularly, his reference to Augustine's *City of God*, as an urgent warning to Schmitt. In a letter to

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55. Peterson, *Theological Tractates*, 38. Schmitt was aware of this idea (*Political Theology II*, 87).

56. See Giorgio Agamben, *The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and Government*, trans. Lorenzo Chisea (with Matteo Mandarini) (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), chapter 2.

57. This is why Esposito claims that "the terminus technicus of persona acted as a semantic transformer in the workings of the political-theological machine" (Esposito, *Two*, 84). Christ's hypostatic union (two "persons" in one), as well as the Trinity (three "persons" in one) are at the root of the machine, by "expressing a unity through a division" (Esposito, *Two*, 84).

58. Schmitt, *Political Theology II*, 44.

59. Schmitt, *Political Theology II*, 63.

60. Schmitt, *Political Theology II*, 98.

Schmitt, written in 1979, Taubes confides:

> You yourself have established that the term *Führer* is unique, as is the reference to "Christian ideology" for Eusebius's *theologumenon.* Also astonishing is the reference to *Civitas Dei* III.30, which has nothing "historical," but which in 1935 was shockingly contemporary: *caecus atque improvidus futurorum,*[61] a coded warning to you – which you never received. You have had no better friend than Peterson to put you on the path to the Christian Church.[62]

In Taubes' analysis, Peterson's work acquires an urgent, contemporary tone. Confronted with the emergence of the Nazi terror, he delivered a message to Schmitt ciphered inside an Augustinian quote. This message, Taubes laments, was never received.

III

Eric Voegelin explicitly acknowledged Peterson's claim against political theology.[63] In his most known work, *The New Science of Politics,* he subscribes to his critique of Eusebius and arrives at Peterson's conclusion that "this is the end of political theology in Orthodox Christianity."[64]

Voegelin singles out two major developments in the history of political ideas that have influenced our understanding of human existence.[65] First, the Platonic "anthropological principle," which stated that the micro-cosmos of the individual is recreated in the macro-cosmos of the *polis*, that is, that "every society reflects the type of men of whom it is composed."[66] Second, the Christian "theological principle" that opened the way for communication

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61. "Blind and reckless about what was to come."

62. Jacob Taubes, *To Carl Schmitt: Letters and Reflections* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 28.

63. See Eric Voegelin, *The New Science of Politics* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1952), 102n76.

64. Voegelin, *The New Science of Politics*, 106.

65. This is Voegelin's "principle of maximal differentiation": "theory is bound by history in the sense of differentiating experiences. Since maximum differentiation was achieved through Greek philosophy and Christianity, this means theory is bound to move within the historical horizon of classic and Christian experiences. To recede from the maximum of differentiation is theoretical retrogression; it will result in the various types of derailment which Plato has characterized as doxa" (Voegelin, *The New Science of Politics*, 79-80).

66. Voegelin, *The New Science of Politics*, 62.

between God and human beings to the point where, for Christianity, "the fact of revelation is its content."[67] The end of the theologico-political means, for Voegelin, the de-divinization of the world, that is, the end of "political religions," which existed before Christianity (e.g. the solar cult of Aton under the reign of Akhenaton, between 1405-1307 B.C.), and after it. These re-divinization projects are at the forefront of Voegelin's project.

In *Political Religions* – his last book written before he fled Germany in 1938 – Voegelin attacked "political religions," singling out Nazism as a "Satanic force," a substantial evil threatening to devour the existence of individuals.[68] Political religions operate on the symbolic level, that is, they function as mechanisms of *representation*.[69] The "political" dimension of political religion becomes visible in the process of articulation, understood as a force applied on the social body, which ultimately finds the State as the "primal ruling power."[70] The "religious" dimension, on the other hand, is identifiable in that the justification of the ruling power is done by linking sovereignty and a metareality – what Voegelin calls the *Realissimum* – that signals the "true" human existence, or its connection with Being. Voegelin distinguishes between "world-transcendent religions," which locate the *Realissimum* outside this world, and "world-immanent religions," which keep it in this world.[71]

For Voegelin, the development of world-immanent religions, or political religions, is linked to modern gnosticism[72]. In *Ersatz Religion*, he identifies

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67. Voegelin, *The New Science of Politics*, 78.

68. Voegelin rejects Augustine's famous doctrine of evil as absence, (*The City of God*, XI:9) in order to introduce National Socialism as a radical evil: "A religious view of National Socialism must proceed from the assumption that there is evil in the world. To be sure, evil not only as a deficient mode of Being, something negative, but rather as a genuine, effective substance and force in the world. A not merely morally bad, but also a religiously evil, Satanic substance can only be opposed by an equally strong, religiously good force of resistance. A Satanic force cannot be combated with morality and humanism alone" (*Political Religions*, trans. T.J. DiNapoli and E.S. Easterly III [New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1986], 2).

69. "In order to come into existence, a society must articulate itself by producing a representative that will act for it" (Voegelin, *The New Science of Politics*, 41). Note the resemblance with Schmitt.

70. Voegelin, *Political Religions*, 6.

71. Voegelin, *The New Science of Politics*, 12-14.

72. In his autobiographical reflections, Voegelin recognizes that "[s]ince my first applications of Gnosticism to modern phenomena… I have had to revise my position. The application of the

progressivism, positivism, Marxism, psychoanalysis, communism, fascism, and national socialism as gnostic movements.[73] Gnostics are dissatisfied with the world, the wickedness of which they attribute to a defective creation by a wicked god. Notwithstanding its vicious origin, gnostics believe the world can change, and that hope is in our hands: it is through knowledge (*gnosis*) that the order of being will be changed. Against Christianity, which denies that this world can ever be perfect – or perfected by human hands alone – and opposes to this world the Kingdom of God that we can only glimpse at through faith,[74] gnosticism sees "a concrete society and its order as an eschaton."[75]

The gnostic approach consists in the immanentization of basic symbols in order to collapse the distinction between man and God, that is, the *divinization* of man.[76] Notions of "hierarchy," "ekklesia," "spiritual/temporal," and the Apocalypse are used by gnosticism in its quest for a perfect world, here-and-now, that human beings will build for ourselves. If we take, for example, National Socialism, we can see that the notion of "ekklesia," which for Christian theology cannot be understood as *just* immanent, is identified with the *Volk*. Voegelin explains that for both Italian

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category of Gnosticism to modern ideologies, of course, stands. In a more complete analysis, however, there are other factors to be considered in addition," such as the apocalypse deriving from the Israelites prophets. Some lines after, he claims: "I found, furthermore, that neither the apocalyptic nor the gnostic strand completely account for the process of immanentization. This factor has independent origins in the revival of neo-Platonism in Florence in the fifteenth century" (Voegelin, *Autobiographical Reflections* [Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2011], 93).

73. Voegelin, *Science, Politics, and Gnosticism* (Chicago: Gateway, 1968), 57.

74. "The tension between a different truth of the soul and the truth of society cannot be eliminated from historical reality by throwing out the one or the other. Faith is the anticipation of a supernatural perfection of man; it is not this perfection itself. The realm of God is not of this world; and the representative of the civitas Dei in history, the church, is not a substitute for civil society" (Voegelin, *The New Science of Politics*, 157).

75. Voegelin, *The New Science of Politics*, 166.

76. It is difficult not to read the "Satanic character" of Nazism that Voegelin denounces in Biblical terms. The idea of the divinization of humanity is the Devil's machination ("you will be like God," Gen 3:5). Satan reformulated this temptation, which caused the Fall, in his encounter with Jesus. Satan took Jesus to a high mountain, and showing him all the kingdoms of the world, said to him: "All this I will give you, if you will fall down and worship me" (Mt 4:8-9). What does the adoration of the devil, the Prince of this World (Jn 14:30), mean but the divinization of the immanent world?

Fascism and German National Socialism, "[t]he sacred substance… is the spirit of the people or the objective spirit, a *Realissimum* lasting through the ages which becomes historical reality in individual men as members of their *Volk* and in their works."[77]

Voegelin stresses that the order of being is something *given*, under no man's control.[78] Now, in order for gnosticism to be able to re-divinize the immanent world, "the givenness of the order of being must be obliterated; the order of being must be interpreted, rather, as essentially under man's control. And taking control of being further requires that the transcendent origin of being be obliterated: it requires the decapitation of being – the murder of God."[79] This need for absolute emancipation is clear in Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*: "*If* there were gods, how could I endure not being a god! *Therefore,* there are no gods!"[80] Voegelin also refers to Hegel, for whom "God has died because he was no more than a phase of consciousness that is now outmoded. And it is outmoded because consciousness in its dialectical progress has gone beyond it."[81]

The criticism Voegelin directs against gnosticism and political religions rests on two main premises. In the first place, gnostic movements are possible only by suppressing a significative part of reality: Thomas More's *Utopia* suppresses man's lust for property, a consequence of original sin, in order to present a perfect society that has abolished private property; Thomas Hobbes obliterates the *summum bonum* in order to present, on the contrary, the *summum malum,* the fear of violent death, as the dominant human passion, against which he will oppose his *Leviathan*, the first modern political religion; and Hegel excludes "the mystery of a history that wends its way into the future without our knowing its end," and thus presents his theory of history as a "meaningfully self-contained process of history."[82] Secondly, and as a consequence of this omission, gnosticism must prohibit any questioning that puts the doctrine in jeopardy. Marx, for example, admonishes his socialist pupil: "Give up your abstraction and you will give

77. Voegelin, *Political Religions*, 67.

78. Voegelin, *Science, Politics, and Gnosticism*, 35.

79. Voegelin, *Science, Politics, and Gnosticism*, 35-36.

80. Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), Part Two, §2: "Upon the Blessed Isles," quoted in Voegelin, *Science, Politics, and Gnosticism*, 36.

81. Voegelin, *Science, Politics, and Gnosticism*, 47.

82. Voegelin, *Science, Politics, and Gnosticism*, 72.

up your question along with it."[83] Questioning leads to the unmasking of the system as a falsification of reality, and thus needs to be precluded at all cost.

In close connection with his rejection of gnosticism and political religions, Voegelin shares Peterson's dismissal of political theology, denouncing it as the attempt to immanentize what is essentially transcendent, an anxiety to control what escapes human control, and a yearning to be like God. He dismisses the identification of Christianity with political movements or with revolutionary attempts to change the world once and for all.[84] While "uncertainty is the very essence of Christianity,"[85] gnosticism rejects the imposition of any limits on knowledge, confident in its ability to subdue and transform this world. This doesn't mean that Christianity preaches passivity and indifference towards the world; what it teaches is that there is a limit to human understanding and power, and that the effort to overcome these limits is futile, leading only to a caricature of a divinized human being which will find in the Nazi *Führer* its most hubristic and horrific manifestation.

Despite his uncompromising critique of political religions, Voegelin doesn't see a clear-cut distinction between politics and religion. In the epilogue to *Political Religions,* he makes this point clear:

> [T]he life of men in a political community cannot be defined as a profane sphere, in which we only have to deal with questions of organizations, of law, and of power. The community is also a realm of religious order, and the recognition of a political situation is incomplete in one decisive point if it does not also embrace the religious forces of the community and the symbols in which they find expression; or indeed, if it embraces them but does not recognize them as such, but rather translates them into a-religious categories. Man lives in the political community with all aspects of his being from the corporeal to the spiritual and

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83. Voegelin, *Science, Politics, and Gnosticism*, 17.

84. "[T]here is no passage in the New Testament from which advice for revolutionary political action could be extracted. The Gnostic revolutionary, however, interprets the coming of the realm as an event that requires his military co-operation" (Voegelin, *The New Science of Politics*, 145).

85. Voegelin, *The New Science of Politics*, 122. Elsewhere he claims that "with the refinement and clarification of the relationship between God and man, the moment of uncertainty, and with it the need for more solid certainty, is intensified" (Voegelin, *Science, Politics, and Gnosticism*, 76).

religious.[86]

Christianity created a tension between reason and revelation,[87] between the political community and the eternal community of the children of God, by bringing about the "idea of a universal community of mankind, beyond civil society, through the participation of all men in the common measure."[88] Hence:

> we must distinguish between the opening of the soul as an epoch in experiential differentiation and the structure of reality which remains unchanged. From the distinction it follows for the present problem that the tension between a different truth of the soul and the truth of society cannot be eliminated from historical reality by throwing out the one or the other. Faith is the anticipation of a supernatural perfection of man; it is not this perfection itself. The realm of God is not of this world; and the representative of the *civitas Dei* in history, the church, is not a substitute for civil society.[89]

IV

Joseph Ratzinger has repeatedly denounced the horrors of totalitarianism, leaning instead towards democracy as the best political regime. However, not everyone sees Ratzinger as an ally of democracy. John Allen Jr., for example, claims that Ratzinger "believes that the best antidote to political totalitarianism is ecclesial totalitarianism."[90] Allen's claim exemplifies the false dualism I reject in this work. It is easy to show Ratzinger's opposition to totalitarianism, and not very hard to uncover his hesitation about the possibility of "an ecclesial totalitarianism."

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86. Voegelin, *Political Religions*, 77.
87. Voegelin, *Political Religions*, 14.
88. Voegelin, *The New Science of Politics*, 156.
89. Voegelin, *The New Science of Politics*, 157. Giorgio Agamben coincides in the inescapability of the tension: "He [Jesus] – who has not come to judge the world but to save it – finds himself, perhaps precisely for this reason, having to respond in a trial, to submit to a judgment, which his alter ego, Pilate, in the end will not pronounce, cannot pronounce. Justice and salvation cannot be reconciled; every time, they return to mutually excluding and calling for each other" (G. Agamben, *Pilate and Jesus*, trans. Adam Kotsko [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013], 44).
90. John Allen, *Benedict XVI. A Biography* (New York: Continuum, 2000), 3.

Ratzinger rejects political theology on at least four grounds. First, he subscribes to Peterson's rejection of the idea of a Christian political theology.[91] The possibility of political theology is also rejected in the New Testament: Ratzinger leans on the historian Martin Hengel, who contrasts the Jewish Zealot movement with the preaching of Jesus of Nazareth, affirming that "one could, like the Zealots, attempt to 'force'… the imminent reign of God through militant action, with weapons in hand, or, conversely, to alleviate the enormous, concrete need, to bind up wounds instead of inflicting them. Jesus consistently chose the second way."[92]

In the third place, he follows Voegelin's critique of gnosticism.[93] In opposition to the gnostic tenet that through the use and perfection of human knowledge we can establish a new order of being, Ratzinger claims that our "relationship to truth is first of all essentially receptive and not productive."[94] Gnosticism, on its part, represents a rejection of the *cosmos* and its God, "a radical form of protest against everything that up until then had seemed to be holy, good, and upright, and that was now exposed as a prison, which gnosis promised to show the way out of."[95]

For Ratzinger, however, "neither reason nor faith ever promises us

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91. "In the old Church the victory of belief in the Trinity over Monarchianism signified a victory over the political abuse of theology: the ecclesiastical belief in the Trinity shattered the politically usable molds, destroyed the potentialities of theology as political myth, and disowned the misuse of the Gospel to justify a political situation" (Joseph Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity* [San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004], 170-171). See also Ratzinger, *The Unity of the Nations* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2015), 7, 103, 112; Ratzinger, *Eschatology: Death and Eternal Life* (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1988), 58.

92. Martin Hengel, *Was Jesus a Revolutionist?* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971), 20. "It is not unlikely that Jesus formulated his demand to forgive one's enemies and be ready to forgive in conscious contrast to that Zealot passion that so informed the leading intellectual and spiritual class of his nation" (Hengel, *Victory over Violence: Jesus and the Revolutionists* [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1973], 50).

93. According to the website *VoegelinView*, published by the Eric Voegelin Society, Ratzinger wrote to Voegelin in 1981, praising his study on gnosticism. The then cardinal confides: "Since I came across your small volume on *Science, Politics, and Gnosticism* in 1959 I have been fascinated and inspired by your thought" ("Benedict and Voegelin," *VoegelinView*, February 13, 2013, https://voegelinview.com/benedict-and-voegelin/ [accessed Dec. 5, 2017]). Cf. Ratzinger, *The Unity of the Nations*, 18n22.

94. Ratzinger, *Church, Ecumenism & Politics* (New York: Saint Paul Publications, 1988), 160.

95. Ratzinger, *The Unity of Nations*, 18-19.

that there will ever be a perfect world. It does not exist,"[96] and thus the gnostic project is condemned to fail. A fourth ground for rejecting political theology comes from Ratzinger's Augustinianism.[97] He adopts Augustine's doctrine of the two cities, the idea that, although mixed together here on Earth,[98] the two cities are distinguishable in their origins, their loves, and their *telos.* Happiness, for the citizens of the heavenly city – which is "true" happiness – is not attainable in this world, for "no one lives as he wishes unless he is happy, and… no one is happy unless he is righteous. Even the righteous man, however, will not live as he wishes unless he arrives at the state where he is wholly free from death, error and harm."[99]

Consequently, when we hubristically deceive ourselves into the belief that our sole efforts can change human nature[100] and thus "renew the face of Earth,"[101] the illusion of an unbridled reason becomes potentially destructive. Politics, therefore, can't aim at ultimate happiness, it cannot try to bring God's kingdom to earth, to divinize its immanent form. Politics, as understood by Christianity, is an "exceptionally sober" human activity: "it must ensure peace at home and abroad."[102]

The definition of politics above is vague enough to allow a considerable variety of political regimes: it can range from Hobbes' solution of an absolute sovereign that holds together the keys of the two cities, the sword and the staff, to Kant's perpetual peace among republican governments. We need, therefore, to clarify what Ratzinger means. To do this, we need to understand the relation between faith and reason, in order to see how politics, which for Ratzinger is "the realm of reason,"[103] relates to faith and religion.

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96. Ratzinger, *Church, Ecumenism & Politics*, 208.

97. Ratzinger, *Milestones: Memoirs 1927-1977* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1998), 44.

98. Cf. Augustine, *The City of God* I:35.

99. Augustine, *The City of God* XIV:25.

100. The creation of an ideal society is impossible because human nature remains a constant over time: "Man, precisely as man remains the same both in primitive and in technologically developed situations. He does not stand on a higher level merely because he has learned to use more highly developed tools. Mankind beings anew in every single individual. This is why it is not possible for the definitely new, ideal society to exist" (Ratzinger, *Values in a Time of Upheaval* [San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006], 25). See also Ratzinger, *Fundamental Speeches from Five Decades* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2012), 149.

101. Psalm 104:30.

102. Ratzinger, *Values in a Time of Upheaval*, 22.

103. Ratzinger, *Values in a Time of Upheaval*, 24.

Christianity shook the Hellenistic world, presenting itself as a *scandal*. Paul's speech at the Areopagus (Acts 17:22-34) challenged not only traditional polytheism, it also claimed that God had come to earth, adopting the human nature, had been arrested, crucified, and had resurrected. Christianity understood itself from the beginning as a *rational* religion, a claim that is beautifully expressed in the introductory lines of John's gospel: God, the *logos*, became *sarx* and dwelled among human beings. In Christ, God's communication with human beings reached its fullness: Jesus made known God's name to the humankind (Jn 17:26).[104] That faith is reasonable means it is not mythical, that is, it is not a human product, but God's revelation to human beings. On the other hand, faith is not rational in the sense that God is cognoscible. God is the absolutely "Other,"[105] the being that is not graspable by the human mind. For that reason, Augustine's claim remains final: "We see that the world exists, whereas we believe that God exists."[106]

The tension between faith and reason is reflected in the tension between the church and the state. The state acts in accordance with divine ordinance insofar as it "guarantees peace and the rule of law,"[107] irrespective of the personal beliefs or intentions of those in office; this "sober" definition entails a limitation on the state: "the refusal to adore the emperor and the refusal in general to worship the state are on the most fundamental level

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104. For Ratzinger, this passage must be understood along with Exodus 3:13-14. Ratzinger explains: "All chapter 17 [of John's gospel] – the so-called 'high priestly prayer,' perhaps the heart of the whole Gospel – centers around the idea of 'Jesus as the revealer of the name of God' and thus assumes the position of New Testament counterpart to the story of the burning bush" (Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity*, 132-133).

105. "[T]here is an infinite gulf between God and man… God is not just he who at present lies in fact outside the field of vision but could be seen if it were possible to go father; no, he is the being who stands essentially outside it, however far our field of vision may be extended" (Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity*, 49-50).

106. Augustine, *The City of God* XI:4.

107. Ratzinger, *Values in a Time of Upheaval*, 20. This idea has Augustinian roots as well. Paul Weithman writes that, for Augustine, "the moral assessment of political authorities turns crucially on how they try to bring about earthly peace" (Weithman, "Augustine's Political Theology," in *The Cambridge Companion to Augustine*, eds. Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001], 244; see also Jean Bethke Elshtain, "Augustine," in *The Blackwell Companion to Political Theology*, eds. Peter Scott and William Cavanaugh [Malden: Blackwell, 2004], 40).

simply a rejection of the totalitarian state."[108] A question immediately arises: Where does law come from? The answer, for Ratzinger, is that laws must reflect societies' deepest convictions, its lifestyle and self-understanding.

Ratzinger focuses on democracy – which he deems "the most appropriate of all political models"[109] – where decision making is understood as a collaborative effort to shape the law. Democracy is, however, not perfect. He sees the main weakness of this political regime in what Alexis de Tocqueville described as the tyranny of majorities. Ratzinger's solution to the tyranny of majorities is, consistently, a Tocquevillian one. Contemporary democracies, Ratzinger alerts us, are too invested in institutional design, displaying, on the other hand, "a complete oblivion of the second basic ingredient of political life, the *mores*," which he understands not in terms of "*morality* but...*custom* or lifestyle."[110] The political community feeds off "utopia," the reflection on the ideal city and its moral content. This symbiosis between politics and utopia must not forget that the human society will never be perfect and, for that reason, must always remain open to change and reform. This is true, moreover, because there is no single moral imperative that can be deemed definitive:

> There is no single rational or ethical or religious "world formula" that could win acceptance by everyone and could then provide support for the whole. At any rate, such a formula is unattainable at present. This is why the so-called "world ethos" remains an abstraction.[111]

Ratzinger rejects both relativism and authoritarianism. He emphatically claims that Christianity cannot be forced upon people. He quotes Origen: "Christ does not win victory over anyone who does not wish it. He conquers

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108. Ratzinger, *Values in a Time of Upheaval*, 20.
109. Ratzinger, *Values in a Time of Upheaval*, 33.
110. Ratzinger, *Joseph Ratzinger in Communio*, Vol. I. (Michigan: Eerdmans Publishing Group, 2010), 25. In my view, contemporary democracy is *not* oblivious of *mores*. The contrary seems true: liberal democracies invest a lot of resources to shape their citizens' worlviews and life-styles. See, for example, William Galston, "Defending Liberalism," *The American Political Science Review* 76, no. 3 (1982): 627. Ratzinger's worry can (and, in my view, should) be reformulated, in order to express that the liberal ethos is not the best one for a healthy democratic society.
111. Ratzinger, *Fundamental Speeches*, 42.

only by convincing, for he is the *Word* of God."[112] This sentence, which reminds us of Revelation 3:20, "I stand at the door and knock; if any one hears my voice and opens the door, I will come in to him and eat with him, and he with me," is consistent both with the idea that the kingdom of God is otherworldly, and, consequently, with the necessary separation of church and state:

> The state is entitled to be autonomous with respect to the Church, and the bishop must acknowledge that the state has its own reality and law. He avoids mixing faith and politics and serves the freedom of all by refusing to allow faith to be identified with a particular form of politics. The Gospel prescribes certain truths and values to politics, but it does not respond to concrete questions concerning particular political and economic issues. This "autonomy of earthly things," of which the Second Vatican Council spoke, must be respected.[113]

Ratzinger is aware of the dangers of the marriage of faith and a particular social design, as was the case of Christendom,[114] and for that reason is committed to a healthy separation of orders. However, this separation cannot imply a complete divorce. At least two reasons can be adduced: first of all, if we assume that truth – i.e., truth about the meaning of life, which necessarily includes *communal life* – is not a human possession, but is received as a gift in revelation, then it follows that the state is obliged to listen and learn from the great religious traditions;[115] secondly, even if we adopt a pluralist view of human communities, we still can defend the duty of the churches to actively participate in the public sphere and offer arguments to inform their moral positions. Ratzinger's notion of the state

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112. Ratzinger, *Values in a Time of Upheaval*, 52.

113. Ratzinger, *Called to Communion: Understanding the Church Today* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1996), 101.

114. "The use of the State by the Church for its own purposes, climaxing in the Middle Ages and in absolutist Spain of the early modern era, has since Constantine been one of the most serious liabilities of the Church, and any historically minded person is inescapably aware of this. In its thinking, the Church has stubbornly confused faith in the absolute truth manifest in Christ with insistence on an absolute secular status for the institutional Church. Another characteristic deeply imbedded in the Catholic mentality is the inability to see beyond the Catholic faith, the inability to see the other person's viewpoint" (Ratzinger, *Theological Highlights of Vatican II* [Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1966], 144).

115. Ratzinger, *Fundamental Speeches*, 43.

and, particularly, of democracy, is more welcoming to modernity than, for example, Voegelin's.

What is, finally, Ratzinger's position about the Church? Is he really advocating an "ecclesiastical totalitarianism"? Here we see Ratzinger leaning again on Peterson.[116] His understanding of the Church was shaped by the latter's article *The Church*, where Peterson deals with Alfred Loisy's dictum: "Jesus proclaimed the Kingdom; what came was the Church." According to Peterson, the Church's existence is possible only as the Church *of Gentiles*. Jesus sent his apostles to every corner of the world, Peterson argues, *because* the chosen people rejected him. Paul deems Israel's conversion as an eschatological event: "a hardening has come upon part of Israel, until the full number of the Gentiles come in, and so all Israel will be saved" (Rom 11:25-26). The Church exists between Pentecost and the Parousia, she is *not* the kingdom, but they are not in opposition to each other.

Ratzinger borrows an image used by the Church Fathers to conceptualize the relationship between God and the Church. The Church resembles the moon, whose light is not hers, but comes from the sun. The moon "represents the earthly world, the world that is characterized by receptivity and neediness."[117] Therefore, the Church "receives light from the true *Helios,* Christ."[118] Ratzinger reacts against a feverish demand for "reform" in the Church, a yearning that is often driven by a falsification of what she is. We are tempted to see her only as a structure, an institution, that can be changed to our likes. In opposition to this all-too-human understanding of the Church as a flexible human institution,[119] Ratzinger insists that, notwithstanding the many scandals inside the Church, the multiple ways in which she has betrayed the message of Christ, falling short from her mission, the Church of Jesus "lives behind 'our church.'"[120]

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116. Ratzinger, *Called to Communion*, 21n6.
117. Ratzinger, *Fundamental Speeches*, 142.
118. Ratzinger, *Fundamental Speeches*, 143.
119. "His Church has been replaced by our Church and, thus, by many churches, since everyone has his own. The churches have become *our* undertakings, of which we are either proud or ashamed" (Ratzinger, *Fundamental Speeches*, 145). Elsewhere, Ratzinger contends: "A church based on human resolutions becomes a merely human church. It is reduced to the level of the makeable, of the obvious, of opinion. Opinion replaces faith" (Ratzinger, *Called to Communion*, 139).
120. Ratzinger, *Fundamental Speeches*, 146.

An "ecclesiastical totalitarianism" betrays the Church founded by Jesus, to say nothing of betraying the Scriptures, which reject oppression and commend conviction. The Church's obligation is to preserve herself as the recipient of revelation, as its guardian. At the same time, she must recognize the human element in her, which demands of her to be constantly purified by reason. Just as reason, when it turns pathological – e.g. the atomic bomb, totalitarianism, science understood as completely independent of moral constraints – is in need to listen the great religious traditions, the pathologies of faith – e.g., fundamentalism, oppression, immanentization of eschatology – need the salutary check of reason.

V

In this article I have tried to show that a stable and consistent tradition of non-liberal, antitotalitarian political thought can be read in the works of Erik Peterson, Eric Voegelin, and Joseph Ratzinger. They all reject political theology if we understood the concept as the attempt to coat a political regime with a theological narrative, bringing down the eschatological distance between God's Kingdom and the human *polity*. This strategy finds its extreme incarnation in totalitarian regimes. The three thinkers are critical, in different degrees, of modernity. Finally, none of them can be counted as part of mainstream liberalism. Voegelin and Ratzinger question the very possibility of a clean-cut distinction between the spheres of the state and church. Although both alert against the conflation of the two orders, they recognize that the relationships between faith and reason, politics and religion, church and state, are complex. Moreover, for both, the pathologies of reason – which arise every time reason dreams with total autonomy – call for religion as a salutary check.

I have tried to show the dangers of putting theology in the service of politics *and* vice versa. It is a bad idea to try to solve the tensions between faith and reason, immanence and transcendence, human justice and salvation, instead of assuming these tensions as the inescapable reality of existence, as the permanent questions of human life.

This is not, to be sure, the first attempt to denounce the imposition of the liberal framework onto theology, that is, to free the latter from the former's hegemony. One of the most influential non-liberal political theologies is that of Radical Orthodoxy, a theological sensibility that claims that, contrary to the dominant story that sees secularization as the progressive liberation of

reason from religious superstition and prejudice, secularity was *invented* and, moreover, that its origins must be traced to theology. Modern secularity was made possible by a move from an ontology of participation (in which the being of creatures is given by their analogy with their Creator) to a univocal ontology where Being "becomes a category that is unhooked from participation in God and is a more neutral or abstract qualifier that is applied *to* God and creatures in the same way."[121]

According to John Milbank, liberalism creates an artificial subject, whose nature is defined not by any goal or end, but by pure volition, by the "will to will."[122] This view of human nature is incapable of fostering friendship or community – or even, for that matter, of upholding human rights against the recrudescence of intolerant religions, for this is "rather a problem that liberalism tends to engender."[123] The liberal state can only proclaim violence as its principle of order.

Radical Orthodoxy opposes the Christian *polis* to state politics. Mary Doaks claims that the solution Milbank offers, while accepting the need for the state as a necessary evil, is "not to engage and transform the state, but to build up the church as the only true polis with a genuine justice and peace that cannot be found elsewhere."[124] William Cavanaugh goes beyond Milbank; he utterly rejects the state as an evil, and proposes instead a "Christian anarchism," a government without state in which "multiple associations and communities work things out among themselves without any central or sovereign authority to enforce laws regulating their interrelationship."[125]

Doaks is right in stressing the incompatibility of these political theologies. Non-liberal Catholicism provides a different solution to the political problem: it acknowledges that church and state work on different levels of human existence, denounces the immanentization of God's kingdom as foreign to Christian doctrine, but also opposes the seclusion of religion as a private matter. It defends strong claims about human nature, about politics

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121. James K.A. Smith, *Introducing Radical Orthodoxy* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2004), 97.
122. John Milbank, "The Gift of Ruling," in *The Radical Orthodoxy Reader*, eds. John Milbank and Simon Oliver (New York: Routledge, 2009), 338.
123. Milbank, "The Gift of Ruling," 356.
124. Mary Doaks, "The Politics of Radical Orthodoxy: A Catholic Critique," *Theological Studies* 68 (2007): 375.
125. Doaks, "The Politics of Radical Orthodoxy," 379.

and its relationship with faith, religion and the churches, about human goals, and the fact, tragic or liberating, that perfection, either individual or social, is not achievable in this life, that we are, in the end, condemned to be always a work in progress.

Inferential Orientation and Religious Belief: Foundations of a Wittgensteinian Critique of Religion

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What follows is an effort to demonstrate how Wittgenstein's late thought on religion outlines a unique basis for a thoroughgoing and systematic philosophical critique of religion.[1] To this end, it is imperative to isolate and substantiate this key analytical focal point of his writings on and relevant to the subject, which broaches a mode of experiential orientation germane to ordinary language: what, in a broad and non-technical sense, I describe as "inferential." I have not encountered a robust thematic treatment of this topic with express consideration of Wittgenstein's philosophical views on religion; it is accordingly where I seek to intervene in the scholarship.[2]

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1. By calling this a critique I mean that the resources of the targeted framework are taken up in order to show the limits of what can be meaningfully said and laid licit claim to respective to that framework, as well as to identify what can be termed the "dialectical illusions" embroiled in it, to expressly align this method with Kant's own and the tradition inspired by it. See Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, eds. and trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), A58/B82-A64/B89 [Doctrine of Elements. Pt. II. Transcendental Logic] and A293/B249-A298/B355 [Transcendental Illusion]. Cf. Stanley Cavell, "The Availability of Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy," in *Must We Mean What We Say? A Book of Essays* (Cambridge: CUP, 2002), 60-1.

2. I am considering authors that have sought comprehensive elucidations and/or adaptations of Wittgenstein's late philosophy generally, as well as those who have undertaken narrower examinations of his thought on religion in particular. Among the first, I include Stanley Cavell (esp. *The Claim of Reason* and parts of *Must We Mean What We Say?*), P.M.S Hacker (esp. *Comparisons and Context*), and John McDowell (esp. *Mind and World* and parts of *Mind, Value, and Reality*). Among the second, I include *Religion and Wittgenstein's Legacy*, eds. D.Z. Phillips and Mario von der Ruhr (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), a systematic study by leading Wittgenstein scholars; Stephen Mulhall's "Wittgenstein on Religious Belief," in *The Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein*, eds. Oskari Kuusela and Marie McGinn (Oxford: OUP, 2012), 755-775, and "Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Religion," in *Philosophy of Religion in the 21st Century*, ed. D.Z. Phillips and Timothy Tessin (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 95-118; Martin Kusch's "Disagreement and Picture in Wittgenstein's 'Lectures on Religious Belief,'" in *Image and Imaging in Philosophy, Science and the Arts*, Vol. 1, eds. Richard Heinrich, Elisabeth Ne-

Wittgenstein's most sustained, but not yet definitive, philosophical engagement with religion can be found in his "Lectures on Religious Belief" from 1938. It therefore marks the obvious place to focus an examination of his thought on the subject, proceeding via critical detours to his scattered comments on religious belief, language, and related remarks in *Culture and Value* and in his fully developed late philosophy in *Philosophical Investigations* and *On Certainty*. Doing so, we encounter his opposition to rationalist-evidentialist forms of theism and atheism (the latter of which are sometimes labelled "scientism") – together with the very debate constructed on that basis – as well as the qualifications and limitations he imposes on religious language, owing to grammatical considerations that are especially attentive to accepted inferential practices. I examine circumstances of language use, standards and criteria of judgment, ordinary beliefs, and means and possibilities of conceptual assimilation among language-games as the nodes of analysis with respect to which a critique of religion firmly rooted in Wittgenstein's ordinary language philosophy is to be developed.

Circumstances of Use

It comes practically as a stipulation when Wittgenstein announces, in the Lectures, that evaluating religious beliefs according to criteria belonging to a major representative form of experiential orientation, which I have called "inferential," is fundamentally misguided. At once, my choice of the term "inferential" may be objected. It bears mentioning that the term stems from a related use in Wittgenstein; in this passage, for example:

> Imagine a procedure in which someone who is pushing a wheelbarrow comes to realize that he must clean the axle of the wheel when the wheelbarrow gets too difficult to push. I don't mean that he says to himself: "Whenever the wheelbarrow can't be pushed…," but he simply *acts* in this way. And he happens to shout to someone else: … "This wheelbarrow won't push. So the axle needs cleaning." Now this is an inference. Not a logical one, of course.[3]

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meth, Wolfram Pichler et al. (Berlin: De Gruyter Open, 2011), 35-58; Norman Malcolm's *Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View?* (London: Routledge, 2002); and Cora Diamond's seminal "Secondary Sense," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 67 (1966): 189-208. I could include others, but I consider these sources representative of the tracts of Wittgenstein scholarship that my claim has in view.

3. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*, 3rd ed., eds. G H. Wright,

I will not get into the non-propositional backdrop of this and related inferential statements. All I mean to illustrate is Wittgenstein's broadening of the range of application of inferential statements by disburdening us of the presumption that they belong strictly in the province of logical operations, but are rather far more pedestrian; "ordinary," as stated. We will have occasion, further on, to link this mode of orientation to reasoning based on past experience, to further explicate its quotidian dimensions and sharpen its contrast from specialized uses of the term that may misleadingly invite objections to inferentialism, e.g. in its use as an epistemological solution to skepticism about other minds.

To return to Wittgenstein's point from the Lectures: the wrong game is being played if one supposes the rules and criteria connected with inferential practices to be involved in or serve as grounds of appeal where religious beliefs are in question. Why Wittgenstein does not so much argue this as ascertain it off-the-bat is that the insight is plainly gleaned from observation of the circumstances in which those beliefs have their life ("don't think, but look!"[4]). In his late philosophy, this methodological procedure becomes the norm: "Ask yourself: On what occasion, for what purpose, do we say this? What kinds of action accompany these words?... In what kinds of setting will they be used; and what for?"[5] Also: "One cannot guess how a word functions. One has to *look* at its application and learn from that."[6]

In the Lectures period, this methodology is already in use. Where he observes adherence to an "unshakeable [religious] belief," he notes that it shows "not by reasoning or by appeal to ordinary grounds for belief, but rather by regulating for *(sic)* all in [the believer's] life."[7] For many, the belief in divine redemption is something on which their way of life hinges; the

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Rush Rhees, and G E. M. Anscombe, trans. G E. M. Anscombe (UK: Athenæum Press Ltd, Gateshead, Tyne & Wear, 1978), §30.

4. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* [henceforth *PI*], revised 4th ed., eds. P M. S. Hacker, and Joachim Schulte, trans. G E. M. Anscombe, P M. S. Hacker, and Joachim Schulte (Chichester, West Sussex, U.K: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), §66.

5. *PI* §489.

6. *PI* §340.

7. Ludwig Wittgenstein, "Lectures on Religious Belief" [henceforth *LRB*] from *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief*, ed. Cyril Barrett (Berkley: University of California Press, 1966), 54.

belief in the possibility of snow tomorrow is not.[8] A notebook entry from the period in *Culture and Value* captures this thought according to a slightly different, but equally applicable, source of comparison:

> Christianity is not based on a historical truth; rather it offers us a (historical) narrative and says: now believe! But not believe this narrative with the belief appropriate to a historical narrative, rather: believe, through thick and thin, which you can only do as the result of a life. *Here you have a narrative, don't take the same attitude to it as you take to other historical narratives!* Make a *quite different* place in your life for it.[9]

Relatedly, the reason that the "expression of belief may play an absolutely minor role" in, for example, "what we call believing in a Judgement Day or not believing in a Judgement Day,"[10] is that this kind of statement – the form of which, in another context and using other terms, would straightforwardly appear derivative or revelatory of a belief – is here overshadowed by (and in another sense, is secondary to) the believer's existential outlook, which encompasses a gamut of judgments, actions, behaviour, and thought exhibited in her life in connection with that belief.[11] The system of reference in which such a belief is encountered is scaffolded by this matrix of interrelated modes of experience, which speaks to the circumstantial background of that belief far more than merely articulating the belief can, even though in ordinary contexts the latter is typically sufficient to warrant judgments about the articulated belief and its relata.

To be sure, Wittgenstein does eventually support his original stipulation

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8. But perhaps the framework in which that belief is embedded, is. An inferential-scientific frame of reference may determine for many their form of life in consequential ways as well; in crucial ways, which will be explored, it already does. The question of whether it can (perhaps, thus) make it meaningful is one that I leave aside here.

9. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value* [henceforth *CV*], eds. G H. Wright and Heikki Nyman, trans. Peter Winch (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 32e 1937. All *Culture and Value* references list the corresponding dates of entry in order to mark the timeline between the Lectures and Wittgenstein's concretised philosophy of language, hence tracking the developments of that period according to a precise chronology.

10. *LRB*, 55.

11. Compare with an entry dated a decade later: "It strikes me that a religious belief could only be something like a passionate commitment to a system of reference. Hence, although it's *belief*, it's really a way of living, or a way of assessing life. It's passionately seizing hold of *this* interpretation" (*CV* 64e 1947).

with some important contrasts, highlighting why it is of the essence to examine circumstances of use, to learn to compare between different ones, and to remain vigilant when drawing those comparisons. As Wittgenstein emphasizes – what will become a major target in his later thought owing to the pseudo-problems it generates for philosophers – the fault in failing to appropriately survey circumstances of use is a frequent source of linguistic bewitchment in our critical approaches, in this case, to religion:

> In a religious discourse we use such expressions as: "I believe that so and so will happen," and use them differently to the way in which we use them in science. Although, there is a great temptation to think we do. Because we do talk of evidence, and do talk of evidence by experience.[12]

Concepts that figure representatively in contexts of inferential orientation, together with their related practices – predictions and retrodictions, appeals to grounds of evidence or experience – make an appearance in religious discourse at times, which misleads us into construing them as amenable to the same evaluative standards. This equivocation, by which two language-games are conflated and thereby seemingly responsive to the same standards, performs a double disservice: one incurred by atheistic rationalist-evidentialists, who are now convinced that subjecting religious beliefs to those standards is an effective critical path to disarming the system of reference to which they belong as a licit epistemic source (a correct conclusion, but wrong premises, as will be shown); the other by theistic rationalist-evidentialists, since their being so is grist to the mill of their atheistic objectors. Such a theist Wittgenstein finds in his co-panelist from the Lectures, Father O'Hara.

O'Hara pretends to support his (religious) beliefs on grounds of evidence, on account of which Wittgenstein rebukes: "But I would ridicule [his belief], not by saying it is based on insufficient evidence. I would say: here is a man who is cheating himself. You can say: this man is ridiculous because he believes, and bases it on weak reasons."[13] The circumstantial backgrounds, against which the roles of the concept of belief in the language-games at issue are understood, are very different. In one, holding beliefs prima facie relates to existential codes of conduct; in the other, holding

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12. *LRB*, 57.
13. *LRB*, 59.

beliefs prima facie relates to contexts of justification under particular norms.[14] Both involve given sets of commitments, which, as so given, are bound by normative canons and institutions that guide those commitments in particular ways. (Compare the normativity of ritual versus the normativity of causal explanation.) These differences in kind of commitments show up in the circumstances. To pursue one major (but not the only) such difference: the belief in snow tomorrow is born and embedded within circumstances in which procedures of justification are at play, which are distinctively structured on a motivation to know, and to act accordingly; the belief in eternal reward is, primarily, not.[15]

That difference, to codify it philosophically, is that while both modes of orientation are doxastic, only the inferential ones can rightfully be called epistemic, where the latter are structured upon possibilities of justification ("reasons-giving") in accordance with accepted normative procedures. (We might codify the religious mode as "existential" in this contrast.) By couching religious beliefs in inferential terms, O'Hara turns non-originally epistemic concerns into epistemic ones, thereby subjecting them to standards of judgment to which beliefs in an inferential context are held, and in accordance with whose criteria they are vetted. That is why he makes himself a target of ridicule on account of them: religious beliefs are not "based on reasons," assuming they are framed in such terms, in ways remotely consonant with the ordinary practice of basing beliefs on reasons. Within this ordinary practice, inferential (and, as we will see, often also scientific) beliefs constitute representative cases, and these anchor credence and confidence on criteria responsive to standards of plausibility or probability supported by past experience. Were one to adjudicate religious beliefs by those and related standards, the verdict could not help but be

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14. Readers familiar with *On Certainty* might argue that beliefs stand in no need of justification, that only knowledge-statements do. While this is indeed a concern of Wittgenstein's as far as differentiating the grammar of knowing from that of believing is concerned, he nonetheless agrees that in certain circumstances – the discussion shows that this is one – a "system of verification" ties in with our beliefs (§279): we are called to answer to why such beliefs are held by giving reasons (§243, §550, §556, inter alia).

15. I think Wittgenstein would argue that the concern over "knowing" whether eternal reward is true or not enters quite late into that language-game. By the time one raises that question, and insofar as one raises it as a pressing concern, one's life has already been decisively shaped and conditioned by that belief.

exceedingly unfavourable; "weak," as Wittgenstein judges.

Hence to the supposition that a believer should invoke evidence in support of his belief in the Last Judgement, which an atheistic objector counters by arguing that such a belief rests upon very flimsy evidence, Wittgenstein replies: "If you want to compare it with the evidence for it's raining to-morrow it is no evidence at all."[16] To accommodate the appeal to evidence for the kind of proposal the theist makes would require flouting the recognizable patterns of what we ordinarily call "inferring on the basis of evidence" at an elementary level, which is why Wittgenstein refuses to call the theist's move an appeal to evidence *überhaupt*. Immediately following, Wittgenstein notes a parallel of this situation in mathematical language-games: "If you suddenly wrote numbers down on the blackboard, and then said: 'Now, I'm going to add,' and then said: '2 and 21 is 13,' etc. I'd say: 'This is no blunder.'"[17] It is no blunder because it is a fundamental misunderstanding of the practice of addition, and it is only within that practice, against a background in which its rules are understood – even if they are misapplied – that something is or not a blunder. Relatedly, the appeal to the practice of basing beliefs on evidence in the context of religious beliefs reveals, not a mistake, but a grammatical deception. This is the charge Wittgenstein levels at O'Hara.

To illustrate this last point, consider these related remarks from *Philosophical Investigations*, both of which have the form of transcendental arguments: "Orders are sometimes not obeyed. But what would it be like if no orders were *ever* obeyed? The concept of an order would have lost its purpose"; and "… if rule became exception, and exception rule; or if both became phenomena of roughly equal frequency – our normal language-games would thereby lose their points."[18] A language-game of course tolerates measures of deviation in the application of its rules and the performance of its instituted practices. But to pretend religious beliefs are amenable to evidence, and so, answerable to standards in the province of inferential orientation, would amount to integrating a host of exceptions – of "unobeyed orders" – to the inferential language-game in proportions that it cannot tolerate without causing the whole set of accepted institutions

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16. *LRB*, 61.
17. *LRB*, 62.
18. *PI* §345; §142.

that make evidence-based beliefs what they are to collapse. For an instance to be lawfully said to belong to a practice, it must be able to behold itself to the standards that define that practice; it is in this regard that religious beliefs prove ineligible for consideration within the criterial parameters of inferential orientation. This also means they would not even qualify as "false" (nor "true") or "unsound" (nor "sound") with regard to them: they are of the wrong kind, categorically off the spectrum within which such assessments are meaningful.

Standards and Criteria of Judgment

Some mention of standards and criteria of judgment has been made. This is the place to expand on them. By examining what the standards and criteria of judgment consist in as far as inferential language-games are concerned, it is possible to produce a sharper description of these language-games and begin answering why the beliefs pertaining to them are woven into the tapestry of our ordinary beliefs, in contrast to beliefs whose provenances are in religious systems of reference. I take Cavell's distinction between standards and criteria to be the most instructive: criteria "determine whether an object is (generally) of the right kind, whether it is a relevant candidate at all, whereas standards discriminate the degree to which a candidate satisfies those criteria."[19] That critically different standards and criteria of judgment govern inferential and religious language-games is crucial to Wittgenstein's point: belief-statements are answerable to the standards of judgment of their respective language-games. When these criteria are conflated, we have seen, the beliefs of one language-game are inappropriately evaluated with reference to standards that would collapse if this conflation were carried out to its logical conclusion, which is a principal reason why those beliefs cannot even constitute tolerated deviations from accepted paradigms, viz. "blunders."

Much of Wittgenstein's late philosophy of language revolves around traditional skeptical problems in epistemology. *Philosophical Investigations*

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19. Stanley Cavell, "Criteria and Judgment," in *The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 11. My own exploration of standards and criteria of judgment in Wittgenstein converges significantly with Cavell's; his account is thus the right source to consult for a greater overview of my own background of understanding of the topic.

dwells on these topics at length; *On Certainty* is almost exclusively concerned with them. We must be very cautious where we situate religious beliefs in this relation. It would be presumptuous and misleading to claim that the theist who stakes his hopes on a better future world fits the same mold as the skeptical metaphysician who hangs his doubts on the possibility of a world in which brains reside in vats. But it would be credulous to dismiss, on those grounds, the important similarities that the skeptic and the theist exhibit, especially in cases where the latter frames beliefs in terms proper to inferential contexts. We proceed to examine standards and criteria of judgement with respect to inferential contexts as those foci of analysis which, once foregrounded in Wittgenstein's diagnoses, serve to dispel certain philosophical bewitchments and skeptical anxieties in order to "show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle"[20] – where that fly will, occasionally, prove to be the theist.[21]

Take this example: "What we call historical evidence points to the existence of the earth a long time before my birth; – the opposite hypothesis has *nothing* on its side."[22] It certainly has nothing we would be prepared to call "evidence"; and since it fails to respect the normative delimitations interwoven with that term's usual use, as a hypothesis proceeding from evidence it is a miscarriage in principle. Among other hypotheses that would, by Wittgenstein's lights, have nothing on their side, would be the hypothesis that the earth was created six-thousand years ago by God. And through a rough reformulation of that objection raised earlier regarding the collapse of grammatical standards, in this case regarding scenarios of intolerable skeptical doubts, we glimpse another junction where the latter and religious beliefs intersect: "If someone doubted whether the earth had existed a hundred years ago, I should not understand, for this reason: I would not know what such a person would still allow to be counted as evidence

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20. *PI* §309.

21. I am sympathetic to Cavell's insight that Wittgenstein's preoccupation with skepticism is not purely motivated by an urge to easily brush it away as incoherent, but stems from genuine existential pressures rooted in it (see Stanley Cavell's "Criteria and Skepticism," in *The Claim of Reason*, 37-48). That said, Cavell engages only the *Investigations* to pursue this point, expressly eschewing *On Certainty*, in which Wittgenstein markedly shifts gears to the more sardonic purpose of ridiculing and poking holes in certain skeptical thought-scenarios.

22. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *On Certainty* [henceforth *OC*], eds. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, trans. Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1969), §190.

and what not."[23] The believer who entertains related doubts on religious grounds – think Creationism – likewise expresses, not an epistemic attitude, but an attitude toward epistemic attitudes, which is partly why it lands itself outside the epistemic framework that it targets, and why it entails a pointless debate.

Creationists recognize scientific standards of evaluation – e.g. the appeal to evidence – and take their position to vie for credence within the playing-field of those standards. As such, they should be accepting the criteria of judgment which those standards command, but they do not. (In fact, as we are seeing, their proposal cannot be amenable to those criteria – it can satisfy them to no degree. This is the grammatically deceptive attitude.) Philosophically, the situation is like recognizing rules and pieces of chess, and to claim to be playing it, all the while tossing dice around and shuffling checkers across the chessboard, crying "Checkmate!" (Cavell: "I must move the Queen in straight paths… You CAN *push the little object called the Queen* in many ways, as you can *lift* it or *throw* it across the room; not all of these will be *moving the Queen.*"[24]) The scientists' problem is to think that this remains a chess game. For to seriously entertain the Creationist "thesis" – to consider it amenable to the criteria of their discipline, and thus, disputable with respect to their standards – would mean for the scientists to allow an exception they would not otherwise admit (say, coming from someone in a lab-coat), and could not admit without tearing down the evaluative foundations of their discipline; with respect to which, among other things, proposals first qualify as entertainable "theses."

Qualification according to criteria lands an attitude in or outside a practice (Cavell, above); but this just means that those criteria preside even when attitudes are to be describable as ones of objection: objections take place within the logic of language-games, are rounded by its standards. In an explicit defense of inferential-scientific doxastic attitudes (the reason for the hyphen will become clear shortly), Wittgenstein identifies in "reasonableness" such a standard: "Thus we should not call anybody reasonable who believed something in despite *(sic)* of scientific evidence."[25]

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23. *OC* §231.

24. Stanley Cavell, "Must We Mean What We Say?" in *Must We Mean What We Say? A Book of Essays: Updated Edition* (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 26.

25. *OC* §324.

It is not, however, that given religious beliefs now count as unreasonable: to designate them as such would be to subject them to a standard of inferential-scientific language-games, as instances that fall afoul of the standard. But Wittgenstein's point is that religious beliefs do not recognize that standard, which means they can neither honour nor dishonour it. As Wittgenstein notes in the Lectures, in a statement that summarizes his contention with O'Hara: "'Unreasonable' implies, with everyone, rebuke… [but] they don't treat this as a matter of reasonability… Not only is it not reasonable, but it doesn't pretend to be. What seems to me ludicrous about O'Hara is his making it appear to be *reasonable*."[26]

There is, after all, an alternative to "unreasonable" when something is avowedly not reasonable, and that is *a*reasonable. In this context, "areasonable" implies that standards of reasonableness can neither diminish nor enhance religious beliefs, because these beliefs are by their very nature disqualified from the domain where such standards preside. It may be a matter of perspective whether exempting religious beliefs from standards of reasonableness is an insult or a courtesy, but this much is certain: they are to be given no weight as epistemic alternatives against inferential-scientific beliefs – they are not alternatives. The destination of the atheistic rationalist-evidentialist was correct, but the journey was in error: religious beliefs have no place in reason/evidence-based systems of reference, not because they try to get in and consistently fail the entry exam, but because they do not categorically (=criteriologically) belong there.

To some ears, this criteriological exemption spells fatal relativism. Yet aside from showing that the appeal to inferential/scientific standards is fundamentally misplaced and practicably untenable where religious beliefs are concerned, Wittgenstein furthermore considers it impotent as far as diminishing the value of the convictions that religious beliefs command goes: "Anything that I normally call evidence wouldn't in the slightest influence me [as a believer]."[27] While it is true that one may be moved to abandon a religious outlook owing to exposure to arguments against the existence of God predicated on lack of evidence, such a change in outlook supposes an antecedent acceptance of paradigms of a scientific worldview, viz. those which enshrine the preponderance of evidence as desideratum

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26. *LRB*, 58.
27. *LRB*, 56.

for believing something *überhaupt*. Where these are not accepted, or not accepted always – e.g. cases of religious convictions – Wittgenstein's point is exactly proven.

Whatever relativistic consequences Wittgenstein's view entails, some of which I will discuss, there is nothing to suggest that religious frameworks are immunized from criticism. For one, Wittgenstein's grammatical qualifications do far more to restrict the sphere of influence of religious beliefs than atheistic rationalist-evidentialism could lay claim to, since the latter (along with many theists) continue to count religious beliefs as eligible contenders for empirical explanation and prediction, which is chess with dice and checkers (i.e. not chess). Wittgenstein not only rejects the very structure and legitimacy of that competition by a priori disqualifying one side of it, but doing so, grants inferential-scientific frameworks the full dominion over empirical-epistemological matters that, as it is, they anyway enjoy, while (re)confining religious beliefs to the domains in which they paradigmatically have their meaning and exert their influence.

Ordinary Beliefs

We know that religious beliefs are regarded by Wittgenstein as immensely valuable and consequential for many a believer, as the excerpts from *Culture and Value* suggest, and as general observation of the kinds of commitments those beliefs entail (existential, psychological) reveals.[28] But how consequential to the way we live our lives are inferential beliefs? For Wittgenstein, the answer to these questions is, I think, unavoidable in his mature philosophy: tremendous, owing to their indispensable everyday ubiquity. What I have been calling inferential beliefs make up – and in their primitive form are the foundation of – the constellation of our ordinary beliefs. Their regular and regulating role in the quotidian lion's share of human actions, judgments, behaviour, and thought is proof of the fact that we could not, because we do not, get by without them. With this, our analysis takes a step away from rationalism-evidentialism (rather than continuing to step on it) and toward a critique of the values of frameworks of belief.

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28. For more on Wittgenstein's own religiosity and his attitude toward religion, see Ray Monk's philosophical biography, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius* (New York: Penguin Books, 1991).

Routine actions and behaviour bespeak an orientation based on the time-tested lessons of past experience into which human beings are reared. As a practice governing regular conduct, and laden with corresponding, largely tacit beliefs, it is paradigmatic of how human beings qua human live in an everyday way: "[People] have always learnt from experience; and we can see from their actions that they believe certain things definitely, whether they express this belief or not."[29] It is in this connection that I have referred to a "primitive" form of inferential systems lying at the heart of our ordinary orientation in the world. Considered in the broadest possible sense, our inferential orientation is an extension of our education in the lessons of past experience: that undisputedly most fundamental teacher of human life, and in important ways, not of human life alone, as I will discuss.

To reiterate this "broadest possible sense" of inference, consider this passage from the *Investigations*:

> "From what one can see here, I infer that there is a chair over there." That is an inference; but not one belonging to logic. An inference is a transition to an assertion; and so also to the behaviour that corresponds to the assertion. I draw the consequences not only in words, but also in deeds.[30]

It is not difficult to appreciate the guiding role of internalized lessons of experience here – the general trust in sense-perception built on them, the kind of epistemic confidence they anchor (though they are not its "ground"![31]) – and how they are routinely expressed in the "consequences we draw," via no logical detour, through deeds (and at times, their accompanying words).

We can also appreciate why objections to inferentialism as an epistemological solution to skepticism of other minds would be misplaced, a result of equivocation prompted by my use of the descriptor "inferential." McDowell captures the spirit of Wittgenstein's view on such matters when he notes that possession of a shared language signifies a capacity for a "meeting of minds," occurring through no mediation of inference (or interpretation, in McDowell).[32] Thus, one sees, one does not infer, another's

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29. *OC* §284. The caveat, stating that the role of the expression of belief is minor in these cases, was encountered above in relation to religious beliefs, and should remind us that at stake are modes of conducting one's life as a whole, not beliefs in isolation of those modes.

30. *PI* §486.

31. *OC* §130-1.

32. John McDowell, "Wittgenstein on Following a Rule," *Synthese* 58, no. 3 (1984), §11.

pain. (One might on occasion infer it; it is not a condition.) One learns, primarily, to recognize that someone is in pain, and to respond accordingly. (One may later learn – on this basis – to infer that someone is in pain.) In inferential orientation we have an extension of those fundamental lessons of past experience, but no past experience corresponds to the lesson or technique of "inferring the existence/content of other minds," and so nothing can correspond to its extension. Although we do certainly infer – often non-propositionally, non-logically, as per Wittgenstein's sense – what someone might do having spoken their minds.

Beliefs based on the lessons of past experience, which qua human we absorb and employ as a matter of everyday life, are at the bedrock of much of our conduct and are exhibited as such, in spite of any religious beliefs that accrete on that system of orientation: by and large, those do not encroach on the province of our experience-based orientation as functional alternatives, nor should we pretend, as theists or atheists, that they do. (I do not touch the flame because I know, from past experience, that it will burn me. Perhaps a given religious belief induces me to do so anyway, e.g. for ritualistic purposes – but that would be, precisely, against my better, i.e. my usual, judgment.) Now it might be objected that this situation is in fact one of a causal framework pitted against a system of reference that does not make sense of experience in causal terms, but say, in providential ones. But how experience is made sense of – interpreted, causally or otherwise – is not the concern here.

I have been conflating the designations "system of practices" and "system of reference," and by and large they are synonymous, but distinguishing them now might be helpful. Religious beliefs belong as much to a system of reference as to one of practices, and these will be quite particular. (And some may overlap with others, e.g. Abrahamic religions. A case of "family resemblances."[33]) I want to confine beliefs exhibited in an orientation that reveals a basis on the lessons of past experience strictly to a system of practices, an elementary and universal one, which in so many words (in less, in fact) is how Wittgenstein has characterized it. Though in reality a system of reference, in the sense of a developed interpretative framework, would be found attached to this elementary system of practices, hypothetically we can regard the latter as independent of those interpretative

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33. *PI* §65.

structures, indeed "prior" to them, for this reason.

Human beings act, behave, judge, and think in ways that bespeaks persistent commitments to the lessons of experience. Even animals exhibit such commitments, in ways bespeaking developed instincts, which shows the shared roots of this system of practices in nature, the continuity we have with animals in this respect, and the independence of that system from frameworks of interpretation.[34] To answer to the present objection and related discomforts: whether we interpret experience causally, providentially, or otherwise, is secondary to, and in ways is contingent on, the fact that human life qua human is primordially guided by our education in past experience.

Whether a causal or providential framework of interpretation captures this fact more "accurately" is a question that cannot legitimately be raised, for at issue is what "accurate" here means, what criteria of accuracy are being employed.[35] A providential framework is under no obligation to accept the criterion "true to past experience" as a measure of explanatory accuracy – unless it purports to play a game that prizes such a criterion. To call the inferential "more accurate" by comparison here seems correct, but is misleading: the providential has no real place in that game. For the measure "explanatory accuracy" paradigmatically, if not exclusively, belongs to an inferential-scientific language-game, in which case its criteria are accepted on its terms or not at all. Who does not accept them cannot rightfully claim to provide, strive for, or deal in, the kind of thing we call "explanatory accuracy."

Assuming one is reared into a scientific worldview which distinctively prioritizes the value of past experience as a cornerstone of its discipline, and routinely demonstrates its success in employing the techniques

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34. Cf. David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and Other Writings*, ed. Stephen Buckle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), section IX; also Wittgenstein: "The squirrel does not infer by induction that it is going to need stores next winter as well. And no more do we need a law of induction to justify our action or our predictions" (*OC* §287). Hume agrees that, like squirrels, humans follow force of habit in their inductive practices – not owing to a lack of need for a "law of induction to justify" it, but because we cannot justify it. This is where Hume and Wittgenstein part ways. However, the fact that we cannot justify our inductive practices with a law of induction, and yet those practices remain effective in our everyday inferential orientation (on the less glamorous basis of habit: Hume's point), simultaneously shows that we do not need that law, as Wittgenstein contends.
35. Cf. *OC* §199.

associated with it to the phenomena we call "empirical" – thus making them epistemologically accessible in all kinds of ways, e.g. via prediction or explanation – these scientific judgments also become interwoven in the "*totality* of judgments [that] is made plausible to us,"[36] and which hangs together with our ordinary doxastic and epistemic attitudes. Hence it is not *per accidens* that, in our place and time, the "pictures" we absorb as tools of judgment in the course of our rearing into the practice of judging happen to be those at once commonly accepted and endorsed by science: "The picture of the earth as a ball is a *good* picture, it proves itself everywhere… we work with it without doubting it"; "this picture now helps us in the judgment of various situations."[37] And even more generally: "'We are quite sure of it' does not mean just that every single person is certain of it, but that we belong to a community which is bound together by science and education."[38]

I stress the conditionality of the last paragraph, because it signals where relativistic constraints merit attention.[39] While a primitive form of inferential orientation, one simply denoting a system of practices based on the lessons of past experience, was said to belong universally and elementarily to human beings, it was not claimed that a scientific framework, however much it may be said to honour or build upon those lessons, does so as well, or should. But any group of people whose lives are conditioned in significant ways by a scientific framework – to whom it makes a difference to anchor their goings-on or getting-by upon an education in and application of scientific canons and institutions – and who, as such, frame their judgments

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36. *OC* §140.

37. *OC* §147; §146. This example is obviously dated. But note that its fundamental purpose is to illustrate a grammatical point: the term "picture" designates its role in our judgments. Wittgenstein no doubt conceded, with every other reasonable person, that the earth's being a sphere was a well-established fact; but that does not exclude its grammatical use as a picture as well.

38. *OC* §298.

39. Wittgenstein is explicit about his relativism, e.g. concerning "reasonableness": "But what men consider reasonable or unreasonable alters. At certain periods men find reasonable what at other periods they found unreasonable. And vice versa" (*OC* §336). But this relativistic proviso does not diminish the objections raised concerning reasonableness and religious beliefs: as stressed, if the latter should be described in terms proper to the former, it must signal acceptance of what, "at that period," just are the criteria for qualifying or not as reasonable, and we know the problems this entails. For Wittgenstein, as for *us*, what is reasonable and what is scientifically accepted hang together: "Not merely is nothing of the sort ever seriously reported to us by reasonable people, but our whole system of physics forbids us to believe it" (*OC* §108).

about empirical phenomena in ways that bespeak elementary commitments to that framework – are beholden to its standards in these regards. We would not say this of an isolated tribe, regarding which a genuine clash of radically distinct language-games may obtain in this respect, a point I will return to. But we would say it of theists like O'Hara, who, in framing his beliefs, betrays his rearing into a system of reference in which evidence is resorted to as a basis of support for certain belief-statements, which in turn betrays his acceptance of that institution.

Accordingly, when doxastic attitudes are adopted that are blatantly antithetical to the lessons acquired by rearing in past experience with the aim of casting doubt on a system that is an extension of those lessons (the inferential), it can only mean that its rules are accepted, as must therefore its ruling. Failure to honour that condition is what makes them intolerable. Consider:

> If anyone said that information about the past couldn't convince him that something would happen in the future, I wouldn't understand him. One might ask him: What do you expect to be told, then? What sort of information do you call a reason for believing this?... If *these* are not reasons, then what are reasons?[40]

The very concept of reasons that gives sense to the proposition "I have reasons for believing X" – where X is an empirical proposition – gets its meaning against a background of education in past experience. If one employs that concept in this way, the only appropriate frame of reference from which to judge the possibility of occurrences ("empirical" ones, as if the epithet needed to be added) is with respect to the constitutive criteria and evaluative standards of that frame of reference, to which statements about such occurrences must answer. A believer does not generally adopt the attitude toward the "occurrence" of Judgment Day that she adopts toward occurrences in general: the former is a doxastic, but not concomitantly an epistemic, attitude. And the point here is: if she did adopt an attitude toward Judgment Day that resembled her attitude toward ordinary occurrences (an epistemic attitude), she could not give reasons for it without dissolving what distinctively makes up epistemic attitudes in their interdependence with the grammar of "reasons," which is produced against a background where the verdict of past experience has a veto on what can and cannot lay

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40. *PI* §481.

claim to counting toward beliefs in the possibility of an occurrence. (The point of Hume's "Of miracles," condensed to a sentence.)

What, then, is the value of our inferential orientation? This much we know: we do not get by without it in our everyday life. The Wittgensteinian defense of the value of inferential orientation is not without its Humean side: we habitually – I use the term deliberately – guide our actions and resolutions in accordance with lessons of past experience; but there is no basis prior to experience, or after, on which that mode of reasoning can be foundationally justified, there are only conventions that we live by, and that time and again prove their worth, primarily by that fact that we do live by them.[41] And we have shown that, where inferential beliefs have earned their keep, there religious beliefs, as much as derailed skeptical ones, cannot feasibly encroach. None of this rids religious beliefs of their highest claim to value: bestowing meaning on a believer's life. In this sense, the way one regulates one's life in accordance with religious beliefs is fundamentally different from the way it is regulated by inferential beliefs. This is not to deny that an inferential/scientific framework can bestow existential meaning; though, speaking from general observation, I am unconvinced that such a system self-sufficiently possesses the resources for that. (But this would require a separate discussion.) So the question now becomes: can we grasp how religious institutions of value take charge of the domain of existential meaning? Can we understand the terms in which meaning is given to believers through religious codes and practices? Well, if we can grasp the concepts, their circumstances of use…

Conceptual Assimilation

"In one sense, I understand all he says – the English words 'God' [etc.] … I could say: 'I don't believe in this' and this would be true, meaning I haven't got these thoughts or anything that hangs together with them."[42] Can I acquire a sense of what hangs together with those words? –Yes, but only a

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41. From the *Investigations* it can seem like Wittgenstein feels himself at loggerheads with Hume on the problem of induction; and, to the extent that the latter considered it a "problem," he is. But as far as what they ultimately make of induction – a sub-category of "inference," both in the technical and non-technical sense I have been using – they are more in agreement than Wittgenstein perhaps cared to realize (footnote 34, above).
42. *LRB*, 55.

radical change in your life-circumstances could bring about the appropriate exposure to the circumstances of use of those words, which, to you, are otherwise off the grid of meaning: "I cannot utter the word 'Lord' with meaning. *Because I do not believe* that he will come to judge me; because *that* says nothing to me. And it could say something to me, only if I lived *completely* differently."[43] Such is Wittgenstein's attitude toward conceptual assimilation at the time of the Lectures. As his late philosophy develops, he loosens these strictures.

It would certainly be disappointing to discover, having prodded religious belief to the lengths we have, that nothing meaningful has actually been said that can speak to those beliefs in their own terms. True: by and large, we have not, strictly speaking, addressed those beliefs in "their own terms," since we have mainly occupied ourselves with distinguishing those terms and that body of beliefs from the interrelated set of ordinary-inferential-scientific ones. On the other hand, "their own terms" are our terms, not an incommensurably alien tongue, as Wittgenstein, somewhat begrudgingly, concedes back in the Lectures:

> "Being shown all these things, did you understand what this word [God] meant?" I'd say: "Yes and no. I did learn what it didn't mean. I made myself understand. I could answer questions, understand questions when they were put in different ways—and in that sense could be said to understand."[44]

By the time his late philosophy of language has crystalized, Wittgenstein is begrudging on this account no longer. As a passage from the "Philosophy of Psychology" fragment of the *Investigations* goes:

> Religion teaches that the soul can exist when the body has disintegrated. Now do I understand what it teaches?—Of course I understand it—I can imagine various things in connection with it. After all, pictures of these things have even been painted. And why should such a picture be only an imperfect rendering of the idea expressed? Why should it not do the *same* service as the spoken doctrine? And it is the service that counts.[45]

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43. *CV* 33e 1937.
44. *LRB*, 59.
45. *PI* Part II §23. Cf. "In the first place, our language describes a picture. What is to be done with the picture, how it is to be used, is still obscure… it must be explored if we want to understand the sense of our words. But the picture seems to spare us this work: it already points to a particular use. This is how it takes us in" (*PI* Part II §55).

It is a direct consequence of his fully concretized philosophy of language that conceptual assimilation becomes a more ready possibility in practice than Wittgenstein admits in the Lectures period. As this passage points out, that possibility depends on exposure, particularly, grammatical exposure.

How do we acquire "grammatical exposure"? Apply the lessons we have learned so far. Pay attention to the circumstances of use, to how words are used in their circumstances and to what connects with them. To wit, statements about a thing "existing": "If 'X exists' amounts to no more than 'X' has a meaning – then it is not a sentence which treats of X, but a sentence about our use of language, that is, about the use of the word 'X.'"[46] Relate that to religious propositions about God existing, and compare: "The way you use the word 'God' does not show *whom* you mean – but rather, what you mean."[47] As we are finding, "what" is meant by the term God is (and therefore can be) learned, specifically by learning what hangs together with it, e.g. the pictures and the service they render, the associations that accompany it, the patterns of action and thought endorsed in conjunction with it. The term "God" is not learned nor does it have its meaning in a vacuum: no matter how personal and subjective the content of that belief is said to be, there are "paradigms of behaviour" that are exemplificatory of what hangs together with such words, and, belonging to their circumstances of use, belong therefore to their meaning, whether that deeply private content is expressed by the word "God" or by the word "pain" (minding their interdistinctions).[48]

To allegorize: the gap between language-games is bridged by behaviour, the toll to cross, paid in units of grammatical exposure: "Shared human behaviour is the system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language."[49] Before coming to share or share-in a language-game, and as their precondition, we must already share common behavioural patterns; and it does seem quite impossible for a person or group to come to understand another with whom no behavioural traits whatsoever are shared.

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46. *PI* §58. Cf. Cavell's "Criteria and Skepticism" in *The Claim of Reason*, which makes the crucial point that the function of Wittgensteinian criteria is to tell us, not of a thing's "existence, but of something like its identity, not of its *being* so, but of its being *so*" (p. 45).

47. *CV* 50e 1946.

48. See *PI* §300.

49. *PI* §206.

This condition is compatible with Wittgenstein's views on conceptual assimilation in the Lectures; recognizing that, there, the gap between himself and the believer in Judgement Day appears so wide as to require no less than a total revolution in one's way of life to begin sufficiently sharing the behaviour needed to bridge it, possible though it remains in principle. Wittgenstein of the *Investigations* and *On Certainty* no longer considers it necessary to go to such extremes. In part, this owes to a less qualified acceptance of the fact that, at a primordial level, there is already a great deal of behaviour shared among human beings, the most evident arguably being that expressed in connection with an orientation based on past experience.

Between secular and religious Europeans, significant degrees of shared behavior are to be expected; in a globalized and pluralized world, which is not only fertile for the crosspollination of language-games but has, in the course of becoming such a world, repeatedly experienced and effected such crosspollination, our behaviour is bound to be shared to great extents as well. Even between radically different language-games, where degrees of assimilability will be severely reduced at first (the isolated tribe case), the possibility of assimilation, communication, and ultimately sharing-in each system of reference exists; which is not to say that such a process is straightforward, innocent, or even desirable, but is to say that some stratum of shared human behaviour, however limiting, will always be present.[50] To deny this would mean committing to the view that certain human groups are fundamentally less comprehensible than certain animals. Yet consider our adeptness at understanding animals, especially mammals, on the basis of their behaviour – what they want, what they know (and know how to do), whether they feel anxious, eager, playful, tired. This is not an incorrect use of the term "understand."

It so happens that more than only behaviour is shared by atheists and theists: words. Wittgenstein of the Lectures only hesitantly accepts that theists and atheists use the same words with the same sense, otherwise stressing that the latter have a very limited understanding of the former's world of meaning. (This remains too true, owing to poor efforts at grammatical exposure; but, we have seen, theists also exhibit grammatical alienation from their own systems of meaning.) Yet the same Wittgenstein of that period would prefigure, in his discussion of private use of the word

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50. See *OC* §609-12.

"death," the basis for the concessions he would eventually make on this point in later thought, anticipating many elements of his so-called "private language argument" from the *Investigations*:

> We are all here using the word "death," which is a public instrument, which has a whole technique [of usage]. Then someone says he has an idea of death. Something queer; because you might say "You are using the word 'death' which is an instrument functioning in a certain way." If you treat this [your idea] as something private, with what right are you calling it an idea of death?—I say this, because we, also, have a right to say what is an idea of death. He might say "I have my own private idea of death"—why call this an "idea of death" unless it is something you connect with death… [In this case,] it does not belong on *(sic)* the game played with "death," which we all know and understand. If what he calls his "idea of death" is to become relevant, it must become part of our game.[51]

As the passage suggests, the possibility of making that idea part of our game presupposes the whole ordinary, public grammar of the terms according to which that idea is articulated, including to the extent that it is called an "idea," which is "private," and is "about," in this case, "death." More so than in the private language remarks of the *Investigations* – where, in expressions of interiority construed "on the model of 'object and name,'" the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant"[52] – Wittgenstein is willing to allow (as I believe he would still allow in his later philosophy, if only for cases of deeply personal religious sentiments, not so much for philosophically-motivated idealism-supporting ones) that it is possible to acquire a better understanding of what, say, a believer expressing a highly particularized notion of death means by surveying what a sentence which employs that term "is connected up with, and get more and more of an idea as I see what he does with it."[53]

In an entry from *Culture and Value* dating to the final years of his life, Wittgenstein supports this procedure with reference to the utterances of believers more generally:

> If someone who believes in God looks round and asks "Where does everything I see come from?"… he is *not* craving for a (causal) explanation… He is, namely,

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51. *LRB*, 69. Brackets in original.
52. *PI* §293.
53. *LRB*, 70.

expressing an attitude to all explanations.—But how is this manifested in his life?... *Practice* gives the words their sense.[54]

Here are words and sentences with ordinary institutions of use, which in that form hang together with causal explanations and their associated standards.[55] Yet the believer orients these toward a different purpose, which would be lost on us, unless we were to heed the double-register wherein a familiar linguistic construction takes on an unusual role. But if this register is double, it is so, not because it tracks two modes of use that run parallel to one another without intersecting, but only to the extent that an unordinary mode of use bifurcates, as it were, from an ordinary one. And insofar as it is to remain expressed and expressible in an unordinary avenue of use, it will be found not only departing from the ordinary, but routinely crisscrossing back to it: "Could you explain the concept of the punishments of hell without using the concept of punishment? Or that of God's goodness with using the concept of goodness? If you want to get the right *effect* with your words, certainly not."[56] And that right effect includes the expression of those constructs insofar as they are to reflect deviations from or modifications of the ordinary concepts they employ.

Towards the end of his thought, it does not appear that Wittgenstein's intention is to make of religious concepts and beliefs something exceptionally unordinary, as the Lectures more or less had done, but rather, to preserve their unordinary aspects while diminishing their exceptionableness, grammatically speaking. In other words, it is not the case that Wittgenstein sought to establish religious concepts and beliefs as exceptions to the grammar of beliefs, nor would his late philosophy allow this. Notwithstanding the important differences they exhibit and call to honour, they are structured on the grammar of ordinary beliefs, as is evidenced, inter alia, by the fact that they resemble them exactly in form. This resemblance is largely responsible for the apparent conflict between theistic and atheistic rationalist-evidentialism: without it, that conflict could not effectively be staged, mainly because theistic rationalist-evidentialism such as it is could not really arise.

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54. *CV* 85e 1950.

55. Cf. Cora Diamond's "Secondary Sense" (cited above, footnote 2). Also: *PI* Part II §274-§278.

56. *CV* 80e 1949.

Indeed, by the end of his thought, Wittgenstein would also concede that the conditions for exposure to religious language-games – and thus, for conceptual assimilation and the possibility of critical orientation toward the modes of experience connected with them – were at reach as a matter of ordinary maturation into contexts of human interaction:

> Life can educate one to a belief in God. And *experiences* too are what bring this about… These neither show us God in the way a sense impression shows us an object, nor do they give rise to *conjectures* about him. Experience, thoughts,—life can force this concept on us. So perhaps it is similar to the concept of "object."[57]

Road Forward

On the basis of the Wittgensteinian foundations for a critique of religion outlined, the fundamental method of philosophical access to religious frameworks has to proceed by examination of the actions, behaviour, judgments, and thought expressed in conjunction with the concepts and conceptual constructions belonging specially to those frameworks. It goes without saying that to speak of an examination of such modes of experience is to speak of an examination of modes that are collectively manifest, namely, by the group claiming adherence to that framework which they are said to belong to, precisely on grounds of such collective manifestations in its name. Collective manifestations are instances of the paradigmatic patterns which adherents to a religious outlook with a general consistency follow, else those patterns would not be definitive of *that* religion, nor could be followed as distinctive paradigms of that religion so as to warrant self-description or identification in terms of *that* religion uniquely, as distinct from any other. That is why saying that such collective manifestations are not the "real" manifestations of a given religious framework would not do: they are the "data" of the philosophy of religion.[58]

Those collective modes are to be evaluated within the purview of the categories they lay licit claim to – such categories as concern the ethical,

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57. *CV* 86e 1950.
58. Cf. David Hume, *Dialogues and The Natural History of Religion*, ed. J. C. A. Gaskin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 29-130. "True religion, I allow, has no such pernicious consequences: But we must treat of religion, as it has commonly been found in the world" (*ibid.,*125).

the existential, the psychological, the metaphysical, the political – attending to their interconnections within their own systems of provenance and with respect to others. Laying claims to these, as religious frameworks do, by extent implies their readiness, acknowledged or not, to be answerable to the governing standards of these categories; but, unlike with inferential orientation, where these categories are concerned religious frameworks must be answerable to them, too, precisely because these involve evaluative canons they have had, and have still, a meaningful hand in shaping in accordance with commitments that are like in kind to other frameworks that similarly partake in that process, such as philosophical ones.

That being said, our inferential orientation, inasmuch as it extends the elementary and universal operations of reasoning on the basis of past experience, therefore provides a kind of bedrock for criteria of judgement that can or ought to (where they do not in fact already permeate them) serve as limiting critical reference-points for many of these categories. (This is a point Hume goes to lengths to elaborate throughout his writings, and dimensions of it were seen in Wittgenstein's treatment of certain religious and skeptical attitudes.) I can only state this proposal tentatively here, but I regard it as marking the road forward in the development of a critique of religion that proceeds in accordance with the foregoing outline: the use of the criteria of inferential orientation as yardsticks for evaluation in all those categories of human action and thought where religious values eligibly contend.

Those familiar with Wittgenstein's biography might reproach, perhaps rightly, that Wittgenstein would disapprove of this project on a personal level, since it threatens to slight his broader sympathies for religious values; although, as I hope to have shown, his philosophy warrants it. The road forward thus leads to a more aggressively Humean horizon, since Hume considers our inferential reasoning to structurally underlie our moral reasoning,[59] to override in matters legal and political,[60] and even observes that we commonly default to it in considerations which, on the surface,

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59. David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and Other Writings*, ed. Stephen Buckle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), XII, §29.
60. David Hume, "Of Suicide," in *Moral Philosophy*, ed. Geoffrey Sayre-McCord (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co, 2006), 383, footnote 4; cf. *The Natural History of Religion*, section IX.

call for evaluation by reference to religious codes[61] – for such reasons, we are best off honouring its conventions than not. But Hume's method is similar to Wittgenstein's (in ways I will one day further explore) in that both endeavor to remind us of what we already know, and can "know," as part of an effort to draw boundaries; most considerably, boundaries of judgment. Hume said that a "correct *judgment*… confines itself to common life, and to such subjects as fall under daily practice and experience."[62] It has been shown, through Wittgenstein, that our common life, our ordinary beliefs, our inferential orientation, serve as correctives to our judgment in general. I have wanted to show, through Wittgenstein, that we must, as Hume insists, become more rigorous in honouring their role as correctives to our judgment concerning religious values in particular.[63]

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61. *The Natural History of Religion*, XII.

62. *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, XII, §25.

63. I align myself with Cavell in the consideration that such an application of ordinary language philosophy (in the certain Humean vein I tentatively propose) would denote an effort, not to "reinstate vulgar beliefs, or common sense, to a pre-scientific position of eminence, but to reclaim the human self from its denial and neglect by modern philosophy" (*The Claim of Reason*, 154) – or in the case at issue, to reclaim the human self, and sensible and desirable human thought and behaviour, from their denial and neglect by hosts of enshrined values belonging to certain religious systems.

From Rallying Cry to Pejorative: The Taxonomical and Lexical Development of "Fundamentalism"

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"Fundamentalism" is an overused word with an unclear and contested meaning, often used pejoratively toward religious groups and persons seen as extreme; yet some scholarship suggests that fundamentalism is also an area for interreligious work. According to Peter A. Huff, research should focus on dialoguing with rather than demonizing fundamentalisms, since they are the final frontier for interfaith work.[1] This, however, is difficult, since fundamentalists are typically opposed to ecumenical efforts, and demonization impedes dialogue, thereby perpetuating fundamentalisms. This tension is best illustrated by the very term with which fundamentalists are identified – a term often perceived as abusive. According to Alvin Plantinga, "fundamentalist" is a label comparable to English curse words. When someone employs the term's emotive use, they mean that a fundamentalist is "a stupid sumbitch whose theological views are considerably to the right of mine."[2]

Originally, the term was a rallying cry for twentieth century American evangelicals defending their faith from modernism and liberal Christianity. This original, historic fundamentalism was (and remains) a subset of evangelicalism,[3] which is itself a complex and difficult-to-define movement, understood as a subset of Protestantism.[4] Fundamentalism, as a term, has

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1. According to Huff, opening a dialogue with fundamentalisms will "revolutionize ventures in interreligious dialogue." See Peter A. Huff, *What Are They Saying About Fundamentalisms?* (New Jersey: Paulist Press, 2008), 8-9.

2. Alvin Plantinga, *Warranted Christian Belief* (New York: Oxford UP, 2000), 244-245.

3. See Frances Fitzgerald, *The Evangelicals: The Struggle to Shape America* (London: Simon & Schuster, 2017), 5.

4. Evangelicalism is typically defined using D. W. Bebbington's quadrilateral definition, which locates conversionism, activism, biblicism, and crucicentrism as unifying aspects of the evangelical umbrella. See D. W. Bebbington, *Evangelicalism in Modern Britain: A History from the 1730s to the 1980s* (Abingdon: Routledge, 1989), 5-10. Still, as with fundamentalism, debate

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since evolved beyond this context, having obtained pejorative connotations after the fundamentalist-modernist controversy of the 1920s and having its taxonomy expanded after the development of global fundamentalism. Though not all scholars support the concept of global fundamentalism, it is a legitimate academic category that is usually studied sympathetically and neutrally. Most of the pejorative associations come from the media and, at times, from some governments that have concerns about the impact of given fundamentalisms on political, social, or cultural values.[5] Consider, for instance, Christian fundamentalism, which has played a significant role in the rise of the Religious Right – a movement that has had lasting impacts on American and Canadian politics.[6] Most notably, 81% of white evangelicals voted for Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election, and many continue to support his government due to his promises to fulfill their political aspirations.[7] As this essay will show, many theologically conservative evangelicals unknowingly adhere to principles of historic fundamentalism, illustrating its lasting impact on contemporary evangelicalism. Still, in a climate of worsening polarization, pejorative terms like "fundamentalist" do little to quell tensions, which is why I turn to this term's development from rallying cry to derogatory label.

I will begin by etymologizing the term and providing a short historical overview of its transformation into a pejorative. I will then examine its development in referential works, particularly encyclopaedias and dictionaries, thereby revealing the term's popular usage. Next, I will discuss the development of fundamentalism as a scholarly concept, with emphasis on

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continues surrounding the exact taxonomy and definition of evangelicalism, particularly in the context of its global expansion. See Molly Worthen, "Defining Evangelicalism: Questions that Complement the Quadrilateral," *Fides et Historia* 47, no. 1 (2015): 83-86.

5. Fundamentalist forms of religion can also be beneficial for governments. In the United States, for example, Republicans have found a considerable voter base among theologically conservative evangelicals beginning in the Reagan era. See Sara Diamond, *Roads to Dominion: Right-Wing Movements and Political Power in the United States* (New York: The Guilford Press, 1995), 228-231.

6. See Lydia Bean, *The Politics of Evangelical Identity: Local Churches and Partisan Divides in the United States and Canada* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2014), 10-13.

7. Fitzgerald, *The Evangelicals,* 564. It is important to note that Donald Trump's evangelical supporters are not all fundamentalists, but evangelicalism is a movement that has been and continues to be shaped by fundamentalism.

its evolution towards global fundamentalism. Finally, I will present several taxonomical and lexical problems associated with both global fundamentalism and fundamentalism in general, followed by a rebuttal by Bruce B. Lawrence. My aim is to dispel assumptions regarding fundamentalism and to facilitate dialogue between fundamentalists and their opponents.

1. A Brief Etymology & History of Fundamentalism

Fundamentalism's etymology and history demonstrate the term's lexical and taxonomical evolution. Though the term was coined in 1920, the early movement began in the 1800s through Princeton theology and pre-millenarianism. The term itself is simple, deriving from the word "fundamental," referring to something's core, base, or essential nature. "Fundamental" comes from the French *fondamental* and the Latin *fundamentum* and *fundamentalis*, both deriving from the Latin word *fundus*, meaning "bottom."[8] *Fundus* is rooted in a Proto-Indo-European word meaning "bottom" and relates to the English verb "fund" and the French "fond," suggesting a source or wellspring from which a supply comes. In essence, a fundamental is a thing's foundation.[9] For early evangelical fundamentalists, these foundations were core tenets or dogmas upon which other tenets or dogmas rest.

This simple definition is what Curtis Lee Laws meant when he coined the term "fundamentalist" in the summer of 1920. Writing for *The Watchman-Examiner*, Laws defines fundamentalists as "those who still cling to the great fundamentals and who mean to do battle royal for the fundamentals."[10] Laws – a self-described fundamentalist – did not specify what these fundamentals are.[11] Other fundamentalists, however, have identified them as the inerrancy of Scripture, the virgin birth, the bodily resurrection of Christ, substitutionary atonement, and the authenticity of miracles.[12] Of these, iner-

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8. *English Oxford Living Dictionaries*, s.v. "Fundamental," accessed September 10, 2017, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/fundamental.

9. See *A Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary of the English Language*, vol. 1 (New York: Elsevier Publishing Company, 1966), 628; *The Barnhart Concise Dictionary of Etymology* (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), 303.

10. Curtis Lee Laws, "Convention Side Lights," *The Watchman-Examiner* 8 (July 1, 1920), 834.

11. David Harrington Watt, *Antifundamentalism in Modern America* (London: Cornell UP, 2017), 51-52.

12. Fitzgerald, *The Evangelicals*, 96.

rancy has been a particularly distinctive fundamentalist position. A number of fundamentalists, moreover, have also strongly identified with pre-millenarianism as another fundamental tenet.

Princeton Theology and Biblical Inerrancy

In addition to Protestant Reform theology, and an emphasis on personal religious experience following the American Great Awakenings, fundamentalism, rooted as it is in evangelical history, has also been shaped by biblical inerrancy and pre-millenarianism (known also as premillennialist dispensationalism). Biblical inerrancy developed out of Princeton Theological Seminary in the 1800s under Charles Hodge and his successors: Archibald Alexander Hodge and B. B. Warfield. Prior to Princeton Theology, Scripture's truthfulness was largely taken for granted by American Protestants;[13] however, post-Reformation Enlightenment movements – especially biblical criticism, Darwinian evolution, and deist philosophies – contributed to the reactionary theologies developed at Princeton, leading to the formation of biblical inerrancy, that is, the idea that the Bible is fully without error in all areas, including science and history.

Biblical inerrancy, however, is but one hermeneutical system among several that strongly emphasize the authority of the Bible. Other systems include biblical literalism and biblical infallibility. Biblical literalism is perhaps the highest view of Scripture: biblical inerrancy is coupled with a literal, word-for-word reading of the text. Inerrantists, by contrast, accept that the Bible cannot be taken literally in everything it says – for example, certain passages may be interpreted poetically or allegorically – but they hold that everything the Bible says is true and without error. For infallibilists, the Bible is true only in areas concerning religious faith. Despite these differences, research shows that the distinction is unbeknownst to most modern-day evangelicals; they simply tend to choose the most authoritative option when given questions related to biblical authority. Thus, if both an inerrantist and literalist option is given, proponents will tend to choose the literalist option, which presupposes inerrancy.[14]

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13. Fitzgerald, *The Evangelicals*, 77.

14. According to Ted G. Jelen, this is true for most lay evangelicals, who are not versed in the subtleties of hermeneutical differences. Such persons tend to choose the wording that gives the highest view of Scripture. On this basis, Jelen concludes that the difference between

Though early forms of these hermeneutics can be found throughout Church history, their current forms are recent developments. According to Ernest Sandeen, biblical authority did not develop into inerrancy until at least the 1850s.[15] In fact, the Westminster Confession contains nothing resembling inerrancy, focussing instead on biblical inspiration and the canon's status as closed.[16] Revelation, as the Confession sees it, is complete and fully found within Scripture. Even Charles Hodge, one of the first proponents of biblical inerrancy, conceded scriptural imperfection, accepting that Scripture need not be without minor blemishes. Hodge's concession represents the doctrine of inerrancy at an early stage of development. It was following Hodge that Princeton theologians began maintaining a fully inerrant view of Scripture. They would, in fact, argue that, should any error be found in the Bible, it would result in the dismantling of all Christian truth claims.[17] Despite his less strict view in this context, Hodge, in his *Systematic Theology*, nonetheless reveals his high view of Scripture by comparing the study of the Bible to that of the natural sciences. Like the astronomer studies the stars for scientific truth, the theologian investigates Scripture for theological truth.[18] For Hodge, the Bible is a repository of facts ready to be studied like any other object of inquiry. This Newtonian approach to Scripture fast-tracked Hodge's successors toward a solidified doctrine of biblical inerrancy.

Furthermore, advancements in biblical criticism hardened Princeton Theology.[19] Beginning with Archibald Alexander Hodge (Charles Hodge's

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inerrancy and literalism is unimportant (Ted G. Jelen, "Biblical Literalism and Inerrancy: Does the Difference Make a Difference?" *Sociological Analysis* 49, no. 4 [1989]: 421-429). Jelen, Wilcox, and Smidt, however, note that the difference between literalism and inerrancy is important when both options are presented, seeing that Jelen's original study separated questions containing inerrantist wording from those including literalist wording. Nevertheless, since literalism is a higher view of Scripture than inerrancy, this does not contradict Jelen's earlier findings (Ted G. Jelen, Clyde Wilcox, and Corwin E Smidt, "Biblical Literalism and Inerrancy: A Methodological Investigation," *Sociological Analysis* 51, no. 3 [Fall 1990]: 307-313).

15. Ernest Sandeen, *The Roots of Fundamentalism* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970), 106.

16. Fitzgerald, *The Evangelicals*, 77.

17. Fitzgerald, *The Evangelicals*, 78.

18. Charles Hodge, *Systematic Theology* (Greenwood: The Attic Press, Inc., 1960), 1.

19. Ernest Sandeen, "The Princeton Theology: One Source of Biblical Literalism in American Protestantism," *Church History* 31 (September 1962): 315.

son), the Princeton theologians became more defensive, culminating in A. A. Hodge's 1879 edition of *Outlines of Theology*, which claims that only the "original autographs" are inerrant.[20] This claim allows for discrepancies in the Bible without denying inerrancy, thereby enabling the hermeneutic to survive scrutiny and thrive in contemporary evangelical theology. Hodge's argument, in fact, made its way into the 1978 *Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy* in which over 200 evangelical leaders codified Princeton Theology of Scripture.[21] More recently, a 2014 Pew Research study concluded that 31% of Americans believe that the Bible should be taken as the literal word of God; a position held by 55% of evangelical Protestants, 59% of historically black Protestants, and 24% of mainline Protestants.[22] As stated earlier, most evangelicals tend to choose the option with the highest view of Scripture, and in this case, that view is a literalist view, which presupposes inerrancy.

Premillenarianism

Pre-millenarianism is a Christian eschatological system involving the return and millennial reign of Christ on Earth. In the nineteenth century, pre-millenarianism competed in the United States with post-millenarianism, an eschatological system involving one thousand years of peace brought about by the Church rather than Christ, and after which Christ would return to redeem the saints. Post-millenarianism integrated Christian liberalism's optimism, specifically with respect to human progress, but was stymied by World War I and the pessimism that followed. This enabled pre-millenarianism to thrive in American evangelicalism with its hope for Christ's retribution in a darkening world.[23]

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20. Archibald Alexander Hodge, *Outlines of Theology* (London: Thomas Nelson & Sons, Paternoster Row, 1879), 66, 75.

21. See Article X of the "Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy," which says: "WE AFFIRM that inspiration, strictly speaking, applies only to the autographic text of Scripture, which in the providence of God can be ascertained from available manuscripts with great accuracy. We further affirm that copies and translations of Scripture are the Word of God to the extent that they faithfully represent the original." For the full text of the Chicago Statement, see www.danielakin.com/wp-content/uploads/old/Resource_545/Book%202,%20Sec%2023.pdf.

22. "Interpreting Scripture," *Pew Forum*, accessed Dec. 19, 2017, http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/interpreting-scripture.

23. Fitzgerald, *The Evangelicals*, 103-104.

As with inerrancy, pre-millenarianism has spread throughout evangelicalism, having outgrown its fundamentalist origins. It is now commonly referred to as pre-millenialism and can be found in popular evangelical media, particularly through the *Left Behind* series,[24] which has sold over 80 million copies and resulted in four films. The series concerns a seven-year tribulation, which occurs after the disappearance (or rapture) of Christians and concludes with Christ's return and millennial reign on Earth. This, or some version of it, is what many evangelicals believe today. What was once part of the fundamentalist movement has bled into much of contemporary evangelicalism.

During the nineteenth century, many evangelicals held pre-millenarian conferences and Bible studies throughout the United States, and connected their apocalyptic beliefs to current events, making predictions of the future, announcing the fulfillment of prophecy, and defending the Bible against criticism. From this vantage, Lyman Stewart oversaw *The Fundamentals: A Testimony to the Truth*, crystallizing the fundamentalist movement. This document was distributed to more than one million American Protestants so that, by the end of World War I, the fundamentalist movement was mobilized to counter modernist threats. By 1919, William Bell Riley formed the World Christian Fundamentals Association, one year before Curtis Lee Laws provided the movement with its name: "the fundamentalists."

It was not long, however, before "fundamentalist" and its sister form "fundamentalism" were involved in controversy. In 1922, Harry Emerson Fosdick, pastor of Manhattan's First Presbyterian Church, preached the anti-fundamentalist sermon, "Shall the Fundamentalists Win?" equating fundamentalists with the Pharisees and condemning their tendencies to separate into smaller and smaller churches.[25] In response, fundamentalists countered with sermons including, "Shall Unbelief Win?" and, amusingly, "Shall the Funnymonkeyists Win?"[26]

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24. Tim LaHaye and Jerry Jenkins, *Left Behind*, 16 vols. (Wheaton, IL: Tyndale House Publishers, 1995-2007).
25. Harry Emerson Fosdick, "Shall the Fundamentalists Win?" *Christian Work* 102 (June 10, 1922): 716–722.
26. Fitzgerald, *The Evangelicals*, 121-122.

The Scopes "Monkey" Trial:
When Fundamentalism Became Pejorative

Fundamentalists and "funnymonkeyists" took centre stage at the Scopes "Monkey" Trial, where William Jennings Bryan – three-time presidential candidate and self-described fundamentalist – battled famed attorney, Clarence Darrow, over the fate of John T. Scopes, a high school teacher arrested for teaching evolution in a Dayton, Tennessee high school. Though Scopes was convicted and fined a mere $100, fundamentalism lost all legitimacy. The trial attracted media outlets from across the country who witnessed Bryan's humiliation at the hands of Darrow, as he laid bare Bryan's fundamentalist beliefs in a 6,000-year-old Earth, the historicity of Jonah, and various biblical miracles; this resulted in the media's ridicule of fundamentalists, thereby relegating them to the cultural outskirts. According to George M. Marsden, fundamentalists lost the ability to "raise the level of discourse to the plane where any of their arguments would be taken seriously. Whatever they said would be overshadowed by the pejorative associations attached to the movement by the seemingly victorious establishment."[27]

This humiliation was joined with incorrect judgment. The media mistakenly equated fundamentalists with bigots from the agrarian south. Leading the charge was H. L. Mencken of *The Baltimore Sun*, a staunch anti-religion reporter and author who wrote extensively about the trial, designating the residents of Dayton, Tennessee as fundamentalists.[28] Though other reporters also referred to Daytonians with the label,[29] Mencken was particularly harsh, also designating them as "gaping primates," "peasants," "hillbillies," and "morons."[30] For Mencken, fundamentalists were everywhere and were sinister, even having ties to the Ku Klux

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27. George M. Marsden, *Fundamentalism and American Culture* (New York: Oxford UP, 1980), 188.
28. H. L. Mencken, "Scopes Monkey Trial," *Deadline Artists: America's Greatest Newspaper Columns*, eds. John Avlon, Jesse Angelo, and Errol Louis (New York: The Overlook Press, 2011), 66-69.
29. *The New York Times*, in particular, posted scathing articles on the apparent fundamentalism in Dayton, while admitting that Mencken's work bordered on extreme. See Susan Harding, *The Book of Jerry Falwell: Fundamentalist Language and Politics* (New York: Princeton UP, 2000), 67; "Mencken Epithets Rouse Dayton's Ire," *The New York Times*, July 17, 1925.
30. Harding, *The Book of Jerry Falwell*, 67.

Klan.[31] According to Marsden, Mencken's rhetoric against fundamentalism altered public perception. The term now "applied to almost every aspect of American rural or small-town Protestantism";[32] its use was no longer limited to a small group of anti-modernist evangelicals.

These false portraits tainted fundamentalists, portraying them as bigoted and ignorant southerners, despite recent scholarship having identified early fundamentalism as a northern, urban movement that emerged when agrarian traditionalists encountered urban culture. As Nancy Ammerman argues, "Fundamentalism is most likely to be found at the points where tradition is meeting modernity rather than where modernity is most remote."[33]

Actual fundamentalists, unfortunately, worsened their own situation. According to Susan Harding, the Scopes trial was interpreted as Bryan's defeat, but it could have been interpreted as his victory.[34] However, fundamentalists acquiesced to the narrative of loss, cementing the negative portrayal that has continued to the present throughout the media, entertainment industry, and popular culture.[35]

Billy Graham and the Neo-Evangelicals

After their cultural defeat, fundamentalists seemingly disappeared, though denominational disputes continued during and after the 1930s as fundamentalists frequently separated from churches perceived as liberal or modern. Eventually, the movement resurfaced, particularly through the rising popularity of Billy Graham in the 1940s and 50s. Graham was a self-described fundamentalist who held to biblical infallibility, the virgin

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31. Mencken is known for saying, "Heave an egg out a Pullman window, and you will hit a Fundamentalist almost anywhere in the United States today" (quoted in Marsden, *Fundamentalism and American Culture*, 188).

32. Marsden, *Fundamentalism and American Culture*, 188.

33. Nancy Tatom Ammerman, *Bible Believers: Fundamentalists in the Modern World* (London: Rutgers UP, 1987), 8.

34. Harding, *The Book of Jerry Falwell*, 71.

35. Portrayals of fundamentalists in entertainment culminated in the play, and eventual film, *Inherit the Wind*. The story is a retelling of the Scopes "Monkey" Trial, except that the names of figures central to the trial are changed. According to David Harrington Watt, *Inherit the Wind* is a "catechism for the set of feelings, assumptions, and beliefs" that he calls antifundamentalism (Watt, *Antifundamentalism*, 113).

birth, and pre-millenarianism.[36] Through his preaching, Graham propagated fundamentalist views in a manner devoid of controversy, thereby removing stigma from fundamentalist beliefs and separating the movement from the tainted label. This success occurred under the guise of neo-evangelicalism, a movement started by Graham to attract mainline Protestant denominations. Graham, however, understood that attracting these denominations meant changing people's perceptions of fundamentalism.[37] From his efforts, tension arose between neo-evangelicals and fundamentalists, resulting in the call for unification under the banner of evangelicalism,[38] which further blurred the lines between fundamentalists and evangelicals. Though the term "neo-evangelical" fell into obscurity, Graham and his successors further infused evangelicalism with fundamentalist positions, particularly in relation to the Bible.

Religion Fights Back

In the latter half of the 1970s, much of evangelicalism aligned with the Republican party due to the leadership of self-described fundamentalist Jerry Falwell, who rallied evangelicals against abortion and homosexuality. To this day, most American evangelical denominations lean to the right of the political spectrum. According to Pew Research, 64% of the Southern Baptist Convention is Republican, along with 57% of the Assemblies of God. The only evangelical denomination surveyed with less than 50% of its members leaning Republican is Seventh Day Adventism.[39] Though degrees vary amongst such right-leaning Christians, Falwell effectively united them with the hope of making the United States the Christian nation he believed it had once been; to return it to its Christian roots.[40] This aspiration has ties to dominionism, that is, the worldview that Christians should have dominion over secular institutions.[41] While Falwell and most conservative evangelicals

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36. Fitzgerald, *The Evangelicals*, 175-176.
37. Fitzgerald, *The Evangelicals*, 186-187.
38. Fitzgerald, *The Evangelicals*, 195.
39. Michael Lipka, "U.S. Religious Groups and Their Political Leanings," *Pew Research*, accessed Nov. 30, 2017, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/02/23/u-s-religious-groups-and-their-political-leanings.
40. Fitzgerald, *The Evangelicals*, 307.
41. See Sara Diamond, *Roads to Dominion*, 246.

do not directly espouse this worldview, it has influenced proponents of the Christian Right.[42]

Owing to its influence, Falwell's political movement sparked fear. God was not "dead," as many had thought, especially during the 1960s. Rather, God was "fighting back" through the fundamentalists, but not just evangelical fundamentalists; God was fighting back through militant believers from many faiths around the world. These faithful were labeled extremists, and extremism became synonymous with fundamentalism. This synonymy took full shape after the 1979 Iranian Revolution through the concept of global fundamentalism. No longer limited to American evangelicalism, fundamentalism expanded to every religion, typically as a form of religious revitalization responding to modernization, secularization, and westernization. This global application, however, has been quite elastic.

2. Fundamentalism's Lexical Development in Reference Works

The evolution of fundamentalism can be seen in encyclopaedias and dictionaries (including theological dictionaries) throughout the twentieth century. Earlier reference works represent fundamentalism as a Protestant movement, related to biblical inerrancy and dispensationalism; however, reference works slowly reflected the changes in scholarship related to global fundamentalism. In this section, I will explore some of these lexical changes in order to understand popular conceptions of fundamentalism.

Fundamentalism, according to the online *Oxford Dictionary* (2017), is "A form of a religion, especially Islam or Protestant Christianity, that upholds belief in the strict, literal interpretation of scripture."[43] Oxford also provides a broader definition encompassing non-religious fundamentalism: "Strict adherence to the basic principles of any subject or discipline." *Merriam-Webster Dictionary* (2017), by contrast, offers the following definition: "a movement in 20th century Protestantism emphasizing the literally interpreted Bible as fundamental to Christian life and teaching."[44] The Merri-

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42. Diamond, *Roads to Dominion*, 248; see also Fitzgerald, *The Evangelicals*, 8.

43. *English Oxford Living Dictionaries*, s.v. "Fundamentalism," accessed September 10, 2017, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/fundamentalism. Another online source with a similar definition is that of Dictionary.com, s.v. "Fundamentalism," accessed Dec. 22, 2017, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/fundamentalism.

44. *Merriam-Webster*, s.v. "Fundamentalism," accessed September 10, 2017, https://www.

am-Webster definition is similar to that of Oxford, except that it highlights fundamentalism as a single movement within Protestantism, while Oxford presents fundamentalism as a global phenomenon. As we will see, most reference works offer variations of these two definitions, except for earlier reference works, which describe fundamentalism pejoratively, reflecting post-Scopes trial attitudes.

One of the earliest definitions is from H. Richard Niehbuhr in his entry "Fundamentalism," published in the 1931 *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*. Niebuhr presents fundamentalists as imposing their creed – the five points of fundamentalism – on public schools, religious colleges, and seminaries.[45] He describes fundamentalists as "aggressive conservatives,"[46] who had succeeded in banning the teaching of evolution in many American states. Like Mencken, Niebuhr relates fundamentalism to racist movements like the Ku Klux Klan and describes adherents as having little affinity for change.[47]

Fundamentalism, however, did not immediately appear in dictionaries. For instance, the 1933 edition of the *Oxford English Dictionary* does not define fundamentalism or fundamentalists. Nonetheless, many dictionaries as late as the 1980s and early 1990s portray fundamentalism as a strictly Protestant phenomenon. For instance, the 1973 edition of the *Funk & Wagnalls New Comprehensive International Dictionary of the English Language* defines fundamentalism as, "The belief that all statements made in the Bible are literally true," connecting their definition to evangelical Protestants and literalism.[48]

The 1980 edition of the *Oxford American Dictionary* presents a more inclusive definition by connecting fundamentalism to the "strict main-

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merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fundamentalism.

45. H. Richard Niebuhr, "Fundamentalism," in *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 6 (New York: Macmillan 1931), 526-527.

46. Watt, *Antifundamentalism*, 89.

47. Niebuhr, "Fundamentalism," 527.

48. *Funk and Wagnalls New Comprehensive International Dictionary of the English Language* (New York: Ferguson Publishing Company, 1973), s.v. "Fundamentalism." For similar definitions, see s.v. "Fundamentalism," in *The New Collins Dictionary and Thesaurus* (Hong Kong: South China Printing Co., 1987); *Webster's New World Dictionary, Third College Edition* (New York: Simon & Shuster 1988); and *The Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary* (New York, Oxford UP, 1989).

tenance of traditional orthodox religious beliefs (especially Protestant), such as the literal truth of the Bible."[49] Though global fundamentalism had not yet taken root in contemporary dictionaries, this definition by Oxford broadens the term, removing it from its strict relation to evangelical dogmas. Thereafter, the second edition of *Oxford's English Dictionary* (1989) directly connects fundamentalism with global religions, while mentioning that non-evangelical fundamentalism especially occurs in Islam.[50]

By the late 1990s, certain dictionaries provided broader definitions than even global fundamentalism. The *Nelson Canadian Dictionary of the English Language* (1997), for example, defines fundamentalism as, "A movement or point of view characterized by rigid adherence to fundamental or basic principles,"[51] thereby connecting fundamentalism to political and economic fundamentalism. Similar definitions occur in the second edition of *Oxford's English Dictionary* (1989), and more recently in *Collins Cobuild Advanced American English Dictionary* (2016), which defines fundamentalism as, "the belief in the original form of a religion or theory, without accepting any later ideas."[52]

By the 2000s, global fundamentalism was an established academic concept, as reflected in the differences between the second edition of the *Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church* (1974) and the third edition (2005). In the second edition, the term is defined strictly as a Protestant phenomenon, involving a "profession of strict adherence to (esp. Protestant) orthodoxy in the matter of biblical interpretation."[53] Despite being virtually the same, the third edition adds an addendum regarding global fundamentalism and highlights the term's pejorative connotations.[54]

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49. *The Oxford American Dictionary* (New York: Oxford UP, 1980), s.v. "Fundamentalism."

50. *The Oxford English Dictionary Second Edition* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), s.v. "Fundamentalism."

51. Note: this dictionary's second definition connects fundamentalism directly to twentieth century evangelicalism, and opposition to liberalism and secularism. See *Nelson Canadian Dictionary of the English Language* (Ontario: International Thomson Publishing, 1997), s.v. "Fundamentalism."

52. *Collins Cobuild Advanced American English Dictionary* (Bishopbriggs: HarperCollins, 2016), s.v. "Fundamentalism."

53. *The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford UP, 1974), s.v. "Fundamentalism."

54. *The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church*, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford UP, 2005), s.v. "Fundamentalism."

Global fundamentalism, however, has not been uncontested in reference works. In *The Encyclopedia of Christianity* (1999), James Barr states that fundamentalism's application beyond Protestantism has yet to be proven viable by scholarly analysis.[55] Barr also describes fundamentalism as a pejorative label often rejected by purported fundamentalists. According to Barr, many apparent fundamentalists prefer to call themselves "evangelical" or "orthodox."[56] Moreover, the 2008 *Global Dictionary of Theology* describes fundamentalism as having taxonomical and lexical problems, illustrating the near impossibility of establishing a strict definition.[57] Nonetheless, a broad definition can be made, encompassing believers who "attempt to preserve their distinctive identity as a people or group."[58]

Although revealing the term's opacity, these definitions are reflections of fundamentalism scholarship. Doubtlessly, fundamentalism is difficult to define, having passed through various stages of lexical development. Prior to the Scopes trial, the term was not inherently pejorative, but it later gained negative connotations, as seen in Niebuhr's encyclopedic entry. It has since morphed into a category involving non-Protestant and even non-Christian movements, though this global application has not been accepted universally. In the next section, I turn to fundamentalism scholarship, detailing the term's evolution therein from a strictly Protestant phenomenon to one applicable across faiths.

3. Fundamentalism Scholarship

According to Peter A. Huff, there have been three stages in the study of Protestant fundamentalism, the first of which began during the fundamentalist-modernist controversy of the 1920s when research was mostly conducted by modernists and opponents of fundamentalism. The second stage began in the 1970s and contains the influential works of Ernest Sandeen and George M. Marsden – historians sympathetic to the movement.

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55. James Barr, "Fundamentalism," in *The Encyclopedia of Christianity*, vol. 2, eds. Erwin Fahlbusch et al. (Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company), 365.
56. Barr, "Fundamentalism," 364.
57. For an additional example of a contemporary reference work questioning global fundamentalism, see *The Encyclopedia of Christianity* (New York: Oxford UP, 2005), 481-482.
58. *Global Dictionary of Theology* (Nottingham: InterVarsity Press, 2008), s.v. "Fundamentalism."

They revolutionized fundamentalism scholarship, paving the way for a third stage, which occurred in the 1980s and involved feminist and comparative perspectives.[59] Contemporaneously to the third stage, the Iranian Revolution and the reinvigoration of global religions motivated scholars to apply the category of fundamentalism across faiths.

The First Stage: Early Scholarship

In the early twentieth century, initial fundamentalism scholarship undertaken by Shailer Matthews and Shirley Jackson Case centered on pre-millenarianism. They did not, however, fully explore its historical origin or cultural background. Matthews, nonetheless, co-wrote a complete study of fundamentalism with William Warren Sweet, entitled *The Story of Religion in America* (1939), in which they describe the competing forms of fundamentalist and modernist Christianity.[60] This approach exemplifies one of three models related to fundamentalism research – that of a cultural clash between fundamentalists and modernists, where fundamentalism is defined by what or who it opposes. The second model, known as the "rural-urban theory," portrays fundamentalism as a rural movement in opposition to urbanism, representing the false portrait that circulated after the Scopes trial. The third model is the "cultural lag thesis," which portrays fundamentalism as a remnant of an outdated religion that "has been left behind by the Western World's rapid advance toward modernization."[61] Of the three, this third model has been the most viable.

In 1931, Stewart Cole wrote one of the first historical accounts of the fundamentalist movement. Though he focusses on the cultural clash model, elements of the rural-urban model and the cultural lag thesis find their way into his text. Like his contemporaries, Cole presents fundamentalism negatively and modernism positively. For Cole, fundamentalists are extremists and modernists are progressives.[62] Still, according to Huff, Cole's *The History of Fundamentalism* "remained the benchmark of the field well into the 1950s."[63]

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59. Huff, *What Are They Saying About Fundamentalisms?* 38-39.
60. Huff, *What Are They Saying About Fundamentalisms?* 42, 44.
61. Huff, *What Are They Saying About Fundamentalisms?* 44.
62. Huff, *What Are They Saying About Fundamentalisms?* 47.
63. Huff, *What Are They Saying About Fundamentalisms?* 46.

The Second Stage: Neutral Historiographies

Fundamentalism research dwindled after the 1930s, since fundamentalism was perceptibly dying. However, interest stirred in the 1950s as fundamentalism returned to the forefront of mainstream currents. The zenith of scholarship in this period was Ernest Sandeen's influential work, *The Roots of Fundamentalism*: *British and American Millenarianism 1800-1930*, which epitomizes the neutrality of the second stage. Sandeen wrote his text in 1970 – ten years before the Iranian Revolution and the propagation of global fundamentalism as a category. His attempted neutrality is expressed in his introduction, wherein he says, "This book is not the obituary of Fundamentalism."[64] A few pages later, he calls the rural-urban model invalid, stating that the campaign against evolution may have been led by "rural, southern interests," but not by fundamentalism.[65] He also reveals the shocking state of contemporary fundamentalism research, showing that scholars had not verified the rural-urban hypothesis against fundamentalist demographics.[66]

According to Sandeen, fundamentalism should be understood as an offshoot of millenarianism's history, and not the other way around. Typically, fundamentalism scholarship had focused on the apparent five fundamentals, which Sandeen demonstrates are problematic. The five fundamentals were propagated by the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, and not directly by fundamentalists. They were also mistakenly identified as originating at the 1895 Niagara Bible Conference, an idea spread by Cole's *History of Fundamentalism*. This, however, was incorrect; the five fundamentals began in 1910 and were reaffirmed in 1916. According to Sandeen, students of fundamentalism were familiar with the fundamentals, but not with fundamentalism's roots; they were unacquainted with millenarianism, and this lack of familiarity caused scholars to correlate fundamentalism with old-time religion.[67]

Though focussing on millenarianism, Sandeen also examines biblical literalism based on the millenarian mindset. For millenarians, if the Bible

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64. Sandeen, *The Roots of Fundamentalism*s, ix.
65. Sandeen, *The Roots of Fundamentalism*s, xi.
66. Sandeen, *The Roots of Fundamentalism*s, xii.
67. Sandeen, *The Roots of Fundamentalism*s, xix, xiv, xv.

contains any error whatsoever, their enterprise is jeopardized, tarnishing their ability to make predictions. Sandeen also connects biblical literalism to Princeton biblical inerrancy, which he argues was largely a response to nineteenth century secularism. Though millenarian biblical literalism predated Princeton inerrancy, the millenarians were ill-equipped to respond to higher criticism, which was left to Princeton theologians.[68] Still, demand for an inerrant Bible is deemed the "central question of Fundamentalist historiography,"[69] despite the minority status of inerrantists in the nineteenth century.[70]

The Roots of Fundamentalism is doubtlessly one of the most influential historiographies of fundamentalism; however, according to Huff, Sandeen's focus on its early forms does not explain fundamentalism's resurgence in the 1950s onward. Though its roots were in biblical inerrancy and millenarianism, fundamentalism – as Huff illustrates – had become enveloped in a culture war against abortion, homosexuality, evolution, and secularism.[71] To fill this void in the scholarship, George M. Marsden published *Fundamentalism and American Culture* in 1980.

Marsden's work is partially the result of his disagreement with Sandeen. For Marsden, millenarianism is not the bedrock of fundamentalism, since not all fundamentalists are pre-millenarianists; for example, J. Gresham Machen, a prominent fundamentalist leader, opposed pre-millenarianism. Sandeen also did not consider cultural factors influencing fundamentalism, hence, Marsden explores the impact thereon of anti-liberalism, anti-evolution, ecclesiastical separatism, and moral purity. Early on, Marsden saw anti-worldliness as the factor common to all fundamentalists. But he later adapted his position, perceiving modernism as the central fundamentalist opposition, and this perception has become Marsden's lasting influence on fundamentalism scholarship.[72]

As his title suggests, Marsden places fundamentalism in the context of twentieth century American evangelicalism. He is careful, however, to

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68. Sandeen, *The Roots of Fundamentalism*s, 107, 104, 114.
69. Sandeen, *The Roots of Fundamentalism*s, 107.
70. Sandeen, *The Roots of Fundamentalism*s, 107.
71. Huff, *What Are They Saying About Fundamentalisms?* 71-72.
72. Huff, *What Are They Saying About Fundamentalisms?* 75, 77. See Marsden, *Fundamentalism and American Culture*, 5.

situate fundamentalism as a particular form of evangelicalism shaped by its temporal and cultural context.[73] He then explains the fundamentalist drive: "Evangelicals were convinced that sincere acceptance of this 'Gospel' message was the key to virtue in this life and to eternal life in heaven; its rejection meant following the broad path that ended with the tortures of hell." He suggests that appreciating fundamentalists' "thought and action" requires that we appreciate their "deep religious commitment" to the Gospel and man's eternal fate.[74] Often forgotten, this drive reveals the perceptibly altruistic aims of many fundamentalists – however misguided they may be.

After examining the movement's early history, Marsden presents fundamentalism as social, political, intellectual, and American phenomena. He does this while continuing to critique Sandeen's focus on the theology of fundamentalism and lack of concern for the social and cultural influences on the fundamentalist experience.[75] This experience, for Marsden, is similar to the immigrant experience of arriving in an alien territory with a culture removed from one's own.[76] Through these vantage points, Marsden goes beyond Sandeen's focus on fundamentalist theology and complexifies this once misrepresented and misunderstood movement that has shaped and been shaped by American society, politics, culture, and intellectualism. As a result, *Fundamentalism and American Culture* stands as a magisterial historiography in fundamentalism research.

The Third Stage: Feminist and Comparative Perspectives

Scholars of the third stage delved further into fundamentalism's cultural underpinnings, utilizing comparative and postmodern methods to better understand historical and contemporary fundamentalism. Amidst these new angles, Betty Deberg, Margaret Lamberts Bendroth, R. Marie Griffith, and Brenda Brasher employed feminist approaches in their fundamentalism scholarship.[77] Of these four, I will focus on the work of Betty Deberg.

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73. Marsden, *Fundamentalism and American Culture*, 3.
74. Marsden, *Fundamentalism and American Culture*, 3.
75. Marsden, *Fundamentalism and American Culture*, 200-202.
76. Marsden, *Fundamentalism and American Culture*, 204-205.
77. See Betty Deberg, *Ungodly Women: Gender and the First Wave of American Fundamentalism* (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1990); Margaret Lamberts Bendroth, *Fundamentalism and Gender, 1875 to the Present* (New Haven: Yale UP, 1993); Marie R. Griffith, *God's Daughters:*

Deberg's *Ungodly Women: Gender and the First Wave of American Fundamentalism* (1990) is ground-breaking for its approach. Deberg, unlike previous scholars, focusses on the fundamentalism of common persons and not that of fundamentalist leaders, taking into consideration that the average pew-sitting fundamentalist is unaware of liberal Christianity's intellectual threats. She separates what she calls "official" fundamentalism from "popular" fundamentalism, with the latter being that of the common person.[78] As she says, "No interpretation that fails to examine fundamentalism's broad, popular appeal can adequately explain the movement."[79]

According to Deberg, there were two principal approaches to fundamentalism scholarship: the religious/theological approach, and the social/cultural approach. Sandeen and Marsden focus on the former by concentrating on fundamentalism's doctrinal concerns. Though Marsden, as Deberg argues, entertains fundamentalism's cultural influences, he is concerned with its theological substructure.[80] Deberg's concern, in contrast, is with its social and cultural base, especially related to gender and family, since changes with respect to gender roles were major factors in the rise of fundamentalism.[81]

Take, for example, the 1898 *Women's Bible* – published by Elizabeth Cady Stanton – which sparked outrage among proto-fundamentalist communities. One beleaguered preacher called any Stanton follower, "an awful creature," stating that "you had better not come near such a reeking lepress. She needs to be washed, and for three weeks to be soaked in carbolic acid, and for a whole year fumigated, before she is fit for decent society."[82] Without reservation, Deberg is unsympathetic to such rhetoric, arguing that a balanced scholarly view would "do grave injustice to the historical materials themselves," since "[t]he fundamentalists were not objective or balanced when it came to gender."[83] With that, she signals a derogating

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Evangelical Women and the Power of Submission (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); and Brenda E. Brasher, *Godly Women: Fundamentalism and Female Power* (New Brunswick: Rutgers UP, 1998).

78. Deberg, *Ungodly Women*, 6.

79. Deberg, *Ungodly Women*, 7.

80. Deberg, *Ungodly Women*, 2.

81. Huff, *What Are They Saying About Fundamentalisms?* 80-81.

82. Deberg, *Ungodly Women*, 1.

83. Deberg, *Ungodly Women*, vii.

stance toward early fundamentalists, which would tinge her excursion into an unexplored aspect of the movement.

Global Fundamentalism

Written in the 1990s, *Ungodly Women* was one among many contemporary ventures into fundamentalism. With the rise of reactionary religious movements throughout the world, scholars became increasingly interested in comparing (Christian) fundamentalism to global religions. Propelled by the Iranian Revolution, the comparisons began with Islam, although such had been made much earlier. In fact, the first comparisons began in the 1920s, and one of the first mentions of "Muslim fundamentalists" was made by William Jourdan Rapp in 1925; he wrote an article titled, "Islam Fundamentalists Fight Modernist Trend," which draws an analogy between the fundamentalist-modernist conflict in the United States and Muslim encounters with modernity. He is perhaps the first author to make a direct connection between fundamentalism and Islam, yet he was not the only author of the 1920s to do so. One year later, Edwin W. Hullinger made a similar point, tying Muslim fundamentalists to conservativism and extreme traditionalism.[84] The conclusions drawn by Rapp and Hullinger mirror later scholarship surrounding global fundamentalism.

In his text *Antifundamentalism in Modern America*, David Harrington Watt invites readers to imagine a line-graph representing textual mentions of Muslim fundamentalism from the 1920s to the present. The line would be barely visible from 1920-50, after which the line would slowly inch upwards through the 1950s and 1960s before shooting straight up after the 1970s.[85] It was not, therefore, until the 1980s that scholars began exploring global fundamentalism in depth. For example, Marsden's *Fundamentalism and American Culture* (1980) acknowledges the global phenomenon, stating that fundamentalist tendencies are not strictly American, or even Christian.[86] Full-fledged explanations of global fundamentalism followed years later;

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84. Edwin W. Hullinger, "Islam's Ties of Union are Loosening," *The New York Times*, July 18, 1926, accessed November 26, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/1926/07/18/archives/islams-ties-of-union-are-loosening-danger-of-a-holy-war-wanes-as.html.

85. Watt, *Antifundamentalism*, 85. Note: these results can be reproduced through Google Book's Ngram Viewer™ by searching for "Islamic Fundamentalism" or "Muslim fundamentalism."

86. Marsden, *Fundamentalism and American Culture*, 227-228.

one of the more successful is found in Bruce B. Lawrence's *Defenders of God: The Fundamentalist Revolt Against the Modern Age.*[87]

Defenders of God (1989) is largely a response to abuses of the term "fundamentalism" and to those denying its global application. In many ways, serious fundamentalism scholarship sought to course-correct misuses of the concept, which were widespread after the Iranian Revolution. Unbound from its evangelical origins, the term became a powerful, rhetorical device – a Devil's word, applicable to all religious dissidents. For journalist Robin Wright, all that is needed to dismiss militant Islamic movements is to deem them fundamentalists.[88] To counter such abuses, Lawrence examines fundamentalism with remarkable sympathy, considering it not as a "political gambit, to seize public power," nor as an "economic ploy, to take resources from the privileged," nor as "a social strategy, to gain visibility and prestige."[89] For Lawrence, fundamentalism is shaped by "religiously motivated individuals, drawn together into ideologically structured groups, for the purpose of promoting a vision of divine restoration."[90] Fundamentalists are, above all, against modernism. Yet, they *are* moderns, recognizing the changed and changing state of the world – a world where, as Marshall Berman states, "all that is solid melts into air."[91] Lawrence argues that, because modernism is global, so is fundamentalism. As he sees it, one of the uniting factors for fundamentalists is their scripture, since such encompasses more than religious texts; scripture is also "an appeal to one community as authoritative interpreters of the pure, the sole, the 'inerrant' sense of scripture." In this manner, Lawrence expands the use of inerrancy to more than sacred texts as such.[92]

He also perceives fundamentalists as a marginalized group, whose marginalization occurs at the hands of the media and academia. For the media, "[f]undamentalists are marketable symbols … mined for the

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87. Bruce B. Lawrence, *Defenders of God: The Fundamentalist Revolt Against the Modern Age* (New York: Harper & Row, 1989).

88. Robin Wright, *Sacred Rage: The Wrath of Militant Islam* (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1986), 19.

89. Lawrence, *Defenders of God*, 1.

90. Lawrence, *Defenders of God*, 1.

91. Lawrence, *Defenders of God*, 1. See Marshall Berman, *All That is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity* (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1982), 345.

92. Lawrence, *Defenders of God*, 5-6.

combination of fear, awe, and ridicule that they evoke in the minds of modern readers."[93] According to Lawrence, they do not understand fundamentalism's complexity, seeing fundamentalists as merely prey on whom a target is painted. For academia, Lawrence says that fundamentalism is "anathema" due to its opposition to modernity. In fact, up until the Iranian Revolution, fundamentalism was understudied and treated as non-threatening.[94] Academia's apparent aversion to fundamentalism and religion in general is, Lawrence suggests, due to a prevalent mindset in the humanities that religion is dying, to be replaced by science. Ironically, however, science is the field most populated by religious persons – at least it was when *Defenders of God* was published – according to Robert Bellah.[95] As Lawrence sees it, academics would rather see fundamentalism disappear, yet it remains and is worth our attention.[96]

Two years after Lawrence's publication, Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby produced a massive study entitled the *Fundamentalism Project* (1991-1995), which is perhaps the most enduring examination of global fundamentalism, involving hundreds of scholars and spanning five volumes, a documentary, a radio program, and a companion text, each exploring fundamentalist movements from around the world. The first volume concludes with Marty and Appleby declaring the existence of "family resemblances,"[97] and arguing that fundamentalism is a militant form of traditionalism: the result of traditionalists reacting against real and perceived threats, particularly modernism and its tenets.

In the companion text, Marty and Appleby offer the following definition of fundamentalism:

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93. Lawrence, *Defenders of God*, 3.
94. Lawrence, *Defenders of God*, 7.
95. Lawrence, *Defenders of God*, 7. See Robert Bellah, *Religion and America: Spirituality in a Secular Age*, eds. Mary Douglas and Steven M. Tipton (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983), ix; additionally, see Rodney Stark, "Secularization, R.I.P.," *Sociology of Religion* 60 (1999): 264-266.
96. Lawrence, *Defenders of God*, 8. Also, strict forms of religion are typically those that see the most growth, so fundamentalism will not be disappearing anytime soon; see Laurence R. Iannaccone, "Why Strict Churches Are Growing," *American Journal of Sociology* 99, no. 5 (March 1994): 1180-1211.
97. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, "The Fundamentalism Project: A User's Guide," in *Fundamentalisms Observed*, eds. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), ix.

> … a distinctive tendency—a habit of mind and a pattern of behavior—found within modern religious communities and embodied in certain representative individuals and movements. Fundamentalism is, in other words, a religious way of being that manifests itself as a strategy by which beleaguered believers attempt to preserve their distinctive identity as a people or group.[98]

Though they argue there are shared patterns among fundamentalist groups, Marty and Appleby maintain that fundamentalisms contain "substantive differences."[99] For this reason, they employ Ludwig Wittgenstein's concept of family resemblances, wherein the example of shared characteristics between different games is used. For Wittgenstein, though there are many different *types* of games – board games, Olympic games, card games, etc. – they are all members of the same genus, "game."[100] Likewise, fundamentalisms have certain commonalities, though each form is distinct. Evangelical fundamentalists accept biblical inerrancy, whereas Catholic fundamentalists believe in papal infallibility, and Islamic fundamentalists adhere to a particular interpretation of an inerrant Qur'an. This utilization of Wittgenstein's family resemblances is perhaps the *Fundamentalism Project*'s lasting contribution to the field, establishing an effective conceptual framework in which global fundamentalism can be understood.[101]

Unfortunately, the *Fundamentalism Project* encouraged scholars to expand the horizons of global fundamentalism. Questionable tactics were employed, as fundamentalism's categorical reach was broadened – not only in relation to global religions but also with respect to its historical origins. Some scholars have located fundamentalism in movements much earlier than twentieth century evangelicalism. For instance, Robert Glenn Howard locates fundamentalism's origins with Martin Luther, since Howard sees

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98. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, *The Glory and the Power: The Fundamentalist Challenge to the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1992), 34.

99. Marty and Appleby, *The Glory and the Power*, 35.

100. Similar to games, the members of a family may share certain visual and character traits, such as eyes, hair colour, height, and personality, yet each person has unique characteristics within the same family. See Anthony Kenny, ed., *The Wittgenstein Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 48-49.

101. It is worth mentioning, however, that this use of "family resemblances" in speaking of fundamentalisms did not originate with Marty and Appleby. Examples of this correlation can be found in earlier works, such as Lawrence, *Defenders of God*, 100.

the reformer as the cause of pluralist and fundamentalist ideologies.[102] For Howard, fundamentalist ideology is "made possible by Martin Luther's location of divine authority in the individual experience of the biblical texts."[103] This claim incorporates many, if not all, Protestants under the label of fundamentalist, thereby broadening the term's religious scope and historical roots.

Global fundamentalism has also been a source of academic controversy.[104] Since its inception as a category, it has been questioned and scrutinized with scholars like Watt arguing that fundamentalism is best left in its original evangelical context.[105] While early scholarship fixated on evangelical fundamentalism, especially its cultural and doctrinal particularities, later scholarship has followed the journalistic trend of equating fundamentalism with global religions. In many cases, the development of global fundamentalism as a category has led to a more neutral, mature, nuanced, and sympathetic approach to fundamentalisms; however, the expansion of this category has also led to the distension of fundamentalism's pejorative connotations, which are no longer limited to evangelicals.

4. Lexical and Taxonomical Problems

Thus far, we have seen fundamentalism's development from rallying cry to derogatory label through its history, lexical development, and conceptual evolution in academia. In this section, I will examine several lexical and taxonomical issues associated with fundamentalism based on the work of David Watt. I will also examine the work of James Barr, who highlights the problematic nature of defining fundamentalists as strict literalists. To balance these critiques, I will return to Lawrence, who responds to several problems with fundamentalism's global application.

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102. Robert Glenn Howard, "The Double Bind of the Protestant Reformation: The Birth of Fundamentalism and the Necessity of Pluralism," *Journal of Church and State* 47, no. 1 (2005): 104; 107.

103. Howard, "The Double Bind," 106.

104. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, "Introduction," in *Fundamentalisms Comprehended*, eds. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 6.

105. Watt, *Antifundamentalism,* xvii.

Antifundamentalism and Orientalism

In *Antifundamentalism in Modern America* (2017), Watt examines the phenomenon of antifundamentalism, or "a set of conversations (literal and metaphorical) that began in the 1920s and that have continued to the present."[106] Amidst these conversations, proponents of antifundamentalism have been attempting to assess what fundamentalism is and what threats it poses to society. These conversations have led to the delegitimization of specific religious movements and persons, whose grievances and positions are often ignored.

Watt begins his text by examining the advantages and disadvantages of sustaining fundamentalism's global application. In his first chapter, he explores the arguments against applying fundamentalism beyond American evangelicalism. For Watt, global fundamentalism is a problematic category, because many purported fundamentalists do not describe themselves as such. This label blurs the lines among fundamentalist groups, compounding differences under the banner of anti-modernism.[107] Watt then explores two issues: the use of fundamentalism as a political tool, and the problem of orientalism.[108]

Fundamentalism's use as a political tool is tied to the notion of antifundamentalism. It is important to note, however, that Watt did not coin this term. It can be found in the *Fundamentalism Project* in an article written by Mark Juergensmeyer, who discusses fundamentalism as an object of fear for much of the Western world. He refers to this fear as "'fundaphobia'—the irrational fear of fundamentalism." He then indicates a preference for naming this attitude "antifundamentalism."[109] According to Jeurgensmeyer, being accused of fundamentalism is a serious issue, which has led to the delegitimization of religious communities by political entities. Using contemporary examples from Algeria, Israel, and India – wherein governments used this term to justify violating the human rights of supposed fundamentalists – Jeurgensmeyer demonstrates the dangers of a

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106. Watt, *Antifundamentalism*, xii-xiii.
107. Watt, *Antifundamentalism*, 18-20.
108. Watt, *Antifundamentalism*, 28-30.
109. Mark Jeurgensmeyer, "Antifundamentalism," in *Fundamentalism Comprehended*, eds. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 354.

pejoratively charged term like fundamentalism.[110]

Watt also highlights the work of Saba Mahmood, who argues that the *Fundamentalism Project* uses double standards in designating certain nations as fundamentalist hotspots. According to Mahmood, the *Fundamentalism Project* fails to adequately scrutinize nations like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia for encouraging fundamentalist movements, which, he argues, is the result of the United States' alliances with these nations. In contrast, the *Fundamentalism Project* focusses greatly on Iran, a prominent threat to American interests.[111]

One of the better arguments against the category of global fundamentalism is that it is orientalist. In fact, this argument is mentioned at the beginning of Marty and Appleby's *The Glory and the Power* as the "best case against the word…"[112] For Watt, the use of fundamentalism to describe non-Western religious movements treats the European Enlightenment with "too much deference."[113] This also situates the West as the protagonist, turning Eastern fundamentalist movements into global antagonists. Since the West already encountered fundamentalism in its regions prior to outbreaks in the East, the West is placed on the pedestal of solving the problem of global fundamentalism, which – as implied by this narrative – is now found predominately in the Orient.[114] This approach has the effect of relegating fundamentalist movements to the bottom of an advancing society. Fundamentalists are backwards, while proponents of the secular West are forward-thinking.

Inerrancy & Ethnography

As we saw earlier, fundamentalists are often defined as holding literal interpretations of sacred texts. However, according to James Barr, whose analysis is centered on fundamentalism as an evangelical phenomenon, fundamentalists are not true literalists, since literalism is not the root of their hermeneutics. Their true root is biblical inerrancy. Fundamentalists slip in and out of literalism based on their need to maintain the aura of

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110. Jeurgensmeyer, "Antifundamentalism," 355-365.
111. Watt, *Antifundamentalism*, 27-28.
112. Marty and Appleby, *The Glory and the Power*, 4.
113. Watt, *Antifundamentalism*, 29.
114. Watt, *Antifundamentalism*, 29.

textual perfection. For Barr, then, it is inerrancy and not literalism that indicates fundamentalism.[115] Yet, while many evangelicals adhere to biblical inerrancy in some form – whether knowingly or not – it is difficult to label all inerrantists as fundamentalists. In fact, if we label much of evangelicalism as fundamentalist due to the diffusion of inerrancy, we risk decreasing the term's value and precision.

The same is true of other religions, such as Islam. For Muslims, scriptural perfection is a virtually universal belief,[116] and most Muslims perceive the Qur'an as the literal word of God. Though interpretations differ, the general hermeneutic is, thus, centered on inerrancy. Would it then be fair to say that all Muslims are fundamentalists? Muslims are, also, offended by the notion that fundamentalists are the *strict* literalists.[117] Does this make non-fundamentalist Muslims not true Muslims? Even Muslims labeled fundamentalists frequently do not consider themselves such. The only religious movements with adherents labeling themselves fundamentalists are found within Protestant Christianity and Mormonism – yet even these individuals are a minority.[118]

Ethnographic studies in both fundamentalism and evangelicalism have provided insights about the distension of fundamentalist beliefs in broader evangelicalism. Many evangelicals unknowingly hold to the five fundamentals, especially inerrancy, as well as premillennial dispensationalism; yet, most would resist the label fundamentalist.[119] This creates a tension in scholarship over whether such individuals can be labeled such, based on their beliefs, or if the term applies only to those who adopt it. If we apply the term's original sense, based on its original context, many who would not call themselves fundamentalist would be labeled such, based on what they believe. However, what they know about this term are its negative connotations, making such a designation unhelpful towards dialogue.

As we have seen, many reference works and scholars define fundamentalists as strict literalists, though fundamentalist hermeneutics

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115. James Barr, *Fundamentalism* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1977), 40.
116. Malise Ruthven, *Fundamentalism* (New York: Oxford UP, 2004), 5; 83.
117. Huff, *What Are They Saying About Fundamentalisms?* 129.
118. Watt, *Antifundamentalism*, 18.
119. See Randall Balmer, *Mine Eyes Have Seen the Glory* (New York: Oxford UP, 1989), xvii; also see Amy Johnson Frykholm, *Rapture Culture* (New York: Oxford UP, 2004), 15.

are anything but strictly literal. Even if we define fundamentalists as persons adhering to an inerrant form of their tradition or religious text, this definition also poses several problems, since inerrancy is not only the norm in Islam but also in many forms of evangelicalism. Moreover, only select forms of American Protestantism and Mormonism refer to themselves as fundamentalists, making fundamentalism, for the most part, a term labeled on the *other*, rather than a term upheld by those who are so labeled.

Rebuttal: Nominalism and Originism

Lawrence objects to nominalism (i.e., the notion that religious movements can only be named fundamentalists if they call themselves such) and originism (i.e., the notion that fundamentalism cannot be extended beyond its origins in evangelicalism). Against nominalism, Lawrence argues from analogy, revealing the *reductio ad absurdum* of the nominalist position. If we are to restrict the labeling of groups to titles used by the groups themselves, then "the only humanists are those who claim to be humanists."[120] Nominalist arguments should also lead to the rejection of secularization and nationalism, since it is mostly academics who use these terms. For Lawrence, this form of argumentation is "tantamount to empirical literalism."[121] As he sees it, labeling is necessary for comparing one group to another.[122]

Lawrence then argues that originism leads to the rejection of Christianity and Marxism, except in their places of origin.[123] Christianity, by originist logic, should not exist outside of first century Palestine. Moreover, the very notion of *religion* should not be applied to many movements, since the category developed much later than the rise of, for instance, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Christianity; yet few will deny that these movements are religions. For Lawrence, "[p]laces are incidentally significant, not historically decisive in the development of socio-religious movements."[124]

Like Marty and Appleby, Lawrence sees fundamentalists as sharing

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120. Lawrence, *Defenders of God*, 93.
121. Lawrence, *Defenders of God*, 94.
122. Lawrence, *Defenders of God*, 95.
123. Lawrence, *Defenders of God*, 92.
124. Lawrence, *Defenders of God*, 93.

certain traits, forming a category applicable across religious divides. For him, fundamentalists are a minority confronting a supposed majority; they are oppositional; they appeal to a "direct, unmediated" scriptural authority; they "generate their own technical vocabulary"; and their ideology is a recent phenomenon, despite their historical antecedents.[125] Though most of these categories can, in my view, be questioned, that there are commonalities between certain fundamentalisms seems undeniable. As Marty and Appleby say: "Fundamentalists… fight back. That is their mark."[126] They fight back against modernization, secularization and all opponents of their traditional ways of life.

Despite his insistence on global fundamentalism, Lawrence maintains that scholars and journalists should be wary of fundamentalism's pejorative connotations, which is precisely my focus. I am not attempting to argue against the category's global applicability; I am drawing attention to its abuses and potential for harm. If religion has its place, then so do fundamentalisms, which are not disappearing anytime soon. As a result, we must learn to live with them, instead of perpetuating their griefs and sustaining their perceived otherness.

Conclusion

Fundamentalism is a simple word that has spawned a complex category. On the surface, this term represents a return to the source, a return to the foundations. However, from its history, and its lexical and taxonomical transformation, the term has morphed into a pejorative leveled at pious people of all faiths. It has evolved from a rallying cry for twentieth century evangelicals to a term spanning across global religions. Global fundamentalism as a concept highlights a series of traits common to faiths from around the world; while there are problems with this concept, it is not the concern of this paper. My concern is with the distension of fundamentalism's pejorative connotations.

Certainly, critiques are not without warrant as there are legitimate concerns with fundamentalisms, particularly with groups that advocate theocratic authoritarianism. This calls for thoughtful critique and

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125. Lawrence, *Defenders of God*, 100-101.
126. Marty and Appleby, *The Glory and the Power*, 17.

engagement; but such critiques will doubtfully be successful if delivered with prejudice and infused with pejoratives. Still, words have a life of their own. Even if scholars were to limit their use of pejoratives, the words would continue in popular culture. David Harrington Watt best captures the issue when he says, "The problem is with the assumptions, hopes, and habits of mind upon which [the words] rest."[127] The problem then is with attitudes toward otherness; attitudes toward those who seemingly have no place at the pluralist's table. Fundamentalists are reluctant to join the table, yet they should be invited continuously. They deserve the courtesy of inclusion, and this requires that we check our own assumptions and prejudices. For the time being, fundamentalisms are here to stay, so we should make room for discussion instead of demonization, which begins with choosing our words carefully.

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127. Watt, *Antifundamentalism*, 173.

Identity in the Imagination of the Exiled Community: A Response to Deportation and Decolonization

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The book of Ezra-Nehemiah has been the subject of much debate over the course of the last 30 years of scholarship. The primary debate amongst scholars, such as T. C. Eskenazi,[1] J. Blenkinsopp,[2] and H. G. M. Williamson,[3] is whether the characters and the content are historically accurate. The relationship between Ezra and Nehemiah is equally problematic with the primary concern being how to accommodate both of these individuals in a late Persian period timeline. Other scholars have emphasized the relationship between the post-exilic, returning diasporic community and the Persian administration, and the role the Persian imperial authorization played in the reconstruction of the Temple and the formation of the Torah.[4]

Eskenazi argues that Ezra and Nehemiah are fictional characters placed into a historical context, characters created by the priestly imagination to distinguish proper religious conduct.[5] In contrast, Blenkinsopp states that Ezra and Nehemiah can be placed within the late fifth century BCE and can be understood as natives of the Babylonian Diaspora.[6] This article will argue that the entire Ezra-Nehemiah composition is a fictional creation by elite members of the diasporic community living in exile, and it serves

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1. T. C. Eskenazi and K. H. Richards, *Second Temple Studies. 2: Temple and Community in the Persian Period*, JSOT Supplement Series 175 (Sheffield, UK: JSOT Press, 1994).

2. J. Blenkinsopp, *Judaism, the First Phase: The Place of Ezra and Nehemiah in the Origins of Judaism* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009).

3. H. G. M. Williamson, *Ezra, Nehemiah* (Waco, TX: Word Books, 1985).

4. K. G. Hoglund, *Achaemenid Imperial Administration in Syria-Palestine and the Missions of Ezra and Nehemiah*, Dissertation Series / Society of Biblical Literature, no. 125 (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1992); J. L. Berquist, *Judaism in Persia's Shadow: A Social and Historical Approach* (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1995).

5. T. C. Eskenazi and E. P. Judd, "Marriage to a Stranger in Ezra 9-10," in *Second Temple Studies. 2: Temple and Community in the Persian Period*, eds. T. C. Eskenazi and K. H. Richards, JSOT Supplement Series 175 (Sheffield, UK: JSOT Press, 1994), 266-268.

6. Blenkinsopp, *Judaism, the First Phase*, 34-36.

three functions. Firstly, to construct the Judean identity as a response to the colonial oppression incurred by the diasporic population in exile. Secondly, to emphasize the Temple and the city of Jerusalem as central to the restoration of Judah and the Judean community. And thirdly, to provide a Persian historical setting – indicative of a later redactional layer – which presents the Persian Empire as supporting the endeavors of the exilic Babylonian returnees who, thus, receive authority and legitimacy through Persian imperial authorization.

This article will argue that the entire Ezra-Nehemiah composition should be classified as a socio-literary[7] construct intended to generate a specific ethnic and religious identity. Thus, the first step will be to analyze the historical accuracy of the information provided by the text. The article will take a look at material evidence from the late fifth to early fourth century BCE Persian period to establish the historical reliability of the Persian elements in the Ezra-Nehemiah composition. Once the fictitious nature of the composition is established, the article will argue that, because the Temple and the city wall of Jerusalem in the text are no longer concrete structures, a social memory of these entities is drawn upon to reinstate and rebuild them.[8] Moreover, the manner in which the Ezra-Nehemiah composition shapes and formulates the cultural memory of the restoration of the Temple and the reconstruction of the city wall leaves the readers with the impression that the remnant community, that is, those Judeans left behind during the Babylonian Exile, were so desolate and poor that they were unable to restore the Temple and city back to their former "monarchic" glory. This impression, though, does not concord with the evidence presented by recent archaeological excavations,[9] which demonstrates that Judah continued to flourish well after

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7. This is to be understood as a fusion between literature (fictional, non-historical forms of writings) and social/collective memory; it is the history and identity constructed by remembering the past in response to the contemporary setting of the author. (See the theory of collective memory discussed by M. Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, ed. L. A. Coser [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992].)

8. K. Berge, "Palaces as Sites of Memory and Their Impact on the Construction of an Elite 'Hybrid' (Local-Global) Cultural Identity in Persian-Period Literature," in *Memory and the City in Ancient Israel*, eds. D. Vikander Edelman and E. Ben Zvi (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2014), 100-101.

9. O. Lipschits, "Achaemenid Imperial Policy, Settlement Processes in Palestine, and the Status of Jerusalem in the Middle of the Fifth Century BCE," in *Judah and the Judeans in the Persian*

the Babylonian Exile of 586 BCE. Hence, there is a contradiction, or at the very least a tension, between the narrative and the archaeological evidence.

Furthermore, the article will argue that the Babylonian diasporic community used the social memory of the Temple and the city to serve a dual purpose. The first was for it to serve as a resistance narrative, a strategy for living under colonial rule,[10] and later, during the Persian period, to legitimize the returning Babylonian exiles' minority position vis-à-vis the majority position of the remnant Judean community. K. Berge explains that cultural remembering also includes purposefully forgetting, and that the elite Judean community living in exile created a "hybrid" identity during the Persian period.[11] R. Young explains that this "hybrid" identity is customary amongst refugees and those who view themselves as landless, because one must adapt to a new culture while trying to preserve one's own.[12] This article will argue that this "hybrid" identity is evident in the composition of Ezra-Nehemiah, as the author presents the Judean elite in exile as enthusiastic supporters of Persian endeavors.[13] And this collusion with Persian colonial ideology, in turn, also allows the elite Judean exiles to seek out the support of the Persian imperial authorization and gain legal recognition of Mosaic Law (Ezra 7; Nehemiah 2).[14]

Ezra-Nehemiah Composition

The Ezra-Nehemiah composition (henceforth EN composition) leads the reader to believe that the Babylonian exiles returning to Jerusalem were returning to an empty land, a land devoid of ritual practice and Torah law. Thus, the Babylonian returnees are viewed as the saviors of the remnant of the land, the poor agrarian community left behind to survive, and are depicted as the legitimate authoritative community that has been designated

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Period, eds. O. Lipschits and M. Oeming (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2006), 45-6.

10. J. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (New Haven: Yale UP, 2008).

11. K. Berge, "Palaces as Sites of Memory," 102-105.

12. R. Young, *Postcolonialism: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2003), 50.

13. Berquist, *Judaism in Persia's Shadow*, 3-19.

14. G. N. Knoppers and B. M. Levenson, "How, When, Where and Why Did the Pentateuch Become the Torah?" in *The Pentateuch as Torah: New Models for Understanding its Promulgation and Acceptance*, eds. G. N. Knoppers and B. M. Levenson (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2007), 1-5.

by the salvific Persian imperial rulers to restore order and law as defined by the covenant between the people of Israel and Yahweh. From the onset, there is an observable tension between the remnant of the land, who are viewed as foreign and incompatible with the Judean identity, and the "Persian-Babylonian" returning exiles, who developed and introduced this "new" Judean identity. To gain a better understanding of the dichotomy created by the narrative, between the remnant and the returnees, we will first examine the possible literary function and purpose of the EN composition.

According to J. Blenkinsopp, the EN composition is a "Judean narrative which seems to be dominated by the narrow concerns of a clerical order which had little interest in *litterrae humaniores* (more human or cultured) and the creative activity of the mind."[15] Blenkinsopp argues that the EN composition closely follows the priestly perspective, which presents the religious sanctuary as the focal point of the narrative.[16] This, in turn, establishes the Temple as a central component of the covenantal agreement between Israel and Yahweh, and, thus, the setting up of the Temple in the EN composition is done in accordance with the specifications received by Moses and maintained in the Sinai tradition.[17] Moreover, Blenkinsopp explains that the absence of political autonomy during the period of exile is viewed from the priestly perspective as a sabbath, a time of rest from worship; thus, the law codex brought back by Ezra, Nehemiah and the Babylonian exiles is viewed as the reformation necessary for the restoration of the Temple and cult.[18]

The authors of the EN composition were not only concerned with securing control of the Temple but also the city (Jerusalem) in which the sanctuary was located. The question that then arises is, what segment of the population would be most interested in staking a claim over both the Temple and the city, and why? According to Blenkinsopp's arguments, the priestly class would be those most interested. However, Blenkinsopp only approaches the EN composition with the intent of reading specific elements of the narrative (such as the restoration of the Temple) from a priestly standpoint; he does not take into account other possible authors

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15. Blenkinsopp, *Judaism, the First Phase*, 36.
16. Blenkinsopp, *Judaism, the First Phase*, 36.
17. Blenkinsopp, *Judaism, the First Phase*, 37.
18. Blenkinsopp, *Judaism, the First Phase*, 37.

when attempting to discern the concerns and function of the text. This, as a result, provides us with a one-sided perspective as to possible authorship and motivations for writing the EN composition.

On the other hand, L. L. Grabbe contends that the authors of the narratives were politically motivated, and that the purpose of the EN composition was not to recount chronological historical events nor even to give the readers an accurate retelling of the events. Rather, what we have here is a social reconstruction, whose primary purpose is to intertwine historical details with theological meaning.[19] In this context, Grabbe offers a very closed definition of what should be deemed as "historical." He argues that historians should be guided by principles and methodology and, on this basis, that the authors of the EN composition should not be understood as historians.[20] He moves on to explain that history has always been used in aid of propaganda, while also being distorted by it; and he argues that the primary function of the EN composition is to spread propaganda under the guise of history.[21] Grabbe moves on to explain that propaganda was a customary phenomenon in the ancient world; very often an edict or decree made on behalf of the head of state would then be altered to suit the needs of an author reusing it.[22] Grabbe argues that the likelihood Cyrus would have issued a decree specifically for the remote province of Judah is minimal.[23] Moreover, the Persian king's involvement in the details of the rebuilding of the Temple would have been unlikely and, according to some scholars, such as P. Georges, impossible. Georges indicates that Persian kings were inaccessible to all foreigners; they maintained distance from them even at Persian court where foreign notables were expected to pay tribute to

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19. L. L. Grabbe, *Ezra-Nehemiah* (London: Routledge, 1998), 125.

20. Grabbe, *Ezra-Nehemiah*, 3-6.

21. Grabbe, *Ezra-Nehemiah*, 5-6.

22. Grabbe, *Ezra-Nehemiah*, 130. Grabbe gives several examples of historians in the ancient world who falsified edicts and/or decrees on behalf of interested parties. He states that "one of the best examples of Jewish scribes taking a genuine decree and altering it to fit their own propaganda is found in a passage of Josephus relating to citizenship for Alexandrian Jews.... Josephus quotes a decree allegedly from the Roman emperor Claudius which states that the Jews have 'equal civic rights' with the Greeks (*Ant*. 19.5.2 §§280-85)" (Grabbe, *Ezra-Nehemiah*, 130).

23. Grabbe, *Ezra-Nehemiah*, 130-131.

the king.[24] Persian court had a specific protocol in place; foreign noble representatives were to seek an audience with a court member who would pass along any messages to the appropriate Persian noble whose role was to transfer the information to the emperor and his immediate entourage.[25] Even more preposterous is the claim made by the EN composition that the rebuilding of the Temple would be fully funded by the Persian treasury (Ezra 1:6-11; 6:8; 7:15-16, 21-22; Nehemiah 2:8). This has led Grabbe to argue further that the dubious historical documents presented by the composition are all Jewish inventions.[26]

Based upon Grabbe's strict definition of what constitutes history writing, it is clear that no other category than literary fiction can be applied to the EN composition; a literary fiction that can only be understood as ideologically/theologically motivated. Perhaps the difficulty, then, lies not in the manner in which the authors of the EN composition have chosen to recount history, but rather the manner in which modern day biblical scholars approach the question of history telling in the ancient context. Ultimately, history telling or reconstruction was irrelevant to ancient historiographers if it lacked theological/ideological purpose. What good would it be to recount historical details or events if they were not fused with an ideological goal? In addition, the reconstruction of historical events always occurs after the fact; thus, the memory of an event is what is reconstructed, and it would only be worth telling if it were infused with theological and/or ideological meaning. However, Grabbe does not identify the importance of reconstructing a theologically infused history, nor does he recognize that accuracy in this social construction was of little relevance to ancient historiographers. That said, the theological meaning was relevant due to and legitimated by the historical elements. Thus, the historical "reconstruction" of the events and the details offered should be understood as a necessary framework in which to present the audience/s with an authoritative and legitimate narrative of who fits and what is to be understood as the "true" Judean identity.

To further support the argument that the EN composition should be understood as a "fictional" reconstruction of history, A. Kuhrt notes that

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24. P. Georges, *Barbarian Asia and the Greek Experience: From the Archaic Period to the Age of Xenophon* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UP, 1994), 49-50.

25. Georges, *Barbarian Asia and the Greek Experience*, 49-50.

26. Grabbe, *Ezra-Nehemiah*, 130-131.

nowhere in the Cyrus Cylinder[27] are there any remarks concerning a general release of deportees or exiled communities, nor is the province of Judah ever mentioned.[28] The passage that has frequently been interpreted as decreeing the release of those who had been deported by the previous regime is found in lines 30-32 of the cylinder; however, these lines clearly state that it is the "gods" (here referring to idols) of specified places together with their people that are to return to their original dwelling place.[29] It is important to note that this cylinder played an important function historically and, in order to ascertain the purpose of such an edict, one would need to identify the literary genre of the text in question.

According to Kuhrt, the physical shape and literary genre of the Cyrus Cylinder is that of a typical Mesopotamian building text, a genre that was common amongst royal inscriptions and had already been in use for about two thousand years. She also points out that there is nothing particularly "Persian" about the inscription. In general, building texts often provide historical information concerning a reign and were commonly placed as foundation deposits underneath or in the walls of buildings the construction or restoration of which they were intended to commemorate. Furthermore, the ruler, in building texts, is always represented as acting particularly pious in the name of the god whose building is being restored, an element which is quite standard and thus should be expected.[30] Kuhrt notes that, in this instance, the Cyrus Cylinder was intended to commemorate Cyrus' restoration of Babylon, much like the building text of his predecessor Assurbanipal (the Assyrian king), and recounts his ascension and pious acts, hence, establishing his legitimacy as ruler of Babylon.[31] Thus, this establishes that the primary role of the edict was not to make a moral statement ensuring the human rights of its subjects,[32] but rather a claim to

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27. The Cyrus Cylinder is a clay cylinder which is inscribed in Akkadian cuneiform script. It is said to have been written in the name of the great Persian ruler, Cyrus the Great, who invaded and conquered Babylon in 539 BCE, thus bringing an end to the Neo-Babylonian Empire.

28. A. Kuhrt, "The Cyrus Cylinder and Achaemenid Imperial Policy," *JSOT* 25 (1983): 87.

29. Kuhrt, "The Cyrus Cylinder," 86.

30. Kuhrt, "The Cyrus Cylinder," 88.

31. Kuhrt, "The Cyrus Cylinder," 87.

32. Several scholars have made this claim; see, for example, P. R. Ackroyd, *Exile and Restoration: A Study on Hebrew Thought in the Sixth Century B.C.* (London: SCM, 1968), 140-41; J. P. Weinberg, *The Citizen-Temple Community*, JSOT Supplement 151 (Sheffield, UK: Sheffield

authority and legitimacy. Hence, it can be reasoned that the "reconstruction" or "reinterpretation" of the Cyrus edict by the EN composers equally served to legitimate the returning Babylonian community represented by Ezra and Nehemiah. Arguably, the "historical" elements found in the edict can be perceived as having been purposefully altered to meet the needs and objectives of the EN composers.

L. S. Fried makes note that other "historical" elements, such as the chronological ordering of both the Persian kings and the Aramaic letters in the EN composition, are central issues debated amongst scholars when trying to ascribe historical authority to the text.[33] S. Japhet suggests that the chronological reordering of the documents in the text occurred because the biblical authors wrote according to, what Japhet terms, "the documentary imperative." Japhet explains that "imperative" refers to the author's decision to use material out of its historical context to prove a point for another context for which the author had no sources.[34] Hence, ancient historiographers employed what was accessible to them in terms of documents, rendering the original historical context of a source secondary to the purpose and function of the narrative. That said, Fried questions the necessity of including the Aramaic letters which contain, amongst other things, narrative squabbles between various groups, lists of vessels and lists of returning residents, all of which are uncommon to the building-inscription genre.[35] As a result, Fried argues that the EN composition was not written in the Persian period but the Hellenistic period; many of the elements found in the text can be attributed to Hellenistic forms of history writing.[36] Amongst these elements, Fried indicates that a key feature of good history writing at the time included the insertion of "official" documents in a narrative.[37] These documents were generally reworked for the sake of rhetorical embellishment, or entirely fabricated. The inclusion of lists (both authentic and fabricated, dependent

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Academic Press, 1992), 40; and T. C. Young, "Cyrus," in *Anchor Bible Dictionary* (New York: Doubleday, 1992), 1231-32.

33. L. S. Fried, "Ezra's use of Documents in the context of Hellenistic Rules of Rhetoric," in *New Perspectives on Ezra-Nehemiah*, ed. I. Kalimi (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2012), 12.

34. S. Japhet, *From the Rivers of Babylon to the Highlands of Judah: Collected Studies on the Restoration Period* (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2006), 162.

35. Fried, "Ezra's use of Documents," 15.

36. Fried, "Ezra's use of Documents," 19.

37. Fried, "Ezra's use of Documents," 17.

upon availability) was another prominent and popular feature utilized by ancient Greek historiographers. This allowed the author to display his detailed knowledge of the subject under discussion and, thus, increase the reader's confidence in the historical reliability of the text.[38] However, Fried does not account for the EN composers' intent or motivation; rather, her arguments for a possible Hellenistic setting are founded solely upon a few stylistic points of comparison, and otherwise, she provides no plausible arguments or evidence that would clearly place the authors in the Hellenistic period.

We can conclude that there is no scholarly consensus with respect to which elements of the EN composition can be identified as "historical" nor whether parts of the composition can be categorized as an ancient form of historical writing. Despite this lack of consensus, I believe that it can be ascertained that the authors of the EN composition were invested in presenting their audience with a past with which they could identify, that is, a social reconstruction that was relevant to the contemporaneous setting of the reader and in which the facticity of the so-called historical elements was irrelevant. What can be established from the narrative is that the authors of the EN composition had a specific time frame in mind. At some point, they wished to situate their readers in the context of a post-exilic Judah and a Persian-ruled Babylon. Two distinct ideas, moreover, can be discerned from the narrative. Firstly, the Temple and the city wall are key infrastructures that need to be reconstructed in order for the Judeans returning and the remnant of the land to be recognized as a distinct ethnic and religious community. Secondly, the claim to the restoration of the Temple and city wall necessitates legitimacy and authority from an imperial power. These claims made by both Ezra and Nehemiah are supported by Persian imperial authority, which legitimates both the law codex and the Babylonian exiled community returning with the laws. It, thus, gives the returning exiled community the authority needed to claim both the central sanctuary and the city by making it the only legitimate collective bestowed with the necessary authority and support to restore the Temple and rebuild the city walls of Jerusalem. Moreover, this authoritative claim places into question the identity of the remnant Judeans who had never left, but clearly were not viewed as having a legitimate claim to the Temple nor to membership in the

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38. Fried, "Ezra's use of Documents," 17-18.

"true" Judean community.

In order to emphasize this latter point, the authors of the EN composition introduce the element of ethnic purity, which is supported by the requirements set forth by the laws established by Judean religion. The element of ethnic purity is introduced in the EN composition by way of the "foreign wives" (Ez. 9-10; Neh. 10:30, 13:23-31). On the surface, the text clearly presents the marrying of foreign wives as forbidden and in contradiction with the law. However, these wives are never spoken of in detail; the reader is not told who they are nor where they come from. Moreover, the response by the characters of the EN composition to these "foreign" wives is quite absolute: only one possible solution is presented, that of expulsion from their families and community, thus alerting the reader to the fact that conversion was not an option. How the wives were treated or removed is not known, nor are we told of the outcome of the children of these wives. Some scholars have argued that the foreign wives' element is indicative of the conflicts arising between the returning Diaspora community and the remnant of the land.[39] Thus, the remnants are presented as not abiding by the laws and as the source of a continuous, vicious circle of disobedience, further contributing to the list of reasons why they should not be viewed as legitimate members of the Judean community. However, this argument is somewhat lacking as it treats the event of the expulsion of the foreign wives as factual, as a historical event that occurred. But this is dubious as no details concerning the process of expulsion of the women are offered by the text.

Furthermore, the EN composition also contends that the Babylonian deportation of 586 BCE was a "massive" exile of the Judean population, and that those returning from exile were returning to an "empty land," aspects of the text which are also debated amongst biblical scholars as being fictitious. Nevertheless, these elements are critical to understanding the purpose and function of the EN composition and will require further inquiry. If the claims of the narrative are fictional, then why lead the reader to believe that the entire Judean population had been deported, that the exilic Judean community then returned all together, and that the

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39. D. Janzen, "Scholars, Witches, Ideologues and What the Text Said: Ezra 9-10 and Its Interpretation," in *Approaching Yehud: New Approaches to the Study of the Persian Period*, ed. J. L. Berquist, Semeia Studies, no. 50 (Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 2007), 49-51.

remnants had intermarried with women of foreign nations? What purpose does this fictional reconstruction of Judean history offer the authors of the EN composition? In order to answer these questions, let us move on to an analysis of the "myths" in question.

Myths of "Empty Land" and "Mass Return"

The EN composition begins by reconstructing history with the intent of presenting the contemporary exilic community in Babylon as representative of the "whole" Judean community living in Judah at the time of the deportation in 586 BCE. That is, the audience is led to believe the "myth" that the returnees were coming back to resettle a land which had remained uninhabited since the Babylonian exile.[40] Grabbe makes note that there is limited inter-biblical support for the "empty land" claim in two passages in the narratives of 2 Kings, which state that only the "poorest of the land" remained in Jerusalem (2 Kgs. 24:14; 25:12).[41] However 2 Kings 25 and Jeremiah 40-43 also mention that there were plenty of nobles, soldiers, priests and even the odd prophet living in Jerusalem; in fact, the picture painted by these narratives is not of a devastated wasteland but rather of a large remnant community that was quite active in the goings-on of everyday life. The community was large enough that it even necessitated that a Babylonian governor (Gedaliah) be assigned to the province of Judah. H. Barstad argues that, after reviewing the biblical sources (primarily 2 Kgs. 24-25; Jer. 52:2; 2 Chron. 36) alongside the archeological evidence from both neighboring Assyria and Babylon (namely, monographs and documents concerning deportation policies), the biblical narratives present a somewhat accurate historical picture of who remained in the land after the exilic period.[42] He concludes that the destruction of the Temple and royal palace, as well as the subsequent deportation of a few elite members of the community, had little to no effect on daily activities in the province of Judah.[43] The social order remained essentially intact as much of the

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40. Grabbe, *Ezra-Nehemiah*, 136.
41. Grabbe, *Ezra-Nehemiah*, 136.
42. H. Barstad, "After the 'Myth of the Empty Land': Major Challenges in the Study of Neo-Babylonian Judah," in *Judah and the Judeans in the Neo-Babylonian Period*, eds. O. Lipschits and J. Blenkinsopp (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2003), 4-7.
43. Barstad, "After the 'Myth of the Empty Land,'" 6.

population remained and continued with their lives much as they had before the Babylonian invasion. B. Becking notes from the archeological evidence that population growth was stable between the Neo-Babylonian and Persian I periods, which indicates that Judah was not empty and the remnant of the land were descendants of the people who were there before the exile.[44]

The myth of "the empty land" is not the only invented component of the EN historical reconstruction; alongside it, the audience is told "the mass return" myth. In the text, the myth of mass return is presented as though the whole exilic community of Babylon returned as one to Jerusalem; a collective event that involved the entirety of Israel.[45] The book of Ezra states that, soon after the edict of Cyrus, the exiled Judeans were granted permission to return to Judah (Ez. 5:1). According to Becking, the text gives the impression (from the list of returnees in Ez. 2; Neh. 7) that not only was the return a one-time, collective event that occurred early in the Persian period, it was also a massive one.[46] But the historicity of the mass movement from Babylon to Jerusalem was challenged early on by scholars, such as C. Torrey, who argued that both the characters and the event are part of the tradition and should be understood as literary fiction.[47] Furthermore, Becking notes that, if the return was a historical fact, one would expect some evidence in Mesopotamian or Persian documents.[48] As noted earlier, though, the Cyrus edict, which has customarily been interpreted as a universal Persian policy of decolonization,[49] needs to be understood as purely stereotypical imperial propaganda that has nothing to do with the Judeans but everything to do with maintaining Persian military and political dominion.[50] That the mass return is myth is further supported by a large number of archaeological digs that have been ongoing in modern day Israel. The expectation is that, if a large mass of the exilic population returned together at one time to Jerusalem, there would have been a dramatic demographic decrease in the Judean population living in Babylon, as well

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44. B. Becking, "We All Returned as One!" in *Judah and the Judeans in the Persian Period*, eds. O. Lipschits and M. Oeming (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2006), 8.
45. Becking, "We All Returned as One!" 8.
46. Becking, "We All Returned as One!" 4.
47. Becking, "We All Returned as One!" 4.
48. Becking, "We All Returned as One!" 4.
49. Young, "Cyrus," 1231-32.
50. Kuhrt, "The Cyrus Cylinder," 93.

as an increase in the population of Jerusalem and the establishment of new settlements during the Persian period.

Becking indicates that the demographic patterns in Judah during the late Iron III (Neo-Babylonian) and early Persian I periods demonstrate a continuity in population size, reiterating the argument made earlier that Judah was not empty and those who were there were descendants of the pre-exilic population.[51] Lipschits argues that it is most probable that the exilic returnees did not come back all at once, but rather that there were several waves of migrations during the Persian I period.[52] Becking contends that, because the archaeological data does not support the mass return narrative depicted in the EN composition, this element of the text should be understood as historical myth, a social construct.[53] This further emphasizes my initial argument that the narrative should not be understood as factual or a historical retelling of actual events, but rather as a socio-literary reconstruction. What exactly do we mean by social construct, though? How is a social construct born and how is it developed?

The Construction of Social Memory
through the Postcolonial Lens

The study of Israelite religion through the lens of sociology allowed biblical scholars to identify certain key social structures as playing an important role and function in the development of Israel's religious beliefs and practices. Through the work of E. Durkheim, sociologists of religion were able to demonstrate that humans are social beings, and that every religion arose in a particular social context and was subject to its influence; in turn, religion exerted an influence upon the formation of social structures.[54] M. Halbwachs theorized that, since human beings tend to belong to groups,

51. Becking, "We All Returned as One!" 8.

52. O. Lipschits, "Demographic Changes in Judah between the Seventh and the Fifth Centuries B.C.E.," in *Judah and the Judeans in the Neo-Babylonian Period*, eds. O. Lipschits and J. Blenkinsopp (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2003), 365.

53. Becking, "We All Returned as One!" 12.

54. M. Sydney Cladis, "Introduction," in *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, by E. Durkheim, trans. C. Cosman and M. Sydney Cladis, Oxford World's Classics (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2001), vii-xxxv.

these in turn will affect our perceptions and our memory in different ways.[55] He contends that individual memory is always an aspect of group memory, because it is acquired through the medium of collective frameworks (i.e., families, clans, tribes).[56] Halbwachs also argues that the past is not preserved in memory, but is adjusted and distorted in the interests of making the past relevant to the contemporary setting.[57]

Halbwachs identifies collective memory as the active past that continues to impact our lives and forms our identities through our participation in commemorations, festival enactments and other rituals:[58] a process by which the socially constructed memory is constantly being altered and transformed to remain relevant in its contemporary setting, from one generation to the next. Social memory is a process that is implicated in the formation and perpetuation of identities; it is both constant and changing, and plays an important role in both constructing and supporting distinct national narratives.[59] However, in order for a constructed narrative to be perceived as "historical," or at least to have "believable" historical components, it needs to provide a historical framework in which to situate the reader and to provide a sense of historical credibility. Sites of commemoration or sites of communal assembly, such as the Temple and the city gates of Jerusalem, are visible and tangible markers of the past, and are ideal for anchoring constructed social narratives. Social memories, such as those documented in texts, give concrete examples of how social identities are actually constructed through a particular version of the past.[60] But why does a specific remembered past get constructed and reinterpreted in order to shape a collective identity?

Postcolonial theory has demonstrated that imperial policies generate particular circumstances that will lead to a portion of the people living in colonized nations to suffer some form of landlessness (e.g., deportation,

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55. Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, 135-6.
56. Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, 135-6.
57. Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, 184-90.
58. Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, 118-20.
59. J. K. Olick, "Products, Processes, and Practices: A Non-Reificatory Approach to Collective Memory," *Biblical Theology Bulletin: Journal of Bible and Culture* 36, no. 1 (February 2006): 5–14.
60. J. Fentress and C. Wickham, *Social Memory: New Perspectives on the Past*, ACLS Humanities E-Book (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), v-ix.

exile, forced displacement).[61] These "colonial" circumstances will, at some point, generate specific forms of narrative that will be used as a passive means to counter the empire that has imposed the state of landlessness;[62] a state that has broken the individual or group link to their land of origin by force. The loss of land generates a sense of instability and, by extension, a sense of loss of origin, past and identity.[63] In addition, the introduction of a new environment and culture also places strains upon the individual and group identity, as the exiled community struggles to adapt to their new settings. P. Firmat argues that exilic adaptation occurs when the awareness of displacement crushes the fantasy of rootedness, that is, rather than feeling nostalgic, the community now feels estranged and disconnected.[64] There is a fear of assimilation and, in the case of the ancient Israelites, of becoming like the nations that worship idols.

Forced deportation/exile by a colonial power to an unknown land is a painful experience of dis-ruption, dis-location and dis-remembering.[65] The break between the community, land, past and identity is an imperial strategy used by colonial powers to inflict trauma upon those they colonize. The exiled communities will often try to remedy the trauma through passive forms of resistance, which are achieved through narrative re-telling.[66] Narrative re-telling will focus on preserving the community's identity against the imposed identity of the imperial foreign nation. In this particular instance, in the EN composition, the focus is on preserving an ideal form of the Judean identity, one that is supported by the deity, Yahweh, as well as by His divine law given to the Judean community to safeguard its identity from assimilation into that of the foreign nation.

Furthermore, loss of land, blurred borders, and loss of divinely endowed monarchy led the Babylonian exiled community to confront these realities by constructing an imagined community. They constructed an identity that emphasized the Temple and the city that surrounds it, but

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61. Young, *Postcolonialism*, 11-13.
62. Young, *Postcolonialism*, 49-51.
63. Young, *Postcolonialism*, 49-51.
64. J-P. Ruiz, "An Exile's Baggage: Toward a Postcolonial Reading of Ezekiel," in *Approaching Yehud: New Approaches to the Study of the Persian Period*, ed. J. L. Berquist, Semeia Studies, no. 50 (Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 2007), 126-130.
65. Young, *Postcolonialism*, 49-51.
66. Young, *Postcolonialism*, 51.

without monarchical borders and human authority to reign over and protect them. Thus, the returning exiled community created and shaped a national identity through shared culture (i.e., language, traditions and practices) and social experience (i.e., a remembered and forgotten past).[67] According to B. Anderson, national identity is often the creation of those who have left the land and who, in exile, fund, construct and shape idealized memories of their past;[68] a process that involves both remembering and forgetting.[69] In this context, Berger notes that, in the EN composition, when reporting on the construction taking place in Jerusalem, the text only refers to the city wall and Temple, but never to the palace.[70] Furthermore, even the recollection of the Babylonian invasion and its destructive force upon Jerusalem seems to emphasize only the burning and destruction of the Temple,[71] despite the fact that the palace was also razed. It would, thus, appear that the exilic community was purposefully focussing on the Temple and the city that housed it as sites of memory, and choosing to "forget" the palace and monarchy.[72] This is significant, because it is difficult to forget a building and an institution when the palace ruins are visible to the Judean community living in Judah. However, it is not very difficult when the community who chooses to forget are living in exile at a distance from the ruins and the site of memory.

Moreover, the narrative places a particular emphasis on the creation of boundaries and the expulsion of "the other." In ancient Israel, gender played an important role in relations of power and domination, as well as in the creation of boundaries, which in turn structured how society functioned.[73] Thus, the world was divided between those who dominated – always males – and those who were dominated – predominantly females or males who

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67. J. L. Berquist, "Construction of Identity in Postcolonial Yehud," in *Judah and the Judeans in the Persian Period*, eds. O. Lipschits and M. Oeming (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2006), 53-66.

68. Young, *Postcolonialism*, 63.

69. Berge, "Palaces as Sites of Memory," 100-101.

70. Berge, "Palaces as Sites of Memory," 101.

71. Berge, "Palaces as Sites of Memory," 101.

72. Berge, "Palaces as Sites of Memory," 101-102.

73. A. Brenner, *The Intercourse of Knowledge: on Gendering Desire and 'Sexuality' in the Hebrew Bible*, Biblical Interpretation Series, vol. 26 (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 4.

were spoken of in feminine terms.[74] The subordination or domination of the "other" could be spoken of as a feminine personification, or as female. This, in turn, means that there were also real women in the land who symbolically stood for the "foreign" nation, that is, the ethnic other.[75] Therefore, when narratives depict heinous crimes being committed against foreign women, such represents the erasure and replacement of the ethnic other.[76] S. de Beauvoir, in her work on the Old and New Testaments, introduces the idea of "the other and the verb to other" to explain the process of constructing one's own identity in opposition to "the Other" as both mutual and unequal identities.[77] The element of "other" is brought to the forefront of the EN composition and presented as inferior, weak, in opposition to and a threat to the ethnically pure identity construed and supported by the laws of the diasporic community.

Thus, it is possible to suggest that the "foreign wives" in the EN composition, much like the elements of "mass return" and "empty land," could be understood as a literary device used to construct a social memory in which the Judean ethnic and religious identity is being placed at the forefront; a central concern that the authors of the composition wish to address. There is an emphasis placed on "the otherness" of the foreign wives, which is presented as forbidden by the law and, thus, viewed as an impure element, necessitating the community to take immediate action in order to safeguard the ethnic and religious identity of the community.

If a primary concern of the exilic community was to condemn assimilation, then the story of the foreign wives is an understandable resistance narrative. The resistance to intermarriage clearly presents the reader with the importance of maintaining a "pure" Judean identity that is dependent upon a carefully constructed genealogical framework which, in turn, is supported by Mosaic Law and the covenant agreement between God and Israel. Once the narrative is understood as a form of resistance to "the other," and the other is understood as the primary threat to the ethnic

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74. Brenner, *The Intercourse of Knowledge*, 4.
75. V. Lovelace, "Feminist and Intersectional Perspectives in the Deuteronomistic History," in *The Hebrew Bible: Feminist and Intersectional Perspectives*, ed. G. A. Yee (Baltimore, MD: Project Muse, 2018), 79-80.
76. Lovelace, "Feminist and Intersectional Perspectives," 79-80.
77. Lovelace, "Feminist and Intersectional Perspectives," 80.

and religious identity of the diasporic Judean community, then it becomes a great deal more plausible to understand this threat as having been a primary concern to Judeans living in exile, whose daily experience was living in the midst of "the other." Dispossessed and landless with no direct connection to their traditions, history or culture, the psychological mindset of those living in diasporic communities is self-preservation, that is, the preservation of their identity as unique and distinct from that of the other.

The narratives that speak of the empty land and mass return helped the authors of the EN composition create a fictional and ideal setting that supported the diasporic-returning community's re-entry into Judah. Thus, that community, which according to Ez. 2:64 "numbered 42, 360," reasonably outnumbered the remnants of the land, since the reader is told that the land was "empty." In addition to the "mass return," we are told in Ez. 1:11 that the exiled community returned to Jerusalem with 5, 400 gold and silver articles, further emphasizing the importance and contribution of that community, which returned not only to re-populate the city but brought back a large amount of wealth to restore it as well. These elements of the narrative do not pertain directly to the question of ethnic and religious identity, but are building upon another important theme, that of legitimacy. The EN composition, thus, is concerned with two issues: 1) the pure and distinct ethnic and religious identity of the Judean community living in Judah; and 2) providing the diasporic-returning community with the authority and legitimacy it needs to regain control of the Temple and the city.

The narrative components, which emphasize the ethnic and religious distinctiveness of the Judean identity, could only be born out of a context that necessitated a distinctive identity. Several biblical scholars, such as Baker, have argued that narratives that create and shape a community's identity as distinct – that is, to distinguish between "us" and "them" – are crafted as a form of defense mechanism against competing groups that impose a specific metanarrative.[78] Empires employ this tactic of metanarrative as a means to present their god, king and empire (in this particular case, the Babylonian Empire) as powerful, invincible forces which are, thus, superior.[79] As mentioned earlier, during the Babylonian exile of 586 BCE,

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78. C. Baker, "Social Identity Theory and Biblical Interpretation," *Biblical Theology Bulletin* 42, no. 3 (2012): 133.

79. L. G. Perdue and W. Carter, *Israel and Empire*, ed. C. A. Baker (London: T&T Clark,

the elite Judeans were deported to Babylon; this "point of contact" would have constituted an appropriate period for when the Judeans came into contact, not only with the Babylonian imperial metanarrative, but also with the legal and mythical discourse utilized by the Babylonians and the Assyrians before them. Hence, it is reasonable to argue that the notion of ethnic and religious distinction in the EN composition was motivated by the context generated by the deportation of the elite Judeans.

Postcolonial theory seeks to examine and assess the psychological and cultural difficulties prompted by being uprooted from a familiar life-setting and forced into a new alien context.[80] This theory stipulates that it is this context of "diaspora" (i.e., exile, dislocation or deportation) that allows interpretations of older traditions to be reformulated with the objective of resisting the forces of imperial hierarchy, cultural uniformity and political hegemony, whose aim is to erase the ethnic and religious identity of the people they conquer.[81] This is the landscape that the Babylonian exile of 586 BCE provided: the necessary context that would have motivated the development of a discourse that sought to create a distinct ethnic and religious identity, in order to distinguish "us" – the true Judeans – from "them" – the other/foreign nation.

The Persian Empire, on the other hand, is not viewed in the EN composition as perpetuating an imperial policy that needs to be resisted. Rather, the Persians are understood as a salvific force (cessation of exile) which would enable the diasporic Judean community to return to Judah. In fact, not only does the Cyrus edict, presented in Ezra 1, authorize the return of the diasporic community, but the Persian kings provide the leaders of the community with Persian authorization and legitimacy to restore the Temple and the city wall, as well. Persians recognized the importance of adopting some of the customs of other nations and, although there was no attempt to force Persian values and standards on those they conquered, there are some indications of Persian influence that led to "hybridity" in the literature and religious ideology of the conquered.[82]

2015), 72-74.

80. F. F. Segovia, "Postcolonial and Diasporic Criticism and Biblical Studies," *Studies in World Christianity* 5, no. 2 (1999): 187.

81. Perdue and Carter, *Israel and Empire*, 86.

82. Perdue and Carter, *Israel and Empire*, 113-4.

The Persian military was very present throughout the empire as they provided military protection to commerce and trade routes, which led to the establishment of Aramaic as the *lingua franca* of the empire.[83] For this reason, a substantial portion of the book of Ezra is written in "official" or "imperial" Aramaic (see Ez. 4:6-8:18; Neh. 7:12-26). These Aramaic components of the EN composition deal with the authority and legitimacy attributed to the leaders of the Babylonian diasporic community returning to Jerusalem to restore the Temple and the city wall. These sections also mention the names of several different Persian kings, which as noted earlier, have been the subject of much debate amongst scholars due to the lack of chronological ordering.[84] In effect, the authors of the EN composition were not interested in providing the reader with actual facts but, rather, wished to situate the reader within a particular time frame, specifically 539-400 BCE. Writing in the context of the Persian period allowed the authors to integrate specific elements that provided both the Judean leaders, Ezra and Nehemiah, and the Babylonian diasporic community with the necessary authority and legitimacy to return to Judah and restore both the Temple and the city wall.

Hence, I conclude that the EN composition is a socio-literary reconstruction of the past, and presents the reader with two different discourses developed and motivated by two different contexts. The first is the discourse of a distinct Judean ethnic and religious identity that was developed in Babylon after the exile of 586 BCE with the objective of countering the imperial metanarrative of the Babylonian Empire. The second is a discourse of authority and legitimacy, that of recognizing the leaders of the Babylonian diaspora and the returning exiles as authorized by the salvific Persian Empire, which made the return possible. As a consequence, the EN composition provides the reader with a form of "hybrid" narrative

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83. Perdue and Carter, *Israel and Empire*, 114.

84. Five Persian kings are mentioned, three of whom are identifiable historically, but none of whom lived in the same span of time. In Ezra 6:14, Cyrus, Darius and Artaxerxes are mentioned, and in Ezra 4, we also have king Ahasuerus and Artaxerxes (assuming that we are speaking of another Artaxerxes than the one mentioned in Ezra 6). The other problematic with these Persian names is that many Achaemenid rulers came to be associated with them, thus allowing us to speak, for example, of Artaxerxes IV and Darius II; hence, we are unable to conclusively identify which rulers the EN composers refer to. There is a deliberate lack of time association made with these rulers, because dates and notions of time were simply not important (Williamson, *Ezra, Nehemiah*, 5).

that combines the two discourses. The "hybridity" of identity is largely dependent upon imperial policies and how these policies are received by the subject communities. The Neo-Babylonian military and economic strategies were designed for quick expansion of their territory and, thus, included aggressive deportation policies. Whereas the Achaemenids, upon defeating the Babylonians, inherited a very large territory and, thus, were predominantly preoccupied with maintaining stability and the economic growth of the empire. The application of postcolonial theory to biblical narratives is a relatively recent development in biblical studies. These studies, however, have consistently approached the Neo-Babylonian period and the Persian period as continuous and, thus, have ignored critical distinctions in their approaches to imperial foreign policy.[85] Both the Neo-Babylonian and Persian empires were dominant colonizers that exerted authority and power over their subjects;[86] yet, their colonial ideologies were distinctive – one relied on deportation policies while the other implemented de-colonization policies. R.S. Sugirtharajah argues that, due to differences like these, diasporic communities respond to stigmatization and marginalization in distinctive ways, which are reflected in the content of the narratives they produce.[87]

Concluding Remarks

From the evidence provided by both archaeological and historiographical studies, it is clear that the Ezra-Nehemiah composition is not representative of any actual events or circumstances that may have occurred during the restoration of the Temple. Rather, the narrative should be understood as a response to the trauma of displacement and marginalization caused by the deportation and exile of Judeans in 586 BCE. In fact, the idealized identity construed by the diaspora community should be understood as a passive counter-response to the imposed "imperial" identity

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85. Ruiz, "An Exile's Baggage," 121.

86. R. Boer, "Thus I Cleansed Them from Everything Foreign: The Search for Subjectivity in Ezra-Nehemiah," in *Postcolonialism in the Hebrew Bible: The Next Step*, ed. R. Boer, Semeia Studies, no. 70 (Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 2013), 221-222.

87. R. S. Sugirtharajah, "Biblical Studies after the Empire: From a Colonial to a Postcolonial Mode of Interpretation," in *The Postcolonial Bible*, ed. R. S. Sugirtharajah (Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998), 13-22.

of the Babylonians. This, in turn, allowed for Judean law to function as a tool utilized by the post-exilic community during the Persian period to resist assimilation and maintain an exclusive, group-specific identity: an identity centered around constructed social memories of the Temple and the city of Jerusalem. Furthermore, this exclusive, group-specific Judean identity, which was later transferred to Israel, was construed as a form of resistance to ancient colonialism. The Persian period demonstrated the importance of "hybridity," that is, the significance of being able to adapt elements from other nations to strengthen one's own metanarrative. It is important to note that the Cyrus edict was not addressed to the Zoroastrian god, Ahura Mazda, but to the Babylonian god, Marduk. In fact, as noted earlier, the edict was written in the same genre as a traditional Mesopotamian building text and used to commemorate the victory of the Persian king over the failing Babylonian Empire, as well as to reinforce the authority and legitimacy of the Persian ruler. This, in turn, allowed the Judeans to strengthen their own metanarrative with Persian elements, which equally allowed the authors of the EN composition to gain authority and legitimacy through them.

Ancient Near Eastern imperial policies, moreover, were not construed as a monolith, rather, they were distinct from one another; not all empires were the same and not all responses to imperial domination were equally effective. By presenting this distinction in imperial policies, I contend that it is possible to read the Ezra-Nehemiah composition as a Babylonian exilic resistance narrative, which retells history by highlighting the necessary elements for a pure ethnic and religious identity; a group-specific identity that was not constrained by time nor place but, rather, was continuously active and interacting with the elements that shaped the diasporic community's perception of historical events. Thus, it was an identity capable of hybridity and adaptation during the Persian period when the imperial authorization allowed for de-colonization, that is, a return to the indigenous land and community. Many scholars who have examined and analysed the Ezra-Nehemiah composition interpret the identity politics of the narrative as reflective of the exilic community's disagreement with the ethnic plurality and legal liberalism of the remnant Judean community during the Second Temple period. The exilic community's insistence that Judeans must maintain their ethnic purity and live according to the rules prescribed by the law are often treated as examples of the internal conflict within Judah, or as theological concerns of the authors during the late Persian period. However,

I contend that the composition needs to be read in light of the distinct imperial policies implemented by the two empires in question. This, in turn, will allow scholars to view the composition as two distinct responses, that is, as two different discourses that were brought together during the Persian period as a form of "hybrid" narrative: a resistance narrative that creates an idealized, pure ethnic identity to counter Babylonian policy of assimilation, and a salvific narrative that constructs a Persian imperial authorization that supports the exilic community's return, as well as restoration of the Temple and city.

Charles Taylor and Rowan Williams in Conversation[1]

The following is a transcript of the keynote event of the Centre for Research on Religion [CREOR] Graduate Student Conference 2017, held at McGill University, "Problematizing Religious Diversity in a Secular Age." The discussants are Charles Taylor and Rowan Williams, two renowned public intellectuals who have worked extensively at the intersection between religion, politics, ethics, and culture. Dr. Taylor is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at McGill University, and co-author of the Bouchard-Taylor report (2008) on religious accommodation in Quebec. Dr. Williams is Chancellor of the University of South Wales and Master of Magdalene College, Cambridge University. From 2003-2012, he served as the Archbishop of Canterbury in the Church of England. The discussion was moderated by Dr. Victor Muñiz-Fraticelli, Associate Professor of Law and Political Science at McGill and Associate Director of CREOR.

V.M.-F: The question of terms is important to settle before we begin to question the phenomena of religion and secularism in present day society. Very often, the term religion in the news is associated with terms like fundamentalism or extremism, but religion is not always the same thing in every place, and extremism is not always religious: it takes many forms in different kinds of societies. This association of religion in our secular condition with fundamentalism and extremism seems to obscure more than it explains. So how do we explain the term? How do we problematize the term so we can understand the place of religion in our changing society?

C.T.: I think, first of all, religion can mean an incredible variety of things, all the way from the Roman Republic where religion was part of the organization of public life through the great world religions, and just a tremendous variety of ways of living these traditions that we think of. There are people out there preaching violence in the name of some ideology and

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1. Transcribed and edited by Hadi Fakhoury and Shaun Retallick with the permission of the discussants.

there are people like Gandhi and Martin Luther King introducing, I think, one of the most fruitful developments in modern society: the possibility of non-violent challenge and change that can open up the possibility of getting rid of harmful systems or regimes without leaving a legacy of hatred and violence in their wake. So, there just isn't a single thing called religion.

R.W.: Just to add a further dimension to that: I think that one of the difficulties we have at the moment is, because people have a very simple linear narrative of how the secular emerges out of a religious past, and assume therefore that religion is something superseded culturally, then you have people saying that, Islamic State for example, that it's medieval, as if that were an insult! But the fact is that Islamic State would be a lot less worrying if it were more medieval, in the sense that, what we see in some forms of current extremism are the tools of modernity – technological modernity – put in the service of a particular extremist agenda. And even the very attitudes of certain sorts of religious conservatives are themselves the mark of modernity: you have to define your position, you have to state your case, you have to block out your territory against others, and you have to defend it by whatever means are available. And if necessary attack by whatever means available. Now that's not, in any sense, a description of what traditional religion amounts to. Tradition is something you inherit, inhabit; it does not necessarily need defense in that way; it is much more about the habits of thought, practice, and so forth, which you develop, than a position that you try to occupy. The very idea that you occupy a position and defend it suggests that you're in a world of competing goods, of a competitive market of ideas in which you have to define your market share. But that's modernity, late capitalist modernity, and that's the paradox. We have this deep source of confusion where people imagine that, let's call it "conservative religion" for short-hand, is pre-modern, and yet it is in fact itself a reactive formation out of the Enlightenment and afterwards, using all the technological sophistication that we see in the propaganda war – waged now.[2]

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2. In the question period following the discussion, Williams explains: "I don't want to idealize the Middle Ages, nor do I want to say that the Middle Ages were a paradise of pluralism. Somebody ending their life under the judgment of the Spanish Inquisition would have a view on this! But we are in a different anthropological climate when we see the most significant thing about individuals as their purchasing power. And when we understand some of our most important

C.T.: If I could elaborate on that: I think that the difference between the modern state and the medieval state is that all modern states are based on mobilization around certain markers: Canadian, American, Frenchman, and we build up a very strong sense of belonging to a community under certain principles together. Without that, a modern state of any kind is inconceivable. Nothing like this existed in the Middle Ages: for example, people were subjects of the King of France via a series of lords – vassalship; it was a completely different way of understanding politics. We need today markers and mobilizers, and this is what all these powerful religious movements are doing; they are finding ways of creating unity, and fighting other states and other markers.

V.M.-F.: One of the interesting things to come out of this intervention of medieval structures into our discussion is that the medieval religious structures were quite institutional, that is, religion was understood as equivalent to, as identical to the Church. Even after schisms and disputes, the idea was, how do we reestablish the institutional structure? And identification with that institutional structure was part of one's identity. One of the things that the process of enlightenment has done is shift religion from an institutional understanding to an understanding of religion as freedom of conscience, fundamentally, which is an individual dimension, an individual expression. So, it's no wonder that disaffiliation, and especially disaffiliation from the formerly hegemonic religious traditions that were highly institutionalized, is on the rise. I was reading some Pew Forum data recently that show there's an enormous rise in non-sectarian, simply and completely independent spiritual movements. Is there a connection between disaffiliation from formerly institutional understandings of religion and the rise of these other sources of identity that mobilize around more modern, perhaps more extreme, religious organizations?

C.T.: I think the things you describe are really quite different phenomena in the world in which you have people seeking, trying to find their way spiritually, some of them taking what some would consider a religious path, some not. And these kinds of mobilization around religious markers are not only very different from one another, they're actually opposed to each

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decisions and self-orientations in terms of purchasing power."

other. If you think of the way in which traditional Islam in certain societies, on the Indian subcontinent, for instance, had this tremendous variety of different movements around different Sufi saints, around different modes of understanding, different forms of prayer, and so on. The Muslim community was immensely varied, precisely because people had different kinds of understandings of how we could make some kind of spiritual headway. And what happens, as soon as you get this kind of mobilization, is that everything becomes totally uniform. People who stand out are tremendously persecuted. Sufis, different kinds of Shia movements, are tremendously subject to persecution – more than persecution: in some cases, they're being annihilated. The spirit behind this kind of mobilization is not the spirit that says: let people seek, that is, let people seek to advance in their spiritual life, whether in this or that Christian or Muslim direction. The latter is not at all the spirit behind the kind of mobilization that produces violence.

R.W.: I think I would want to push that a bit further and say that what I see is more of a bifurcation, not just that enforced uniformity or what you described as the informal spiritual network – as if the options were either utterly uniform adherence to a clearly specified, highly distinctive religious identity, or the modern self in search of various kinds of religious illumination or satisfaction which could be selected from a market variety, which could be assembled into a personal package, a portfolio of religious practice and identity which would serve the self. And it's that bifurcation that interests me; somewhere in between is that lost notion of the unselfconscious traditional identity. So that what's left is either a highly self-conscious traditionalism of modern fundamentalisms, or the marketization of religious identities and religious satisfactions. I don't think there's any simple way of getting back to the pre-modern traditional identity. That's one of the real challenges for religion in modern society. All the pressures around us in the culture we inhabit, the pressures of modernity as they are experienced, seem to push us to one or the other of those options. Either what I call the pseudo-traditional extremist or the individualist portfolio religion.

C.T.: What I think can be done, recovered – not in full, as it were, but as a way of living – what can be recovered is a sense of the great variety of richness in a given religious tradition. That's in a way what people in Islam who are fighting against this mobilization are carrying on. I have a very

good friend who is Senegalese and, as you know, in Senegal, the majority of the population belongs to one of four Sufi brotherhoods. The Saudis offered to Senegal, "Why don't we set up madrasas," and the Senegalese said, "No, thanks. You would destroy our spiritual life. You would teach our children to despise." A similar thing can be said about a certain kind of Catholicism, known as *intégrisme* in French, that has totally neglected a tremendous variety of spiritualities represented very often by different orders in the Catholic Church. What we very much need in religious life today is a recovery, in a sense, of the multitrack nature of a religious tradition.

R.W.: Yes, and I think that that's part of what I meant when I said that I'd be happier if Islamic State were more medieval, in that there's an assumption in medieval Islam, as in medieval Christianity, that there are routine, ongoing internal disagreements and arguments to be had. Of course, as it's been said, that's true of Judaism to an even more marked degree. Judaism really is a continuity of argument, argument about text. But also within medieval Christianity and medieval Islam, the assumption is that the normal style of intellectual engagement with the truth of faith is not just dogmatic repetition; it's also a highly sophisticated system of dialectical exploration, positioning, discerning, and so forth, in the context of a sufficiently stable practice that makes the disagreement not threatening nor lethal. And when you have a situation where there isn't that holding environment of a practice, a culture, if you like, which allows you disagreement and exploration, then you have the intellectual closing-in which we see in various kinds of neo-conservative religion around the world.

V.M.-F.: I worry sometimes that unreflexive religious tradition can collapse into blind acceptance of religious authority or something like religious aestheticism, as in the phenomenon of cultural Catholics or cultural Anglicans who identify in some way with the tradition but do not make the link between their attachment to a statue or a piece of art and the authority of bishops in the Church. Of course, not all churches are structured in this way, but at least the churches represented on this stage are! Is it possible for the Church to respond to the problem of modernity where religion is being used as a mark of political legitimacy without, on the one hand, transforming itself into a quasi-state and reinforcing its hierarchical structure and its political and legal structure, and on the other, collapsing into a kind of aestheticism?

R.W.: I think you've summed up just the point I was trying to articulate a moment ago, that we seem to be faced with two quite untraditional and potentially either destructive or vacuous options; either the re-inscription of authoritarianism or a religiousness that boils down to the beautiful soul. Now, what is it that lies in-between? Because if, as we say, we can't just revive tradition as it was, which we can't, what then is there? I think what you were saying, Charles, is absolutely right, that that's where we look at the ways in which pre-modern traditions actually handled some of their disagreements. We look at what especially the spiritual writers of the tradition had to say about the trajectories of discovery and conversion that go on within practice; we look at the ways in which certain disciplines of religious living do exactly the task that you are suggesting: helping people disentangle inessentials from essentials, to detach from a sort of pious sentimentality that just fixes onto one thing. There are resources, there really are. And, I suppose, to put it rather in a nutshell, you don't have to try to recreate the sixteenth century to read St. John of the Cross with that kind of critical edge.

V.M.-F.: Another one of the misconceptions about the medieval and the traditional, which you have both brought up, is the enormous diversity within religious traditions. We usually now hear traditionalism as a reductionist term; traditionalism means reducing everything to one particular strand, very often a quite conservative strand, a narrow strand of the religious tradition, when, in fact, religious life, the most traditional religious life, is enormously diverse. Sometimes this is even enshrined textually, as in the Talmud, and sometimes institutionally, as in the multiplicity of orders and vocations within both the Anglican and Catholic churches. How do you manage that diversity, particularly within the Church? And how is it managed in the state when there is still a latent religious identity associated for the most part with one particular tradition, say Catholicism in Quebec? In sum, how do you manage diversity, both religion in the state and religion within itself, within its own institutions?

C.T.: Well, I think that there has to be some kind of understanding of what it means to coexist with people from different religious traditions, that is, what it means to live with them in a modern state. Now, our idea of the modern democratic state is that it has openness and freedom in this regard,

and there is a kind of rulebook – which we try to specify in our courts, for instance – that the state is basically neutral in matters of religion, that there is maximum freedom of conscience. The big issue is how this can be lived. And it can't be seriously lived if there is a powerful sense that other ways of living are terrible and dangerous, that we don't want to have them around us, and so on. Now, in a society like ours today, in Quebec, the principal source of that kind of very negative feeling is not exactly religious, it's *laïque*; it's a certain reading of secularism which has to marginalize religion. And so, you can have a beautiful rulebook established there and an accepted set of rights and so on, but they are completely undercut if you get proposals like the Quebec Charter of Values. I'm very glad it wasn't enacted, but many of its provisions would have been knocked down by the judiciary any way, I'm sure, because it wasn't open to others in terms of religious diversity and freedom of conscience. I would go further than that because, in a certain sense, you develop this sense of the legitimacy of the other in a society – and I think this is one of the great things about a society of seekers – where more and more people are sincerely interested in the others' convictions. Now, that kind of exchange, that kind of contact is what is needed to give, as it were, lifeblood to the theoretical, legal organ that we've developed. The opposite of that is a condition of maximum suspicion hanging over certain communities, as we find with the spread of Islamophobia today. So, although the law, the rulebook is great, it is insufficient. So, what kind of seeking involves openness, even at times solidarity? And how can you implement that in society? This is something you can't do by law. You can't say, "Everybody, appreciate each other!" But without that culture developing in society, the rulebook is powerless.

R.W.: I agree with that very strongly, because I think again and again, it seems, we're tempted in modern societies to try to solve intractable problems by law rather than culture, not understanding that it is the growth of culture that allows this to happen. But to go back to Victor's original question about the management of diversity – how do you manage diversity in the Church? Well, my own experience inclines me to say, "unsuccessfully!" In all seriousness, one of the things which seemed to me crucial in trying to handle diversity and disagreement in the Church in a way that wasn't destructive, had to do with a couple of things, like the assumption that, if the Church is what it says it is, we will always have something we need from

the other, that we have something to learn from the other. And, therefore, it's worth hanging in there for the disagreement on the off chance that you might just learn something, as they say. That's putting it at a pragmatic level. But I think there's a deeper theological question after that, and alongside that, you need ways of reaffirming what I'd call the big picture – you know, what is it, what model of reality is it that our discourse together points us to? – and try and get back into that.

But now turning to the question of diversity in society, I think there are a couple of things here which we need to keep in focus, and Charles illuminated the question of why democracy is not as easy a notion as we thought it was. I think we have to have that in mind. There's a temptation to think of democracy in a very unmanageable way; that is – God help us – "the will of the people" or something, language we're getting an awful lot of in the United Kingdom, in ways that I find worrying. The will of the people; a majority has spoken, therefore, x, y and z follow, and that's it, the argument is over. Well, I'd say that democracy, if it's not just a majoritarian tyranny, assumes ongoing argument. It assumes continuing disagreement. And the role of an efficient and just state is precisely to manage public argument justly, peacefully, and purposefully. That is, allowing the widest possible range of voices to be heard, restraining those pressures that might lead people toward violence in word or act, and looking for an outcome that will be livable in a diverse society. That's what the modern state, at least, I think, seems to do. And that, in turn, means exactly as you said, Charles, that a just state does not seek to suppress, silence, or make invisible the difference of identities that exist within it. Nobody's identity – and this is a point I've made many times in recent years – is just that of a citizen; and the best, most effective citizen is the person who is not *just* a citizen, but has other affinities, other resources of meaning and all the rest of it, on top of it. So, a state doing its business is a state prepared to allow those resources of meaning and prompts to action to come to the light. Not to silence these sources of meaning in the name of rational homogeneity, as if we are all exactly like each other. Charles and I were talking about this at dinner last night, the way in which certain aspects of the Enlightenment, and the practice and theory of the French Revolution resulted in some of the most violent anti-Semitism of the late 18th and early 19th centuries, because, the assumption was, Jews needed to be liberated from the oppression and violence afflicted on them by Christians, and the simplest way of doing that was to stop them

from being Jews! You know, think about it, and it gets worse and worse. But that's the kind of homogenizing rationalism which we're always in danger of when we talk about democracy, if it is not utterly committed to thinking of the rights of minorities, the rule of law, the universal application of law, and so forth. This is really the key point at the moment when confusions about the nature of democracy are so prevalent in pretty well every western society we look at.

V.M.-F.: There's that term that you finished on, which causes some tension and concern. The rule of law is usually understood in modern democracy, at least, as applying to absolutely everyone. It's one thing for the state to encourage disagreement and discussion, but when that disagreement and discussion start to take institutional form, then there's an enormous amount of resistance. Tocqueville's observation was that democracy wanted to equalize and abolish the rights of cities, churches, and universities, and so on, because there should be one law that applies to all of us. In fact, one of the points that comes out of the Quiet Revolution in Quebec is the idea that institutional diversity is a threat. At first, it's a threat because of the Church. After all, the Quiet Revolution, at least the educational aspects, began when the Jesuits wanted to establish a university. And, as a result, now we have to make everything public and eliminate religious instruction. A similar tension can be observed in western societies with regard to the judicial institutions of Islam, which are misunderstood and essentialized. So, encouragement of discussion, I think, is something that everyone could get behind. But what about when it takes institutional form? Must it take institutional form? And is that compatible with the rule of law?

R.W.: Well, that's a very complex issue on which I've burned my fingers in the past! But, I would still want to say, there is a proper universalism about the rule of law, which simply states that the guarantee of dignity and redress for every citizen is beyond question. Dignity and redress. Everyone can properly, legally claim the same levels of protection from the state. Whether they do so or not, of course, and how they do so, are going to be affected in some ways, in some circles, by their other affiliations. And the complicated thing that a state jurisdiction has to work out is how it can simultaneously affirm these legal dignities and claims, while not seeking simply to abolish community custom and those subsidiary areas where it

might be possible for other forms of resolution to be legally recognized. So, to take the example I've sometimes used in the past, if you're looking at certain kinds of ultra-Orthodox Jewish or Muslim communities where there are issues about the legal rights or claims of women in a marriage, divorce and so forth: how do you balance the fact that no community could take away from women in those communities their legal standing as citizens of the country but not simply try and abolish what's there from the top-down? And, as I said, I don't think there's a quick solution to that, but I don't think it's a complete stand-off either.

C.T.: And I think that, if we look at the discussion of *laïcité* in France and then here as a result, I think we see one of the pitfalls that we have to avoid in order to achieve what Rowan is getting at; that what we must avoid is really a definition of, if you like, the identity of our republic, what is absolutely essential to our republic, with measures that silence certain voices. Now, it's very interesting if you look at the 1904-1905 law in France: there were two tendencies throughout, and there was very much a tendency which said, we should silence religion; religion should be put in its place, or kept out of this place, that place, because it [religion] is the enemy of everything *laïque*. And there's another reading which said, on the contrary, what we must do is avoid silencing any voice, that's what *laïcité* means. And that's why both of these versions of *laïcité* were against the idea of a Catholic monarchy, because that was still silencing voices. And it's very interesting to see that, after looking at the debate in France – and you have to do that, you know, because *laïcité* is the same word and we're very influenced by it – you find that, in Quebec too, you begin to get, in favour of that more rigorous *laïcité*, identitarian arguments: "That's really what it is to be Quebecois, really what it is to be a *citoyen français*." And there's a real struggle to examine very closely what our notion of common identity is, to make sure that it's not a way of silencing people. Which it is becoming, as we see in a large number of European countries today, such as Hungary or Kaczyński's regime in Poland, from a supposedly religious side. Viktor Orbán, the prime minister of Hungary, said, these refugees are a threat to Christian civilization! From the *laïque* side, it is very easy to fall into the same scenario.

V.M.-F: We have an additional dimension in both Europe and Quebec. It's something that you briefly mentioned in the context of the Charter of

Values, that this would never pass judicial muster. The question is from whom? Because there are federal and supernational structures here, and the question of identity – of the identification of *laïcité* with identity – may not mean the same in Quebec City as it does in Ottawa, or in Hungary as it does in the European Union as a whole. So, is there an additional complication, or is there simply additional opportunity, for diversity to emerge in a federal or cross-federal world?

C.T.: Yes, there is a possibility for very negative things to emerge. I don't think Europe has quite solved that problem yet, because I think the European courts are sometimes too deferential to national positions, as they were about the interdiction of the hijab in French schools. But, in our case in Canada, the grounds on which someone would throw out some of these restrictions for wearing the hijab are in the Quebec Charter, as well as in the federal Charter. However, the argument here is principally about what citizenship means. It can't be aligned with a set of rules which silences certain voices.

V.M.-F.: One of the interesting aspects of a lot of debates over secularism, and over the management of diversity itself, is the centrality of gender. Not only the centrality and status of the participation of women, which, say the ordination of women as priests and bishops in the Anglican Communion, becomes a central point of contention, but also the place of gay and lesbian congregants. And there is a call, which I think is also tied with this notion of a single people, or a single law, for isomorphism, whereby, as we have come to accept equality and equal dignity in society as a whole, the institutions within society also must accept them; those that do not are somehow alien. It's unclear what religious communities should do in the face of this tension between tradition and diversity, how they should respond to calls for accommodation.

R.W.: I often wish that I didn't have to fight this battle on this particular set of issues, because I end up defending the right of some communities to maintain positions that I myself don't really like. It's not very congenial. Yet, my worry is that if we don't somehow understand the risks there, we will end up saying, the state determines the arguments by which people come to their conclusions about social matters. So, taking again the highly controversial and neuralgic question of same-sex marriage in the UK, the

difficulty, I think, many people felt – many as a church felt – was not so much about the legal equality of LGBTI people as about the state's implicit claim to be saying that this is how you have to argue to be a citizen. Now, this does not prevent a religious community to come to new conclusions out of its own resources or out of its own terms or even at its own pace. The problem is that churches often confuse their own faith-based wrestlings over these issues with state policies; secondly, they forget that they have sometimes been violently opposed to legal equality for LGBTI people, or have been reluctant to go along with equalizing legislation for women. They haven't got very much credibility on these issues. They have tried to say, well, the state ought to be accepting our argumentation. It is, therefore, not perhaps entirely surprising if the state sometimes turns around and says – almost says – you've got to accept *our* argumentation. And one of the struggles that we've often had in the Anglican setting over the years is trying to clarify, especially with some of our brothers and sisters from Africa, that it is perfectly possible to say, there is a moral question about the legal status, legal liberties, and legal dignities of lesbian and gay people, which we as Christians ought to be unambiguous about. There should not be a disagreement about that. What we have to wrestle with is what we make morally of the relations people enter into – and that's not a closed argument yet. What should be a closed argument is the utter rightness of legal and universal dignity, and protection; that is, the resistance to restrictive and repressive legislation, and persecution of gay people and so on. That ought not to be an issue, and there have been successive statements by Anglican bodies underlining that, but our practice has yet to live up to it. So, it's not entirely surprising to say that we rather lack credibility there. But the worry remains, I would like to see religious bodies given the space to reflect and make up their minds in their own terms about their own business. But, the state, in moving towards certain legal positions, can sometimes give the impression of wanting to dictate how the argument should be conducted. That's my worry.

V.M.-F.: One of the religious resources internal to the Anglican community is the nurturing of diversity – of all sorts of exceptions or accommodations – for instance, with respect to the settlement of the issue of the ordination of women bishops. It was fascinating to see how the House of Clergy and the House of Bishops were very much on what we would deem the progressive

side, while a significant minority of the House of Laity resisted. The accommodation was that you could slow down the process of normalizing women's ordination within some of these parishes. They could avail themselves of other sources of authority within the Communion. Is this translatable to a modern democratic state? Are the resources of religious traditions translatable to the institutions of the state and to the claims of a modern democratic state governed by the rule of law?

C.T.: If you look at various religious communities, from the point of view of the state, they are allegiances made by individual people. Now, one thing is if in the course of practicing that they violate the law egregiously, or force people to do this or that. That obviously is the case for state intervention. But if you think that citizens have the right to form or belong to associations, even though they do things that go against our principles, unless there is a clear violation of the right of the individual, then it's part of what it is to live in a society where there is real diversity. Of course, there are cases where it is not so clear cut, but clearly a democratic state doesn't require a uniformity of internal ethos within particular associations.

V.M.-F: I want to circle back to the traditional understanding of religion as something that one lives and doesn't decisively choose. It seems that the norm of the modern democratic state is actually pushing a particular vision of religion by regarding every single religious tradition as a mere collection of individuals who are voluntary members. This technically forces them to conceive of themselves in this very modern way, interfering with religious traditions that wish to contribute to democratic societies while retaining their traditional identity. Is that voluntarist concept of religion compatible with religious traditions themselves?

C.T.: It's not so much constructed by the state as it is constructed by modern culture. The thing is, we are living in societies that are tremendously diverse, where people are changing their positions. Many no longer go to the church their parents took them to. In that kind of world, we begin to construct ourselves as all sorts of individuals. Now, of course, there are certain ways of living a very tight communitarian life within this; for example, in Montreal, the Hassidim have a very tight community structure, and people do lead that from time to time. But that's a way of going against the current, and they're

going against that which is not simply created by modern law, but which is the dominant current in modern culture. So, it's not simply a question of law, but of culture.

R.W.: It's a secular example, but I listened to a discussion a couple of weeks ago about the younger generation in Hong Kong, those who have grown up there since the handover to China. A young journalist named Ben Bland has written a book called *Generation HK* about these young Hong Kong people who've grown up neither with the mainland China identity, nor with the Hong Kong colonial identity. And these are the people who are currently protesting most strongly against the increased influence of Beijing in Hong Kong's politics, but don't quite know themselves – and nobody can answer this for them – where they belong politically, socially and culturally. They are at sea in some ways. They haven't inherited or inhabited any of the old models of identity. This example of a non-religious environment affected by the voluntarist trend is a parable. And because it's not just a matter of the state being difficult – the state often acts as it does because culture is as it is – there is, I think, a very big job to be done to elucidate what we do mean by the density or solidity of religious community as something other than just an assembly of individual choices; and there's a major descriptive and philosophically analytic job to be done about how that relates to a society which is not simply homogenously rationalistic. We need to have more argument in public. We need to have more discussion about what exactly is the matter with the idea of a rationalist-secularist universe which silences other voices – because that's the default setting in a lot of political discussion these days. Also, we need to push a bit to say, look, can you see why that is not necessarily the obvious meaning of democracy? And why that, in the long term, may in fact undermine some things about liberalism, the rule of law and all the rest of it?

V.M.-F.: One of the problems in translating the religious point of view – the demands of faith, the demands of religion, whether mediated by human beings, or seen as directly connected with the authority of God or the divine – is that many religious individuals do not regard their religion as a voluntary choice. Many of the conversations around controversial social issues are presented as if religion were voluntary – "well, you can keep all of your religion, but you can choose to abandon this particular segment or

this particular tenet which is offensive to dominant culture." The religious individual's response to that is, "I did not choose the rest, so I can't choose not to affirm this." I often wonder whether it's possible to accommodate that religious understanding of authority within not only a voluntarist presumption, but also a presumption that the only source of authority ought to be our identity. Is it possible, in a secular state, to be religious with an unambiguous attachment to religious identity and authority? Is that conceptually and practically possible?

C.T.: I think there's a deep conceptual confusion in that. I mean, when you say, "free choice," you're thinking in two quite different contexts. I don't really have a free choice to suddenly become an Islamic State jihadi: everything in me rebels against that; it's not one of my choices. On the other hand, I have a free choice to practice and preach this particular outlook in the sense that nobody can stop me. In my case, I feel I am grabbed by a conception of human right and dignity. It's not a power I have to say, "Oh, I'm going to choose something else." I think that this confusion, however, although it is only a conceptual confusion, goes very deep in people. A lot of people, in particular, who argue from a secular point of view talk as though it should pop up from you at any given point, entirely out of yourself, as if you could suddenly make your identity. Nobody totally makes their identity! It is formed – sometimes by rebellion – in families, communities, and so on. So, I think there's a conceptual confusion here; but it's a conceptual confusion that can have political consequences if people carry them in a way that does not recognize that conceptual distinction at the basis of this.

R.W.: Yes, that's right. Sometimes it comes across as if one is saying to the religious person, "Why can't you just change your mind?" As we all know, that's not a terribly helpful question, because what makes the mind we have is, as you say, a whole range of belongings, affiliations, and affinities, which are not just dependent on our will. So, there is a good deal of confusion. As to whether it is possible to exercise an integral religious identity within the secular state, of course, a lot depends on what this platform has made abundantly clear: what do you mean by the word "secular"? I think we've already to some extent noted just how different models of secularity may be. For my part, I've tried in recent years to elaborate a bit of a distinction between what I call programmatic and procedural secularism. Programmatic

secularism is the silencing option; procedural secularism is the state holding the ring, facilitating debate, including religious voices, with the aim of justice and agreement. It's not always easy to see where a society may lie on that spectrum.

V.M.-F.: To go back to the question, "Why can't you just change your mind?" Sometimes the argument is more sophisticated, and much more practical, along these lines of two different versions of free choice: the freedom to act or practice in a particular way vs. the freedom simply to shape oneself, which I agree is not complete and certainly problematic. Sometimes the argument is addressed to religious believers differently: in this pluralistic, democratic, liberal society, we will let you believe whatever you want to believe, but this is not a question of belief, it's a question of action; and religion is merely a question of belief. To give some controversial examples that have emerged in different countries recently, of course, you can believe whatever you want about the structure of traditional marriage – marriage ought only to be between a man and a woman – but if you happen to occupy a position, say as a clerk in Kentucky, you cannot act upon it. There's conflict there between identities, because you are voluntarily a clerk with duties there as well. One can also mention the case of the Trinity Western University Law Faculty, where there is a covenant that asks all members of the community to affirm and abstain from conduct that violates the principle that marriage is only between a man and a woman, in a society where you're being trained as lawyers and governed by those provincial and federal laws which state something different. On the other hand, there seems to be something similar on the side of the state. For example, the Ontario Law Society says, we believe certain things, but you're forcing us to be complicit with them. So, the argument of complicity seems to obscure the distinction between belief and action, which are closely tied not only in the mind of the religious believer, but in the mind of the citizen as well. How do you respond to the question: we won't change your mind, and you can believe whatever you want, but you have to act in this way, regardless of what your faith tells you is correct?

R.W.: I think the key question there is, what "you have to act" means here. You have no legal freedom to impede anyone's access to what the law provides. That seems to be a reasonable demand from the state. You can't actually

forbid or obstruct what the law, as a matter of fact, lays down. So, there's a kind of negative condition there. A much more controversial proposition is: you, as a citizen, in every imaginable circumstance, have to enact what the law makes possible. Just as in British law the exemption still remains, under the Abortion Act of 1967, for those who have conscientious scruples about performing an abortion, that they are not compelled to act against their conscience. So, this is a delicate exercise. I think there is a distinction that can be affirmed. But it is becoming increasingly difficult – as in the Kentucky case – to know exactly where the border lies. If you are holding a legal position, say you are a clerk solemnizing or registering marriages, that really is your job. You're not expected to affirm conscientiously everything you do. I think it would help if we were a bit clearer about that; the person registering a marriage of which they do not approve is simply doing a legal job about which there's a perfectly legitimate expectation they'll perform it, in terms of their professional duty. It's a grey area, and I don't see it being settled in a hurry. I was for two years Chair of a working party set up by the Commission for Equality and Human Rights in the United Kingdom on religion and the law. We went round and round these issues; we were a very mixed group, including some hardnosed secularists, as well as representatives of various religious communities. On the whole, the point we kept on coming back to was exactly the one that Charles brought up earlier, and which I very much echo: it is extremely difficult to solve certain problems by law rather than culture. Legal accommodation is only ever a partial answer. What we ought to want to get is a culture of sufficient patience and respect to allow conscience to work at its own pace in some areas, while being uncompromising about what protections and proper claims the law gives to everyone.

V.M.-F: To take up this question of it being someone's job to perform a legal transaction, and this is something that they voluntarily assume: some of them may have taken-up the job before the law came into play, but still they did so voluntarily. That was one of the points of contention for the Bouchard-Taylor Commission. What exactly counted as someone's job? I think there the line between law and culture became fudged. Because of the way that, say, a judge or police officer presents themselves to the public, there's some disagreement as to whether an appearance can be counted as someone's job. In some cases, the problem is one of general expectations as

to how someone else looks, and whether that has an exclusionary effect on some communities which would therefore not be able to participate. So, in a context like that – I remember that was a point that you, Charles, wrote about after the Commission ended – can your job sometimes be to enact a political culture?

C.T.: Yes, it can be. I think that what we have here – to underline what Rowan was saying – are these difficult dilemmas. But there are ways out of them. We see two possible ways; the one is, what we would probably recommend to the Kentucky court clerk, to say: "Look, it's your job and you're not doing anything really terrible by just writing it down and signing it." Whereas in the other case, the abortion case, obviously the actual doing of this act is something that deeply offends the conscience of the person concerned. There, the solution is usually to find some kind of substitution arrangement: "Okay. You don't have to do this; someone else will." And even in the case of the clerk, you could imagine setting up the institution in such a way that there was a deputy on hand, as it were, that could step in. These are two ways of avoiding the dilemmas, of having your cake and eating it too. But, to go back to a point Rowan made, nobody has a right to stop someone from doing what they have a right to do; you can't step in and say: "No, you can't do this." But at the same time, you have to respect the very powerful dictates of conscience to the extent that this is possible. So, there are moments where, if you didn't use one of these get-outs here – substitution and so on – you'd be forced to say, "no" to this, or "no" to that. You would be forced to deny some citizen a right – marriage, abortion and so on – or on the other hand, to force some citizens to do something absolutely against their conscience. See, I think this is where culture enters in; a society that really respects difference would be a society that would go many miles in order to allow these two to co-exist. Now, that offends a certain sensibility. But my understanding of democracy, my sense of democratic sensibility is that that's what you've got to do. Nobody must be stopped from exercising a right, but nor can you force people against powerful dictates of conscience.

The conversation was followed by a question period with the audience.

Book Reviews

Reconfigurations of Philosophy of Religion: A Possible Future. Edited by Jim Kanaris. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2018. Pp. xxi + 295.
Reviewed by Nathan Strunk, *McGill University*

At the beginning of the book, Kanaris forewarns: "One will be hard pressed to find a uniform vision in this collection" (ix). From the start, then, it seems there is scarce chance of uncovering a golden thread weaving together the twelve contributions of the book. An impression further confirmed by the radical divergence of the contributors' methodologies, interlocutors, and objectives. Consider, for instance, Pamela Sue Anderson's feminist philosophy of religion, Jin Y. Park's East-West comparative philosophy of religion, Tyler Robert's socio-political critical philosophy of religion, or Clayton Crockett's appeal to François Laurelle's non-philosophy for philosophy of religion. Each of the contributors in the volume presents an innovative reconfiguration of philosophy of religion with varying implications for its future. And yet, as the subtitle suggests, the many reconfigurations of philosophy of religion propose "a possible future," in the singular, and consequently, the possibility of a cumulative way forward for a field of inquiry which seemingly has as many methods as it has researchers like so many unrelated points of light in the night sky. As philosophy of religion continues to proliferate in a myriad of directions with increasing distance and isolation over time, what possible future can constellate its reconfigurations together?

Kanaris prefers a musical metaphor suggesting that the differences among the contributors form a polyphony (echoing the title of one of his earlier books) rather than the chaotic dissonance of a cacophony. To this polyphony ensues the back and forth of philosophy of religion. Following Raschke, Kanaris likens the contrasting interplay of the contributors to "play therapy" – a kind of jouissance or "jig" – intended to characterize the contributions' interrelation as step and counter step, which involves a certain degree of synchronization harmonized, at least in part, by a common cadence. In the introduction, the reader can find a succinct summary of the contributions that delineates their similarities and differences, so it would be redundant to do the same here. Rather, the purpose of this review will be to adumbrate several of the primary leitmotifs composing the fugue of the future of philosophy of religion intonated in the book. In the first chapter, Joy Morny fittingly quotes David Tracy: "The entire narrative of philosophy of religion in the modern West

needs rethinking and retelling if both the 'roots' and 'fruits' of that curious modern invention, philosophy of religion, is one day to play a properly interdisciplinary and intercultural role" (3). Many of the contributors speak to this narration and pursue very different story lines for rethinking and reconfiguring philosophy of religion. Yet, some of the main topoi reappear in re-narrating its history and repositioning it in academia as a "properly interdisciplinary and intercultural" field of inquiry that can have a significant role for religious studies as a whole.

One primary aspect of retelling the story of philosophy of religion is reassessing the place and function of demonstrative arguments for theism like the proofs for the existence of God and the project of theodicy for addressing the problem of evil. Joy, Anderson, Trakakis, and Knepper speak directly to the shortcomings of this approach for philosophy of religion. For instance, Anderson, who in seeking to re-vision gender for philosophy of religion, critiques traditional philosophers of religion: "Most notable here is the central concept in philosophy of religion," she explains, "the 'masculinist' ideal of the omni-perfect God that has been an 'idol' for men's rational subjecthood and that has idolized 'the second sex' who fixes her gaze on the God-man, preventing her from thinking and living a life that is her own" (58). From this perspective, the approach to philosophy of religion that concentrates its efforts on advancing rational arguments for theism or theodicy without regard to the contexts motivating its most basic categories often unwittingly recapitulates politico-identity prejudices like the "masculinist ideal" or, inversely and adversely, flawed femininity. As a corrective, Anderson accentuates the importance of a "contextualized" reconfiguring of philosophy of religion that critically reflects on gender, sex, race, and class, and accomplishes this critical reflection by incorporating multiple disciplines within its field of inquiry. Other contributors think similarly, advocating for contextualized, multi-disciplinary, and comparative engagement in philosophy of religion. For instance, Trakakis encourages Western thinkers to adopt a "metaphysical reorientation" and "turn to the idealist and monist metaphysics of the East" (99). Knepper proposes that philosophy of religion become "an academic field of inquiry that seeks, above all, to understand and explain the diversities and patterns of religious reason-giving in the religions of the world" (108). Similarly, Wildman contends that philosophy of religion should become a multidisciplinary-comparative inquiry if it is to remain a viable interlocutor in modern academia. Jin Park provides an outstanding example of the cross-fertilization of comparative analysis by comparing the reception of the disciplinary locution "philosophy of religion" in an Eastern context.

Each of these contributors has their own reasons for advancing a contextualized, comparative approach to the study of religion, but perhaps no one articulates the postmodern philosophical basis for doing so as clearly as Carl Raschke. When referring to the impact of Derrida, Raschke commends that philosophy of religion

adopt the radical stance of "theorizing and philosophizing the force of difference" (164). Raschke puts this so pointedly that it is worth quoting at length: "However, what is clear is that Western philosophy, and philosophy of religion in particular, has no choice but to go global and to 'decolonize' in ways it has never imagined before… To decolonize, and thus to 'postmodernize' in the most radical sense imaginable, would involve far more than any tiresome academic 'diversity' program of recognizing privilege or learning to listen to the 'other'. It would be to penetrate philosophically into what we wrongly consider as 'naïve' symbolico-collective narratives of those whom we have not allowed to speak in the past, and whom we are used to dismissing with our familiar pan-Cartesian hauteur before we in our good Western 'parental' attitude take it upon ourselves to 'speak for' them" (170). Along similar lines, Caputo in Derridean terms characterizes the kind of radical theology ingredient in philosophy of religion as the "invention de l'autre in the double sense of invention, the in-coming or breaking-in of something unforeseeable and the coming-upon something we did not see coming" (215). It is the hope in encountering l'autre and "the force of difference" that sets forth the conditions for the possibility of philosophy of religion's reconfiguration as well as its place within religious studies. It is to the latter that I now wish to turn.

In 2013, Kanaris invited the contributors of this volume to a symposium seeking to answer the question, "Does philosophy of religion have a future?" The book is the fruit of that inquiry. Invariably and unsurprisingly, they all answer in the affirmative and with the caveat that it will be a future that departs significantly from its past. The book is divided into two parts: Part One: Philosophy of Religion and the Philosophical Tradition, and Part Two: Philosophy of Religion and Religious Studies, Theology, and the Modern Academy. Without much ado, Kanaris only mentions this division in a footnote. The difference between the two approaches, one historical-genealogical and the other intra-disciplinary, is not elaborated in detail. It seems rather only a matter of emphasis. Rather than an internecine debate, there is a sense that the volume presents a tacit vision of philosophy of religion as a field of inquiry consisting in evaluating presuppositions – often tracing their progeny and evolution – that govern the concepts, methodologies, and practices that determine various approaches to studying religion. Thus, broadly speaking, philosophy of religion as it is presented in this volume suggests a kind of reflective discourse on the discipline of religious studies as a whole, evaluating critically the assumptions and implications of those who through the application of varying methods study religion. By doing so, philosophy of religion crystallizes the reasons for favoring contextualized and comparative studies of religion like sociology of religion, anthropology of religion, gender studies, comparative studies of religion, religion and politics (i.e. political theologies), etc. Philosophy of religion thus distills the presuppositions governing why and how religion should be (and should not be) studied.

This task gives philosophy of religion a new charter. Its reflections on any particular religion must remain descriptive while its disciplinary task for the field of religious studies aims to be normative. Both tendencies are new to philosophy of religion in the late twentieth- and twenty-first century. Previously when early modern philosophers of religion compared Western religions to other religions they often included an evaluative component favoring the former to the latter. While this kind of normative comparison of religions has long been passé, what is new is that many of the contributors see a tacit continuation of this kind of normative-preferential assessment in contemporary philosophers of religion who through proofs for God's existence (theism) or arguments for God's goodness (theodicy) implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, privilege one religion over others. If philosophy of religion is to avoid valuing particular religions and safeguard difference to become a truly comparative and contextualized inquiry, it must take upon itself the responsibility of methodological reflection on what studying religion entails and what norms are requisite to preserve the integrity of its subject. As the philosophers of religion in this volume consistently emphasize, one such norm is that the study of religion can no longer take place from the perspective of a removed, abstract observer. Instead, it must be critically immersed in the embodiment of religious beliefs, symbols, and practices. There are different names for this approach with varying emphases. Kanaris calls this kind of posture to studying religion an "enecstatic jig," Roberts, "critical responsiveness," and Caputo, "radical hermeneutics."

Speculating about what might possibly come to pass usually disrupts the present with what should now be the case. Herein lies the challenge of contemplating the possible future of philosophy of religion: if the present and the future are situated through their critical reception of the past (i.e. narration and renarration), then it is quite challenging – after all, we are most unaware when we are most convinced – to imagine the ways in which contemporary philosophy of religion will become our successors' past and become so many foils for them when they indict us not in our weaknesses but in what we perceive to be our strengths. Insofar as the future puts the present under critique by welcoming in anticipation what is avenir (to come), few aspire to be the first to the future and thereby inaugurate in the present "a time out of joint," as Raschke phrases it à la Derrida and Hamlet. The notable contributors of this volume, insightfully brought together by Kanaris, have braved just that.

Carl Jung and Maximus the Confessor on Psychic Development: the dynamics between the 'psychological' and the 'spiritual'. G.C. Tympas. London: Routledge, 2014. Pp. xvii + 203.
Reviewed by Daniel Heide, *McGill University*

The chief task of G.C. Tympas' *Carl Jung and Maximus the Confessor on Psychic Development* is, in the words of the author, to bring together "two dissimilar theories on psychic development" by introducing "a theoretical framework for a synthesis that integrates and, at the same time, exceeds both" (1). Such a theoretical framework, or *trans-disciplinary* methodology, Tympas argues, is necessary for the critical comparison of Jung's modern psychological model of *individuation* with Maximus Confessor's ancient theological ideal of *deification*, or *theosis*. The aim of this book, then, is to attempt a critical comparison between the psychological and the religious approaches to psychic development or spiritual progress without reducing one to the other.

The immediate question that presents itself is, of course, why Jung and Maximus Confessor? What is to be gained from a comparison between an ancient Orthodox theologian and a modern analytical psychologist? The initial inspiration behind this novel comparison appears to be a personal one: Tympas holds a PhD in psychoanalytic studies and serves as a priest in the Greek Orthodox Church. As such, the author's attempt at a non-reductionist comparison between a psychologist and a theologian represents the author's personal attempt at a reconciliation of these two, distinct approaches to interior development. Due to his intimate acquaintance with both parties, Tympas holds the conviction that a "retrospective encounter" between Jung and Maximus could serve to correct Jung's tendency towards psychological reductionism (despite his generally *positive* view of religion), while providing an ontological grounding for his metaphysically ambiguous notions of synchronicity, individuation, and the Self. On the other hand, Jung's insights into the workings of the unconscious psyche could enrich the traditional, theological understanding of the personal journey towards deification, which tends to minimise the personal and socio-cultural aspects of the journey. The "horizontal" approach of Jungian psychology coupled with the "vertical" approach of Maximian theology, Tympas suggests, are ultimately complementary and capable of being integrated by means of a *trans-disciplinary paradigm of development*.

The need for such a trans-disciplinary paradigm compels Tympas to devote considerable attention to the problem of methodology – a problem with which the book begins and ends. In the interests of avoiding a reductionistic approach, Tympas suggests the inclusion of multiple disciplines such as biology, sociology, psychology, and theology. He envisions this inter, or trans-disciplinary approach to psycho-spiritual development unfolding according to a fivefold "ontological hierarchy":

bodily/biological; psychic/unconscious; interpersonal/social; cultural/symbolic; metaphysical/religious. Tympas thus envisions an "evolutionary relationship between the psychological and the spiritual" (34) within this multilevel framework, such that the spiritual journey incorporates and progresses through the multiple levels of human experience culminating in the ultimate goal of deification beyond individuation. In this way, Tympas aims for a synthesis between "wholeness" and "holiness," in which both the relative and absolute aspects of psychological and spiritual development are included to their mutual benefit.

Having established his methodology, Tympas devotes the central chapters of his work to comparing the respective approaches of Jung and The Confessor. Topics of discussion include individuation vs. deification, the archetypes vs. *logoi*, the psychological God-image/Self vs. the theological understanding of the *imago dei*. Despite his espousal of an egalitarian, non-reductionistic approach to his subject, Tympas' comparative enterprise possesses a certain asymmetrical character – evident in the oft-repeated phase "Jung failed to address/overlooked/lacked… etc." As such, Tympas tends to regard Maximus as a corrective to what he regards as the psychological reductionism of Jung. Granted Tympas' hierarchical understanding of psycho-spiritual development, it stands to reason that the theological gains precedence over the psychological. Yet, it is worth recalling Jung's frequent frustration in his own lifetime at the charge of "psychologism" – as though his psychological speculations were "*only* psychological." For Jung, the psyche was never "merely" the psyche but rather a fundamental principle of reality, a fathomless, infinitely mysterious realm shot through with numenosity. Rather than simply subordinating the psychological to the theological, this reader would have liked to learn something about the "crypto-metaphysical" character of the Jungian Unconscious, with its unmistakeable resonance with the Platonic world soul or the Plotinian *nous*.

For the more scientifically and less metaphysically inclined reader, however, Tympas' comparative synthesis (replete with graphs and diagrams) will prove worthwhile. For those unfamiliar with the thought of Jung and Maximus Confessor, the central comparative chapters provide an excellent, in-depth primer on their respective psychological and theological systems. Of particular interest is Tympas' comparison of the distinctive "eschatologies" of Jung and Maximus in relation to the problem of evil. In his fascinating and controversial *Answer to Job*, Jung rejects the classical understanding of evil as the *privatio boni* arguing instead for the need to integrate the dark elements of the god-image/Self within the collective psyche. As such, the goal of individuation as the attainment of psychic wholeness involves the synthesis of the contraries of good and evil, light and dark, masculine and feminine. For Maximus, on the other hand, the attainment of deification involves the transcendence of polarity in which male and female are resolved into the higher unity of universal human nature, while evil is abolished in the ultimate triumph of

the Good. Beyond the "wholeness" of individuation, suggests Tympas, awaits the "holiness" of deification.

For Tympas, Jung's dualistic *telos* stems from the inability of his psychology to rise above the natural, socio-cultural levels of being. Jung's determinedly anti-metaphysical stance means that he remains stuck at the level of archetypal polarities with "no redeeming power from outside to cast out the devil and man's evil side" (153). Maximus, on the other hand, takes us beyond Jung thanks to his Logos-theology. Whereas the Jungian Self remains confined to the psychological dimension, Christ the Logos, as simultaneously God and human, is capable of uniting both the psychological and the metaphysical. The central symbol of Maximian *theosis* is thus not merely unifying, but *transfiguring*.

Despite this somewhat asymmetrical comparison whereby Maximus serves as a corrective to Jung, Tympas concludes by emphasising some important ways in which Jung's psychological insights might complement Maximus' theological scheme. For example, a one-sided emphasis upon spiritual detachment can sometimes mask unconscious drives which have merely been supressed rather than properly integrated. This can lead to contemporary problems of distorted loves such as paedophilia in the priesthood. Jungian analysis serves a crucial role in unmasking one's spiritual *persona*, ensuring that the individual acquires the necessary psychic maturity that undergirds authentic spiritual progress. In sum, Tympas argues for an "emerging complementarity" between the Jungian and Maximian models whereby psychological "wholeness" opens onto the metaphysical level of being, while theological "holiness" manages to incorporate the unconscious, interpersonal, and socio-cultural levels of experience. As such, both models, while challenging each other's priorities, nonetheless work together to accomplish the whole spectrum of developmental perspectives spanning the five ontological levels (the bodily, psychic, social, cultural, metaphysical).

In conclusion, G.C. Tympas' *Carl Jung and Maximus the Confessor on Psychic Development* offers a carefully considered comparison between two divergent models of psychological and spiritual development. Despite considerable differences with respect to their historical and socio-cultural contexts, Tympas manages to bridge the gap by means of his trans-disciplinary paradigm. As such, Tympas' work is sure to satisfy all those seeking to reconcile or integrate the discoveries of modern depth psychology with the timeless spiritual insights of antiquity.

Heidegger and the Death of God: Between Plato and Nietzsche. Duane Armitage.
London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. Pp. xi + 118.
Reviewed by Jason Blakeburn, *McGill University*

Duane Armitage, in *Heidegger and the Death of God: Between Plato and Nietzsche*, analyzes the epistemological commitments of Martin Heidegger in terms of the polarity offered by Plato and Nietzsche as they argue for the proper account of reality, that is, the ontological status of intelligibility, meaning, truth, and being. On the one hand, Plato represents a transcendent idealism, that of the forms, in which truth, being, and intelligibility are mind-independent, thus grounding the changing sensible world on the fixed, invisible world of being. Moreover, this Platonism is inherently theistic, grounding the intelligibility of being in the existence of God (much like the rational theism of Cartesianism for which Armitage also advocates). On the other hand, Nietzsche represents the gross materialistic reductionism of modern science and technology that results in an atheistic nihilism and relativism. This Nietzscheanism reduces all metaphysical claims to natural processes and the will to power – things are true insofar as they are of use to the exercise of one's will, including notions of God. Armitage situates Heidegger in the midst of this battle between the giants of materialism (Nietzsche) and the gods of idealism (Plato), with reference to the Gigantomachy rhetorically sketched by Plato in *The Sophist*. Heidegger offers Armitage a purported third way to overcome metaphysics outside the boundaries of the battle between the gods and giants: a perspectival understanding of being that mediates the two realms of being and becoming through a rendering of the Platonic notion of methexis (participation) via alethia (truth). Heidegger comes close to resolving the Gigantomachy with what Armitage describes as his "meta-metaphysical" position on the importance and necessity of doing metaphysics and his attempt to overcome nihilism via art. Yet even Heidegger's attempted third way via art is itself already posited by Plato, as noted by John Sallis, leaving one caught amidst the battle of the Gigantomachy. Building on the work of Thomas Nagel, Armitage advocates for the necessity of metaphysics and transcendence in the manner of Plato's ontologically independent forms. Ultimately, Armitage argues that both Nietzsche and Heidegger fail to sufficiently ground the intelligibility of being and truth.

Armitage structures the text well, concisely rendering each chapter. In the introductory chapter, Armitage sketches the gist of his argument, highlighting the stakes of the Gigantomachy with an either-or proposition. Either meaning, intelligibility, logic, reason, etc. are real or they are not. If yes, then Platonism and Theism. If no, then Nietzcheanism and atheistic nihilism (6). In the second chapter, Armitage criticizes Nietzsche's philosophy of science as a self-defeating materialism and atheism that relies on making metaphysical truth claims which become a merely

self-referentially unintelligible liar's paradox resulting in the destruction of the foundation of modern science and technology. In chapter three, Armitage delves into Heidegger's third way via an analysis of the Platonic problem of methexis (participation) and alethia (truth) through art.

The argument is roughly made up of two parts. First, Armitage establishes the metaphysical and transcendental nature of Heidegger's thought, dialoguing with Heidegger's essay "What is Metaphysics?" and the notion of nothing. The human being transcends the physical to the metaphysical after recognizing nothing or difference, which Armitage succinctly describes: "Nothing is quite simply the possibility of metaphysics," and later "Nothing then is the condition for asking the why" (64). In other words, nothing prompts one to question the nature of being, though how or why the nothing does this remains unexplored other than Heidegger says it does. The human being at its core is metaphysical, "always transcending beings in favor of their being, their intelligibility" (65). One should ask whether this is what Heidegger means by transcendence for the Dasein. Second, Armitage explores Heidegger's notion of art, which discloses or reveals truth and mediates the methexis or participation of particular being with "beyng" and the beautiful. This notion of art "enacts a radically new ontology: an ontology of truth and beauty that can prove salvific in the current cultural climate of Nietzschean nihilism" (70). Armitage argues that this position on art is actually already present in Plato, thus making Heidegger a type of realist in that meaning, truth, intelligibility, and being are "ontological independent realities that reside outside of the human subject's will" (76). With this insight, Armitage seemingly neglects Heidegger's discussion of Plato's *Sophist* or his work on the status of images from his lectures on Hölderling's *The Ister*.[1] It also seems to misrepresent the status of being as some kind of graspable, external reality rather than the abyssal, absconding, and concealing groundless ground of beyng of Heidegger's other beginning of metaphysics.[2] This latent Platonism in Heidegger's thought then leads to "a kind of theism," in direct contradiction to Heidegger's stated text in his Contributions to the Philosophy of Religion (83).[3] In the fourth chapter, Armitage breaks away from Heidegger and Nietzsche to trace the work of Kierkegaard and Thomas Nagel regarding the paradox of the Gigantomachy, finally

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1. Martin Heidegger, *Plato's Sophist*, trans. Richard Rojcewics and Andre Schuwer (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2003); Martin Heidegger, *Hölderlin's Hymn "The Ister,"* trans. William McNeill and Julia Martin (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996).

2. Martin Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela Vallega-Neu (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2012).

3. "With the death of this God, all theisms wither away," in Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, 326.

concluding with Nagel that only Platonic realism sufficiently grounds reason and rationality.

As Armitage's argument unfolds, the ostensible topic of the book, namely Heidegger and the death of God, appears but only as a small example of Heidegger's attempted third way between the gods/Plato and the giants/Nietzsche. In this sense, the work seems mislabeled. It is not an in-depth analysis and rendering of Heidegger's engagement with the notion of the death of God, nor does it engage with the multitude of scholarship on the topic.[4] Rather, the work as a whole is an argument for Platonic and Cartesian theism over and against a Nietzschean atheistic nihilism. Heidegger's work provides Armitage a useful heuristic within which to couch this argument and recount the history of Western metaphysics as the history of Platonism and its inversion by Nietzsche. In other words, Armitage uses Heidegger's critique of Nietzsche as a scaffold to support his claims for a theistic ontological idealism and realism. This leads to a somewhat idiosyncratic reading of Heidegger's position regarding the ontological status of truth, being, beauty, and art, as well as a truncated engagement with Heidegger's notion of the last god. If the reader is looking for an insightful analysis of Heidegger's take on the death of God, the reader should look elsewhere.[5]

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4. F. Schalow, *Heidegger and the Quest for the Sacred: From Thought to the Sanctuary of Faith* (Boston: Springer, 2001); Gail Stenstad, "The Last God - A Reading," *Research in Phenomenology* 23 (1993): 172–185; George Seidel, "Heidegger's Last God and the Schelling Connection," *Laval Théologique et Philosophique* 55, No. 1 (1999): 85–98; Ben Vedder, *Heidegger's Philosophy of Religion: From God to the Gods* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2007); Elliot R. Wolfson, "Heidegger's Apophaticism: Unsaying the Said and the Silence of the Last God," in *Contemporary Debates in Negative Theology and Philosophy*, eds. Nahum Brown and Aaron J. Simmons (Palgrave: Cham, 2017), 185–216; Benjamin D. Crowe, *Heidegger's Phenomenology of Religion: Realism and Cultural Criticism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008).
5. For a start, see Tracy Colony, "The Death of God and the Life of Being: Heidegger's Confrontation with Nietzsche," *Interpreting Heidegger: Critical Essays*, ed. Daniel Dahlstrom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 197-216.

Introduction to the New Testament: Reference Edition. Carl R. Holladay. Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2017. Pp. xl + 248.
Reviewed by David Anthony Basham, *McGill University*

First published in 2005, Carl Holladay of the Candler School of Theology at Emory University has provided an updated and reprinted *Introduction to the New Testament* (NT) that assumes little to no familiarity with the NT. With the twofold focus of theology and church, Holladay initially sought to provide an Introduction that answered the question: "What … do ministers really need to know about the [NT] to relate it meaningfully to their own life of faith and the communities of faith they serve?" (xxvii–iii). This new edition continues to work toward that answer. While his *Introduction* includes the necessary discussion of historical and literary information regarding the NT, Holladay's particular approach is, admittedly, theological. This approach stems from his view that the NT is a defined group of writings that has been privileged by the church at large as "theologically normative for interpreting the message and meaning of Jesus Christ" (1). He is quick to distinguish his *Introduction* from a NT theology, though, since he is not arranging the material thematically but, rather, introducing the NT theologically in a somewhat canonical order. Holladay moves through the NT in canonical groupings, addressing the Gospels, Acts, the Pauline letters, Hebrews, the Catholic Letters, and Revelation. The specific order of writings dealt with in each grouping, however, reflects critical insights (e.g., beginning with Mark instead of Matthew).

Part One concerns the NT as theological writings, noting that the underlying conviction of each writing is that "God is at work in Christ" (19). The history of how the NT canon was shaped is also discussed, though a more in-depth treatment of the entire Christian canon follows in *Part Seven* at the end of the volume. Holladay highlights the theological significance of the current arrangement of the NT, as well as the value judgments it represents. Maintaining the canonical order of the various groupings, while altering the specific order within each, Holladay's approach portrays a respect for church tradition in tandem with more critical research that has challenged some of the church's canonical convictions.

In *Part Two*, Holladay begins discussion of the Gospels with their relationship to one another, as well as their relationship to the historical Jesus. These chapters include helpful diagrams that visualize some of the more prominent theories of source dependence and Gospel origins.

Part Three concerns the Acts of the Apostles as the narrative of the church's origin and expansion. Holladay again emphasizes the implicit message in canonical ordering: that Acts precedes the Pauline letters "invariably affects the mental image we form of Paul as we read the letters" (371).

Part Four addresses the Pauline letters and Hebrews. The Pauline letters are

characterized as containing *situational theology* – they show Paul developing theological positions in response to questions from within specific situations – and *dialogical theology* – reflecting an ongoing conversation between Paul and his churches. Paul not only brings theological conviction "to the conversation," but he also works out his positions "in the conversation" (393). Holladay prefaces his introduction to the Pauline corpus, which he has reordered, with a discussion of ancient epistolography, the general formatting of each letter, form criticism as applied to the letters, their identity as an edited collection, a possible timeline for Paul's life and letters, and Paul's indelible imprint on the Christian church.

In addition to the undisputed Pauline letters, Holladay also considers 2 Thessalonians to have been written by Paul and, possibly, Colossians. He is less confident about the authorship of Ephesians and unconvinced of direct Pauline authorship of the Pastorals. These judgments stem, in part, from the likely timeline of Paul's letter-writing activity. If the thirteen letters attributed to Paul were written in the latter third of his twenty- to thirty-year ministry (i.e., within a maximum ten- to twelve-year period), Holladay concludes that these letters should represent a mature Paul, albeit with room for some adjustment and refinement of positions. Using such a framework, Holladay moves to determine outliers with regard to authentic Pauline form and content.

Part Five introduces the Catholic Letters which, in contrast to Paul's letters, generally envision a wider audience. Holladay also acknowledges that such groupings can often mask the individual peculiarities of each letter.

In *Part Six*, Holladay's robust treatment of Revelation details the wide range of literary issues, theological concerns, and potential historical backgrounds that make the text elusive.

Holladay closes his volume with further discussion of the Christian canon in *Part Seven*. Here, he provides an historical overview of the church's privileging, not just of the NT writings, but those of the Old Testament as well, and outlines the multi-faceted significance of accepting these writings as *canonical*. The *Introduction* includes two appendices: one on ancient canonical lists and the other on early Christian views of the Gospels.

The greatest drawback to Holladay's *Introduction* is intentional. He has chosen not to incorporate preliminary material on the world of the NT for two reasons: such constructions, he claims, are always highly selective and never ideologically neutral; and second, these constructions often oversimplify the complexity of the historical, political, social, and religious realities of the first century CE (xxvi). These realities are nevertheless laced throughout, enriching the treatment of each NT writing. Holladay masterfully weaves theological insight together with necessary critical information in a way that simultaneously illumines the message of the NT, while readily supplying the committed reader with the dense history of NT scholarship.

Terrestrial Lessons: The Conquest of the World as Globe. Sumathi Ramaswamy.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2017. Pp. xx + 429.
Reviewed by Helena Reddington, *McGill University*

Sumathi Ramaswamy's *Terrestrial Lessons: The Conquest of the World as Globe*
centres on the history of the terrestrial globe in the Indian subcontinent, and
examines how the European preoccupation with terrestrial sphericity came to be
an Indian concern. Ramaswamy raises the important question: does this object have
the same history elsewhere and everywhere, and with the same affects and effects?
Ramaswamy provides a much-needed alternative history of this "worldly" object,
which serves to fill a significant gap in the existing literature. While the notion of the
world as a globe has been extensively examined and studied in the Western context,
the question arises, what occurs when this conception of our earth travels elsewhere?
Moreover, what are the implications when the globe, as a symbol of the educated,
enlightened, and modern, is received in a colonial context?

Significantly, Ramaswamy's work makes a meaningful contribution to the
field of South Asian Religions. In her study, Ramaswamy highlights the disparity
between, on the one hand, the Western enlightenment and Christian understanding
of the earth as spherical, and on the other, the multiple Hindu conceptions of the
earth, for example, the idea of the flat Earth as resting upon an animal variously
imagined as a turtle, elephant, or a multi-headed cobra. In her analysis of the
confrontations between European and native conceptions of the earth, Ramaswamy
coins the term "cartographic evangelist" (61) which she uses to describe a figure
who is involved in the task of "geographic catechism" (16). Many Europeans living
and working in colonial India took up the mantel of guiding young Indians away
from the "darkness" of their false ancestral knowledge into the European "light" in
the form of the "the Gospel of Modern Earth" (61), as Ramaswamy aptly phrases
it. Ramaswamy illustrates not only how the spherical world became an object to be
both surveyed and mastered by the colonial British, but also came to represent the
superiority of European scientific knowledge. She convincingly argues that these
beliefs cannot be untangled from the Christian notion of God as not only the creator
of the universe but also the spherical earth and the life which inhabits it. In this
context, Ramaswamy interprets the globe as becoming an instrument of conversion
which strikes down the very foundations of Hinduism and serves to wean the young
Hindu child away from their native idols.

Ramaswamy traces the history of the terrestrial globe in colonial India
and, through extensive archival research, is able to relate key accounts of Indian
encounters with this object. Her command of the history and sources across the
regions of both North and South India is impressive. Moreover, a notable feature of
Ramaswamy's book is the remarkable images and photographs which have remained

unscrutinized until now. These visuals further complement her critical analysis on the terrestrial globe as a material object.

Ramaswamy structures the chapters of her book around three key encounters with the terrestrial globe, the first being the story of a teenage Maratha prince who was gifted a globe by a colonel. The prince was subsequently encouraged to study the terrestrial globe and learn geography by a reverend of the Halle Mission in 1794. Yet, in his pursuit of European science throughout the course of his life, Ramaswamy highlights the fact that the Maratha king retained his ancestral faith even while he converted to "the Gospel of Modern Earth."

In the second encounter, Ramaswamy relays the account of a female Protestant missionary who, in 1815, presented a makeshift ball of silk fashioned out of some scrap cloth to a young Brahman who was troubled about his ancestral beliefs. The young man abandons his inherited faith as a result of this encounter and undergoes baptism, eventually becoming a teacher of so-called "terrestrial lessons" to a new generation of native pupils in mission schools. Ramaswamy coins the term "global pandit" (94) to categorize this young man as a figure who feels pressured to uphold his ancestral knowledge, yet rejects his hereditary role in order to advance the cause of Western science alongside European adherents.

The last encounter centers on the plot of the 1956 Indian film, *Aparajito*, in which a Bengali Christian headmaster presents his brightest pupil with a pocket globe. The young boy uses the globe to teach his widowed mother the terrestrial lessons he has learned in school. However, as a young man, he rejects his mother's wish for him to follow in his ancestral profession of Hindu priesthood and embarks on a journey to pursue his higher education in the city, which comes to represent secular modernity.

Ramaswamy's method of weaving these personal narratives with the history of the terrestrial globe in different places and times across the Indian subcontinent is both effective and engaging. These core narratives provide a springboard from which Ramaswamy is able to delve into more nuanced historical accounts and analysis over the course of her chapters. At the same time, these core narratives serve as anchors which aid the reader in making meaningful connections across the various topics and themes discussed in each of the chapters.

Ramaswamy's *Terrestrial Lessons* is an ambitious work which takes an innovative approach by making the central "protagonist" of the academic work the artefact of the terrestrial globe. Ramaswamy has achieved her goal in demonstrating that even the most commonplace objects, such as the school globe, have consequential histories. This work promises to make a valuable contribution to the scholarship of South Asian Religions and Post-Colonial Studies.

The Art of Visual Exegesis: Rhetoric, Texts, Images. Edited by Vernon K. Robbins, Walter S. Melion, and Roy R. Jeal. Atlanta, GA: SBL Press, 2017. Pp. xix + 511. Reviewed by Nicola E. Hayward, *McGill University*

The present volume of essays developed during monthly seminars over the 2013-14 academic year at Emory University. The point of these monthly meetings was to engage in scholarly discussions which focused on visual hermeneutics and exegesis as applied to multiple religious traditions. The book consists of twelve essays and is divided into three parts – "Methodology for Visual Exegesis and Rhetography," "Visual Exegesis Using Roman Visual Material Culture," and "Visual Exegesis Using Christian Art." The purpose of this book is to examine the relationship between the verbal or written word and its visual production, whether it be words that elicit a visual image in the mind or an image that elicits a text. The importance of images for both the writing and interpretation of the New Testament is an area which has garnered much attention in recent years.

Part 1 opens with "New Testament Texts, Visual Material Culture, and Earliest Christian Art" by Vernon K. Robbins, who presents an overview of scholarly works which interpret New Testament texts in light of visual material culture. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, textual evidence dominated scholarly debates, but in the last few decades, scholars have begun to emphasise the importance of visual culture and cognitive studies in biblical interpretation. Robbins' survey of works covers scholars who focus on how words elicit mental images in the reader/ hearer and scholars who focus on the role of material culture in biblical exegesis.

Roy R. Jeal in the second chapter, "Visual Interpretation: Blending Rhetorical Arts in Colossians 2:6–3:4," discusses visual exegesis as it relates to Colossians 2:6-3:4. He is interested in how a biblical text evokes images in the imagination of the reader/hearer and how these images impact group behaviour and identity. Colossians 2:11-15 serves as an excellent example of what Jeal describes as the "blending of images." These verses present a mingling of images, such as circumcision, burial and baptism, all "located in Christ and brought about by the workings of God" (77). This highly complex set of images, Jeal maintains, presents a new reality or mental space for its audience, often creating a new visual argument about social formation.

In the next two chapters, L. Gregory Bloomquist applies rhetography as defined by Robbins to the study of the Gospel of John. In his first essay, "Methodology Underlying the Presentation of Visual Texture in the Gospel of John," Bloomquist is interested in the cognitive sciences, in how the text creates visual images in the mind of the reader/hearer and how such images "create meaning through narrative" (92). In his second chapter, "Eyes Wide Open, Seeing Nothing: The Challenge of the Gospel of John's Nonvisualizable Texture for Readings Using Visual Texture," Bloomquist again applies the term rhetography to highlight the visual argument in

the Gospel of John, showing how the mind is capable of shaping complex images into persuasive narratives. His contribution illustrates the difficulty of using rhetography for reading the Gospel, a narrative that at times is not so easy to form in the mind's eye as it employs abstract concepts, such as word, darkness, light and life. Bloomquist nevertheless shows how the Gospel, through "conceptual blending," a phrase coined by Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner, links mental images together in order to form memorable narratives that gain power the more they are used in local as well as broader cultural contexts (130-2).

Part 2 begins with Harry O. Maier's chapter, "Paul, Imperial Situation, and Visualization in the Epistle to the Colossians." The Roman Empire was a world in which the image functioned as a major tool for communication regardless of one's literary ability. Maier, in his chapter, draws attention to the importance of Roman material culture for the interpretation of Paul's letters, as well as Paul's use of imperial imagery as a persuasive rhetorical tool. In his chapter, Maier discusses the significance of *ekphrasis*, or graphic speech, in Paul's writing, a literary device that helped focalize his audience in an imperial situation. Paul used graphic language constructed from the imperial world to fashion a positive and beneficial image of Christ's reign. Maier uses the Letter to the Colossians as a test case to emphasize the importance of *ekphrasis* for situating Christ followers within a larger Roman visual narrative.

Brigitte Kahl's contribution, "The Galatian Suicide and the Transbinary Semiotics of Christ Crucified (Galatians 3:1): Exercises in Visual Exegesis and Critical Reimagination," explores the graphic image of a suicidal Gaul in relation to the crucified Christ in Galatians 3:1. Kahl uses sociohistorical and sociorhetorical interpretation, as well as a structural-semiotic component to examine how sculptures, like *The Galatian Suicide*, would have provided an important visual context for Paul's audience to understand Christ's dying on the cross. The image of the defeated Gaul originally symbolized the victory of Pergamon and subsequently the triumph of Rome in the province of Gaul. Kahl notes that in the Pauline community, *The Galatian Suicide* might have come to signify in death the power of a new life, such that when viewed through the lens of Christ crucified, the image re-focalizes the reader towards a messianic reading, one in which there is victory and hope in death.

Part 2 concludes with Rosemary Canavan's chapter on "Armor, Peace, and Gladiators: A Visual Exegesis of Ephesians 6:10–17," which engages in a visual exegesis of how clothing and armory imagery reflect the spiritual struggle in Ephesians 6:10-17. Canavan uses the findings from a gladiator graveyard in Ephesus and the context of the *Pax Romana* in Asia Minor to situate the letter and thus its imagery. Canavan argues that a dialogue exists between the material data in the Greco-Roman world and in the text. Her interest lies in looking at how the iconography in the author's world interacts with the textual account of putting on

military armour and taking up weapons, and the effect this interaction between material culture and text has on its audience.

Part 3 opens with Christopher J. Nygren's chapter, "Graphic Exegesis: Reflections on the Difficulty of Talking about Biblical Images, Pictures, and Texts," which focuses specifically on the role of pictures in biblical exegesis. He begins with examining how the term "image" has been understood by art historians and rhetographers. Image is a complex term and often used to signify both physical form and nonphysical form, such as a mental projection or a literary figure. Regardless of its diversity, Nygren notes that the image is essential to understanding Christian religion, and as such, art history and rhetography when utilized collectively can show how "pictures, texts and images exist in dialectical tension" (275). Crucial to his discussion is the term "graphic exegesis," which differs from "visual exegesis" in that it is rooted in actual pictures. To illustrate the significance of graphic exegesis, Nygren concludes his essay with a case study of Titian's *Ecce Homo*.

Chapter nine, "The Gifts of Epiphany: Geertgen tot Sint Jans and the Adorationof the Magi," by Henry Luttikhuizen, takes a look at how the Dutch painter Geertgen tot Sint Jans interpreted the story of the magi found in Matthew 2:1-12. Luttikhuizen examines three of Geertgen's paintings of the Epiphany, noting that, while they draw from the biblical narrative, they also represent varying exegetical layers. For example, Luttikhuizen remarks how Geertgen's paintings allude to Origen's account that there were only three magi, a detail not found in the Matthean account; to Pseudo-Bede's description of one of the wise men as dark-skinned; and to the depiction of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, also not found in the textual account but an important pilgrimage location under Hospitaller care.

In chapter ten, "'Exactitude and Fidelity'? Paintings of Christ Healing the Blind by Nicolas Poussin and Philippe de Champaigne," James Clifton, rather than analyse paintings by one artist, considers the same content by different artists – Poussin and Champagne – in order to understand how paintings function as a form of biblical exegesis. Clifton notes that this is not necessarily an exact interpretation, but is often fluid and open to a variety of readings. Indeed, paintings do not offer up meaning so readily; in fact, meaning must be drawn out and conjured in our imagination.

Next, "Topos versus Topia: Herri met de Bles's Visual Exegesis of the Parable of the Good Samaritan," by Michel Weemans, offers a detailed analysis of Herri met de Bles' *Landscape with the Parable of the Good Samaritan*. Weemans focuses on two characteristics of Bles's painting; its compositional structure and its recurrent motifs. Weemans maintains that met de Bles structures his painting on horizontal and vertical axes, which creates a tension and helps the painter to articulate his visual exegesis of the parable. Understanding the metaphorical use of Bles' motifs helps the viewer to interpret and understand the biblical story, yet the inclusion of

"topoi" not found in the textual version allows the viewer to realize the account on his/her own terms.

In the final chapter, "Signa Resurrectionis: Vision, Image, and Pictorial Proof in Pieter Bruegel's Resurrection of Circa 1562–1563," Walter S. Melion provides a detailed analysis of Pieter Bruegel's *The Resurrection*. Melion points out that the subject of Bruegel's engraving, the resurrection, was never witnessed in the Gospel narratives, yet Bruegel attempts to visually explain the significance of this unseen event. If read correctly, the image points to the *signa resurrectionis*. He depicts signs, like this, by breaking with the pictorial tradition in order to engage with the exegetical tradition, such as the *Glossa*. Through a juxtaposition of light and dark, as well as the role of the gaze, for example, *The Resurrection* shows the importance of vision and image for faith.

This collection of essays nicely addresses Margaret R. Miles' statement over thirty years ago of the need to include the use of both texts and images in the search to understand the past. For those readers interested in the relationship between text and image, this book offers a rich and diverse collection, drawing attention to the need to be more precise in methodology and terminology. It is not, however, for those without any prior knowledge as some of the essays do presuppose a familiarity with biblical interpretation and material culture. Further areas to consider would be how rhetography and visual exegesis are shaped through a gendered and class reading. But, as Vernon K. Robbins points out in his introduction, regarding the interaction between text and image, "we can expect many more [discussions] to appear in the coming years" (54).

La nation pluraliste. Repenser la diversité religieuse au Québec. Michel Seymour and Jérôme Gosselin-Tapp. Montréal: Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 2018. Pp. 293.
Reviewed by Marie-Ève Melanson, *McGill University*

L'ouvrage de Michel Seymour et Jérôme Gosselin-Tapp développe un cadre normatif original pour la gestion de la diversité religieuse en contexte québécois. S'inspirant de la pensée de John Rawls, les auteurs proposent un modèle de laïcité libéral républicain qui réconcilie les conceptions individualiste et communautarienne de l'individu et équilibre les droits individuels et collectifs des peuples. Ils recommandent d'interdire le port de symboles religieux uniquement aux fonctionnaires qui exercent le pouvoir coercitif *ultime* (juges de dernière instance, président de la République, président de l'Assemblée nationale et/ou du Sénat) parce qu'ils incarnent, dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions, l'État laïque. Leurs recommandations incluent aussi que les services publics soient dispensés et reçus à visage découvert, que le crucifix soit retiré de l'Assemblée nationale, que les prières soient interdites avant les conseils de ville et que l'on réduise progressivement le financement accordé aux écoles privées confessionnelles. Cette solution s'appuie sur une conception de la laïcité où la neutralité et la séparation de l'État et de l'Église sont des finalités en elles-mêmes, et non de simples modes opératoires permettant d'assurer l'égalité et la liberté de religion. L'adoption d'une charte de la laïcité, qui aurait la même valeur que la charte des droits et libertés, est au cœur de leurs recommandations.

L'ouvrage peut être divisé en deux parties. Les trois premiers chapitres défendent que la théorie rawlsienne développée dans *Libéralisme politique* et *Paix et démocratie* est opératoire. Les chapitres consécutifs s'engagent plus généralement dans la réflexion actuelle sur la conciliation des droits collectifs et individuels au sein des sociétés pluralistes, et s'intéressent plus spécifiquement au cas du Québec.

Le premier chapitre rappelle l'importance, pour Rawls, de la neutralité métaphysique étant donné le fait pluraliste; la conduite de projets collectifs demande une suspension du jugement sur la vérité des doctrines compréhensives. Les auteurs distinguent les conceptions individualiste et communautarienne de l'individu, de sa liberté et de sa capacité à consentir, et ce dans le but de montrer que le libéralisme politique permet de les concilier. En effet, Rawls reconnaît à l'individu une liberté et une autonomie qui lui est propre sans pour autant nier l'influence de son milieu communautaire sur son développement moral et personnel. L'individu est libre sans toutefois être antérieurs à ses fins puisqu'il sait faire usage d'autoréflexivité au sein de son groupe d'appartenance même si celui-ci l'influence. Dans l'élaboration d'un projet de société, Rawls recommande donc qu'il y ait un dialogue entre la théorie de la justice et les jugements individuels. Un modèle de justice fonctionnel qui

permet de maintenir la stabilité politique requiert en ce sens une évaluation continue de la cohérence entre la conception sociale de la justice et les intuitions morales individuelles.

Le deuxième chapitre met en évidence que la pensée de Rawls comporte des aspects républicains importants, quoique souvent négligés dans la littérature. Or ceux-ci s'avèrent particulièrement utiles pour repenser la diversité religieuse au Québec. Principalement, les auteurs soulignent que Rawls considère que les réclamations morales du peuple sont valides; le peuple est lui-même sujet de droit. Les individus, tout comme les peuples, jouissent de libertés, notamment celle de s'autodéfinir. Il en résulte une série d'obligations, tantôt imposées par le peuple aux citoyens, tantôt mutuelles. Par exemple, l'obligation pour les minorités de s'intégrer à la société et pour l'État de soutenir l'intégration.

Le troisième chapitre s'intéresse plus particulièrement à la liberté de religion et institue une distinction entre ce qui relève des droits fondamentaux (les signes religieux arborés) et ce qui est susceptible de faire l'objet d'un accommodement raisonnable (l'éthique de vie). Puisque les signes religieux individuels sont considérés, suivant Rawls, comme partie intégrante de l'identité morale – c'est-à-dire comme une représentation de soi exprimant un état psychologique – et que le libéralisme politique promeut le respect de l'expression symbolique des identités diverses composant la société, les auteurs défendent que les symboles religieux devraient être autorisés pour les employés de la fonction publique. Parce qu'ils expriment de manière passive l'appartenance à une communauté religieuse, ces symboles constitueraient en fait le noyau dur de la liberté de religion. Une société qui voudrait respecter la conception communautarienne de l'identité ne pourrait se permettre de contraindre l'expression passive de l'appartenance religieuse. Ceci ne signifie pas que tout ce qui relève d'un code d'éthique religieux ou de la démonstration active de l'appartenance religieuse (pratiques religieuses, rituels, traditions, etc.) soit garanti par le principe de liberté de religion. Ces expressions doivent être réputées raisonnables au sein de la société pour y être admises.

L'innovation principale de ce modèle, selon les auteurs, consiste en ce qu'il maintient une tension saine entre les libertés individuelles et les libertés du peuple : l'État ne peut, d'une part, élargir le champ d'application des principes de la laïcité à l'échelle individuelle parce qu'il doit respecter la diversité des identités morales; d'autre part, l'individu religieux ne peut adopter un code de conduite qui va à l'encontre des principes fondamentaux dont s'est doté le peuple parce qu'il doit respecter ses droits collectifs. L'objectif est donc de trouver un équilibre entre le respect de la diversité et de l'unité sociale par l'égale reconnaissance de la légitimité des demandes provenant des personnes religieuses et du peuple – ce à quoi sera consacré la seconde partie.

Les trois derniers chapitres se servent du modèle théorique précédemment développé pour répondre aux besoins spécifiques du Québec. Les auteurs défendent dans le quatrième chapitre que ni le modèle individualiste – qui caractérise le multiculturalisme canadien –, ni le modèle républicain « jacobin » – qui caractérise le cas français –, ne sont adaptés pour le Québec. Le chapitre s'ouvre sur une présentation de ces deux modèles dans leur contexte historique respectif et porte une attention particulière aux décisions juridiques les plus marquantes pour les deux pays. Les auteurs procèdent ensuite à l'analyse de deux projets de lois québécois : le projet de loi n° 94, qui implique l'interdiction d'offrir et de recevoir des services publics à visage couvert, et le projet de loi n° 60 (Charte des valeurs), qui proscrit le port de symboles religieux ostentatoires pour les fonctionnaires. L'échec qu'ont connu ces projets au Québec est attribué au fait qu'ils présentaient une perspective trop individualiste pour le premier, et trop républicaine pour le second.

Une distinction particulièrement intéressante est opérée entre laïcité narrative, relative au discours public sur la laïcité, et laïcité juridique, relevant des règles et des normes effectives au sein de l'État. Les auteurs soutiennent qu'il peut exister un décalage entre ces « deux laïcités » au sein d'une société. L'argumentaire qu'ils développent pour justifier la pertinence de leur modèle pour le Québec semble toutefois accorder une importance marquée à l'harmonie entre les deux. La conséquence implicite est peut-être que si l'on accorde une importance aux droits collectifs des peuples à l'autodétermination, il importe du même coup que la laïcité juridique s'accorde avec la laïcité narrative. Cet aspect aurait pu être développé davantage. Ce qui est certain, c'est que pour les auteurs, si la laïcité juridique canadienne ne convient pas au Québec, c'est qu'elle ne convient pas à son narratif identitaire. La seconde partie du chapitre s'applique d'ailleurs à défendre que le « malaise identitaire québécois » appelle à intégrer, au sein même du modèle de gestion de la diversité, des considérations relatives à l'identité nationale québécoise.

Les auteurs proposent de mettre de l'avant une politique d'interculturalisme pour répondre à ces préoccupations, qui est précisée au chapitre suivant. Cette politique « de reconnaissance réciproque » accorde des droits aux communautés culturelles et religieuses. Les auteurs se limitent à évoquer leur droit de préserver leur langue et leur culture et de se doter d'institutions pour le faire. Ces communautés minoritaires doivent en retour reconnaître leur devoir de s'intégrer linguistiquement, accepter les règles du vivre-ensemble (incluant l'égalité entre les femmes et les hommes) et se soumettre à la définition du bien commun (incluant la laïcité de l'État). L'interculturalisme est en ce sens vertical, c'est-à-dire que les minorités doivent s'intégrer à la société globale.

Le cinquième chapitre critique l'individualisme moral de Jocelyn Maclure et Charles Taylor, ainsi que le républicanisme de Cécile Laborde et Philip Pettit. Entrevoir les angles morts de ces approches permet, selon les auteurs, de tracer

une troisième voix. Puisque la neutralité et la séparation de l'État et de l'Église constituent les finalités de la laïcité, c'est l'État, et non les individus, qui est contraint à ces principes. C'est ainsi qu'est justifiée l'interdiction d'arborer des symboles religieux pour les individus qui incarnent l'État (juges de dernière instance, président de la République, président de l'Assemblée nationale et/ou du Sénat). Le droit du peuple de se doter d'institutions neutres leur impose le devoir de symboliser cette neutralité, même si les manifestations passives de la religion sont considérées comme le noyau dur de la liberté de religion. Suivant ce modèle, les droits et libertés ne visent pas principalement à assurer l'autonomie individuelle; l'objectif ultime est plutôt d'assurer la stabilité politique, la cohésion sociale et l'unité. Ainsi, bien que les libertés individuelles soient soumises au bien commun, la stabilité politique n'est rendue possible que si la liberté de religion et l'égalité des citoyens sont respectées. Les fonctionnaires qui n'incarnent pas l'État devraient donc, quant à eux, être autorisés à porter des symboles religieux (à l'exception de ceux qui couvrent le visage par souci de sécurité, de communication et d'identification).

Si l'enjeu de la laïcité au sens où l'entendent M. Seymour et J. Gosselin-Tapp est la stabilité politique, nous nous questionnons à savoir en quoi le fait d'incarner symboliquement la neutralité de l'État permet effectivement d'atteindre une plus grande stabilité. L'ouvrage aurait gagné à répondre à l'objection selon laquelle cacher les symboles religieux n'entraîne pas la disparition des croyances religieuses.

Le sixième et dernier chapitre prend position dans les débats les plus marquants de la province au cours des dernières années, tant au niveau social (commission Bouchard-Taylor, implantation du cours Éthique et culture religieuse, port du burkini), qu'au niveau politique (Charte des valeurs) ou juridique (arrêts Amselem, Multani, Saguenay, S.L. et Loyola). Le modèle précédemment défendu sert de grille de lecture : les auteurs soulignent chaque fois comment leur modèle aurait permis de résoudre de manière plus efficace ces conflits et prennent soin d'étayer quels sont les principes déterminants qui s'appliquent en chaque situation.

Deux éléments de leur approche sont précisés. D'abord, les auteurs élargissent la catégorie de l'accommodement raisonnable pour y inclure ce qui relève d'un compromis entre un individu et la société en matière de pratiques liées à une éthique individuelle. L'accommodement n'est donc pas considéré seulement comme une mesure visant à corriger une situation d'inégalité. Ceci permet de distinguer ce qui relève du droit fondamental à la religion (les symboles religieux qui constituent une manifestation passive de la religion) des autres considérations qui ont une « importance périphérique » (les pratiques de la religion). Ils insistent également sur l'importance d'utiliser un critère hybride – à la fois objectif et subjectif – pour évaluer le caractère raisonnable d'un accommodement religieux. Ce critère évalue non seulement la sincérité de la croyance, mais aussi si celle-ci s'ancre dans une tradition bien établie. Selon les auteurs, la contrainte ainsi exercée sur le droit à la

religion a le mérite d'assurer un meilleur équilibre entre les droits individuels et collectifs que le modèle subjectiviste et individualiste canadien.

En dernière analyse, si le modèle que les auteurs proposent se présente comme un moyen authentique de mettre fin à la « crise identitaire » au Québec, c'est parce qu'il prétend correspondre, dans une certaine mesure, à l'identité québécoise. Il représente pour ainsi dire une partie de l'aboutissement du projet d'autodétermination qui serait bénéfique à la société québécoise. Il nous semble toutefois que quelques problèmes potentiels de l'approche proposée sont demeurés inexplorés, notamment en cette matière du droit des peuples à l'autodétermination. Si les auteurs ont pris soin de détailler comment ce droit pourrait prendre forme du côté de la majorité d'ascendance canadienne-française, la façon dont ce droit pourrait être appliqué pour les minorités religieuses et culturelles internes au Québec ne fait pas l'objet d'une évaluation soutenue. Pour que le droit des peuples à l'autodétermination ne soit pas l'apanage exclusif d'une majorité culturelle sur un territoire donné, le modèle développé par M. Seymour et J. Gosselin-Tapp gagnerait à accorder une place plus importante aux droits collectifs des minorités présentes au Québec ainsi qu'à leurs propres considérations identitaires.

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1. Stanley Fish, *Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities* (London: Harvard University Press, 1989), 123.

2. M. Jimmie Killingsworth and Jaqueline S. Palmer, "Millenial Ecology: The Apocalyptic Narrative from Silent Spring to Global Warming," in ed. Carl G.

Herndl and Stuart C. Brown, *Green Culture: Environmental Rhetoric in Contemporary America* (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1996), 21–45.

3. Pierre Hadot, *The Veil of Isis*, trans. Michael Chase (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006), 18.

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4. Fish, *Is There a Text in This Class?*, 124.

5. Killingsworth and Palmer, "Millenial Ecology," 34.

6. Hadot, *The Veil of Isis*, 25.

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