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Essays on Embodiment and Religion

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Editors' Introduction

Since Plato's *Symposium*, where flight from the allure of bodily things was presented as a necessary stage in the attainment of wisdom, the question of the role of the body in the spiritual life of the human being has been the object of considered reflection. The present collection of essays seeks to address a number of aspects and stages of the history of philosophical and theological reflection on embodiment. The articles in this collection represent and investigate a variety of religio-philosophical traditions, attesting to the universality of the problem of embodiment.

We are delighted to publish an invited contribution by Ola Sigurdson, Professor of Systematic Theology at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden, a leading scholar in theological somatology and co-editor of *The Body Unbound: Philosophical Perspectives on Politics, Embodiment, and Religion* (Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010). In "Religious Embodiment Between Medicine and Modernity," originally delivered as a keynote address for the European Society for the Philosophy of Religion, Sigurdson reflects upon the effect of the development of modern medicine on attitudes towards the human body, detecting a quest for human immortality in the early-modern mechanization of the body. Sigurdson concludes that "essential to any discussion of religious embodiment or embodied religion is both some kind of historical genealogy of religion as well as of the body, and a philosophical or theological account that tries to lay bare how we always already exist bodily in ways that cannot reduce our embodiment to a manipulable object."

We are also delighted to offer to the reader several peer-reviewed contributions on a number of themes related to the concept of embodiment:

In "The Method-and-Wisdom Model of the Medical Body," Vesna A. Wallace (UCSB) discusses the treatment of the body in Mongolian Buddhist medicine, proposing that the Method-and-Wisdom model "emphasizes integration rather than a reductionistic process, and it seeks to show the

structures and levels at which various psychophysiological functions operate through their immense and complicated networks and interactions."

In "The Faithful Departed," David Givens (University of Pittsburgh) explores the issue of religious embodiment under the aspect of human illness, illustrating how saints identified as patron saints of those afflicted with illness, as well as patron saints who themselves suffered from illness associated with the exercise of their apostolate, are coming also to be identified specifically as patron saints for people living with HIV/AIDS.

In "The Embodiment of Fear," Julie B. Deluty (New York University) explores the ways in which Ugaritic literature addresses the experience of fear, investigating the role of embodiment of fear in the generation of hierarchical social dynamics.

In "Reconsidering Religious Experience," Alessandro Lazzarelli (National Tsing Hua University, Taiwan), examining the role of the body in specifically religious experience, develops a phenomenology of religious experience, contending that "the attempt to emphasize either the emotional or the cognitive aspect of religious experience fails to capture the relationship between felt and discursive ways of knowledge, that is, how consciousness is embodied."

In "The Body of Christ as the Instrument of Timing," Timothy Watt (University of Massachusetts) discusses John Milton's work *Paradise Regained*, proposing that the concept of *kairos*, or right timing, is crucial for understanding the obedience of the Son in response to the temptations of the devil. Christ's obedience consists in his self-orchestration according to God's concept of timeliness: "all the temptations are one temptation: the temptation to transgress the will of God, to be disobedient, in terms of *kairos*, to either rush or drag, either way to be out of step with the timing of the will of God. Thus, the Son waits, saying, 'All things are best fulfilled in their due time, / And time there is for all things, truth hath said.'"

In addition to these peer-reviewed articles, we have the opportunity to present to the reader a number of contributions to the recent McGill Centre for Research on Religion Graduate Students' Conference on *Personhood, Practice, and Transformation: Classical and Contemporary Perspectives* (McGill University, October 2012). In this volume we have included the keynote address by Ravi Ravindra, Professor Emeritus at Dalhousie

University in Nova Scotia. We have also included two papers from the conference to introduce to the reader some of the many topics discussed at the conference: Daniel Robinson (Graduate Theological Union) discusses the commonalities between the Christian personalisms of Max Scheler and Christos Yannaras, and Daniel Wood (Villanova University) compares Blondel's and Hegel's respective treatments of the relation between God and acts of volition.

We are also pleased to be able to present to the reader a number of reviews of recent scholarly publications.

Religious Embodiment Between Medicine and Modernity

Ola Sigurdson, *University of Gothenburg, Sweden*

In August 1308, the abbess Chiara of Montefalco died in her convent. As she was considered to be both a renowned ascetic and a visionary, her fellow nuns decided to embalm her so as to preserve her body on account of her holiness. On the Italian peninsula at this time, embalmment by evisceration was coming into practice, and, to perform this, Chiara's body was to be opened. Consequently, one of her sisters cut her open and took out her viscera and heart to be buried separately. The following day, her fellow nuns continued their explorations of her innards, eventually finding a cross in her exposed heart. A further exploration of her heart showed even further symbols of the crucifixion, and in her gallbladder three small stones, referring to the trinity, were discovered. The miraculous workings of the heart were considered to be further proof of Chiara's holiness.

The reason we know anything about this death and consequent dissection is because of the testimony given by her fellow sister Francesca of Montefalco. In her account, Francesca gives two reasons for opening Chiara's body: (1) the desire to preserve her body by embalming it and (2) the hope of finding something "wonderful" in her heart. Embalmment was seen as a short-term measure, stabilizing the corpse for a couple of days when it could be laid on display. The hope was, of course, that Chiara's body would prove to be a miracle-working relic, and this hope catered, to put it in modern terms, not only to religious but also to civic interests, since this could enhance the reputation of the city in question, attracting pilgrims. Furthermore, the cutting open of Chiara's body took place in accordance with contemporary medical practice; Sister Francesca was the daughter of a physician. There seem, therefore, to be at least three contexts involved in the dissection of Chiara of Montefalco: religious, civic, and medical. As Katharine Park amply has demonstrated, in the account from which I took this example, this period in the Middle Ages was no stranger to human

dissection.[1] Through "Holy Anatomy," evidence for a person's sanctity could hopefully be uncovered. These dissections were, if not common, then at least uncontroversial. Far from being some kind of religious taboo, dissection was practised for a number of purposes, some of them religious. That the church at that time was hostile towards dissection is a misconception, widespread despite the work of many medievalists.[2] Bodies, especially women's bodies, were cut open for several reasons: authenticating sanctity; establishing evidence in a criminal case; Caesarean section; and, increasingly, to gain anatomical knowledge. These practices were often associated, conceptually as well as practically. Dissection of the body was, at that time, not primarily seen as a medical procedure. Except for the (rare) public dissection of bodies for medical research exclusively, which was performed on executed foreign criminals and was considered an act of dishonouring the corpse, opening up the body was most commonly a practice for the cultural and social elite. Medical expertise was, however, called upon to establish evidence, not only in juridical processes, but also, and perhaps here foremost, in processes of canonization. From the case of Chiara of Montefalco and onwards, medical examinations, including autopsy, came to be a part of the systematic inquiry into the authenticity of someone's sanctity.

Religious Embodiment

The topic of this article is religious embodiment or, perhaps more precisely, how religious embodiment has been and is conceived in relation to other perspectives on embodiment, especially the changing role of medicine in modernity. My own theoretical perspective will be phenomenological and hermeneutical, in a broad sense, and will focus upon questions regarding the cultural representation of embodiment rather than, as is also traditional within the phenomenological movement, the subjective experience of embodiment, or, as is common to natural sciences, the biological or physical body. As it happens, I am convinced, as will be clear from the following,

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1. This example is from Katharine Park, *Secrets of Women: Gender, Generation, and the Origins of Human Dissection* (New York: Zone Books, 2010), 39–47.
2. Except for the work of Hart, see also Michel Foucault, *The Birth of the Clinic: An Archeology of Medical Perception*, trans. A. M. Sheridan (London/New York: Routledge, 2010), 153 ff.

that the cultural representation of embodiment plays an essential role in any understanding of the body, including a biological understanding.[3] From this follows, among other things, that the body has a history: it is not an unproblematical given, neither in the form of its representation nor as embodiment as such. This also means, presumably, that the experience of being embodied also varies with time. However, one could object that any talk of cultural representations, subjective experiences, and biological evidence is an abstract way of speaking about phenomena that perhaps are not so distinct from each other; that this introduces precisely those distinctions that this article seeks to overcome. Nevertheless, I think it might be prudent, for reasons of exposition if nothing else, to go along with such categories for a while just to show in a preliminary way that there are many ways to talk about embodiment.

The reason that I began with Katharine Park's account of the dissection of Chiara of Montefalco here is somewhat different from Park's original intent: I think it shows quite clearly how both the dissection of bodies as well as the bodies themselves acquire meaning in a particular context. Even such a practice as the cutting open of bodies, for our part most probably associated with medical autopsies, does not have an established meaning but can take on different meanings depending upon the relevant context of interpretation. The interest that her fellow sisters took in her opened body had little to do with what we would call an autopsy, and even if a medical authority was called upon to establish the facts that would lead to her sanctification, such an authority was never independent of the framing religious interest in Chiara's embodiment. As I hinted at in the beginning, it might be that concepts such as "religious," "civic," or "medical," even though they certainly would have some kind of referent in the beginning of the fourteenth century, are slightly misleading if we take them to refer to some kind of easily-distinguishable spheres of meaning. The differentiation between the "religious," "civic," and "scientific" spheres of meaning takes on its contemporary meaning only through modernity. From the account of the dissection of Chiara of Montefalco, it is quite clear that there was no way of distinguishing the religious and the civic spheres, as if they were

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3. For a more extensive discussion of these matters, see my *Himmelska kroppar: Inkarnation, blick, kroppslighet*. Logos/Pathos 6 (Göteborg: Glänta, 2006), esp. ch. 1 and 8; English translation forthcoming on Eerdmans as *Heavenly Bodies*.

independent of each other. In addition, medicine was understood in a religious context, and Park explicitly warns against the anachronistic supposition that just because the understanding of embodiment in our time is dominated by medical paradigms, the same was true in pre-modern times.[4] And, of course, this does not only refer to the practice of dissection but to embodiment as such. It is not the case that the history of embodiment is the history of anatomy and physiology at the core, to which all other "cultural meanings" are added: "the inhabitants of northern Italian cities from the mid-thirteenth to the mid-sixteenth century, understood their bodies primarily in terms of family and kinship, on the one hand, and religion, on the other," says Park.[5] Medicine comes third.

Through relating religious embodiment to the interest that medicine has had and still has for human embodiment, I think that we can get a notion of how religious embodiment has changed through history. Of course, I will only give the barest of outlines of this history, but if I am successful in giving at least a preliminary account of this history and what this means today, I will have fulfilled my purposes. Thus, in the next section I will return to an historical account of the changing role of religion and medicine for embodiment, ending in a more principled discussion of how to understand embodiment from a philosophical perspective informed by this history. In the next section, I will consider how embodiment is conceived in medicine and religion today. My main question will be how embodiment has been "medicalized" in modernity and where that leaves religious embodiment. Finally, I will present some thoughts on how embodiment can be conceived of differently with the help of a phenomenological perspective, and how the role of religious embodiment can be reconceived thereby.

Embodiment at the Dawn of Modernity

The human body, in pre- or (very) early modern times was viewed as a nexus between the created and the divine spheres. As God was incarnate in Christ, meaning that God became palpable human flesh, the body took on a

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4. Park, *Secrets*, 21 ff.
5. Park, *Secrets*, 23.

particular prominence as a conduit for divine grace. Caroline Walker Bynum is one of the foremost medievalists who have emphasized how very somatic the religious culture at this era was; the human body, and even the female body became a symbol for humanity as such.[6] Since woman, in the Middle Ages, was associated in an especial way with embodiment, by analogy she performed the more perfect *imitatio Christi* through her very physicality. In this way, woman could be the representative also of the male embodiment. The gendered aspects aside, embodiment was seen as the human form of relationality, not only extending to the relations between human bodies but also to those between the immanent and the transcendent. Even the sense of vision was often understood as a reciprocal and mimetic relation rather than as a relation of domination and subordination, as later became the case.[7] As such, human bodies were not only susceptible of physical trauma, but also of spiritual possession by the Holy Spirit as well as by the devil, both of whom could be presumed to leave bodily marks, a reason as good as any to examine the depths of human embodiment in extraordinary persons. The reason which Park gives for the surprising fact that "holy anatomy" was performed almost exclusively on women—the first known autopsy of a man (Ignatius of Loyola in 1556) took place two hundred and fifty years after the autopsy of Chiara of Montefalco—is both the association of women with corporeality and the (literal) inwardness of their devotion.[8]

In the last two decades of the fifteenth century, according to Park, a new enthusiasm for dissection in the direct service of medical knowledge began to establish itself.[9] Partly inspired by Galen's endorsement of dissection as essential to health care, physicians began to appreciate the practice as a way of gaining essential information about diseases and causes of death. This enthusiasm trickled down to their well-off clients, who required autopsies as a part of their family health care. From now on, private dissection became more popular. One reason for this new interest was, of course, the possibility of establishing the cause of death so as possibly to prevent the occurrence

6. Caroline Walker Bynum, *Holy Feast and Holy Fast: The Religious Significance of Food to Medieval Women* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 263.

7. Park, *Secrets*, 73. Cf. Martin Jay, *Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought* (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 1993).

8. Park, *Secrets*, 35.

9. Park, *Secrets*, 123–131.

of similar diseases in the future. Another reason, however, had to do with quite a different interest, namely to establish kinship and lineage. This had to do with a particular belief about generation, not uncommon at the time in the northern parts of Italy, according to which "if children received their souls—their human life principles—from the paternal seed, their mothers shaped them in their flesh."[10] In other words, there was a strong link between the mother's body and the body of the child. Consequently, it became important, at least for the interests of male dynasty, to find possible evidence of constitutional disease. Even here, then, medical examination in the form of dissection was driven by particular interests founded in conceptions of human embodiment that went beyond medicine. Nevertheless, it was a part of a process of an increasing significance of medical learning as such, in cases of establishing lineage as well as canonicity. Medical authors began publicizing anatomical works, with Andreas Vesalius's *On the Fabric of the Human Body* from 1543 as a landmark. The formal dissections held by medical faculties began to attract more interest, both audience-wise and as a sign of the achievements of the city. Consequently, they became more frequent. Medicine also laid claim to a greater authority to read corporeal signs in a truthful way, as these signs were just too complex or ambiguous for anyone to interpret without the correct experience, erudition, and judgement. With the growth of medical dissections follows a claim to greater expertise on human embodiment. The body became a stage for the performance of signs and symptoms that only could be made to produce evidence through interpretation by a particular competent authority. The physician is the expert and the body the object of his expertise.

This growing prominence of medical anatomy did not mean, however, that anatomy was now somehow independent of theological or religious concerns. Vesalius's book is a case in point, relying for its visual presentation of the human body on available iconographic traditions such as Saint Anthony and the miser's heart and the extraction of Julius Caesar from his mother's womb.[11] Anatomical illustrations could also be part of devotional images, so as to suggest that the border between the two was not entirely rigid. At the same time, Vesalius's work was, as Park points out, a step in the direction of the "desacralization" of anatomy; even when using

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10. Park, *Secrets*, 144.
11. Park, *Secrets*, 221.

iconographic traditions, more obviously religious elements had been left out. His book was informed by his strategy to obtain imperial patronage from the head of the Holy Roman Empire, but also to integrate *physica* (which corresponds with what we call internal medicine) and surgery through the medium of anatomy. Vesalius celebrated this new conception of medicine as a return to Greek medicine. In fact, he staged his own "revival" as a "Caesarean" birth, in a similar way to that of the emperor being seen as a new and from his immediate successors independent beginning of an imperial lineage: "Vesalius has snatched anatomy from the jaws of death, just as Charles resuscitated the Roman Empire, just as the midwife saved the infant Caesar, and just as Apollo rescued Asclepius from Coronis' womb."[12] The bodies depicted in his exposition were often women, signalling a gendered figuration of the relationship between subject (physician) and object (woman). The physician was someone who investigated the "secrets of women," revealing them to the interested onlooker. The distance between subject and object has now increased, both in terms of epistemology and affection, compared to earlier centuries, and the element of reciprocity has been all but lost.

What can we learn from Park's book *Secrets of Women* that treats, in some detail, the praxis of dissection between the fourteenth and the sixteenth century in northern Italy? As she herself points out, this story "is part of a larger story in which anatomical knowledge gained by exploring the dissected body became a way to think about the self."[13] As the body is never given as such but only through some particular configuration of interpretative power, there is a need, if one wishes to speak about embodied religion, to specify which body one is talking about. Park's analysis helps us with two things. First, it informs us that the insight, that to speak of embodied religion or the religious body, is always an abstraction in a certain sense; namely, that what is seen as the domain of the religious is always a part of a larger configuration of other domains, such as the political, the cultural, the scientific (including medicine), *et cetera*. As we understand from Park's account, there is a vast difference between a domain of the religious in pre-modern times, where it in a sense to a large extent overlapped (or perhaps better, never was distinct from) the scientific domain. But, second, Park's

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12. Park, *Secrets*, 247.
13. Park, *Secrets*, 261.

analysis also helps us to understand at least part of the story that has led to the configuration of these domains today, where I presume that it is not very controversial to suggest that medicine often defines what is taken to be the fundamental understanding of embodiment, namely (a version of) the physical or biological body. Even if there certainly are more nuances to be developed both regarding the understanding of the pre-modern body as well as the modern body, embodiment today, here in our Western societies, operates from the perspective of a Cartesian dualism between mind and body, or subject and object. This perspective has, of course, been naturalized for us up to the point where we find it hard to understand how anyone can understand embodiment in another way; as Park points out, it is indeed difficult "to think of this understanding of the body as having had a beginning," saturated as our culture is with such conceptualizations and visualizations of our embodiment.[14] But none of these conceptualizations or visualizations of the body that are part of our daily life is neutral or innocent. The body is never distinct as such from the cultural, political, and social intersections that both produce it and uphold it, making it appear as given.

A Philosophy of Embodiment

Now let us turn briefly to the philosophical position on embodiment that I invoke here. It is inspired by, among others, Judith Butler, although she, of course, puts more emphasis on the gendered form of our understanding of embodiment.[15] Butler has, not surprisingly, been criticized for her perspective in *Gender Trouble* as advocating a remarkably weightless understanding of embodiment, as if the materiality of the body were dissolved in linguistic constructions.[16] Thus, her philosophical perspective would appear to contribute to the typically modern alienation

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14. Park, *Secrets*, 262.

15. Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York/London: Routledge, 1999).

16. Carol Bigwood, "Renaturalizing the Body (with the Help of Merleau-Ponty)," *Body and Flesh: A Philosophical Reader*, ed. Donn Welton (Malden, Mass./Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 99–114.

from nature. This is a criticism that belongs to a more general class of critiques of social constructivism that disapproves of its claims insofar as they seem to champion the presumably nonsensical idea that the body is a social construct, therefore denying its materiality. However, I belong to those scholars who think that this is a misinterpretation of Butler's position: far from the counterintuitive claim that there is nothing before discourse, denying the materiality of the body, a more constructive understanding of Butler's argument would be that the "pre-discursive" materiality of the body is never possible to conceptualize or visualize in any other way than through discourse.[17] What it is that is "matter" or "body" is thus not an absolute basis for philosophical or political arguments, but is itself a contested notion that constitutes part of the argument. This does not mean, then, that the body is simply a matter of linguistic convention, but that everything that is, is always already symbolically mediated, so that there is no object independent of the discourse. This, it seems to me, is a position beyond at least crude versions of both essentialism and social constructivism, suggesting instead that we need more nuanced (and historical) accounts of the intertwining of the linguistic and the material that do not construct these as binary opposites.

Among those advocating such a perspective belongs the Polish medical doctor and biologist Ludwik Fleck, whose reflections on the social conditions of a scientific fact are highly pertinent to the question of a cultural understanding of embodiment. Fleck wrote a small book, *Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact*, published in Switzerland in 1935, where he argued against the prevailing scientific opinion that facts are independent of cultural and social conditioning.[18] In it, he polemicizes against those who refuse to see how even present-day science is dependent upon a particular thought collective and style and by way of this refusal think that there is a complete discontinuity between present-day knowledge and past prejudice. To say that what we today believe is true "*is* ipso facto *true*", is making the same mistake as an Eighteenth-century French philologist who declared

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17. See her *Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex"*. 2nd ed. (New York/London: Routledge, 1993).

18. Ludwik Fleck, *Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact*, ed. Thaddeus J. Trenn and Robert K. Merton, trans. Fred Bradley and Thaddeus J. Trenn (Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press, 1981). Annemarie Mol has in her *The Body Multiple: Ontology in Medical Practice* (Durham/London: Duke University Press, 2002) spelt out some of the implications for a philosophy of embodiment.

that "*pain, sitos, bread, Brot, panis* were arbitrary, different descriptions of the same thing." The difference between the French language and all other languages is "that what is called bread in French really was bread."[19] There is, in other words, no way of stepping out of one's own intellectual context, and the privileging of one's own context as the sole standard for truth-claims is just a case of *petitio principii* (begging the question), as this claim can only be validated by principles internal to the context. Against the supposedly customary view of a fact—and we might want to add of embodiment—as "something definite, permanent, and independent of any subjective interpretation by the scientist," Fleck suggests that facts (and also bodies) are theory-dependent, and that such theories are in turn dependent upon cultural and social circumstances.[20] In a simile, we could compare the linguistic dependence of the study of human embodiment with the dependence on optic lenses or radio telescopes for the study of heavenly bodies that are not visible to the naked eye. All human knowledge is, in some way, contextually mediated, including, as the example suggests, a reliance on various practices and technologies.

Along with the French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty, this suggests an understanding of the function of language as primarily a way of orienting human beings in their life-world, not to create a correspondence between words and things.[21] Language constitutes the world in which human beings understand their existence, and thus Merleau-Ponty can suggest that speech and gesture transfigure the human body, at the same time that it is the human body that talks and gestures.[22] Physical reality is not left intact by language, and thus, in a sense, one could say that a human body is a linguistic body (even the cadaver, of course, exists in a discursive field, as the example of Chiara of Montefalco shows). Language creates all sorts of possibilities for bodily existence, even though language always exists through and between bodies. This, in turn, implies that the world is not primarily the object of human subjectivity, but something we live in and through; our subjectivity is not something that we can place outside of the body, but instead it is through our bodies that we are subjects

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19. Fleck, *Genesis*, 50.
20. Fleck, *Genesis*, xxvii.
21. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception* (London: Routledge, 1992), 193.
22. Merleau-Ponty*, Phenomenology*, 197.

that also can reach out for something else. The body is always already a part of the world, and neither the body nor the world could be explored independently of how the subject of the exploration bodily experiences the world. This mode of embodiment is a presupposition of the possibility of experiencing the body as an object of our gaze and therefore a more fundamental dimension of our embodiment. That we still tend to think of the body as an object is in part dependent upon the fact that we become aware of our own body through our interaction with other bodies in the world—but also, I might add, because our contemporary culture teaches us to understand the body as an object. Merleau-Ponty insists, along with the phenomenological tradition, that the subjective experience of being embodied and the biological body belong together, or are even two abstract aspects of some more primordial embodiment. What I wish critically to suggest to such a phenomenological perspective on embodiment is the emphatic need to supplement it with the importance of the cultural representation of embodiment for the understanding of both. In my example about the dissection of Chiara of Montefalco above, it becomes clear, I hope, how our experience of being embodied is dependent upon the cultural framework within which our bodies are thematized and become meaningful. The cultural representation of embodiment is not static: it is historically given; therefore, any talk of religious embodiment or embodied religion stands in need of a critical historical account. This brings me back from this more abstract elaboration of how I understand embodiment to the question of how the medical body and the religious body are conceived of today.

The Medicalization of Human Embodiment

When I left my historical account above, I had just explained how medicine through Vesalius (as an example) came to attain a more prominent place in the early modern hegemonical conceptions of embodiment. Today, it is quite clear, as Park also has pointed out, that an anatomical understanding of embodiment has become part of our understanding of our own embodiment. This process has been studied in some detail by the American MD and philosopher Jeffrey P. Bishop as well as the French philosopher Michel Foucault. Let me now turn to their account.

In his book, *The Anticipatory Corpse*, Bishop tells us the story of the gradual medicalization of the understanding of human embodiment with the help of the Aristotelian four causes. Two of them are maybe not of as prominent interest for our purposes: the material cause that tells us what a thing consists of or the formal cause that tells us how this matter is arranged. More important for Bishop's argument, however, are the two remaining causes: the efficient cause that is the primary source of an entity's movement and the final cause that is its aim or purpose. An important historical change took place in early modernity that could be interpreted by the changing role of the four causes: modern science including modern medicine repudiated or at least minimized formal and final causation at the same time as it elevated material and efficient causation. Bishop explains:

> Medicine's metaphysical stance…is a metaphysics of material and efficient causation, concerned with the empirical realm of matter, effects, and the rational working out of the causes for the purposes of finding ways to control the material of bodies.[23]

This is part of the technological drift of modern science; the body loses its own integrity and turns into a material object, as there are no intrinsic aims or purposes that could be assigned to it. To quote Bishop again:

> Bodies have no purpose or meaning in themselves, except insofar as we direct those bodies according to our desires…The world—the body—stands before us as a manipulable object, and all thinking about the world or the body becomes instrumental doing.[24]

Of course, there is still the "I" which has desires, wishes, aims, and purposes, but this subjectivity is now both divorced from our embodiment and situated outside the realm of medicine, and, consequently, beyond instrumental reasoning. Bishop notes that modern medicine or modern

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23. Jeffrey P. Bishop, *The Anticipatory Corpse: Medicine, Power, and the Care of the Dying* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2011), 20.
24. Bishop, *Corpse*, 21.

science in general sometimes denies having a metaphysics at all, but in the sense that a metaphysics is a particular view of the fundamental nature of being and the world, there is a metaphysics at work, at least implicitly, in its way of dividing the world between the meaningful and the manipulable or subject and object.

In fact, Bishop suggests that contemporary medicine is centred on the dead body. It begins with medical training, where the first person that the students meet in their training (for the purpose of training, that is) is the dead person, and the first dead body they meet is the cadaver, or in other words, a body that is presumed to be devoid of any social relationships to family, place, or history.[25] This is the body through which the students learn to care for the living. It is a phenomenon that Bishop suggests is significant for modern medicine and is summarized in the spatialization of time: "It is in the dead body that the flux of time can be captured in the space of the body, and medicine and medical technology are built upon this truth."[26] The spatialization of time is a notion that Bishop retrieves from Michel Foucault's classic *The Birth of the Clinic*, where Foucault suggests that modern medicine, like most modern science, prioritizes space over time.[27] To put it quite bluntly, the advantage of the dead body is that it lies still. Death stops the flow of time and could thus be perceived as a stable ground for a systematic knowledge also about the living body. Life, on the other hand, is in constant flux, giving it the disadvantage of not being as easily measured. The body that medicine presupposes is the measurable body and thus it gives priority to the dead body. As Bishop and others have noted, even in death the body is not static in that it inevitably suffers decay.[28] Death, then, becomes a kind of ideal-type between the flux of life and the flux of decay. As Foucault writes: "It is when death became the concrete a priori of medical experience that death could detach itself from counter-nature and become *embodied* in the *living bodies* of individuals."[29] Only through the elimination of himself does the modern human being succeed in establishing himself as the object of medical science. Indeed, modern

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25. Bishop, *Corpse*, 14.
26. Bishop, *Corpse*, 15.
27. Foucault, *Birth*, 3–21.
28. Bishop, *Corpse*, 59.
29. Foucault, *Birth*, 243.

medicine is motivated by the wish to lessen suffering and to help, but, like a comic hero, it often contributes to the opposite. Summarizing his own claim, Bishop writes, "Medicine has pulled the dead body out of community, stripped it of communal significance, and found the ground of its knowledge in the dead, decontextualized, and ahistorical body".[30] The body that is the centre of interest for modern medicine is not the living body that Merleau-Ponty suggested is primary for our understanding of human embodiment, but the body as an object: the objectified body.

Central to modern medicine as performed in the clinic, by the patient's bedside, is a particular form of gaze that corresponds to the spatialization of the body.[31] This is a gaze that subjects the body to an interrogating scrutiny through putting it in the ordered space of the clinic. This gaze becomes possible, then, through a particular political configuration of space, and is by no means naturally given as such. To be able to look upon things, including the human body, in a particular way, presupposes that we relate to the object looked upon in a certain way, and so a particular mode of the gaze corresponds to a particular mode of embodiment. This mode of embodiment is, as is the particular gaze, dependent upon a particular political configuration. The individual body is, in other words, never independent of the social body. As Bishop formulates it, "[t]he space of the clinic is the neutral space that allows one to see the truth of the disease. It is the view from nowhere."[32] For Foucault this particular configuration of power finds its expression in a "speaking eye that would be the servant of things and the master of truth."[33] With the merging of the clinic and anatomy as two ways of perceiving medicine that first stood against each other, the gaze was no longer just a passive recording gaze but became an active penetrating gaze. Not content with just registering what it saw, the gaze now was engaged in a conquest that depended for its success on generalizable knowledge. The clinician had to look deeper than the symptoms of the patient, which were now understood as subjective, to the real cause of the disease, the signs of the body, or from within the body, that were interpretable only to the trained

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30. Bishop, *Corpse*, 27.
31. On the gaze and its relationship to embodiment, see, once again, my *Himmelska kroppar*, esp. ch. 4–7.
32. Bishop, *Corpse*, 48.
33. Foucault, *Birth*, 141.

eye of the clinician. The autopsy became the ultimate boundary where any interpretation would receive its final confirmation or disconfirmation; as Foucault puts it: "The living night is dissipated in the brightness of death."[34]

To the body perceived in this way corresponds, as I have already mentioned, a particular configuration of space, but this configuration has also been changing in the history of modern medicine. Foucault talks about a particular moment at the beginning of the eighteenth century when this space was conceived according to a "medicine of spaces," in which an "absolutely open space… [was] reduced solely to the plane of visible manifestations."[35] This means, in contrast to other historical configurations of spaces, that there is nothing in this space except for the body of the patient and the gaze of the medical eye. In this way, the patient as well as the physician are individualized, and the relationship between them is construed as a dichotomy between the perceiver and the perceived. But this particular configuration gave way to another configuration at the end of the eighteenth century where the medical gaze was conceived as a generalizable gaze, giving information not only about the individual patient but also about society as a whole, a society in whose service the physician ultimately stands. As time passed, a "medicine of epidemics" was constituted, where the emphasis on supervision as well as on information was deepened. The knowledge that medicine claims became more centralized in structure, when the medical space coincided with or penetrated the social space. Foucault writes:

> The locus in which knowledge is formed is no longer the pathological garden where God distributed the species, but a generalized medical consciousness, diffused in space and time, open and mobile, linked to each individual existence, as well as to the collective life of the nation, ever alert to the endless domain in which illness betrays, in its various aspects, its great, solid form.[36]

In this space, and from the point of view of death, disease can be inscribed as a land or "a mappable territory," giving the physician the power

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34. Foucault, *Birth*, 180; Cf. 152–180.
35. Foucault, *Birth*, 21. Cf. 44 ff.
36. Foucault, *Birth*, 36.

to master, if not (at least not to begin with) all its ravages, then at least its development in the living.[37]

In the years around the French Revolution, the medical profession in France was increasingly understood as similar to clergy, but whereas clergy had as their responsibility the supervision of the soul of individuals, to the physicians fell the supervision of the body. It is interesting to note, both the distinction between body and soul as the specific departments of medicine and religion respectively, but also the suggestion that the organization of physicians should be centralized, falling under the pastoral care of the state. "Pastoral care" is, to be sure, not a concept that Foucault uses in *Birth of the Clinic*, but, nevertheless, this concept is apt for describing what he talks about here; namely, the increasing power of the state to care for its citizens through the systematization and classification of medical knowledge "for their own good."[38] Moreover, in a way perhaps more profound than the pastoral power of confession, the medical gaze produces knowledge of things invisible even to the patients themselves in its ability to probe the internal depths of the body. In this way, the task of the physician becomes not only of monitoring and policing the bodily health of the citizens, but assumes a political dimension in that bad government could also be bad for your health. Medicine was thus linked to the welfare of the state. Such an ambitious endeavour also meant that an ideal of the healthy and the normal came to be prominent in healthcare. If health was more important in the eighteenth century, normality became more important in nineteenth-century medicine.[39] In this, the regulatory aims of modern medicine become even more prominent. The primary space for this new configuration of power became the clinic, as the symbol of the intersection of "scientific coherence," "social utility," and "political purity of the new medical organization."[40] The clinic deals not with cases but only with examples, and is consequently

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37. Foucault, *Birth*, 183.
38. See, for instance, Michel Foucault, "Sexuality and Power" in *Religion and Culture by Michel Foucault*, ed. Jeremy R. Carrette, Manchester Studies in Religion, Culture and Gender (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), 121–125.
39. Foucault, *Birth*, 40; Cf. Georges Canguilhem, *The Normal and the Pathological*, with an introduction by Michel Foucault (New York: Zone Books, 1991).
40. Foucault, *Birth*, 85.

different from the hospital. The patient here becomes, as Foucault writes, the accident, not the subject of her or his disease.[41]

There is a paradox hidden here, however. When the dead body becomes the paradigmatic body, simultaneously the body is turned into "a perpetual motion machine," which, at least theoretically, can live forever as long as any malfunctioning part is exchanged for a functioning part.[42] Thus, the mechanization of the body under modernity could be interpreted as a kind of hidden quest for immortality; immortality now understood in a strictly inner-worldly sense. Much of modern medicine consequently becomes a certain kind of technological project, the aim of which is to preserve life, life understood according to the metaphysics of efficient cause as locomotion, as expressed in the ICU. Here, Bishop claims, "The patient vanishes in every sense except as an object of technological monitoring and mechanical intervention."[43] All other aspects of life than purely physiological ones are considered irrelevant. This finds expression, among other things, in an attitude of life at all costs, life as a matter of bare life without any qualifications.[44] The other side of this apparatus is the autonomous self, conceived as sovereign will. If the body is dependent upon the workings of the machine to keep it alive, the mind is understood as something independent of all social and technological machinations, a position from where it can exercise mastery. The manipulable body and the autonomous self are, in reality, two sides of the same coin, and the only thing that the will can be sovereign over is its own death. As Bishop puts it, the "patient becomes that oxymoron of liberalism: a sovereign subject, the sovereign who subjects his own body and psyche to his own sovereignty."[45] In other words, the question becomes only *how* we die, not *why* we die, and therefore also only *how* we live, not *why* we live. There is, consequently, not a *why* of the body but only a *how*. Embodiment is conceived of in the terms of efficient causation.

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41. Foucault, *Birth*, 71.
42. Bishop, *Corpse*, 97.
43. Bishop, *Corpse*, 113.
44. For Bishop's discussion of "bare life," see *Corpse*, 197–222. But see also Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).
45. Bishop, *Corpse*, 121.

It needs to be pointed out that Bishop is not arguing against modern medicine; he is well aware of the groundbreaking achievements that have followed in its wake. He is also careful to point out that one of the most important motives for becoming a doctor is that one has been moved by the suffering of the other. At the same time, his often quite generalizing talk of modern medicine runs the risk both of reifying modern medicine and of presenting modern technology and the patient's life-world as a dichotomy, thus presenting too stark a contrast between cure and care in the contemporary world. His main target, however, is the eradication of all understanding of the body as also something else than just a manipulable object. This presupposition is counterproductive as it obscures how we also experience ourselves as embodied beings with shared histories. Medicine is, of course, not alone the (efficient) cause of this tendency, as this is rather a common view of the trajectory of a particular modern kind of dualism. Iris Murdoch has formulated it particularly well, I think:

> We have suffered a general loss of concepts, the loss of a moral and political vocabulary. We no longer use a spread-out substantial picture of the manifold virtues of man and society. We no longer see man against a background of values, of realities, which transcend him. We picture man as a brave naked will surrounded by an easily comprehended empirical world.[46]

Even if she does not explicitly talk about human embodiment, the image of a human being as a Giacometti-like "brave naked will" evokes the loss of embodiment, which actually goes hand in hand with a loss of concepts and vocabulary regarding the purposes and aims of human existence. The loss of a more comprehensive understanding of embodiment also entails the loss of a richer vocabulary that goes beyond the instrumental reason. The body has become the object of our manipulation and has put an increased pressure on our subjective construal of our embodiment in the wake of a more generally accepted metaphysics of embodiment beyond efficient causation; the more dietary and medical knowledge we get, Anthony Giddens reminds

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46. Iris Murdoch, "Against Dryness: A Polemical Sketch," *Revisions: Changing Perspectives in Moral Philosophy*, eds. Stanley Hauerwas and Alasdair MacIntyre (Notre Dame/London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), 46.

us, the more we have to choose our embodiment. As he puts it, "Today, in the Western countries at least, we are all on a diet, not in the sense that everyone tries to get slim, but in the sense that we have to choose how and what to eat."[47] And as if dietary (self-)regulations were not enough, there is also exercise and general appearance to think about, since none of these any longer are given.

What space or place is left for religious embodiment in such a hegemonical understanding of embodiment? The history of the concept of religion is, I would presume, quite well known, so I will not spend too much time elaborating on it here.[48] Suffice it to say that religion has increasingly undergone a process of subjectivization, correlative to the objectivization of the body. Among other things, in the Protestant repudiation of the Roman Catholic liturgy, its customs and practices—its "legalism"—the essence of religion came to be located to "the inner human being" where all legitimacy in the eyes of God depends on an inner faith, not external achievements as such. Religion was privatized; its domain came to encompass feeling rather than thought or practice. Charles Taylor has, in his *A Secular Age*, described this process with the help of the term "ex-carnation" (as a contrast to "in-carnation," "becoming flesh"), which means that both the religious communities as well as society as a whole lose sight of the (inevitable) social embodiment of religion, as well as a forgetfulness of how even one's personal faith is expressed through one's body.[49] In some ways, medicine came to replace religion in that the understanding of health came to be understood in both a less holistic way, with the absence of disease as its main meaning rather than the more comprehensive well-being of the human being, and also in a more immanent manner, as having no final aim over and above the individual and social body. Unlike the time of someone like Chiara of Montefalco, where *cura corporis*, the cure of the body, was taken care of by the doctor, and *cura animae*, the cure of the soul, was taken care of by the priest, and where both functions at times were gathered together

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47. Anthony Giddens, *Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1994), 224.
48. For an extended account, see my article "The Return of Religious Embodiment: On Post-Secular Politics," *The Body Unbound: Philosophical Perspectives on Politics, Embodiment and Religion*, eds. Marius Timmann Mjaaland, Ola Sigurdson, and Sigridur Thorgeirsdottir (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2010), 19–36.
49. Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge, Mass./London: Belknap Press, 2007), 554.

in the monastic houses, today these two functions are not only separated institutionally but are also taken to be independent of each other.[50] This means that the contemporary configuration of discursive power where both religion and medicine are parts actually turns the religious body into a sublime body; a sublime body that is impossible to represent, both in a spatial and a discursive sense. If one of the defining traits of any talk of the body is that it "takes place," in such a configuration of discursive power it is an open question whether religious embodiment actually "takes place" today. Or if it does, maybe this is a challenge to the very modern configuration of power that wants to make a neat distinction between "inner" and "outer" or "private" and "public" but also between "care" and "cure."

Re-imagining Religious Embodiment

The challenge to such a configuration of discursive power is hardly a literal revival of an Aristotelian metaphysics of the four causes, and, on my reading of Bishop, this is not his aim. Rather, he argues that final causation could be understood through a contemporary phenomenology of embodiment as we find it in Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and this is to me a viable way forward. Working against the modern dichotomy between subject and object, both philosophers tried to regard embodiment more from the perspective of the life-world. Rather than trying to overcome dualisms, they try to show that they are not there from the beginning. There is of course a vast tradition of interpretation with regard to both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty and how well they actually succeed in overcoming the subject-object dichotomy, but let me here just claim that one important strand in their philosophies is to regard the human body not as a manipulable object for our desires but rather as the way we exist in the world and through which we relate to other bodies. The body is not a tool, but we *are* our bodies. It is through our embodiment that we are a node in a network of relations and stories and it is so that we become what we are. Of course our body lets us do things, for instance drink a cup of coffee,

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50. See Bishop, *Corpse*, 256, but, above all, Klaus Bergdolt, *Wellbeing: A Cultural History of Healthy Living*, trans. Jane Dewhurst (Cambridge, Polity, 2008).

and in this sense it is tool-like. As the act of drinking coffee is not just an extrinsic occurrence that happens to take place to and through my body, but is (hopefully) a pleasurable experience to me as a person, an experience that also could be a shared experience as a participation in a—however fleeting—human community, it would be misleading to characterize the arm that moves the cup to my lips as a mere tool. It is indeed I who am drinking the coffee.

More examples that encompass a broader horizon of human experience could obviously be produced here, but I hope this simple and perhaps pedestrian example will suffice to convince, for now, that our bodies are always already part of a context where our human existence is defined by our aspirations and desires, who or what we love, and what we are hoping for. Thus, we are always already engaged in practical projects that intrinsically contain some form of *teloi* or final causes. For Bishop, these causes can be of different natures, not necessarily belonging to some grand metaphysics, as in Aristotle or Christian theology, but are an effect of an understanding of embodiment that refuses to reduce the human body to a manipulable object. Projects can be of such a grand scale, but can also concern matters of daily living, but common to both long-term projects and more mundane projects is that both take an embodied form. To quote Bishop on this: "Formal and final causes are embodied, even as that embodiment is shaped by meaning and significance outside the body and directed to purposes outside of the body."[51] Our individual bodies are not only meaningful in and by themselves, but as members of a social body that defines meaning beyond the borders of the individual body. It is important to realize that such a meaningfulness is not something that is added *post hoc* but is a function of being embodied in itself. It begins with small, everyday projects that evolve into some form of community, whether big or small, with its own history and its own *telos*, but it can also be part of living religion.

This means that the body is never neutral. Not even the medical body that Bishop equates with the corpse is neutral. Through modern medicine, the human body is reduced to a more or less well-functioning machine. The aim of medicine, then, is to, as far as possible, maintain this machine. But to turn the human body into a manipulable object, it needs to withdraw it from its communal context, making it acontextual and ahistorical. The corpse

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51. Bishop, *Corpse*, 289.

becomes the paradigmatic body because death stops, ideally at least, the flow of time, helpfully turning the body into a stable ground for systematic knowledge. But to a living body according to the phenomenological perspective, death is not only about the termination of the functioning of the body-machine, but more about the cessation of capacities, projects, plans, hopes, desires and so on. This gives an entirely different perspective on life, health, disease and illness, and, I might add, on religion. Indeed, to the ill person, the body can become an object, as it suddenly or gradually turns from being an invisible background horizon for all intentional projects to a highly visible cause for concern in its own right. This can be experienced as an alienation from one's own body. But this is a different objectification than the one that is performed by the doctor in a medical examination, for whom our projects and purposes that we are keen to restore are more or less irrelevant. The doctor considers the function of the body, something that is distinct from the purpose and goods of the embodied life.

One may wish to object, against Bishop but perhaps also Foucault, that there is no single medical body but several, phenomenologically speaking. What kind of embodiment gets actualized depends upon what kind of medicine we are talking about: radiology, cardiology, or surgery. Any medical discipline regards the body from its particular perspective, and the particular mode of embodiment that becomes visible depends upon which gaze is looking at the body in question. This is true up to a point, according to Bishop, but nevertheless, all sub-specialties seem to be quite conversant with each other within the field of Western biomedicine.[52] This suggests that there is, in fact, a shared perspective regardless of discipline. Even if there are tensions in today's medicine between, say, physiology and evidence-based medicine in that the former is the science of the function of living systems and thus more akin to a view of embodiment as a mechanical organism, and the latter more dependent upon meta-analyses of statistical nature, thus more of a social or public-health perspective, both come together in their willingness to take the body as an object of investigation, interrogation, and disciplining in the form of the medical school. I do not find this part of Bishop's argument entirely convincing; as the Dutch philosopher Annemarie Mol has suggested, in a nuanced ethnographic account of how atherosclerosis is dealt with in a certain hospital, the body in medical

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52. Bishop, *Corpse*, 63.

practice may actually be "more than one, and less than many" (borrowing this phrase from the British anthropologist Marilyn Strathern).[53] What looks like a shared perspective is rather a number of more or less successful acts of negotiation on the day-to-day level of actual medical practices. Perhaps the coherence or non-coherence of a notion such as Western biomedicine is dependent upon which level of abstraction we are dealing with, but Bishop's account runs the risk of disregarding the heterogeneity of contemporary medicine to the disadvantage of his overall aim, namely, to offer alternatives to the understanding of the body as a manipulable object.

If this were so, it would be possible to further develop some of Bishop's own suggestions, which I find underdeveloped but which have a phenomenologically interesting potential. One of these is his mention of the reason for the choice of career of many medical students, namely, to alleviate suffering. Such a reason, a reason that we might hope also motivates many practising doctors, presupposes a mutuality in the relation between doctor and patient which on a phenomenal level is much richer than a mere subject-object dichotomy is able to capture. Another aspect, not much thematized by Bishop, is the character of medicine as an art or a craft in the antique sense of a *techne*. Significant for a craft is that it is not only a means to reach a certain goal but has a value in itself.[54] The doctor as a craftsman is, from this perspective, interested in performing her or his practical knowledge *well*, not only *efficiently*, which presupposes an engaged perspective that is different from the modern dichotomy between subject and object.

The care for others as well as the practice of a craft points towards an understanding of embodiment that reaches beyond the manipulable object of instrumental rationality. Significant both for care as well as craft is that the body is not just a tool or an object but something that we in a more profound way *are*. We exist and relate bodily to other bodies in the world. The body can be described as a node in a network of relations and stories that we share with each other and through which we become those we are. This means that we share a life-world with each other where our existence is defined by our longings and desires. The life-world can be

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53. Mol, *Body*, 82, quoting Marilyn Strathern, *Partial Connections* (Savage, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1991), 35.
54. See Richard Sennett, *The Craftsman* (London/New York: Penguin, 2008), 247, which explicitly speaks about doctors as craftsmen.

understood as a set of practical projects that all imply some kind of *telos*. Even if we cannot share or even wish to share the life-world of Chiara of Montefalco, where embodiment was understood within a religious, or more specifically a Christian, context, such contexts, be they of a more low key or of a more comprehensive nature, are still around in our daily projects with all their successes or misgivings. Different ways of imagining embodiment are always already here, if one only knows where to look. It is perhaps one of the contributions of a philosophy of religion, a phenomenology, or a theology today to be able to critically explore the hegemonical mode of embodiment in the service of suggesting a fuller, less reductive, account. Heterotopias are already in existence alongside hegemonical places in society from where it is possible to challenge their account of embodiment.

What I have tried to suggest in this article, more by showing than by arguing perhaps, is that such a fuller account needs to be historically informed. The body has a history, not least in its cultural representations, and being aware of this history is, I would suggest, essential for the understanding of religious embodiment even today, to avoid being caught up in the spatialization of time as well as of the body. Essential to any discussion of religious embodiment or embodied religion is both some kind of historical genealogy of religion as well as of the body, and a philosophical or theological account that tries to lay bare how we always already exist bodily in ways that cannot reduce our embodiment to a manipulable object. For such an endeavour, the comparison between modern and pre-modern representations of embodiment could be helpful, not because earlier traditions would provide us with standards, but with critical perspectives on our own modes of understanding. The task of re-imagining religious embodiment in conversation with different modes of embodiment, suggested by politics, science, or art, is an interpretative undertaking not served well by forgetting that the body exists historically.

The Method-and-Wisdom Model of the Medical Body in Traditional Mongolian Medicine

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A Brief Historical Introduction to the Background of the Method-and-Wisdom Theoretical Model of Traditional Mongolian Buddhist Medicine

The genesis of Mongolian indigenous medical knowledge, which predates the Mongols' conversion to Buddhism, was closely related to their experiences derived from their nomadic and pastoral lifestyle, common exposure to severe climatic conditions, and extended periods of military campaigns led by Mongol khans. Bone setting, cauterization, bloodletting, massage, skull trepanning,[1] therapy of soaking and covering with animal hide, soaking in mud, and the like, were most common treatments among pastoral and military Mongols, some of which are still used today. Through their pastoral lifestyle, the Mongols became familiar with the anatomy, physiology, and pathology of their livestock and acquired the knowledge of medicinal plants. Therapeutic experiments that were conducted on sick livestock and that showed favourable results on animals were often applied to humans. These experimental treatments became eventually codified in the traditional Mongolian Buddhist medical treatises.

Traditional Buddhist medicine in Mongolia underwent different phases of development, which started in the fourteenth century with two different translations of the Indian canonical Mahāyāna text the *Golden*

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1. The archeological findings of trepanned skulls discovered near Chandmani Mountain of Ulaanbaatar's district and dated to the seventh/eighth centuries testify to the practice of brain surgery among the Mongols of that period. Likewise, famous Tibetan scholar Desi Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho (1653–1705) mentions in his *gSo rig sman gyi khog 'bugs* the practice of brain surgery among the Mongols.

Light Sūtra (Skt. *Suvarṇaprabhāsottama-mahāyānasūtra*) from Tibetan, prepared by Sharavsenge (Tib. *Shes rab Sangs rgyas*) and *güüish* Dambadorj.[2] In addition to the *Golden Light Sūtra*, the *Four Medical Tantras* (Tib. *bRgyud bzhi*, or *Dud rtsi sñing po yan lag brgyad pa gsang ba man ngag gi rgyud*, Skt. *Amṛtahṛdayāṣṭāṅga-guhyopadeśa-tantra*),[3] better known among the Mongols as the *Four Roots of Medicine* (*Anagaakh Ukhaany Dörvön Ündes*), were also translated from Tibetan in the fourteenth century and became the most important medical textbook in Mongolian Buddhist medicine. The Uighur scholar of the Sakya order of Tibetan Buddhism Čoiji Odser (Chos kyi 'Od 'zer) first translated from Tibetan to Mongolian the *Four Medical Tantras*. Three centuries later, the Oirat Mongol Zaya Bandida Namkhai-Jamts (1599–1662), who from 1650 to 1662 translated 177 medical texts from Tibetan, also retranslated the *Four Medical Tantras* along with several other medical texts. He wrote down his translation in the so-called "Clear Script," which he invented in 1648. The most complete translation of the *Four Medical Tantras* was prepared by Minjüür güüsh erkh tsorj (Tib. *chos rje*) in around 1720.[4] To this day, Minjüüdorj's translation of the *Four Medical Tantras* is considered as the most accurate, and it continues to serve as a handbook for practitioners, researchers, and students of traditional Mongolian medicine. From the fourteenth century on, traditional Mongolian medicine evolved into an amalgam of indigenous Mongolian medical knowledge, Indo-Tibetan Buddhist medicine, and knowledge derived from the Chinese medical tradition. It reached its peak in the eighteenth

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2. In Sharavsenge's translation, the *sūtra* consists of twenty-nine chapters, among which the twenty-fourth chapter, called "The Chapter That Pacifies All Illnesses," gives a summary of the four fundamental antidotes to illness—namely, food, drink, conduct, and medical treatment.

3. According to the Tibetan tradition, the missing Sanskrit original was composed by a certain Pha Khol. It is known under the full title *Rashaany Shimiin Naiman Gishüünt Nuuts Ulamjlalt Ündes Orshvoi*. The *Four Medical Tantras* are:

1. Rtsa rgyud (Skt. *Mūlatantra*, Mng. *Yazguuryn Ündes*, "*Root Tantra*"): 6 chapters

2. Bsad pa'i rgyud (Skt. *Ākhyāta-tantra*, Mng. *Nomlolyn Ündes,* "*Explanatory Tantra*"): 30 chapters grouped in 6 sections (*gnas, sthāna*)

3. Man ngag rgyud (Skt. *Upadeśa-tantra*, Mng. *Uvdisyn Ündes,* "*Instruction Tantra*"): 92 chapters grouped into 15 topics (*skabs, prakaraṇa*)

4. Phyi ma'i rgyud (Skt. *Uttaratantra*, Mng. *Khoit Ündes*): 25 chapters grouped into 4 divisions (*mdo, vibhāga*)

With two additional concluding chapters, it contains 156 chapters altogether.

4. His real name was Luvsandorj, and he came from one of three *hoshuus* of Uradyn Zasag.

and nineteenth centuries, and from 1924, it began to assimilate Western medical theories into its framework. In consequence, today we find two different strands of traditional Buddhist medical training in Mongolia: one that incorporates the fundamentals of Western medicine into the traditional system, and the other that focuses exclusively on traditional medical knowledge and Buddhist healing rituals.

Owing to the Mongols' close historical connections with Tibetan and Uighur forms of Buddhism, which began in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and due to subsequent, centuries long, intellectual exchanges between Mongolian and Tibetan Buddhist scholars, the legacy of Indo-Tibetan Buddhist medical knowledge became the most prevalent constituent of traditional Mongolian medicine, influencing the overall theory, diagnosis, treatment, and preventive traditional Mongolian medicine. By the beginning of the twentieth century, nearly 770 large and small monasteries in Mongolia had their individual medical colleges (Mng. *manba datsan*, Tib. *sman pa grva tshang*); and large monastic medical colleges in Mongolia had approximately 90,000 students.[5] Until 1681, when the first monastic medical college was established in Mongolia by bLo bzang bsTan dzin rGyal mtsan, also known as Lamyn Gegeen (1639–1704),[6] Mongolian Buddhist physicians were trained exclusively in Tibet, most commonly in Lhasa.[7]

Commentarial works on the *Four Medical Tantras* composed by Tibetan physicians[8] and other Indian and Tibetan Buddhist tantric treatises

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5. Sharavyn Bold. *Mongolyn Ulamjlalt Anaagakh Ukhaany Tüükh* (Ulaanbaatar: Admon, 2006), 168.

6. He composed seven medical treatises in the Tibetan language, of which these two, the *Gso ba rig pa'i rdza rgyud kyi grel pa gsal pa'i sgron me*, *Man ngag bdud rtzi zegs ma, Man ngag nyer lnga'i sde tsan*, *bShal le'u'i sdom, gRang ba spyi' joms kyi sbyor pa,* and the *bDud rtzi bcad byor kyi sbyor ba* were written for the sake of his own new medical students and for new students in medical schools.

7. Unfortunately, only two of the *Four Medical Tantras* in his translation have been preserved in their manuscript form—the *Root Tantra* (*Yazguuryn Ündes*) and *Latest Tantra* (*Khoid Ündes*).

8. Among the main Tibetan sources utilized by Mongolian physicians, these are worth mentioning: Zur mkhar ba bLo gros rGyal po's *rTsa rgyud grel ba mes po'i zhal lung*, Dar mo bLo bZang Chos Grags's *Kyi dka 'grel legs bshad gser rgyan*, *Kyi bya rgyud gdongs 'grel legs bshad gser gyi thur ma*, *Kyi chum do man gyi' grel ba zhal lung gnyis pa rdo rje mdud 'grol*, and *Kyi man rgyud lhan thabs kyi gsang sman gab sbas rnams gsal bar ston pa man ngag bka rgya ma*, and sDe Srid Sangs rGyas rgya mTso's *gSo ba rig pa'i bstan bcos sman bla'i dgongs rgyud bzhi'i gsal byed vaidurya sngon po*, and *bDud rtzi snying po yan lag brgyad pa gsang ba man*

also became primary textual sources. In the early seventeenth century, the Mongolian commentarial literature on the *Four Medical Tantras* began to emerge. In 1612, on the order of Güüshi Khan, a Mongolian physician by the name Altai (1554–?) from Upper Mongolia composed the first Mongolian-language commentary on the *Four Medical Tantras*, titled *An Explanation of the Hidden Meaning of the First Section, the Root Tantra, of the Secret Amṛtahṛdayāṣṭāṅga* (*Rashaany Zürkhen Naiman Gishüünt Nuuts Uvidasyn Ündesnii Ankhdugaar Kheseg Yazguuryn Ündsiin Dald Utgyn Tailbar*). In this work, he gives reasons for writing his commentary, pointing out his contemporaries' lack of accurate understanding of the meaning of the *Four Medical Tantras* written in the Tibetan language.[9] Not long after Altai, Lamyn Gegeen composed one of his commentaries on the *Four Medical Tantras*, titled *A Commentary on the Four Roots of Medicine, Called a Clarifying Lamp*.[10] The majority of the later Mongolian medical treatises became further clarifications and expansions of various topics taught in the *Four Medical Tantras*. A tradition of the *Four Medical Tantras* developed in Mongolia through transmission of teachings, empowerments, and various tantric initiations,[11] and it facilitated the golden era of traditional Mongolian medicine in the eighteenth century. The *Four Medical Tantras*, together with the accompanying Tibetan and Mongolian commentaries, gave rise to various Mongolian schools of the *Four Medical Tantras* throughout Mongolia.[12]

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ngag yon tan rgyud kyi lhan thabs zug rngu'i tsa gdung sel ba'i kabur dus min chi zhags gcod pa'i ral gri, and others.

9. For him, a Mongolian commentary that reveals accurate meanings and a terminological dictionary of Tibetan and other languages are precious like gems. See Sharavyn. *Mongolyn Ulamjlalt Anaagakh Ukhaany Tüükh*, 166.

10. The text is included in Lamyn Gegeen's collected works *mKhan chen chos kyi rgyal po'i gsung 'bum las gso ba rig pa'i rtsa rgyud kyi 'grel pa gsal ba'i sgron me zhes bya ba bzhugs so*.

11. The tradition of the *Four Medical Tantras* was transmitted in the line of Khalkha's Egüüzer lama, Khuvilgan Luvsanvanjil, Janja Khutukhtu Navanchoidan, the high incarnation Jebtsundamba (Zanabazar), Ganjuurga of Doloon Nuur, Mergen Dharmarāja Luvsanchültem, the head *lama* (*shireet noën*) Tsorj, Uradyn Mergen Ravjamba Gungajamts, and especially the Oirat Zaya Bandida Namkhai Jamts, Khalkha's Zaya Bandida Luvsanprinlei, and others.

12. The first Mongolian school of the *Four Medical Tantras* was established in 1681 in the place called Bööröljüüt in Bayasgalan üildegch buyanyg arvijuulagch *süm* of Bayankhongor *aimag*, where one of the three newly established *datsans* was a medical college, in which the main subject of study was the *Four Medical Tantras*. The monastery that housed this medical college

From the seventeenth century until the early twentieth century traditional Mongolian scholars and physicians[13] composed numerous medical and astrological treatises, amongst which more than 230 have been preserved, and in which they often synthesized their indigenous medical knowledge with that acquired through the study of Tibetan and Chinese medicine. Mongolian Buddhist medical knowledge also owes its development to Mongolian translations of original Indian medical works included in the Tibetan Buddhist canon, the bKa' 'gyur and bsTang 'gyur. From among 1,260 works contained in the Mongolian Ganjur, twenty-four are related to medicine and astrology, dealing with various therapeutic methods, including healing rituals, prayers, and *mantras*. Likewise, the Mongolian Danjur, which was published in 226 volumes in 1749,[14] includes seven medical treatises, contained in the volumes 206 to 210.

In addition to studying the Tibetan medical literature, the Mongols translated and analyzed Chinese medical textbooks on acupuncture and moxibustion. One such text is *A Compedium of Acupuncture and Moxibustion* (Mng. *Khatgakh Töönökh Tergüütniig Khuraasan Nom Devter*), composed in 1601 and translated into Mongolian by a disciple of the previously mentioned Zaya Bandida Namkhaijamts (1599–1662), around 1660.[15] By the seventeenth century Mongolian Buddhist physicians became well familiarized with Chinese works on astrology and medical classics such as

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was built by a group of famous Mongolian physicians and scholars who returned from their studies in various monastic institutions of Tibet, particularly of Kökenuur and Lhasa. Soon after that, a series of other notable, monastic medical colleges began to appear in 1730, 1739, 1760, 1770, 1788, etc., all in the tradition of the *Four Medical Tantras*.

13. Among them, some of the most renowned medical authors were Erdene Bandita (18th c.), Chakhar dge bshes bLo bZang Tsul Khrims (18th–19th c.), Na'i man dge bsnyen Jam dPal rDo rJe (19th c.), Yondon from Said Wang region of Sain Noyon khan aimag of Khalha (19th c.), Lung Rigs bsTan Dar from Dalai Choinkhor Wang region of Khalkha (19th c.), Lha bTzun Chos 'phel (19th c.), bShad sGrub bsTan Dar, also known as bsTan Dar Argamba (19th–20th c.), Tse sPel dBang Phyug rDo rje (19th–20th c.), and many others.

14. In 1920, Bat-Ochir and Shagj prepared the table of contents of the Tibeto-Mongolian *Danjur*; in 1925, the *Danjur* was brought and housed in the Institute of Sutra Literature; and in 1964, B. Rinchen had the table of contents of volumes 1–75 published. In 2002, the entire table of contents was published in Inner Mongolia.

15. A new, Modern Mongolian translation of the fourth chapter of the text, which is based on the earlier Classical Mongolian version, was prepared by Batsaikhan Shagdaryn and published together with the Classical Mongolian version in 2009.

the *Huangdi Neijing* (*ca* the 5th century BCE–the 2nd centuries CE), also known as the *Yellow Emperor's Inner Canon*, Hua Shuo's *Elucidation of the Fourteen Channels* (*Shi si jing fa hui*), published in 1341, *The Book Beside the Golden Orchid* (*Jin lan xun jing*), written by Wu Tai Bi Lie, a Mongolian member of the Hanlin academy, and published in 1303. Through these works, Mongolian physicians were also introduced to the Daoist *yin*-and-*yang* principle, to the five elements of Chinese astro-medicine (fire, earth, metal, water, and wood), and to Chinese medicinal substances.[16] While integrating the astrological and medical theories and therapeutic methods of India, Tibet, and China with their own folk medical knowledge, Mongolian Buddhist physicians built a system of medicine that transformed its various non-Buddhist components into Buddhist through those physicians' hermeneutical lenses and Buddhist vocabulary. This transformation found its expression in the method-and-wisdom (*arga bileg*) explanatory model of the cosmos, human body, disease, and medical therapeutics.

The idea of the multilayered method-and-wisdom (*arga bileg*) model of a medical theory most likely emerged in its early, non-systematized form among the Mongols in the seventeenth century.[17] However, in the classical medical literature we do not find a single volume dedicated solely to this theory. A detailed presentation of the wisdom-and-method theory appeared in the twentieth century in the writings of the Inner Mongolian physician B. Jigmed.[18] Following his examples, other Mongolian physicians offered their expositions of the theory,[19] which remains to this day a foundational

16. In the eighteenth century, Duke Gombojav (1692–1749) chaired a preparation of one of the earliest Tibetan-Sanskrit-Chinese-and-Turkish medical lexicons, which gives a parallel reading of the *materia medica* in these languages.

17. We do not find the wisdom-and-method medical model formulated in the Buddhist medical theories of Indian and Tibetan scholars, as there is no mention of such a theory in the *Four Medical Tantras*.

18. See B. Jigmed and B. Tsetsenchimeg. *Mongol Anagaakh Ukhaany Ündesen Onol* (*A Foundational Theory of Mongolian Medicine*) translated from the Classical Mongolian (Ulaanbaatar: Mongolian National Medical University, 1993). B. Jigmed. *Mongol Anagaakh Ukhaany Tüiükh* (*History of Mongolian Medicine*) (Ulaanbaatar: Mongolian National Medical University, 2009).

19. See Ch. Baavgai and B. Boldsaikhan, *Mongolyn Ulamjlalt Anagaakh Ukhaan* (*Mongolian Traditional Medicine*) (Ulaanbaatar: Mongolian National Medical University, 1990); and Ya. Ganbayar. *Mongolyn Ulamjlalt Anagaakh Ukhaany Onolyn Ündes* (*A Foundation of Theory of Mongolian Traditional Medicine*) (Ulaanbaatar: Mongolian National Medical University, 2003).

principle of traditional Mongolian medicine. Following a revitalization of traditional Mongolian medicine, which began with democratization of Mongolia in 1989, comprehensive expositions of the method-and-wisdom theory have once again emerged. An example of such works is Ganbayar and Tömörbaatar's textbook titled *Mongolyn Ulamjlalt Anagaakh Ukhaany Onolyn Ündes* (*A Foundational Theory of the Mongolian Traditional Medicine*), published by the Mongolian National Medical University, School of Traditional Medicine in 2003, which deals in good part with the wisdom-and-method theory.

It is clear that the method-and-wisdom model developed through the integration of the following doctrinal and medical principles: the Buddhist doctrinal principle of wisdom and method, the Indo-Tibetan medical theory of the three humours (*doṣa*) and the five elements (earth, water, fire, wind, and space), the Daoist *yin*-and-*yang* principle, and the model of the five elements underlying the Daoist medical theory (wood, fire, earth, metal, and water). Contemporary historians of traditional Mongolian medicine—such as Bold Sharavyn, Ürjingiin Baigalmaa, Ya. Ganbayar, N. Tömörbaatar, and B. Jigmed[20]—trace the earliest source of the wisdom-and-method model to moxibustion, asserting that moxibustion works on the principle of two opposites, as it treats cold disorders with heat; and they argue for the Mongolian origin of moxibustion. Emphasizing that it was practiced as early as the third century BCE, i.e. during the period of the Hun and Xianbi states, Sharavyn and Ürjingiin mention *Huangdi Neijing*, also known as the *Yellow Emperor's Inner Canon*, which mentions moxibustion, as their evidence. They go as far as to interpret the images of the pairs of animal figures, male and female, that face each other on the wall of the Khoid Tsenhkher cave in the Khovd district of western Mongolia as the earliest, material evidence of the indigenous, Mongolian version of the method-and-wisdom model of

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20. Sharavyn, *A History of Mongolian Traditional Medicine*, 91–92; Baigalmaa Ürjingiin, *Diagnosis in Mongolian Traditional Medicine* (*Mongolyn Ulamjlalt Anagaakh Ukhaany Onoshlogoo*) (Ulaanbaatar: Mongolyn Ulamjlalt Anagaakh Ukhaany Khögjliig Demjikh "Khutaibilig" Töv, 2006), 20–21; and Ya. Ganbayar and N. Tömörbaatar, *A Foundation of the Theory of Traditional Mongolian Medicine* (*Mongolyn Ulamjlalt Anagaakh Ukhaany Onolyn Ündes*) (Ulaanbaatar: Mongolian National Medical University, School of Traditional Medicine, 2003), 24.

the world.[21] Others, such as B. Jigmed, draw our attention to the chapter on "Methods of Healing" in the *Four Medical Tantras*,[22] where moxibustion is referred to as "a moxibustion of the Hor" *('khor kyi me btsal)*, "Hor" referring to the so-called "White Mongols," or "Monguors," who settled in the Kökenuur area. The aforementioned scholars also declare acupuncture to be of Mongolian origin. Two discoveries are given as evidence in support of this claim: the finding of a stone needle in the Dolonnuur region of Inner Mongolia in 1963, dated to the Neolithic period; and the uncovering of a bronze needle around the Ikh Zuu[23] district (*aimag*) of Ordos in Inner Mongolia and dated to the Huns period. D. Natsagdorj, on the other hand, traces the origin of the method-and-wisdom model of medical treatment to the Mongolian folk practice of curing diseases characterized by cold and heat with immersions into hot and cold springs.[24]

The Method-and-Wisdom Theory

To understand the manner in which the method-and-wisdom theoretical model functions in the context of traditional Mongolian medicine and what are its implications, one must first examine its common application to the four primary areas of traditional Mongolian medicine, namely, to the elemental composition of a person's body, functions of the individual elements in the body, the aetiology of a disease, and medical therapeutics. Equally important for our understanding is the analysis of the application of the method-and-wisdom principle to medical astrology. As it will be demonstrated later, traditional Mongolian medicine is not to be understood merely as a symbiosis of different medical traditions but also as a branch

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21. Sharavyn, *A History of Mongolian Traditional Medicine*, 91; Ürjingiin, *Diagnosis in the Mongolian Traditional Medicine*, 21; and Jigmed, *Mongol Anagaakh Ukhaany Tüükh Bolon Ertnii Survalj Bichgiin Shinjilgee*, 93.

22. Jigmed, *Mongol Anagaakh Ukhaany Tüükh Bolon Ertnii Survalj Bichgiin Shinjilgee*, 43–47. In the mentioned chapter, the mentioned practice of moxibustion is applied in treating wind disorders with cauterization, which involves mixing the oil of cumin seed with salt and wrapping the mixture in a cloth that is dipped into hot butter and applied on the skin.

23. Ikh Zuu, known also as a Great Temple, sometimes also called The Silver Buddha Temple after its Buddha Śākyamuni statue, was built by Altan Khan from 1579 to 1580 to mark his meeting with the Third Dalai Lama.

24. D. Natjsagdorj, *Anagaakh Ukhaan: Burkhan Emch Sakhius* (Ulaanbatar: Otoch Manramba Deed Surguuly, 2001), 170–171.

of Mongolian Buddhist knowledge, which expounds Buddhist Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna doctrine through theoretical and practical frameworks of medicine. By means of the wisdom-and-method explanatory model, in traditional Mongolian medicine, every existing phenomenon, from an elemental particle up to the cosmos, is classified as either a wisdom or method aspect of phenomenal existence. Just as a unitary ultimate reality, the perfectly awakened mind, or Buddhahood, is known as a union of wisdom that knows reality as it is and method that manifests in compassionate action, so the entire phenomenal world and the person's experience of it is seen as constructed by the interrelated phenomena that bear the seemingly mutually contradictory and yet cooperative method and wisdom aspects.

The concept of method-and-wisdom principle has penetrated various aspects of the Mongols' lives. To this day, the traditional Mongolian home (*ger*), clothing (*deel*), saddle and bridle, cart, offerings to the Buddhas, and other items of daily usage have been fashioned in accordance with the method-and-wisdom principle. The application of the method-and-wisdom principle has also found its way into traditional Mongolian arts such as throat singing, decorative art, and so on. The renowned Mongolian lama and author, the Fifth Khutukhtu, Danzanvavjaa (bStan 'dzin Rab gyas) (1803–1856) expressed a popular Mongolian view with this well-known verse:

> The pairs of birth and death,
> Of creation and dissolution,
> Of the father and mother
> Are the pair of method and wisdom.[25]

In the context of traditional Mongolian medicine, the method-and-wisdom explanatory model situates the synthesized Sāṃkhya's principle of the operation of the three *guṇas* (qualities) of *prakṛti* (the material world), which underlies Indo-Tibetan medical theory, and the Daoist *yin*-and-*yang* principle with the Buddhist Vajrayāna's conception of the nature of the world, human body, health, and illness. Traditional Mongolian medicine conforms

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25. *Törökh ükhekh khoër ny*
Bütekh evdrekh khoër ny
Etseg khoër ny
Arga bilig khoër yom.
Cited in D. Mönkh-Ochir, *Mongol Zurkhain Tüükh* (Ulaanbaatar: Interpress, 2000), 106.

its method-and-wisdom explanatory model to the Buddhist tantric view of the person's psychophysical makeup and his environment as conventional aspects of the ultimate nature of the enlightened mind, which is characterized by the unification of wisdom that sees the emptiness of all phenomena and by compassion, as its method. The medical method-and-wisdom theory is also congruent with the Sāṃkhya and Buddhist tantric exposition of the correspondences between the human body and its natural environment in terms of their common elemental composition and characteristics. It indirectly points to the possible correlations between medical therapeutics based on the method-and-wisdom model and the Buddhist path of the cultivation and mutual integration of wisdom and method aspects on the path to awakening. In the case of an enlightened awareness, which is characterized by the nonduality of wisdom and method, method is nothing other than wisdom expressed through action that eliminates the suffering of sentient beings. Similarly, in a medical tradition that is based on the method-and-wisdom model, preventive and curative methods are viewed as medical wisdom manifesting through actions that eliminate the ailments of others. Therefore, a medical discipline that holds the unity of wisdom and method is to be considered as a particular expression of the Buddha's mind and his teachings. In a medical context, wisdom is of two kinds. One is a conventional wisdom that knows the following three: (1) the intricate networks of the mutually cooperative and causal principles that operate on multiple levels within the mind-body complex, (2) the causes of their disturbances, and (3) the antidotes to their disruptions. The other is a higher wisdom that knows a lack of the inherent existence of the interdependently arisen psychophysical organism, its health, and illness.

In conformity with the Daoist *yin*-and-*yang* principle, method (*arga*) is conceptualized as the dynamic, active, and powerful aspect of a natural phenomenon, and wisdom (*bileg*) as inactive and weak in a developmental process.

In terms of the person's environment, method and wisdom are understood in the following way:

Chart 1: General Classification of Method and Wisdom

Method	Wisdom
Sun	Moon
Summer	Winter
Sky	Earth
Above	Below
Day	Night
Fire	Water
Sunny side	Shadowed side
Male	Female

Similarly, the twelve-year cycle is classified into two sets of method and wisdom years:

Chart 2: Method and Wisdom Years

Method Years	Wisdom Years
Mouse, Tiger, Dragon, Horse, Monkey, Dog	Bull, Hare, Snake. Sheep, Rooster, Pig

However, due to the influence of the method or wisdom nature of their directional abodes and elements, some years will have a combined identity such as method-and-wisdom, wisdom-and-method, method-and-method, or wisdom-and-wisdom.

To know one's environment and the astrological signs of one's birth and the arising of illness in terms of their method and wisdom characteristics is seen as useful for understanding correspondences between the person and his environment and the environmental and astrological influences on the person's body, mind, disease, and medical treatment. As a ratio of wisdom and method elements in the body fluctuates according to the increase or decrease of the method and wisdom components of the current year, seasons, and day and night periods, which are determined by the influences of the

year's element and locations of the sun (method) and the moon (wisdom), it determines the types of diet, preventive conduct, medical treatment, and prognosis of recovery. For instance, even within a day-and-night period, the relationship between wisdom and method changes. In the forenoon and the noon, method is contained within method; in the afternoon, wisdom is contained within method; from the dusk until the midnight, wisdom is contained within wisdom; after the midnight, method begins to arise within wisdom; and at the daybreak, method increases within wisdom.

Through their multifaceted interaction, the two opposing principles of method and wisdom are said to condition each other and depend upon each other, as each contains the other within itself. As in the case of a spiritually awakened mind, so also in the case of any natural phenomenon, the wisdom aspect is contained within method, and the method aspect is contained within wisdom. Without wisdom there is no method, and without method there is no wisdom. A main feature of the relationship between method and wisdom is that they can be limitlessly partitioned within each other. Wisdom can be divided in any number of times and ways within method, and method can be divided within wisdom in any number of times and ways. A visual representation of their interrelation and conditioned existence is based on the example of the Daoist presentation of the *yin* and *yang* principle.

Fig. 1: Method and Wisdom as *Yin* **and** *Yang*

Just as cultivated wisdom and method must be mutually balanced and fully integrated on the Buddhist path for the sake of ultimate health, or the full and perfect awakening, they are also to be kept in a homeostasis within the body for the sake of a conventionally defined physical and mental health.

In terms of medicine, the method-and-wisdom theory concerns itself primarily with 101 illnesses caused by humoural imbalances in the body, which make up one-fourth of the diseases that are recorded in the Tibetan and Mongolian medical traditions and treated with medications, nutrition, behaviour, and external therapies.[26] Imbalances manifest in one of the following three conditions of the humours: excess, deficiency, and mutual aggravation. Illnesses of this category are said to emerge from a disturbed equilibrium of method and wisdom as their specific cause. This specific type of cause pertains to the conventional nature of the world and the body composed of matter, and it is categorized as method because it is active in inducing illness in an unmediated way. Moreover, all ailments also have their distant cause, namely, spiritual ignorance, which pertains to ultimate reality, or emptiness of inherent existence. This distant cause is categorized as a wisdom aspect, since it only indirectly induces the arising of illness.

Specific causes and their primary characteristics are classified as method and wisdom in the following manner:

Chart 3: Bile and Phlegm as Method and Wisdom

Method	Bile (*shar*)	Light	Hot	Sharp
Wisdom	Phlegm (*bagdan*)	Heavy	Cold	Dull

If bodily elements that are of the nature of method (bile) become excessive, an illness associated with wisdom (phlegm) emerges; and if bodily elements that are of the nature of wisdom (phlegm) become excessive, a disease associated with method (bile) arises.

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26. Generally, 404 diseases are recognized, among which are: 101 minor ailments (*ltar snang 'phral nad*), 101 illnesses caused by humoural imbalances (*yongs grub tshe nad*), 101 illnesses induced by previous negative karma (*gzhan dbang sngon las*), and 101 diseases caused by evil spirits (*kun brtags gdon nad*).

The human body is understood as a self-stabilizing system, in which method and wisdom naturally restrict each other's excessive increase and excessive decrease and maintain their relatively balanced relation. For example, if the assimilation of the nutrients in the body is not restricted, a person gains excessive weight, and if the dissimilation of the nutrients in the body is unrestricted, a person loses weight and dies. Dissimilation by itself restricts assimilation, and assimilation by itself restricts dissimilation.[27] As an integrative construct, the body contains both: (1) psychophysical elements that are the objects of harm and healing, and (2) bodily humours that inflict harm and restore health. However, as it will be demonstrated later, the body is also part of the potentiality for realization of personal identitylessness and the highest spiritual achievement, or gnosis.

Imbalances of method and wisdom[28] are characterized as disorders of the three bodily humours (*gem*, Skt. *doṣa*)—bile, phlegm, and wind—the seven essential bodily constituents (*tamir*, Skt. *dhātu*), such as chyle, blood, flesh, fat, bones, marrow, and regenerative fluid, which are produced at every stage of a metabolic process, and three types of impurities (*gkir*, Skt. *mala*), namely, feces, urine, and perspiration. From a perspective of the method-and-wisdom model, specific causes of illness are classified in this way:

Chart 4: Method and Wisdom Illnesses

Method Related Illnesses	Illness caused by excessive accumulation of heat	Illness characterized by bile, or method, disorder
Wisdom Related Illnesses	Illness caused by excessive accumulation of coldness	Illness characterized by phlegm, or wisdom, disorder

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27. Similarly, when there is a balanced relation between hot and cold in the person's body, the bodily temperature remains 36.5 degrees Celsius (98.6 degrees F).
28. An imbalance, or a disorder, of method or wisdom can be of three kinds: excess, deficiency, or aggravation.

Correspondingly, healing is understood to be a process of restoring the equilibrium and proper integration of the method and wisdom elements in the body. It is an interrupted flow of information transiting through the body. The body consists of receptors and transmitters that receive information from the effective environment, such as medicine, nutrition, behaviour, and auxiliary therapy, which regulate and control the aforementioned humours, essential bodily constituents, and impurities. The recovery of a disturbed balance involves the restoration of the insufficient element and suppression of the excessively accumulated one with its opposite. Illnesses associated with method are treated with medications and nutrients that are of the nature of wisdom, and diseases associated with wisdom are treated with medicaments and nutrition that are of the nature of method. Thus, the perception of the body and natural world as consisting of mutually counteracting but cooperative elements, which are of the nature of method and wisdom, underpins traditional Mongolian aetiology and therapeutics.

With regard to medical diagnosis, chronic disorders are generally classified in terms of method and wisdom in this manner:

Chart 5: Diagnostic Methods for Method and Wisdom Illnesses

Method	Symptoms characteristic of heat disorder	Pulse characteristic of heat disorder	Urine characteristic of heat disorder
Wisdom	Symptoms characteristic of cold disorder	Pulse characteristic of cold disorder	Urine characteristic of cold disorder

The body is also understood as a self-organizing system constituted by mutually dependent and interactive components, which bear the features of method and wisdom aspects. Just as the upper and lower regions of the cosmos are characterized as method and wisdom, so are the upper and lower parts of the body. The bodily method and wisdom components are conceived in this way:

Chart 6: The Body as a Network of Method and Wisdom Elements

Method	Wisdom
Upper part of the body	Lower part of the body
Five solid organs: liver, heart, spleen, lungs, and kidneys	Six hollow organs: stomach, duo-dendum, intestines, gall-bladder, bladder, and testes/ovaries
Vascular system	Nervous system, or the white veins, of two kinds: (1) those controlling sensory perceptions; and (2) those controlling bodily movements
Elements constituting the bile humour	Elements constituting the phlegm humour
Male pulse	Female pulse

The integration of method and wisdom is not limited to the bodily constituents alone, but also involves the functions and locations of bodily organs, as seen in chart 7. Thus, a living body is interpreted as a system of the intricate, interrelated networks of diverse method and wisdom factors.

In conformity with this classification of internal organs into wisdom and method aspects, it is generally held that women, in whom wisdom elements are predominant, are generally more susceptible to illnesses related to the six hollow organs (*sav*), most commonly, the kidneys and bladder, which belong to the wisdom category; whereas, men, who are predominantly constituted from method elements, are more susceptible to illnesses of the five solid organs (*tavan tsul*), such as the liver and heart, which belong to the method category.[29]

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29. Mönkh-Ochir, *Mongol Zurkhain Tüükh*, 113.

Chart 7: The Bodily Organs, Their Nature, Elements, Functions, and Locations as Method and Wisdom

Bodily Organ	Nature	Elements	Function	Location
Heart	Method	Method-wisdom	Method	Method
Lungs	Method	Wisdom	Method	Method
Liver	Method	Method	Method	Method
Kidneys	Method	Wisdom	Wisdom	Wisdom
Spleen	Method	Wisdom	Method	Wisdom
Abdomen	Wisdom	Method	Wisdom	Method
Bladder	Wisdom	Wisdom	Wisdom	Wisdom
Gall-bladder	Wisdom	Method	Method-wisdom	Wisdom
Soft organs	Wisdom	Wisdom-method	Wisdom	Wisdom
Colon	Wisdom	Wisdom	Method	Wisdom
Bowels	Wisdom	Method	Method	Method-wisdom

A classification of the bodily constituents into the method and wisdom components is also formulated in close relation to the circulation of the three previously mentioned humours, which flow to different bodily organs through the vascular and nervous systems that branch from the three main, subtle, bodily channels (*sudal*, Skt. *nāḍī*), namely, from the right, left, and central channels. Among the three previous humours, bile, or method, consists of the fire element and is therefore characterized by heat and activity; whereas, phlegm, or wisdom, consists of the earth and water elements and is consequently characterized by cold and inertia. As previously mentioned,

their relationship is of the nature of mutual correlation, resistance, and restriction. For example, when the heat of the absorbing bile (method) enters the seven essential bodily constituents, it melts and digests them with its heat, but its excessive accumulation is restricted by the cooling activity of the moist phlegm (wisdom). As these two tend to fluctuate in terms of their deficiency and excess, which various factors instigate, they perpetuate a continuous process of transformation within the mind-body complex. Thus, the body is seen not only as a unitary entity constituted by mutually interactive method and wisdom components in a state of homeostasis, but also as a continuous process of interdependently arisen, harmful and favourable alterations. The continuous, mutual interaction of method and wisdom effectuates the impermanence of the body, its arising, development, and perishing.

In contrast to the method and wisdom humours, the wind (*khii*, Skt. *vāta*) humour, consisting of the wind and space elements and being neither cold nor hot by nature, is categorized as being neither method nor wisdom. However, due to being of the nature of mobility, the wind spreads and facilitates the proliferation of heat and cold, or method and wisdom, throughout the body. It permeates the body by transiting from the seven essential bodily constituents (*tamir*) to the bones, from the five sense-faculties to the ears, from the five types of sensory awareness to touch, from the solid organs to the heart, and from the hollow organs to the colon. Thus, just as the proliferation and integration of wisdom and method on the Buddhist path of spiritual practice is contingent on the practitioner's unimpeded mind, which is most intimately connected to the wind of vital energies (*amy*, Skt. *prāṇa*) in the body, so too the diffusion and interaction of the bile and phlegm in the body is contingent on the wind, the embodied mind's vehicle.

The nature and efficacies of the three bodily humours in supporting embodied existence are explained in this manner:

Chart 8: The Fire, Water, and Wind as Method, Wisdom, and Neither-Method-Nor-Wisdom

Method	Wisdom	Neither-Method-Nor-Wisdom
Fire-element, heat	a) Water-element, cold b) Earth-element, solidity	a) Wind-element, light and mobile b) Space-element, empty and hollow
Bile humour	Phlegm humour	Wind humour
Forms the complexion, eyes, and visual awareness	a) Forms the blood, tongue, gustatory awareness, and bodily fluids b) Forms the bones, flesh, nose, and gives weight	a) Forms the breath, skin, and tactile awareness b) Forms the bodily apertures, ears, and auditory awareness
Transits through blood, sweat, eyes, liver, gall-bladder, and small intestines	Transits through the 7 essential bodily constituents, nose, tongue, lungs, spleen, kidneys, stomach, and bladder	Transits through the bones, skin, ears, heart, blood vessels, nerves, and large intestine

From the moment of conception until birth, the emerging embryo becomes formed through the integration of the above-mentioned elements of method and wisdom. The proportion of the method and wisdom elements present in the father's semen and mother's ovum and appropriated by a transmigrating consciousness at the time of conception is said to determine the embryo's gender, or its nature as a method, wisdom, or neither-method-nor-wisdom being. If the father's semen, which is comprised of the method elements, is more plentiful at the time of conception, a male embryo, or method being, is conceived. If the mother's ovum, which consists of the wisdom elements, is more plentiful, a female embryo, or wisdom being, is conceived. And if method and wisdom, or the father's semen and mother's

ovum, are of equal proportion, a hermaphrodite, or neither-method-nor-wisdom being, is conceived. In this regard, the hermaphrodite state correlates to the state of a spiritually awakened mind, often metaphorically referred to as an androgynous state, on the grounds that it is ultimately neither wisdom nor method due to the nondual nature of the awakened mind that transcends all conceptualizations, including the categories such as wisdom and method.

During the fifth week of the embryo's development, when the navel is formed, three channels within the navel *cakra* arise, namely, the *lalanā*, or the wisdom channel, on the left, the *rasanā*, or the method channel, on the right, and the central, or the gnosis (*bileg bilig*, Skt. *jñāna*) channel. The wisdom channel, which flows on the left side from the centre of the body, carries the water-element, which is of the nature of wisdom. Therefore, it is white, and it serves as a basis for the phlegm's, or wisdom's, activity in the body. Its upper point forms the brain. Once the brain, whose substance comes from the father's semen, is formed, the marrow comes into existence; and the multitude of white vessels (*tsagaan sudal*), or the nervous system, branches out from the brain and marrow. Due to their arising from the wisdom channel, the brain and entire nervous system are characterized as being of the nature of wisdom. However, as the wind brings bile, or method, into the brain, there is also some bile and blood in the brain. Among the three primary mental afflictions, which characterize the transmigrating consciousness that enters the mother's womb at the time of conception, delusion (*munkhag*, Skt. *moha*) is always associated with the wisdom channel. Delusion has the brain as its physical support in the body, and when it arises, it proliferates and aggravates the bodily phlegm.

The method channel, which flows on the right side from the centre of the body, carries the fire-element, or blood. Therefore, it is of a dark, red colour and functions as a basis of the bile humour in the body. In dependence on it, bile is able to produce bodily warmth. When the method channel flows from the navel toward the top of the head, it forms a lymph gland that penetrates the core of the liver. Ascending further, it forms an aorta located near the tenth spinal vertebra. From that aorta, all the vascular system, which is indispensable for the development of the seven essential bodily constituents, branches out. The mental affliction of anger (*uur*, Skt. *dveṣa*) arises in dependence on the blood in the method channel. Anger has the liver as its physical support in the body, and when it arises, it increases and aggravates the bile humour in the body.

The third channel, or the central channel,[30] which flows along the axis through the centre of the body, is said to be of the nature of gnosis (*bileg bilgüün*, Skt. *jñāna*), or of undifferentiated method and wisdom, for it carries the wind-element, which is neither wisdom nor method. The gnosis channel provides a basis for the wind humour in the body, and it supports the circulation of wind throughout the body. It establishes the centralization of all of one's activities—mental, verbal, and physical. Like a motor, or a stimulator, the central channel generates great power; it controls and directs all of one's activities from birth to death. The wind in the gnosis channel is the foundation of bodily existence, as one's vital breath depends on it. The mental affliction of attachment (Mng. *khüsekh*, Skt. *rāga*) arises in dependence on the wind in the gnosis channel, and it has the reproductive organ as its support in the body. Its arising is known to proliferate and aggravate the body's wind.

Since the flow of vital energies in the body depends on these three channels, they form a physiological foundation of embodied life and transmigratory existence. In conformity with the *Kālacakrantra's* exposition of the human body, traditional Mongolian medicine holds that the number of breaths a person takes within the day-and-night is 21,600. Of these 21,600 breaths, 10,462.5 are said to flow through the method channel (*rasanā*) and exit through the right nostril. Another 10,462.5 breaths flow through the wisdom channel (*lalanā*) and exit through the left nostril. The two remaining breaths of inhalation and exhalation are referred to as the winds of gnosis that exit through both nostrils. When by means of Buddhist tantric, yogic practices, the wisdom and method channels are brought into the gnosis channel and the white, or wisdom, and red, or method, drops within the gnosis channel are not released through the reproductive organ but are dissolved within the central channel, the three channels cease to carry the three humours. In consequence, the three related mental afflictions dissipate. As a result, the wisdom channel eventually becomes transformed into the wisdom of emptiness, or identitylessness (Mng. *bi ügei*, Skt. *nairātmya*), the method channel into the awakening mind (Mng. *bodi sedkil*, Skt. *bodhicitta*), or compassion, and the gnosis channel into freedom from

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30. Known also under the names of *oṃ nādı*, *avadhūtı*, *suṣumnā* in Sanskrit, and as *kun dhar ma*, *phra mo'i gzug*, *srog rtsa*, *srog gi skud pa*, *nang gi shing gcig*, *lam po che*, and *rtsa dbu ma* in Tibetan.

grasping. In this way, the causes of physical ailments become removed for all times and mental afflictions transformed into ultimate mental health, or spiritual awakening. This unification of the method and wisdom channels within the gnosis channel is correlated to the unification of the conventional and ultimate realities within the nondual gnosis that is neither wisdom nor method because it is unitary.[31]

Applying the method-and-wisdom explanatory model to every structural and psychophysiological level of life, traditional Mongolian physicians, similarly to the contemporary system biologists, have sought to elucidate their understanding of a sentient organism as a series of interdependent processes emerging from an array of interactive elements. With this, they also sought to demonstrate the lack of a privileged cause within this net of interactive causalities.[32] The wisdom-and-method model of embodied existence emphasizes integration rather than a reductionistic process, and it seeks to show the structures and levels at which various psychophysiological functions operate through their immense and complicated networks and interactions. Traditional Mongolian physicians pointed to medical discoveries regarding the nature of embodied existence, the dangers and problems that arise from it, and their solutions as congruent with the Buddhist views of the condition of the world. Therefore, they considered such a medical system to be soteriologically relevant. By including the spiritual realm within the conception of health, illness, and healing, the method-and-wisdom theoretical model exemplifies an integrated, mind-body-transcendent paradigm.

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31. The *Altan Hadmal* (*Golden Supplement*) cited in Ganbayar and Tömörbaatar, *Mongolyn Ulamjlalt Anagaakh Ukhaany Onolyn Ündes*, 57.
32. For a new theoretical formulation of the systems biology see Denis Noble, *The Music of Life: Biology Beyond Genes* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

The Faithful Departed: Roman Catholic Saints and Perceptions of Persons with HIV/AIDS

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In December 1984, thirteen-year-old hemophiliac Ryan White was diagnosed with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), during a time that the disease was still poorly understood by both the public and the scientific community. In the years that followed, as White became a poster child for AIDS understanding, research, and increasing public support, societal perceptions about both White and the nature of AIDS slowly shifted. No longer branded as "secretly homosexual," media accounts began instead to classify White as "an innocent victim" of AIDS.[1] The language of innocence and victimization—which White and his family consistently rejected—implicitly contrasts "innocent" people who are diagnosed with AIDS with those whom some perceived to be "guilty"—namely, homosexuals.[2] From the 1980s to the present, the struggle of Western society to conceptualize and understand HIV/AIDS and the variety of men, women, and children who contract it every year has been centrally important to the development of social attitudes, public policy, and perceptions of human sexuality.

There are a number of influences that shape public perceptions of disease, particularly HIV/AIDS, as the case of Ryan White as "victim" versus "homosexual" suggests. Susan Sontag has contended that people understand both diseases and those who contract them through metaphor. Indeed, for Sontag, "one cannot think without metaphors," and human need for such metaphors when dealing with the largely invisible (and often

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1. Alex Witchel, "At Home With Jeanne White-Ginder: A Son's AIDS, and a Legacy," *New York Times*, September 24, 1992, accessed March 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/1992/09/24/garden/at-home-with-jeanne-white-ginder-a-son-s-aids-and-a-legacy.html?pagewanted=6&src=pm4.

2. This perception and the implication of guilt were extended to those perceived to be promiscuous, drug users, or homeless, among others. See also Susan Sontag, *AIDS and its Metaphors* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1989), 24.

frightening and alien) world of germs, viruses, and mutations is especially great.[3] Sontag is not alone in this analysis. Tamsin Wilton notes that for those who become ill, for their families and friends, and for societies in general, "representational practices [regarding how people think about disease] both reflect and construct social and psychological 'reality.'"[4] Medical historian Sander Gilman goes even further, concluding that all human understanding of "disease is…restricted to a specific set of images, thereby forming a visual boundary, a limit to the idea (or fear) of disease. The creation of the image[s] of AIDS must be understood as part of this ongoing attempt to isolate, [understand,] and control [it]."[5] Given this pattern of human behaviour, the creation and continuation of various representations of AIDS has and will continue to have "profound consequences" in contemporary Western society.[6] Both the inevitability of understanding disease through metaphor and the repercussions of such behaviour clearly demonstrate the need to identify factors that contribute to the formation of societal representations of HIV.

Key components in society that both shape and sustain perceptions of illness can stem from religious beliefs and institutions. The following analysis shows that the link between metaphor and religious symbolism is a largely unexplored but important component for understanding how segments of Western society may perceive diseases such as HIV and the people who contract them. Specifically, the evidence here demonstrates that the multiplicity of saints in Roman Catholic devotionalism who are believed to care for persons with HIV/AIDS represent divergent ways that some Catholics in North America[7] conceptualize HIV and Persons with AIDS (PWAs).[8] This analysis examines representations in Catholic publications

3. Sontag, *AIDS and its Metaphors,* 5, 9.

4. Tamsin Wilton, *Engendering AIDS: Deconstructing Sex, Text and Epidemic* (London: Sage Publications, 1997), 6.

5. Sander Gilman, "AIDS and Syphilis: The Iconography of Disease," *October* vol 43 (Winter 1987): 87–107.

6. Wilton, *Engendering AIDS,* 6.

7. The texts available for this analysis limit the present discussion primarily to English-speaking Catholics in North America; all subsequent references to Catholics should be understood in this context unless specifically noted.

8. I will consistently refer to persons living with AIDS with the abbreviation PWAs throughout this article. I have chosen this slightly older terminology for consistency, respect, and for the

and websites of Saints Peregrine Laziosi, Aloysius Gonzaga, Luigi Scrosoppi, and Damien de Veuster (aka Father Damien), each of whom is said to serve as the patron saint of PWAs. Examining the uses, descriptions, and expectations assigned to these saints highlights the ways in which some Catholic men and women may perceive HIV/AIDS and people who have contracted it. This argument proceeds from recognition of the continuance of saint veneration in North America, as well as from the analysis of saints as socio-religious symbols within the history of AIDS research and Catholic policy. It then analyzes the available literature surrounding each saint relative to the patrons they are said to favour. Associations between the primary or original patrons of a saint (such as young people, persons with cancer, or lepers) and the saint's subsequent adoption for or by PWAs strongly suggests that there are specific conceptual links perceived between each saint's primary patronage and HIV and/or PWAs. The evidence that follows linking saints and their patronage to wider perceptions of the disease and PWAs is an important step towards both understanding how segments of Western societies have been influenced by (predominantly English-speaking) Catholic perceptions of this devastating disease and identifying factors that influence these perceptions over time among Catholics and non-Catholics alike.

Catholic devotion to saints is a prime example of how religious practice can shape adherents' worldviews regarding HIV/AIDS. Distinguished scholar of religion Robert Orsi argues (via theorist Clifford Geertz) that one of the primary functions and abilities of religion is to "concretize [for the human mind] the order of the universe, the nature of human life and its destiny, and the various dimensions and possibilities of human[kind]".[9] Orsi feels that the religious lives and institutions of Catholics in particular exemplify this role of religion, and that one primary way that this impulse manifests itself in Roman Catholic life and devotion is through praying to

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nuances that it encompasses. Unlike the most current nomenclature, Persons Living With AIDS (PLWA), Persons Living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA), or People Living Positively (PLP), PWA is most appropriate for this discussion because many of the firsthand accounts in my sources clearly conceptualize persons with AIDS in a manner that extends to people who are all too often *not* living. For further history on the evolving terms for describing people with AIDS, see Wilton, *Engendering AIDS,* 65–70.

9. Robert Orsi, *Between Heaven and Earth: The religious Worlds People Make and the Scholars Who Study Them* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 73.

and identifying with saints.[10] Indeed, Jerome Baggett argues that devotion to saints remains one of the most pious, "most Catholic" forms of expressing one's faith among North American Catholics today, and as such, the influence of specific saints' images and associations cannot be ignored.[11]

Understanding diseases like HIV through symbol and practice is particularly relevant and necessary for parishioners in North America because of the stances and language used by the Vatican, the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops (CCCB), and the US Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) to describe HIV infection and PWAs. That is, both significant amounts of information, aid, and attention from the Vatican are directed (though not without some controversy[12]) to African nations, and the entire body of the USCCB's public ministry concerning HIV has since 2007 been explicitly and almost exclusively directed towards African Americans and women. [13] Catholic policy on HIV prevention itself remains problematic for many parishioners, health professionals, and advocates in North America. For instance, while Pope Benedict XVI has consistently called for compassionate responses regarding people with HIV or AIDS, he

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10. See both Robert Orsi, *Thank You, St. Jude: Women's Devotion to the Saint of Hopeless Causes* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996) and his later work *Between Heaven and Earth* for excellent examples of the continuance of American-Catholic devotionalism in twentieth-century (including post-Vatican II) American religious life.

11. Jerome Baggett, *Sense of the Faithful: How American Catholics Live their Faith* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 161.

12. The Vatican has frequently been criticized in relation to its views on condom use for HIV prevention. See Richard L. Smith, *AIDS, Gays, and the American Catholic Church* (Cleveland, Ohio: Pilgrim Press, 1994); Lisa L. Ferrari, "Catholic and Non-Catholic NGOs Fighting HIV/ AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa: Issue Framing and Collaboration," *International Relations* vol. 25, no. 1 (March 2011): 85–107; and Stephen Muoki Joshua, "A Critical Historical Analysis of the South African Catholic Church's HIV/AIDS Response Between 2000 and 2005," *African Journal of AIDS Research* vol. 9, no. 4, (2010): 437–447.

13. While many dioceses still continue their own local or regional HIV outreach and ministry, in 2007 the National Catholic AIDS Network was disbanded. This rendered The National African American Catholic HIV/AIDS Task Force as the only publicized and authorized nationwide Catholic outreach program in the US and is now the program to which all USCCB AIDS resources direct parishioners. "The National Catholic AIDS Network (NCAN) Records," *University of Chicago Archives* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2007). http://bmrcsurvey. uchicago.edu/collections/2672. See also the USBBC resource listing: http://www.usccb.org/ issues-and-action/cultural-diversity/african-american/hiv-aids-resources-cultural-diversity. cfm

and other top Vatican officials have on numerous occasions denounced the use of condoms and comprehensive sexual education programs for fighting HIV. Medical professionals and the World Health Organization consider such measures to be an integral and successful part of HIV prevention and education.[14]

It is worth noting that the devotion of Catholics to a variety of saints—and the ongoing salience of this practice in their lives—in a post-Vatican II, twenty-first century society is an enduring, if at times less visible, tradition in many North American Catholic parishes. During the last twenty years, scholars of American Catholicism have identified new and continuing traditions of devotionalism associated with the Virgin Mary and a multitude of saints. The persistence of this type of practice in Catholic life parallels the activities of Pope John Paul II, who served as pope from 1978 to 2005 and advanced the causes of more saints than all other Popes in the last five centuries combined.[15] Work by Hopgood, Orsi, Kane, Savastano, Tweed, and others documents numerous forms of devotionalism within a variety of Catholic communities, demonstrating that such practices remain relevant variables in the study of Catholic life in North America and beyond. In 1996, Robert Orsi published *Thank You, St. Jude*, a thorough examination—both historical and contemporary in focus[16]—of how the veneration of a virtually unknown saint became in the twentieth century one of the most important and widespread devotions in America. Less than a year later, the publication of Thomas Tweed's influential work on Cuban Catholics' devotion to Mary, *Our Lady of the Exile*, demonstrated (along with contemporaneous and subsequent work by scholars such as Sally Cunneen, Paula Kane, and Socorro Castaneda-Liles) that Marian devotionalism was alive and well

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14. One notable exception occurred during an interview with Benedict XVI in 2010, but that same year the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith "clarified" that no change in the Church's stance had occurred. See Giuseppe Benagiano, et al, "Condoms, HIV and the Roman Catholic Church," *Reproductive BioMedicine Online* vol. 22, no. 7 (June 2011): 701–709.

15. John Paul II celebrated 147 beatification ceremonies; he proclaimed 1,338 people to be Blessed and canonized 51 Blessed for a total of 482 saints. Holy See, "His Holiness John Paul II: Short Biography" (Vatican City: Vatican Press, no copyright date), accessed April 2012, http://www.vatican.va/news_services/press/documentazione/documents/santopadre_biografie/giovanni_paolo_ii_biografia_breve_en.html.

16. See in particular xiii–xviii for a summary of Orsi's sources, fieldwork, and methodology.

in the United States, particularly in many immigrant churches.[17] In 2005, Robert Orsi followed the success of *Thank You, St. Jude* with *Between Heaven and Earth*, a wider survey of saint veneration in the twentieth century in the United States. This research demonstrated both the history and the continuance of saint and Marian devotions as salient and persistent practices in Catholic lives that straddle "the break between the working class and rural immigrant church and the modern middle class culture."[18] Other scholars, such as James Hopgood, Donald Boisvert, and Peter Savastano, have added to this discussion with new arguments about who can be considered a saint in contemporary society and how some contemporary Catholics are finding novel ways to relate to saints, respectively.[19] In fact, Hopgood argues that more research into the lived religion of those who venerate saints is needed and that the specific ramifications of saint veneration in Western culture remain understudied aspects of religious life.[20] These authors, along with others shaping the renewed interest and scholarship in this field, demonstrate that Catholic saint veneration and the fruitful study thereof remain important factors in significant pockets of Western society.

In addition to describing the continuity and evolution of Catholic devotionalism in the twenty-first century, some of this recent scholarship uncovers ways in which practices and the people who perform them can influence, rather than simply reflect, larger Catholic perceptions and

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17. Thomas Tweed, *Our Lady of the Exile: Diasporic Religion at a Cuban Catholic Shrine in Miami* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1997); Sally Cunneen, *In Search of Mary: The Woman and the Symbol* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996); Paula Kane, "Marian Devotion since 1940: Continuity or Casualty?," in *Habits of Devotion: Catholic Religious Practice in Twentieth Century America*, ed. James O'Toole, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 89–130; Socorro Castaneda-Liles, "Our Lady of Guadalupe and the Politics of Cultural Interpretation," in *Mexican American Religions: Spirituality, Activism, and Culture*, eds. Gaston Espinoza and Mario Garcia (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), 153–179.

18. Orsi, *Between Heaven and Earth,* 107.

19. See James Hopgood, "Introduction: Saints and Saints in the Making," in *The Making of Saints: Contesting Sacred Ground*, ed. James Hopgood (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 2005), xi–xxi; Boisvert, Donald L., *Sanctity and Male Desire: A Gay Reading of Saints* (Cleveland: The Pilgrim Press, 2004); and Peter Savastano, "'St. Gerard Teaches Him that Love Cancels that Out:' Devotion to St. Gerard Maiella Among Italian American Catholic Gay Men in Newark, New Jersey," in *Gay Religion*, eds. Scott Thumma and Edward Gray (New York: Altamira Press, 2005), 181–202.

20. Hopgood, "Introduction," xvi.

worldviews. Robert Orsi's account of women's devotionalism in *Thank You, St. Jude* reflects the historical reality that parishioners both shaped and reacted to their Catholic faith traditions. Orsi describes "how these women created and sustained [their] world in relation to Jude… imagined reality and its alternatives, and how they lived in this imagined and reimagined world through their devotions."[21] These women took in Catholic perspectives, practices, and teachings, and then "re-imagined" them in ways that fit their lives and experiences. In regards to contemporary spirituality, Peter Savastano's ethnographic work in a Newark, New Jersey, Catholic parish exemplifies this same trend. Savastano explicates how some gay Catholic men in his study had become devotees to saints such as Sebastian and Gerard. The men began their devotionalism, the author concludes, because this practice validated and reinforced their own experiences, sexuality, and spirituality.[22] That is, Catholic iconography[23] and devotionalism was adopted and transformed into an affirming validation of both faith and sexuality within this community. As Savastano points out, and as many artists from the Renaissance onward[24] seem to have known, religious images "have the power to stimulate the creative imagination, arouse the emotions, and inflame [desires]," but they can also be re-created, interpreted, and manipulated.[25] Savastano's research strongly suggests that gay men may use Catholic imagery and devotional practice to both buttress their interpretations of their Catholic faith and validate their own perceptions, experiences, and desires. Similarly, the analysis in the pages that follow assumes that the associations

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21. Orsi, *Thank You,* 186.

22. Savastano, "St. Gerard Teaches Him that Love Cancels that Out," 184.

23. Savastano suggests that it is the icons, rather than the hagiographies, that are most relevant in the imaginations of the men who become devoted to them; indeed, the often effeminate images of these saints have encouraged the viewers to project their lives, desires, and experiences onto the saints (see 186 and 188). The author reports this type of devotion to Saints Sebastian, Gerard, Anthony of Padua, Paulinus of Nola, and the Madonna del Carmine. A similar example of one's religious worldview influencing behaviour is McGuire's suggestion that churchmen, such as the abbot Aelred of Rievaulx, subsumed homosexual desires "into 'agapetic love'…to the body of Jesus" (see Savastano, "St. Gerard Teaches Him that Love Cancels that Out," 187, quoting Brian McGuire, *Brother & Lover: Aelred of Rievaulx,* (New York: Crossroads Publishing, 1994), 142 and 148).

24. See Valentina Liepa, "The Image of Saint Sebastian in Art," *Acta Humanitarica Universitatis Saulensis,* T. 8 (2009), 546–547.

25. Savastano, "St. Gerard Teaches Him that Love Cancels that Out," 186.

that have developed around Saints Peregrine Laziosi, Gonzaga, Scrosoppi, and de Veuster both reflect and influence Catholic perceptions of sexuality, disease, and stigma.

In public spheres, people and institutions frequently "deploy religious powers [in order to] make alternate characters" that fit into their worldview or beliefs.[26] The creation of such characters is relevant because these types of religious symbols influence not only perceptions of sexuality and diseases like HIV/AIDS, but also affect Catholics' assumptions about the "type" of person that has contracted HIV. Indeed, the surprising variety of saints purported to attend to PWAs represents the continuing ambiguity regarding who can and should be thought of as living with or having died from AIDS. Is the PWA the young African man, woman, or orphaned child? Is he homosexual? Should she or he be thought of as similar to someone suffering from any other serious illness, such as cancer? Or do the saints intercede for young victims, such as Ryan White, who was often portrayed in North American media as antithetical to gay people and culture?[27] In contemporary Catholic culture, a multitude of saints are said to attend to people with AIDS; four of the most frequently invoked are Saints Luigi Scrosoppi, Aloysius Gonzaga, Peregrine Laziosi, and Damien de Veuster. In significant ways, these different saints are being used as symbols that speak to and about different populations with HIV/AIDS. While on some level the appropriation of saints or near-saint figures[28] as representatives for PWAs stems from a need for individuals to identify and cultivate a sense of "personal connection" and identification with a patron saint,[29] the fact remains that certain saints who are purported to represent and care for PWAs reflect overtly politicized views of the disease and PWAs. Arguing that Saint Peregrine Laziosi, not Saint Damien, for example, is the appropriate saint to which PWAs and their loved ones should pray inevitably invites comparisons to each saints' original patronages; should PWAs be perceived to be in some

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26. Mark Jordan, *Recruiting Young Love: How Christians Talk about Homosexuality* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2011), 209; see also Calhoun, 122–124.

27. Jordan, *Recruiting Young Love,* 190.

28. See Hopgood, *The Making of Saints*, for a full discussion of near-saints and their creation in American culture.

29. Orsi, *Thank You,* 18.

way like Saint Peregrin's principal demographic—cancer patients—or are they more in accord with Saint Damien's concern for lepers and outcasts?

Since 1726, Saint Peregrine Laziosi has served as the patron saint of those suffering[30] from cancer. His hagiography—that is, the sanctified story and myth surrounding and interpreting his acts and life—recounts that he suffered from a cancerous growth or infection of the leg, which was miraculously cured the night before the leg was to be amputated.[31] Such stories of overcoming (or succumbing to) illness often feature significantly in establishing the patronage of saints who represent those with illnesses; it is indeed cited as the (obvious) reason why Saint Peregrine is presumed to intercede for people with cancer.[32] However, following public awareness of the emergence of the AIDS epidemic in the 1980s, some lay Catholics have begun to pray to Peregrine for healing, comfort, or other favours for those with HIV/AIDS. In fact, much Catholic literature that refers to the patrons of Saint Peregrine often conflates "those with cancer or HIV/AIDS."

The association between cancer and AIDS likely stems from several sources. First, some Catholic communities or individuals may have encountered or have remembered some of the earliest labels for AIDS-related illnesses; in the 1980s, one common informal term for the mysterious illnesses that were affecting young gay men was "gay cancer."[33]

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30. Here and in the following sections, terms such as "sufferer" and "victim" are employed as language present within the context of the many sources that use it specifically. While acknowledging a certain amount of judgment or bias implicit in such labels, I have found it cogent to represent such terms as they are found in the source material; they function as important reflections of the ways in which the people who use the terms may themselves perceive PWAs.

31. Philip Noble, *The Wakkins Dictionary of Saints* (London: Wakkins Publishing, 2007), 192.

32. "St. Peregrine: Mass and Novena for those with Cancer and HIV/AIDS" BrotherMichael. com (Servants of Mary, no copyright date), accessed April 2012, www.brothermichael.com/ saints/Peregrine.html; "Shrine of St. Peregrine: The Cancer Saint" (Cross in the Woods.org, 2004), accessed April 2012, http://www.crossinthewoods.org/peregrine.htm; "Chaplet of St. Peregrine: The Saint for Cancer and HIV/AIDS" (Ave Maria's Circle, Rosary Making Supplies, Chaplets, no copyright date), accessed April 2012, https://avemariascircle.com/zencart/ chapletpix/StPeregrine.htm; Nancy Hartnagel, "Saints Connected to Health," *Catholic News Service*, accessed April 2012, http://www.catholic.org/health/story.php?id=218362.

33. Joe Wright, interviewed by Melissa Block, "Remembering The Early Days of 'Gay Cancer,'" *All Things Considered* (National Public Radio) May 8, 2006; Russell, Sabin, "Unsettling Re-emergence of "Gay Cancer,'" *San Francisco Chronicle*, October 11, 2007.

The perceived relationship between cancer and AIDS has likely been reinforced by the prevalence of the AIDS-related illness Kaposi's sarcoma, which is a cancer that presented in roughly eighty percent of all early AIDS cases and was commonly fatal. Sometimes referred to as the "AIDS rash" or the "gay cancer" in the early 1980s, Kaposi's sarcoma, with its many discoloured spots on the person's skin, was long considered one of the most visible signs of AIDS; it remains the most common malignancy associated with HIV infection.[34] Popular knowledge of Kaposi's sarcoma has increased since its inclusion in the 1987 CDC identification of diseases; its diagnosis may also signify the presence of HIV/AIDS, and was prominently depicted in the influential 1993 film *Philadelphia*.[35] A 2008 study found that nearly three-fourths of gay or bisexual men surveyed in California had heard of Kaposi's sarcoma, and that HIV was most commonly (incorrectly) cited as the cause of this cancer.[36] However, none of the Catholic literature cited references Kaposi's sarcoma or any of the early labels for the disease in their discussions of cancer patients or PWAs. If the Catholics who are equating cancer and HIV/AIDS do so because they are aware of the prevalence of Kaposi's sarcoma or think about HIV/AIDS as "gay cancer," they are not explicitly stating it. For this reason, until specific communities devoted to Saint Peregrine can be engaged more closely, the degree to which these historical and clinical associations affect communities praying to Saint Peregrine will remain unclear.

Yet, the fact remains that a number of lay-Catholic websites, parish websites, shrines, and news reports now refer to Saint Peregrine as the saint for those "afflicted with HIV." A second possible explanation for this association can be culled from the language and associations between HIV and cancer in Catholic literature; it is possible that priests and lay Catholics

34. Wright, "Remembering the Early Days of 'Gay Cancer'"; Russell, "Unsettling Re-emergence of "Gay Cancer,'" 2; Abigail Phillips, et al, "Awareness of Kaposi's Sarcoma-associated Herpes Virus Among Men Who Have Sex with Men," *Sexually Transmitted Diseases* vol. 35, no. 12 (2008): 1011–1014.

35. "Revision of the CDC Surveillance Case Definition for Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome," Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists; AIDS Program, Center for Infectious Diseases. *Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report* 36, Supplement 1 (August 1987): 1S–15S; Russell, "Unsettling Re-emergence of 'Gay Cancer,'" 2.

36. Phillips, et. al., "Awareness of Kaposi's Sarcoma-associated Herpes Virus Among Men Who Have Sex with Men," 1013.

identified Saint Peregrine as appropriate for PWAs specifically because they perceived or wished to project HIV in a less stigmatized context.[37] Susan Sontag and others note multiple examples of comparisons between the experience of being diagnosed with cancer and with HIV.[38] By the early 1990s, there was evidence that some patients, ministers, and caregivers were beginning to view PWAs without the intense stigma so often attached to the disease, instead opting to view it as a terminal "disease like cancer."[39] Indeed, by 2007 the Catholic News Service had no qualms about concluding, after describing Peregrine's miraculous healing from cancer, that "naturally [because of his experience with cancer] he is the patron saint of…those with AIDS and other diseases."[40] While there are likely diverse motivations[41] for portraying both HIV/AIDS and cancer as diseases that are equally "life-threatening serious illnesses," the normalization or reduction of stigma commonly associated with HIV/AIDS cannot be discounted as one possible motivation for, or result of, this association. The fact that the National Shrine of Saint Peregrine (located in Chicago, IL), as well as other[42] parishes and

37. "Friday Mass and Novena for those with Cancer and HIV/AIDS and All the sick," (Monson: St. Patrick Church, no copyright date), accessed April 2012, www.stpatrickmonson. org/stperegrine/stprform.html; "Saint Peregrine Laziosi: Patron Saint of Cancer Patients" (Via Rosa Rosaries, Devotional Chaplets, Rosary Beads, and Catholic Gifts, 2006), accessed April, 2012, http://www.viarosa.com/VR/StPeregrine/Rosaries+Chaplets.html; "St. Peregrine: Mass and Novena for those with cancer and HIV/AIDS"; "Shrine of Saint Peregrine: The Cancer Saint"; "Chaplet of St. Peregrine: The Saint for Cancer and HIV/AIDS"; "St. Peregrine, The Cancer Saint" The Grotto, (Portland: The National Sanctuary of Our Sorrowful Mother, 2012), accessed March 2012, http://www.thegrotto.org/liturgies/st-peregrine-devotions-the-cancer-saint/.

38. Sontag, *AIDS and its Metaphors*, 15–17.

39. Smith, *AIDS, Gays, and the American Catholic Church*, 97; see also Richard Hardy, *Loving Men: Gay Partners, Spirituality, and AIDS*, (New York: Continuum Press, 1998), 74–77.

40. Hartnagel, "Saints Connected to Health," 2.

41. A full third of all websites reviewed actively market and sell Saint Peregrine items for those with cancer or HIV/AIDS, while less than one-in-eight referenced websites do so for each of the other three saints in this analysis.

42. Examples include the Shrine of Saint Peregrine in Portland, Oregon, St. Patrick Parish in Monson, Massachusetts, and St. Bartholomew Parish in Wissinoming, PA. See Beverly Johnson Roberts, "St. Peregrine Shrine," accessed April 2012, http://st-peregrine-medal.com/st-peregrine-shrine.htm; "St. Peregrine, the Cancer Saint," "Friday Mass and Novena for those with Cancer and HIV/AIDS and All the Sick"; and David O'Reilly, "Shrine to be Dedicated to Patron Saint of Those with Cancer" *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, April 25, 1998, A14.

shrines to Saint Peregrine, recognizes "those with cancer, HIV/AIDS, and other chronic or life threatening illnesses" together during Mass suggests an impetus towards at least some socio-cultural and religious normalization of the disease among specific subsets of Catholics. [43]

Saint Aloysius Gonzaga is also often cited as "the Patron Saint of People with AIDS." Gonzaga's hagiography, like Peregrine's, includes details about the saint's encounter with disease; at the age of 23, he contracted and died of the plague while treating plague victims with his fellow Jesuits in Rome.[44] However, the patrons originally assigned to this saint were not necessarily ill in any way; Saint Gonzaga is first and foremost the patron saint of youth.[45] He was canonized in 1726 and was declared the patron saint of all students in 1729.[46] It is likely that the story of the end of Gonzaga's life—dying of the plague—drew some Catholics to make comparisons between the specifics of that disease and the experiences of PWAs. Indeed, no cure was known for the plague during Gonzaga's lifetime, and it (like the onset and spread of AIDS in the 1980s and 1990s) often resulted in an excruciating death that frequently included separation from or abandonment by one's loved ones.[47] Thus, Catholic perceptions of HIV/AIDS as a "plague" similar to the Black Death could have led some communities to identify Gonzaga with PWAs. In

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43. The perception that having cancer and having HIV are comparable is clearly not uniform among lay Catholics and Catholic organizations. As of April 2012, for example, there were no references to HIV/AIDS or PWAs in any online literature about the Peregrine Ministry for "people with cancer and other chronic illnesses" published by the Servite Center Mission (headquartered in Omaha, NE). See "Saint Peregrine Ministry," (website: American Province of the Servants of Mary, Omaha, NE, 2012), accessed April 2012, http://osms.org/st-peregrine-ministry/st-peregrine-ministry.

44. "Saint Aloysius Gonzaga," 304; Farmer, *The Oxford Dictionary of Saints,* 193.

45. "Saint Aloysius Gonzaga," *New Catholic encyclopedia*, 2nd ed., ed., Berard Marthaler (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America/Gale Publishing, 2003), vol 6, 304; David Hugh Farmer, *The Oxford Dictionary of Saints,* 5th ed. rev. (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2011), 193.

46. "St. Aloysius Gonzaga, SJ (1568–1591)" Ignatian Spirituality.com (Website, Loyola Press, no copyright date), accessed April 2012, http://ignatianspirituality.com/ignatian-voices/16th-and-17th-century-ignatian-voices/st-aloysius-gonzaga-sj/.

47. For example, see Hardy, *Loving Men,* ch. 3; Smith, *AIDS, Gays, and the American Catholic Church,* ch. 4.

fact, such associations could stem in part from another early title for AIDS in the 1980s—the "gay plague."[48]

Of course, highlighting this aspect of the hagiography of Aloysius Gonzaga also draws attention to the courageous and self-sacrificing roles of the Jesuits and the Catholic Church in tending to the sick during the sixteenth century. While there were some Catholic organizations, particularly Jesuit ones, caring for PWAs in North America during the late 1980s and 1990s, significant criticism arose during this period regarding the Catholic Church's response (or lack thereof) to HIV/AIDS.[49] For this reason it is also possible that the selection of Gonzaga to represent people with AIDS could have been an effort to encourage positive associations between the Jesuits (and thus the Catholic Church) and compassionate responses to HIV/AIDS. Designation of Aloysius Gonzaga as a caring friend to—and fellow sufferer with—the terminally ill could be a small effort by some Catholics to rehabilitate or boost the image of the Church in the face of criticism relating to its concern for PWAs.

There is yet another possible interpretation as to why many Catholics identify Saint Gonzaga with PWAs. Because the hagiographic information about a saint is often cited as justification for establishing patronages, it is significant that Gonzaga is said to have been only[50] 23 years old at the time of his death and is consistently portrayed as a "young, doe-eyed novice" in hagiographic art.[51] The perception of Saint Gongaza as a sick but courageous child or teenager is salient because of the emergence of teenager Ryan White as one of the most notable faces of people with AIDS until his death in 1990 at the age of 18.[52] A significant number of the North American-based texts

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48. Merrill Singer, "The Politics of AIDS," *Social Science Medicine* vol 38, no. 10 (1994): 1321–1324.

49. See Smith, *AIDS, Gays, and the American Catholic Church,* 65–68; Hardy, *Loving Men,* 115–128; *Gay Religion*, eds., Scott Thumma and Edward Gray (New York: Altamira Press, 2005); and *Queer and Catholic*, eds., Amie Evans and Trebor Healey (New York: Routledge Press, 2008). Susan Henking, "Patron Saint of AIDS/HIV, Father Damien, to Be Canonized," *Religion Dispatches*, Oct. 9, 2009. http://www.religiondispatches.org/archive/politics/1895/.

50. Twenty-three years old, while nothing to scoff at by 16th century standards, would undoubtedly be seen as quite young by Western twentieth-century interpreters of his life.

51. See Hartnagel, "Saints Connected to Health," 1–2; "St. Aloysius Gonzaga, SJ", esp. 1 and 6.

52. Witchel, 4; Dirk Johnson, "Ryan White Dies of AIDS at 18: His Struggle Helped Pierce Myths," *The New York Times*, April 9, 1990, 2.

that identified Saint Gonzaga with PWAs was published in Jesuit literature in 1989; [53] White, as an unusually young and outspoken advocate for AIDS research and "poster boy" for PWAs, held tremendous "celebrity status," which endured even after his death in 1990. [54] Evidence that at least some Catholics were associating Ryan White with Saint Gonzaga can be found in the words of one Jesuit author who (after recounting Gonzaga's death from the plague) explicitly invokes Gonzaga's "patronage of youth…asking him to embrace all…youth and children suffering from AIDS." He elaborates further on the relationship between children and teenagers with AIDS and Saint Gonzaga, claiming that, "For six years I have been privileged [to] work with people with AIDS, and have seen…[Gonzaga] bring a gentle brotherhood to the young who find him so comforting." [55] As many devotees explicitly regard the young saint as a "timeless example for our youth [and as a saint who] faced the same kinds of challenges" that youth face today, [56] it may well be that they had young people like Ryan White in mind when they began to talk of Aloysius Gonzaga as an appropriate saint for PWAs.

If, for some Catholics, those who suffer from HIV or AIDS are innocent, young people, then for others the term "AIDS sufferers" calls to mind both Africans and those who pray for a cure. These are the people said to be heard by Saint Luigi Scrosoppi, another saint classified by some Catholics as "the patron saint for those living with AIDS." [57] Interestingly, several lay-Catholic websites dedicated to this saint claim specifically that

53. See, for example, William McNichols, "Saint Aloysius Gonzaga: Patron of People with AIDS," *Jesuit Bulletin* (Summer 1989): 3, accessed April 2012, www.puffin.creighton.edu/jesuit/andre/gonzaga_poem.html; and William Hart McNichols, "Saint Aloysius Gonzaga: Patron of Youth," *Jesuit Bulletin* (Summer 1989): 5, accessed April 2012, www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-religion/703948/posts. They are both about PWAs and were published in a Jesuit journal in 1989.

54. His fame, for instance, carried over into the passing of major national legislation (the *Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency (CARE) Act*) for the treatment and care of low-income persons with AIDS. See Johnson, "Ryan White Dies of AIDS at 18," 3.

55. McNichols, "Saint Aloysius Gonzaga: Patron of Youth," 1.

56. "St. Aloysius Gonzaga, SJ," 1.

57. He is also, some sites claim, the patron saint of football (soccer) players. John Whitehead, "St Luigi Scrosoppi," accessed April 2012, http://onceiwasacleverboy.blogspot.com/2011/10/st-luigi-scrosoppi.html; "San Luigi Scrosoppi: Schutzpatron Der Fussballer," accessed April 2012, http://www.luigiscrosoppi.com/index.php?formular; Robert Stuflesser and Filip Stuflesser, "Research and Creation: Saint Luigi Scrosoppi, patron Saint of all footballers,"

Pope John Paul II declared Scrosoppi to be "the patron of AIDS sufferers"; however, the Holy See's official description of Luigi Scrosoppi includes no official patronage, stating instead that he, "through his efforts on behalf of the little ones, of the poor, of young people in difficulty, of those who are suffering, of all those living in trying circumstances…still continues today to show everyone the path of union with God."[58] Despite this lack of establishment of any official patronage, "hope for AIDS sufferers" in Africa and beyond is a dominant, explicit theme among internet sites and Catholic literature about Scrosoppi. The clear reason for this interest stems not from his (rather unremarkable) hagiography as published by the Holy See but instead from the process through which he was canonized. The Catholic Church investigated and accepted reports from 1996 which claimed that, while dreaming that he was placing a crown upon Luigi Scrosoppi's head, a Zambian priest-in-training with terminal AIDS was miraculously cured.[59] This event cleared the way for Saint Scrosoppi's canonization in 2001. Since then, a number of shrines, websites, and prayers for Saint Scrosoppi have emerged, and most focus on the theme of hope for a cure from "this terrible curse."[60] These websites, several of which reference a "never-ending flow of letters, telegrams, and telephone calls" to the Oratorian Fathers in South Africa (i.e. the Oratory of S. Philip at Oudtshoorn, where the priest in question is reportedly a member), exhort their readers to take heart. "There is hope and consolation for persons with AIDS" one lay-Catholic website reads, "because there is now one in heaven who intercedes" for people— and Africans specifically[61]—with AIDS.[62] The connection between PWAs

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accessed April 2012, http://www.stuflesser.com/en/studio/saint-luigi-scrosoppi-patron-soccer-football/.

58. Holy See, "Luigi Scrosoppi," *Vatican Press*, accessed April 2012, http://www.vatican.va/news_services/liturgy/saints/ns_lit_doc_20010610_scrosoppi_en.html, 5.

59. "Saint Luigi Scrosoppi," *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, 846.

60. James, "Healing of HIV," Totus Tuus, accessed March 2012, www.all-about-the-virgin-mary.com/healing-of-hivsids.html.

61. Clemente-Arnaldo specifically invokes Scrosoppi as an intercessor for those suffering from AIDS in "our country," which (though not explicitly stated) is suggested to be South Africa where the Oratory is located; see Nora Clemente-Arnaldo, "Luigi Scrosoppi, Patron Saint of AIDS Sufferers," Totus Tuus, accessed March 2012, www.all-about-the-virgin-mary.com/scrosoppi.html, p 2.

62. See "Scrosoppi, the Patron Saint of Persons living with HIV," Positivism.com, accessed April 2012, http://www.positivism.ph/comments.php?post=20&cid=329; Clemente-Arnaldo,

and the perception that HIV is an "African disease" has a long history with colonialist and racist undertones that has influenced the implementation of preventative education and treatment of HIV.[63] The aim of many sites focused on the miracle attributed to Saint Luigi Scrosoppi, then, is two-fold: these lay-Catholic sites are explicitly invested in establishing an identity with and for Catholics and those with HIV/AIDS in parts of Africa, while also communicating a message of hope in communities that have been particularly ravaged by (and often still have little or no effective means of protection from) the disease. [64]

Lastly, the saint who has undoubtedly received the most North American publicity as "the patron saint of people with HIV/AIDS" is Damien de Veuster, also known as Father Damien. Recognized as the patron saint of Hawai'i and of people with Hansen's Disease (leprosy), Father Damien died in 1889 after contracting leprosy during the sixteen years he spent serving the neglected leper colony on the Hawaiian island of Moloka'i.[65] Many authors have written about Father Damien as the "unofficial patron saint of HIV/AIDS sufferers" but, interestingly, most of these descriptions stem from scholarly or journalistic publications. That is, contrary to the pattern of lay devotion and identification seen among websites and publications for Saints Peregrine, Gonzaga, and Scrosoppi, most authors who speak of Damien as "the saint of AIDS" do so as reporters or scholars. [66] Given the pattern of devotion and identification with the life of saints and illness outlined above, it is notable that there is a measurably smaller amount of available lay literature and online devotion to a man

1; "Miraculous AIDS healing," accessed April 2012, http://www.mindlight.info/maitreya/miracle_aids_healing.htm.

63. Wilton, *Engendering AIDS: Deconstructing Sex, Text and Epidemic,* 54, 67.

64. For references to this ongoing crisis, see especially Ferrari, "Catholic and Non-Catholic NGOs Fighting HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa," 85–107; Joshua, "A Critical Historical Analysis of the South African Catholic Church's HIV/AIDS Response Between 2000 and 2005," 437–447. See also Beth Haile, "Articulating a Comprehensive Moral Response to HIV/AIDS in the Spirit of St. Damien of Molokai," *Catholic Moral Theology* (May 2011), accessed April 2012, http://catholicmoraltheology.com/articulating-a-comprehensive-moral-response-to-hivaids-in-the-spirit-of-st-damian-of-molokai/.

65. "Blessed Damien de Veuster," *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, vol. 12, 846;
 vol. 14, 467; Farmer, *The Oxford Dictionary of Saints,* 122.

66. "Patron Saint of AIDS to be Canonized in October." *The Salt Lake Tribune* (February 27, 2009).

whose life in several ways closely mirrored the experiences of PWAs and their caregivers. That is, Father Damien spent roughly the second half of his adult life compassionately ministering to people who were both literally and figuratively outcasts because of a disease that was at the time seen as being caused by one's own immorality.[67]

There are several likely reasons for this divergent pattern in devotionalism. The first and most innocuous reason is that Father Damien is among the most recently recognized saints, having been canonized in 2009 by Pope Benedict XVI.[68] Such novelty, combined with the more established devotions already underway to the other saints described above, could conceivably be limiting his appeal among the Catholic faithful. However, the late hour of the saint's arrival has clearly not hindered all Catholics; the self-declared "first and only" Roman Catholic shrine in the world dedicated to persons living with HIV/AIDS and those who have died from AIDS-related illnesses (located in Montreal, Quebec) is consecrated to Saint Damien. Similarly, St. Damien of Molokai, in Pontiac, Michigan, became the first church in the United States to be named in the saint's honour upon his canonization in 2009.[69]

If some Catholics and non-Catholics[70] are recognizing the patronage of Saint Damien for those with AIDS, why then are so many of the references to this ecclesiastical relationship academic or journalistic in

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67. See especially Haile, "Articulating a Comprehensive Moral Response," 1–3; and "St. Damien of Molokai," 7.

68. Henking, "Patron Saint of AIDS/HIV, Father Damien, to Be Canonized," 1; Farmer, *The Oxford Dictionary of Saints,* 122.

69. Haile, "Articulating a Comprehensive Moral Response," 1; Henking, "Patron Saint of AIDS/HIV, Father Damien, to Be Canonized," 2; "Father Damien, Aid to Lepers, Now a Saint," *CBS News*, (Associated Press, October 11, 2009), accessed April 2012, http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-202_162-5377123.html.

70. Commentators on the eve of Damien's canonization included even U.S. President Barack Obama. Having heard stories of Father Damien in Hawai'i as a child, he said on the eve of the saint's canonization that Damien was an example for Americans and all people regarding how one should care for all those who are "suffering from disease, especially HIV/AIDS." However, it is unclear whether such an opinion should be viewed as consistent with or distinct from scholarly and journalistic statements about the saint. It is also unclear whether this statement by such a high-profile figure has had any subsequent effect on the development of devotion to the saint. "Obama Expresses Admiration for Father Damien," *America's Intelligence Wire* (October 9, 2009).

nature? This distinction could stem from the contemporary relevance perceived in the Catholic Church's treatment of both lepers and AIDS sufferers. There is insufficient space here to recount the lengthy and often contentious relationship between PWAs (particularly, and some have argued disproportionally, [71] PWAs within the gay community) and the Catholic Church, [72] nor the strikingly similar relationship that the Church once enforced with lepers. However, these historical comparisons are clearly not lost on those who now reference Damien as the appropriate saint for PWAs. During Saint Damien's canonization, some Catholics acknowledged the historical similarities between how lepers and PWAs have been treated. Parishioners noted that "the way leprosy was perceived then is how AIDS is perceived today," and that "there is a connection between Damien and the AIDS problem today" when questioned by reporters after Damien's canonization.[73] Additionally, Catholic moral theologian Beth Haile recognizes that "just as Saint Damien's lepers were ostracized from society and dehumanized by systematic discrimination against them, so too do we see this same discrimination taking place against those with HIV/AIDS."[74] Others note the "paradoxical" nature of canonizing a man whose life-work calls to mind chapters of "the Church's…own horrifying history" for both lepers and PWAs, and the "obvious parallels between how leprosy was viewed in the nineteenth century and how HIV/AIDS is seen today."[75] Because these types of comparisons seem to be evident to many Catholic observers, it is logical to assume that other Catholic communities might wish to differentiate between the past and present actions of the Church regarding these diseases. If some Catholic communities desire to dissociate themselves

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71. For example, by 1990 the Center for Disease Control reported that 61% of HIV infections in the United States stemmed from unprotected male-male sex (with another 7% linked to both male-male sex and sharing needles). See Gregory Herek and John Capitanio, "AIDS Stigma and Sexual Prejudice," *American Behavioral Scientist* 42 (1999): 1136–1143.

72. For an excellent history of the relationship between the Roman Catholic Church and the American LGBTQ community, see Mark Jordan, *The Silence of Sodom: Homosexuality in Modern Catholicism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), particularly 34–57 for its intersection with AIDS.

73. "Father Damien, Aid to Lepers, Now a Saint," 1.

74. Haile, "Articulating a Comprehensive Moral Response," 2.

75. Henking, "Patron Saint of AIDS/HIV, Father Damien, to Be Canonized," 2; Jan De Volder and John Allen Jr., *The Spirit of Father Damien: The Leper Priest* (London: Ignatius Press, 2010), *x*.

from Father Damien and the inarguably mixed history of Catholic outreach to those with Hansen's disease and HIV/AIDS, then perhaps it is no surprise that this devotion has been taken up comparatively less frequently among laity seeking an appropriate Catholic symbol for those with HIV/AIDS.

From the evidence above, it is clear that there are serious negotiations of identity and shifting perceptions of disease and stigma occurring within the discourses surrounding saint veneration today. The manner in which both HIV/AIDS and PWAs are thought about by Catholic communities is being shaped and contested by the kinds of analogies invited by competing patron saints. Humans understand disease through analogy, and the saints outlined here are clearly being used as salient identifiers and lenses through which Catholics and non-Catholics alike may perceive and conceptualize PWAs and HIV. It need hardly be noted that the manner in which Catholics view these important and sensitive topics is of no small import; Catholic leaders in the United States, Canada, and around the globe frequently enter into the political sphere to debate numerous issues relating to both AIDS and sexuality.[76]

Indeed, the specter of sexuality hangs over the saints in this analysis, and it adds yet another dimension to the uses and meanings these saints may have for different congregations. The Church, the CCCB, and the USCCB have all championed the practices of abstinence for those outside of marriage and celibacy for gay and lesbian parishioners; it is possible that Catholic leaders could also hold up some of the saints analyzed here as models for PWAs or persons at risk for HIV. As previously noted, one longstanding primary role of saints in Catholic tradition has been to serve as sanctioned examples of virtuous behaviours, and accounts of saints' chastity and resistance of sexual temptation are often highlighted. Such rhetoric could easily be applied to the saints in this analysis; Saint Gonzaga was commended for having taken a vow of chastity at age nine, Saint Scrosoppi is said to have taken a number of female orphans and "less reputable young women" from the streets and inspired them to become chaste nuns, and

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76. Such political involvement is additionally noteworthy because Catholic perceptions and discussions of "same-sex desires have been decisive in European and American histories of what we now call 'homosexuality,'" and Catholic policies and interpretation continue to influence perceptions of sexuality and how best to address the AIDS pandemic. Jordan, *Silence,* 7.

detractors of Father Damien were very publicly and resoundingly disgraced for falsely accusing him after his death of sexual impropriety with lepers in his community.[77]

Indeed, there are some suggestions that these saints may be used in certain circumstances to further the Church's vision of sexual ethics. For instance, the African Jesuit AIDS Network (AJAN) specifically promotes Saint Gonzaga and the Blessed Anuarite Nengapeta as the protectors of the AJAN. Alongside the more well-known (and chaste) Saint Gonzaga, AJAN publications specifically highlight that the African nun Anuarite Nengapeta's martyrdom occurred while she was defending her virginity.[78] However, such uses of saints as models of sexual restraint within North American contexts remain speculative. Though the Church does openly and frequently utilize other saints to promote chastity,[79] there are no direct references to sexual practice or orientation in any of the sources cited. It is most likely, therefore, that if any discussions on this topic are occurring, they are taking place at local levels rather than being disseminated as Catholic policy.

While "understanding the iconographic references of [AIDS] images…[and] the extraordinary power the images have to reflect (and shape) society's response to individuals suffering from disease" is of vital importance, the various depictions and uses of saints are not beyond "cultural influences and political interests."[80] Rather, images and perceptions of saints function in these instances as "social actors whose [involvement in] defining and treating disease can express and legitimate" beliefs, perceptions, and worldviews.[81] Engaging cultural constructions, including the religious,

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77. "Saint Aloysius Gonzaga," 304; and Farmer, *The Oxford Dictionary of Saints,* 193; Holy See, "Luigi Scrosoppi," 1; "St. Damien of Molokai," 7.

78. Paterne Mombé, SJ, ed, "AJA News – August-September 2011," *African Jesuit AIDS Network*, accessed November 2012, http://www.jesuitaids.net/htm/news/102ENG.pdf.

79. One of the most notable of these is Saint Thomas Aquinas; he serves as the patron saint of the Angelic Warfare Confraternity. Endorsed by the Catholic Apostolate Courage International, which aims to offer support and guidance for homosexual Catholics, the Confraternity uses the hagiography of Aquinas to try to inspire young Catholics to abstinence and lesbian and gay members to celibacy. Fr. Brian T. Mullady, "The Angelic Warfare Confraternity," pamphlet (New Hope: St. Martin de Porres Lay Dominican Press, 2001).

80. Gilman, "AIDS and Syphilis: The Iconography of Disease," 88.

81. Smith, *AIDS, Gays, and the American Catholic Church,* 8.

allows one to better understand and appropriately respond to the variety of perceptions that the metaphors about HIV/AIDS and PWAs encourage.

The present study demonstrates that further research is needed regarding the relationships among representations of saints, the communities that sustain them, and perceptions of PWAs. For instance, examining communities that favour these saints will clarify the extent to which the saints chosen represent divergent points in time, politics, gender, sexual preference, culture, community differences or perceptions, and the like. These communities and respective shrines, additionally, can illuminate said parishioners' views on HIV/AIDS and PWAs, any roles Catholic leaders have played in these transformations, and influences that these developments have had on parishioners' devotionalism or faith. Such information will likely also clarify the extent to which these developments have permeated larger segments of Catholic culture and communities; the work of scholars of Catholicism from Orsi to Savastano suggest that devotional practices can range from the extremely isolated—captivating only a limited subset of a single parish—to inspiring large numbers of Catholics around the world.[82]

Identifying and engaging the people and communities behind these patron saints for HIV/AIDS and PWAs will also likely explicate more precisely the nature and range of Catholics' choices of saints for PWAs. After all, the list of saints discussed herein is not exhaustive. Rather, these saints were chosen because they represent four of the most substantial devotional followings for saints for PWAs.[83] Further investigation into other HIV/AIDS patrons and patronesses—such as St. Therese of Lisieux, St. Lazarus, or Anuarite Nengapeta—will undoubtedly yield valuable insights of their own into the ways in which people have come to conceptualize HIV/AIDS and PWAs. Engaging such communities and individuals may also clarify the range of motivations and experiences that have led to said associations.[84]

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82. Savastano, "St. Gerard Teaches Him that Love Cancels that Out," 184; and Orsi, *Thank You, St. Jude*.

83. This estimation is based upon the number of websites that reference the particular saint as related to HIV/AIDS or PWAs, the existence of shrines for the patron, and the frequency and volume of Internet traffic directed to each site (compiled and reported by Google, November 2011–March 2012).

84. Several clues about Catholic motivations and experiences with PWAs emerge from the sources presented here. For example, William McNichols, "Saint Aloysius Gonzaga: Patron of People with AIDS" and "Saint Aloysius Gonzaga: Patron of Youth" both provide evidence of

Understanding how these representations have developed in Catholic and non-Catholic communities over specific periods of time relative to the rise and development of the AIDS epidemic both in North America and worldwide will be useful in understanding if and how these perceptions of PWAs contributed to reduced stigmatization in larger societal trends.

The struggle to understand, live with, and hopefully one day overcome the challenges of HIV/AIDS plays out in a multitude of ways, both publicly in societies across the globe and privately within individuals. Yet from its inception, HIV/AIDS has been "a heavily politicized disease."[85] In neither "our political life nor our everyday experience…is religion merely private…[nor is] the public sphere neither a realm of straightforward, rational deliberation nor a smooth space of unforced assent."[86] The scholarship surrounding saint veneration shows that devotion to saints and the ways in which they influence adherents' lives is at times the space where private belief spills over into public speech and action. Such beliefs can be influenced by something as seemingly straightforward as choosing a saint to represent people with AIDS, and the perceptions involved in such decisions easily translate into ways in which disease, stigma, and entire groups of people can be viewed.

Jesuit work among PWAs. Also telling is the fact that no appropriated saints in North America come from existing patrons of groups especially at risk for HIV, including African Americans, the homeless, Haitians, or intravenous drug users. Finally, the fact that one third of all websites reviewed also sell icons or images of Saint Peregrine cannot be ignored as a possible reflection of some individuals' motivations for promoting this saint.

85. Singer, "The Politics of AIDS," 1.

86. Eduardo Mendieta and Vanantwerpen, "Introduction: The Power of Religion in the Public Square," in *The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere*, eds., Mendieta and Vanantwerpen (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 1.

The Embodiment of Fear in Ugaritic and Semitic Literature: Re-examining the Social Dynamic[1]

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I n the Ugaritic Baal Cycle, it is not uncommon for deities to exhibit human emotions, such as fear. In KTU 1.3 III 32–35, the goddess Anat experiences fear due to concern for the safety of her brother, Baal. In an analogous passage, the goddess Athirat likewise succumbs to fear when she anticipates an attack against herself and her family in KTU 1.4 II 12–20. At the oncoming arrival of different messengers, these individual Ugaritic goddesses become increasingly anxious, and that agitation is embodied in their physiological changes. The identification of this common response to the receipt of news is grounded in the work of Delbert Hillers,[2] and represents a *topos* in West Semitic literature. This paper draws attention to that comparative type scene and then reassesses the nature of communication created by both humans and deities who exhibit physiological reactions to fear. Through a comparative study of several biblical and Mesopotamian texts, this essay situates the paralyzing panic that grips Anat and Athirat in apprehension of the unknown, thereby generating a relational dynamic between the participants. While the contours of Hiller's argument lay the framework for analysis, a re-examination of the embodiment or lack of embodiment of fear in the Ugaritic corpus sheds renewed light on the social dynamic that develops in the context of the interchange.

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2. Delbert R. Hillers, "A Convention in Hebrew Literature: The Reaction to Bad News," *ZAW* 77 (1965): 86–90. This *topos* is also interpreted in Umberto Cassuto, *The Goddess Anath*, trans. Israel Abrahams (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1971), 82; H. L. Ginsberg, "The North-Canaanite Myth of Anath and Aqhat," *BASOR* 98 (1945): 15, n. 20.

I. Physiological Manifestation of Anxiety

In KTU 1.3 III 32–35, Anat's support is about to be enlisted for asking El's permission to construct Baal's house. The text reads:

32–34	
hlm. ʿnt. tph. Ilm.	There! Anat perceives the gods/ divine beings,
bh. pʿnm/ ṯṯṯ.	On her, her feet shake/falter,
bʿdn ksl. ṯṯbr/	Around, her [sinews] tremble,
ʿln. pnh. tdʿ.	Above, her face sweats.

34–35	
tǵṣ. pnt /kslh.	The joints of her loins convulse,
anš. dt. ẓrh.	Weak are the ones of her back.[3]

Standing apart as an individual female deity, Anat is poised to receive a message from the divine beings Gapan and Ugar. However, she does not yet know the content of the message and presumes the worst about Baal's state. At the sight of the gods, Anat's internal plight is conveyed literarily through a description of her external disposition. Her visceral reaction is grounded in fear of familial harm concerning those close to her, and captures a certain progression from her feet up through her upper body.

Analogously, in KTU 1.4 II 12–20, Athirat is presumed to have powers of persuasion with El as his consort and is therefore approached. The narrative explains:

12–14	
bnši. ʿnh. wtphn/	When she lifts her eyes, she looks
hlk. bʿl aṯ{t}rt. ktʿn	Athirat sees the advance of Baal,

14–16	
hlk. btlt/ ʿnt[.]	The advance of Adolescent Anat,

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3. Unless otherwise noted, translations of Ugaritic come from Mark S. Smith and Wayne Pitard, eds., *The Ugaritic Baal Cycle.* Vol. 2: *Introduction with Text, Translation and Commentary of KTU/CAT 1.3–1.4* (VTSup 114; Leiden: Brill, 2009). Cf. Simon B. Parker, ed., *Ugaritic Narrative Poetry* (SBLWAW 9; Atlanta: Scholars, 1997). For the discussion of KTU 1.3 III 32–35 and 1.4 II 12–20, see Smith and Pitard, 238–242, 448–450.

tdrq. ybmt/ [limm].	The approach of the In-law [of the Peoples.]

16–18
bh. pʿnm/ [ttṭ].[4]	On her, her feet shake/falter,
[bʿ]dn. ksl/ [ttbr.][5]	Around, her [sinews] tremble,
[ʿln.p]nh. td[ʿ].	Above, her face sweats.

19–20
tġṣ[.pnt. ks]lh/	The joints of her loins convulse,
anš. dt. ẓrh.	Weak are the ones of her back.[6]

There is a parallel concern for Athirat's children in lines 24–26 as the goddess waits alone in her abode. Here Athirat reacts to the arrival of the divine messengers, in this case Baal and Anat, and she is not in a position of control. However, one notes the reversal of status for Anat, who now has the upper hand in the confrontation that is created between messenger and recipient. The role that Anat plays in this relationship changes, and her identity as a warrior and hunter is not a factor in whether or not she achieves her goal.[7] Furthermore, Anat issues a verbal reaction like Athirat in which she articulates her concern.[8]

Like the two independent goddesses, Daniʾil is the subject of fear who reacts to a report about his son in the tale of Aqhat. The desire for progeny is at the forefront of the narrative in KTU 1.19 II 44–47, when messengers come to deliver the dreaded news to Daniʾil. These messengers are identified earlier in lines 27–28 as youths, ġlmm. The role of Anat has

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4. Cf. KTU 1.4 VII 35: bmt ar[ṣ] tṭṭn, "the heights of the earth shook."

5. Perhaps the N-stem of ṯbr, cf. KTU 1.6 II 54: l arṣ tṯbr, "[her jar] shattered on the ground."

6. Note the alternate translation in Moshe Held, "Studies in Comparative Semitic Lexicography," *Studies in Honor of Benno Landsberger on His Seventy-Fifth Birthday, April 21, 1965* (The Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago. Assyriological Studies 16; Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965), 395–406. Held translates as follows: "Behind, (her) tendons do break (i.e., tear), above, her face sweats; loosened are the joints of her sinews, weakened those (i.e., tendons) of her back."

7. For an analysis of Anat's independence, see esp. Kelly Murphy, "Myth, Reality and the Goddess Anat: Anat's Violence and Independence in the Baʿal Cycle," *UF* 41 (2009): 525–541.

8. Smith and Pitard, *The Ugaritic Baal Cycle*, 241–245.

once again changed in this narrative, and she is now guilty of killing Aqhat. The text states:

44–47
[bh pʿnm]/ ṯṯṯ.   [Below, his feet shake/falter,
ʿl[n pnh tdʿ   Above, [his face sweats],
bʿdn]/ ksl. yṯ[br   [Around], his [sinews] tremble,
yǵṣ pnt kslh]/   [The joints of his loins shake],
anš. [dt ẓrh   [The ones of his back] are weak.

According to this passage, the larger *topos* of the physiological reaction of anxiety to imminent news is created and maintained by an unequal relationship between Daniʾil and the messengers. The response of physical embodiment generates the relation between participants, and the messenger has influence over the situation. The concomitant fear of the arriving messenger and the receipt of the message actualize this relationship. The ensuing reaction of Daniʾil's top part of the body also calls to mind KTU 1.2 I 23, where the assembled pantheon lower their heads when they see the arrival of the messengers, *ǵly rʾiš*.[9] They do not yet know the speech that the messengers will convey, but there is an immediate, unconscious presupposition that it will be threatening and they exhibit submission. As illuminated by the prepositions that precede each physical reaction, the description of the bodily contortions is precise and delimits specific knee-jerk movements.

In these Ugaritic literary texts, non-verbal communication[10] takes place between two parties in the documented type scene. This is grounded in certain semantic equivalents between the verbs and described body parts. Of primary significance is the parallelism between Ugaritic *ksl*, Hebrew *kesel*, and Akkadian *kislu*, signifying "sinew, tendon."[11] The sinews of

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9. Compare the semantically equivalent Akk. *rēša šapālu*, "lower the head." This refers to an emotion of humility and submission, as in: *ina pān* ᵃᵐᵉˡᵘ*Bābilî aḫḫēya lā aššatīma rēšīya lā iššappilā*, "I shall not be humiliated before the Babylonians, nor shall my heads be lowered." Citation is found in Robert Francis Harper, *Assyrian and Babylonian Letters* (Chicago 1892–1914), 283, r. 10–12.
10. This phrase comes from the title of Mayer Gruber's *Aspects of Nonverbal Communication in the Ancient Near East* (Studia Pohl 12/I; Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1980).
11. Held, "Studies in Comparative Semitic Lexicography," 401–406.

Anat, Athirat, and Dani'il tremble, *ksl t/yṯbr*, a phrase cognate to the biblical expression, מתנים שברון, in Ezek. 21:11–12. The Ugaritic expression, "breaking/loosening of tendons," finds a parallel in the Akkadian terms, "loosening," *patāru/ramû/batāqu*,[12] and "sinews/tendons," *šir'ānū/riksū/kaslū/matnū*.

While the primary meaning of Hebrew כסל is "sinew/tendon," its derived meaning underlines "inner strength."[13] The parallelism of מבטח and כסל in Job 8:14; 31:24, and תקוה and כסל in Job 4:6, reflects this twofold denotation. To this end, Held rejects the definition of loins for מתנים, due to: (1) the synonymous parallelism of מתנים and שרירים in Job 40:16, and (2) the use of Akkadian *enēšu/unnušu,* "to become weak, to weaken," with *šir'ānū,* "sinews."[14] Moving upwards to the face, the root, *td‵*, "to sweat," represents the external facial manifestation of internal fear, a central symptom of anxiety.[15]

Of further note is the verb, *nǵṣ*, "to shake, tremble," which marks a response of fear toward bad tidings in KTU 1.3 III 34, 1.4 II 19, and 1.19 II 46 (restored). Anat calls into question Baal's safety in KTU 1.3 III 37, just as Athirat fears that the approach of those who attacked her children will foreshadow greater harm in KTU 1.4 II.[16] The appropriate response is

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12. The primary meaning of *kaslu* as "sinew" stems from a medical text: "If a…baby's sinews from its neck to its backbone are loosened (*kaslūšu puṭṭurū*), it will die." Note René Labat, *Traité akkadien de diagnostics et pronostics médicaux,* I (Leiden: Brill, 1951), 222–241. One recognizes a similar meaning in *Ludlul* II 104 between *kaslū puṭṭurū* and *puṭṭurū riksūa*, "my sinews are loosened." See Wilfred F. Lambert, *Babylonian Wisdom Literature* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1960), 44–104. Also see Edith K. Ritter and J. V. Kinnier Wilson, "Prescription for an Anxiety State: A Study of BAM 234," *Anatolian Studies* 30 (1980): 23–30.

13. Held, "Studies in Comparative Semitic Lexicography," 402.

14. *CAD* E, 166a. Held explains, "the substantive *ksl* is attested several times in a stereotyped formula describing fear due to unexpected visitors who might bring bad news" (404–405). The choice of the word "might" is not trivial within this type scene in the literary texts. In these select passages, the reader presumes that the recipient does not know for sure if the message is ominous, although it is believed to be so.

15. Daniel Fleming, "By the Sweat of Your Brow: Adam, Anat, Athirat and Ashurbanipal," in *Ugarit and the Bible: Proceedings of the International Symposium on Ugarit and the Bible, Manchester, September 1992* (ed. George Brooke, Adrian Curtis and John Healey; Münster: Ugarit-Verlag, 1994), 93–100.

16. Fred Renfroe, *Arabic-Ugaritic Lexical Studies* (ALASP Band 5; Münster: Ugarit-Verlag, 1992), 63, n. 6.

described: *y/tǵṣ pnt kslh*, "His/her joints convulsed." This statement parallels Yamm's reaction in KTU 1.2 IV 25, *tnǵṣn pnth*, and Kirta's response to her brother's arrival in 1.16 I 53–55, *[ksl]h. larṣ. ttbr,* "Her loins to the ground tremble/break."

The effect on the joints of the loins, *pnt kslh*, is marked in two similar situations in Isa. 21:3 and Nah. 2:11, passages examined below.[17] Additionally, *nǵṣ* is parallel to *dlp* in KTU 1.2 IV 17[18] and 1.2 IV 26,[19] and is cognate with Akkadian *dalāpu*, "to be agitated."[20] It is secondarily parallel to *anš*, "to grow weak," cognate of Hebrew *'nš* and Akkadian *enēšu*.[21] Taken together, the combination of these verbs circumscribes "the response of some part of the lower body (perhaps the joints of the lower back) to…anxiety."[22] As such, the enveloping semantic field includes *nǵṣ*, *dlp* "to be agitated," and *anš* "to grow weak," the latter of which does not occur elsewhere.

II. Fear Without Embodiment in Ugaritic Literature

Are the emotions of fear and panic ever expressed without a bodily description in the Ugaritic corpus? What language is employed when the literary representation of fear is not embodied? In KTU 1.6 VI 30–31, the deity Mot is afraid due to an intimidating speech by Shapshu. Here the verbs *yr'* and *tt'* stand in parallelism to each other. Shapshu delivers a foreboding statement to Mot that his sovereignty and El's support will be threatened by a potential battle with Baal. Mot is exhorted not to wage such a fight since El's backing is not absolute. The content of the speech is threatening, so that Mot's reaction of anxiety is appropriate in the narrative after he hears the

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17. These examples are provided in Cassuto, *The Goddess Anath*, 130; Cf. Julian Obermann, "Yahweh's Victory over the Babylonian Pantheon: The Archetype of Isa. 21:1–10," *JBL* 48 3/4 (1929): 307–328.

18. KTU 1.2 IV 17: *l ydlp tmnh*, "his form did not break up/weaken."

19. The verb, *nǵṣ* in N-stem: *tnǵṣn pnth*, "his knees shook/buckled."

20. Cf. Baruch Margalit, "Lexicographical Notes on the Aqht Epic," *UF* 15 (1983), 115.

21. Cf. *enēšu*, *CAD* 4: 166 from the first tablet of Gilgamesh: *i-ni-iš-ma ik-ta-mi-us ippalsiḫ*, "he became weak, his knees gave way, he collapsed."

22. Renfroe, *Arabic-Ugaritic Lexical Studies*, 64.

actual words. That response is reflected in the literary description. The text reads:

yru. bnilm <.m>t.	Divine <Mo>t is afraid,
ṯtˤ.y/dd.il.ǵzr[.]	The Beloved of El, the Hero, is scared.

Baal is also presented as fearful of Mot in KTU 1.5 II 6–7, and terrified of what Mot might do to him. The second text states:

yraun.[23]aliyn.bˤl/	Mightiest Baal is afraid,
ṯtˤ.nn.rkb.ˤrpt	The Rider of the Clouds is scared.

It is ironic that the explicit statements of fear in both 1.5 II 6–7 and 1.6 VI 30–31 define the divine subjects through double epithets. As if it were not clear that deities exhibit anxiety, the text emphasizes that the deities in question are none other than El's Beloved and the Rider of the Clouds, respectively.[24] These verses represent the two cases in Ugaritic of the word-pair *yr'* // *ṯtˤ*.

Similarly, Baal cowers, *ǵwr*, under Yamm's chair in KTU 1.2 IV 6–7. The narrative description of this act uses the verbs "to fear" and "to hide," verbs that particularly apply since Baal already has begun to hear the language of the warning. The text reads:

[b]ph. rgm. lyṣa.	Scarcely had the word left his mouth,
bšpth. hwth.	And his speech his lips,
wttn. gh.	When she raises her voice,
yǵr/ṯḥt. ksi, zbl. ym.	He sinks beneath the throne of Prince Yamm.

Like Mot, Baal is submissive to the envoy of the message but not because the message originates with El; rather, his obeisance is generated by the transmission of the warning. The interchange yields subordination of Baal, and by virtue of the overwhelming emotion, he places himself in a

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23. David Marcus explains that the form, *yraun*, is an infinitive absolute consecutive that functions in this text as a third-person singular preterite. See David Marcus, "The Three Alephs in Ugaritic," *JANES* 1, 1 (1968): 1, n. 1.

24. According to Paul Sanders, "the fear of the gods is connected with events which seem to constitute a real threat to their position." See Sanders, *The Provenance of Deuteronomy 32* (Oudtestamentische Studiën; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996), 404.

submissive role. Baal's emotional reaction is explicit,[25] and unlike Anat and Athirat, Baal is cognizant of what is to follow.

In a manner similar to this literary passage, several letters from KTU 2 also employ the language of fear in encouraging the recipients not to quiver at received news. However, the epistolary injunctions, such as "you should not worry" or "you should not be afraid," follow after the delivery of the message and come at the end of the written text. The recipient has already received the content of the remarks, and can now internalize the news. This reaction is not conveyed through the physiological manifestation of fear, and marks a contrast to the narrative occurrences. Rather, the information is being processed by the very act of having the letter in hand, so that there is no need for a visceral bodily reaction that presages the receipt of the actual news.

The form of a letter also creates a degree of distance between the recipient and the messenger, who does not have to know the content of the letter. The messenger is not perceived as superior in status since he may know the potentially dreaded information. Contrary to KTU 1.3 III 32–35 and 1.4 II 12–20, the recitation of a speech by the envoy is not part of the message in KTU 2, and the delivery of a letter is not followed by an oral pronouncement in the exchange. Consequently, the presence of that individual in turn does not generate a psychological response by the intended recipient.

Several lines from Ugaritic letters that include directives not to fear reported developments are relevant.[26]

> (1) KTU 2.16:12[27]
> *w 'al. tdḥln*; Cf. semantic parallel in 1.160:19, *'al ṯtbb riš*
> "And may she not fear."

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25. Cf. KTU 1.4 VII 38-9: *lm. tḥš/ lm.tḥš.ntq*, "why are you frightened, why do you fear the weapon?"

26. The use of the verb, *dḥl*, "to fear, be scared," appears in these passages. There is one case of the root, *yr'* in KTU 2.31:45, where the form *yritn* suggests the G suffixing form of *yr'* with an enclitic or pronominal *–n*. However, the context of this letter is broken. See *DULAT* 269, 977; *CUW* 1507.

27. See J.-L. Cunchillos, "Correspondance," in A. Caqout, J.-M. de Tarragon, J.-L. Cunchillos, *Textes ougaritiques*. Tome II: *Textes religieux et rituels; correspondance* (Paris: Cerf, 1989), 297–302; J.L. Cunchillos, "Que Mère se réjouisse de Père! Traduction et commentaire de *KTU* 2.16," in *Ascribe to the Lord: Biblical and Other Studies in Memory of Peter C. Craigie*

In KTU 2.16, Talmiyānu sends a letter to his mother, Ṯarriyelli, and insists in line 12 that she not be anxious since the Sun has bestowed favour on him. Dennis Pardee offers a different reading of *twhln* in place of *tdhln* from the root *wḥl*, a hapax in Ugaritic.[28] With this alternative, the line may then be translated: "may she not be discouraged." However, that reading does not change the message that has already been conveyed to Ṯarriyelli before she is instructed not to be afraid.

(2) KTU 2.30:21–23[29]
'at 'umy. 'al. tdḥl w. 'ap. mhkm b. lbk. 'al. tšt
"You, my mother, do not be afraid and also do not worry/be distressed."

In KTU 2.30, the king reports a message to his mother about his encounter with a Hittite overlord. After assuring her that he is well, the king tells her that the Hittite sovereign has agreed to increase the amount of his vow. He concludes the letter in lines 21–23 by exhorting his mother not to be anxious for whatever reason. Pardee again offers a variant reading of *tdḥṣ* for *tdḥl*,[30] so that the king states, "do not be agitated."[31] Renfroe notes this variant reading in his discussion of *dḥṣ*.[32] He states that a comparison between Ugaritic *dḥṣ* and Arabic *daḥaṣa*, "overturning, convulsion," can only be argued if an original root, *dḥḍ*, also connoted agitation. In that case, the general meaning then would have been employed metaphorically in the Ugaritic letter. Though the verb is different, the semantic range of *dḥṣ* nonetheless fits the intended effect of the line. This version of the formulary

(JSOT Supplement Series 67; Sheffield: 1988), 3–10.

28. See Dennis Pardee, "Further Studies in Ugaritic Epistolgraphy," *AfO* 31 (1984), 220. Pardee takes the verb as an N-stem or D-stem prefixing form of *yḥl* (*wḥl*) with an enclitic –*n*. This interpretation derives from a reading of the letter /w/, not /r/. He points out that the root has negative connotations in Arabic ("to get into a mess") and Syriac ("to despair"). The phrase may then be compared to PRU V 59:26–27: *w'aḥy mhk b lbh 'al yšt*, "and may my brother not worry."

29. Cunchillos, *Textes Ougaritiques*: Tome II, 321–324; J.L. Cunchillos, "Le texte ugaritique KTU 2.30," *Anuario de Filología*" (Universidad de Barcelona 5, 1979), 73–76.

30. The emphasis on emotional agitation is maintained by the Aramaic root *dḥl*, suggesting anxiety and fear. This supports the Ugaritic rendering of *dḥl* as more contextually appropriate.

31. See Pardee, "Further Studies," 230, but cf. Renfroe, *Arabic-Ugaritic Lexical Studies*, 94 ff.

32. See Renfroe, *Arabic-Ugaritic Lexical Studies*, 94–95.

"do not fear," represents the culmination of the received news and suppresses any cause for alarm by the recipient, i.e., the royal mother.

> (3) KTU 2.38:27[33]
> *w. 'aḫy. mhk b. lbh. 'al. yšt*
> "And so my brother should not worry/be distressed."

In another instance, KTU 2.38 represents a letter from the king of Tyre to the king of Ugarit, documenting the state of ships sent to Egypt. Unfortunately, a storm off of Tyre had destroyed these ships, but the people, grain, and other food were saved. Now the king of Tyre is ready to bring the people and goods back to Ugarit. This text offers a third statement of support and the lack of anxiety following the delivery of a message. By coming at the end of the letter, the recipient has no need to exhibit an external emotional response since he has already read the content of the message and thereby been reassured. Additionally, one person writes to another irrespective of social status and the relation between these two individuals.

These letters provide a contrast to the reactions of Anat, Athirat, and Dani'il, whose bodily responses precede the conscious realization of what has transpired in the texts. Alternatively, the full message or speech has not been given yet in each case in KTU 1, and the literary depiction does not explicitly use the verb "to fear," or some variation (*yr'*, *tt'*, *dḥl*).[34] A study of the larger Semitic *topos* of physiological reaction of panic in biblical literature will illuminate those passages where the corporal manifestation of fear is conveyed, here of humans. However, added also to this comparative evidence are several Mesopotamian examples of both humans and deities who exhibit such responses.[35] An examination of those texts follows.

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33. Cunchillos, *Textes Ougaritiques*: Tome II, 349-357; Jacob Hoftijzer, "Une lettre du roi de Tyr," *UF* 11 (1979) 383-88; Daniel Arnaud, "Une lettre du roi de Tyr au roi d'Ougarit: milieux d'affaires et de culture en Syrie à la fin de l'âge du bronze récent," *Syria* 59 (1982): 101–107.

34. Contrast the distribution of the phrase "fear not" in Near Eastern literature, which underlines justified fear but not anxiety in the context of a threat or figure of authority. See Martti Nissinen, "Fear Not: A Study on an Ancient Near Eastern Phrase," in *The Changing Face of Form Criticism for the Twenty-First Century*. eds. Marvin A. Sweeney and Ehud Ben Zvi (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2003), 122–161.

35. It is curious to note that only one biblical text, Deut. 32:27, has Yahweh as the subject of a verb meaning to fear (*gwr*). See Marjo Christina Annette Korpel, *A Rift in the Clouds: Uga-*

III. *Topos* of Physiological Reaction of Fear in Context of a Foreboding Event

According to KTU 1.3 III 32–35 and 1.4 II 12–20 and contrary to the letters in KTU 2, the embodiment of fear is expressed non-verbally in two specific circumstances. On the one hand, there is an expectation of bad tidings, while on the other hand, Anat and Athirat see the advance of a deity or messenger. However, the response of fear in such a *topos* does not have to be confined to divinities. As elucidated in several biblical passages, humans also exhibit parallel responses that mimic the goddesses.[36] In the context of impending news, threat, or disaster, the situation engenders a certain subservience of the one who receives the news to the one who transmits the news. In the Hebrew Bible, that actor of the imminent event is notably Yahweh, and the language employed does not solely connote a sense of physical defeat or paralysis. Rather, the social dynamic of the message's deliverance creates an uneven scale for the individuals whose anxiety manifests itself in obeisance to Yahweh. The people are not in control and assume a subordinate role through their embodiment of fear.

The oracle of Nahum 2:11 describes the conquest and destruction of Nineveh, where the siege of the city is imminent. The verse reads:

> Desolation, devastation, and destruction?[37]
> Spirits sink,

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ritic and Hebrew Descriptions of the Divine (UBL 8; Münster: UGARIT-Verlag, 1990), 178. Yahweh turns away from His anger in Deut. 32:26–27. According to Sanders, *The Provenance of Deuteronomy 32*, 403, "He expresses the fear that if he does not put his punishment of Israel to an end the enemies will misinterpret their success." This should be contrasted with Job 41:17, where other gods appear to fear Leviathan, through the root *gwr*. Note also that the root *gwr* is parallel to the verb *yr'* in Pss. 22:24; 33:8.

36. The human experience of fear as reflected in the Hebrew Bible is the subject of Paul Kruger, "A Cognitive Interpretation of the Emotion of Fear in the Hebrew Bible," *JNSL* 27/2 (2001): 77–89. Kruger analyzes a variety of conceptual metonymies that point to the physiological manifestations of anxiety, and the subsequent cognitive reactions of the individual. Also see Zoltán Kövecses, *Emotion Concepts* (New York: Springer Verlag, 1990).

37. Translations of biblical passages come from *TANAKH The Holy Scriptures: The New JPS Translation According to the Traditional Hebrew Text* (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society, 1988).

> Knees buckle,
> All loins tremble,
> All faces "turn pale/ashen."

One notes how the collective change in facial complexion reflects the outward manifestation of fear. The focus is placed on the inhabitants of Nineveh who can only wait in anguish to confront their fate, which Yahweh controls.

Two other passages describe the change in colour of one's face on account of fear: Joel 2:6 and Jer. 30:5-6. In Joel 2:6, the mighty army has been sent by Yahweh against Judah, and the Day of the Lord will mark the moment when the divine army is ready to strike the vulnerable nation. According to the verse,

> People tremble[38] before them,
> All faces "turn pale/ashen."[39]

There is a parallel physiological reaction to fear embodied in the people's faces as they confront deprivation.[40] The expression "to acquire paleness or gather a glow"[41] evokes a flushed face or one from which colour has been drained. This "result[s] in a look of anguish…which suggests utter fright brought on by impending doom."[42]

The narrative of Jer. 30:5–6 similarly establishes the context of news about the future, where the nation is submissive to Yahweh's might. Jer. 30:5–6 reads:

> Thus said the Lord:
> We have heard cries of panic, terror without relief.
> Ask and see: Surely males do not bear young!
> Why then do I see every man,
> With his hands on his loins,

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38. Cf. Panic involves trembling in Ps. 48:6–7.

39. Several versions identify *pāʾrûr* with *pārûr*, "cooking pot," and *keqes* for *qibbeṣû*. The Septuagint translates *pān prosōpon hōs proskauma chutras*, "every face like a scorched pot." Similarly, the Vulgate reads *omnes vultus redigentur in ollam*, "every face will be made like a pot."

40. See Paul Kruger, "The Face and Emotions," *Old Testament Essays* 18:3 (2005): 651–663.

41. *HALAT* 860; *DCH* VI, 647 I.

42. James Crenshaw, *Joel* (*AB* 24C; Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1995), 123.

Like a woman in labour?
Why have all faces turned pale?

The passage evokes the palpable fear of Israel and Judah, which is actualized concretely in their subservience to Yahweh. As Mayer Gruber explains, the phrase ונהפכו כל-פנים לירקון "refers to a facial expression of fear," and is the "Hebrew etymological equivalent of Akkadian *pānū erēqu*."[43]

Embedded in this visceral depiction is a reference to the terrifying experience of a woman in labour. The resounding cry of "pains like those of a woman in labour" permeates across several biblical texts that share the specific *topos* of embodied fear in the face of impending news. Such a representation of dismay and consternation specifically echoes in Jeremiah's rhetoric.[44]

The description of the approach of the northern enemy is explicit in Jer. 6:24:

We have heard the report of them.
Our hands fail;
Pain seizes us,
Agony like a woman in childbirth.

In Jer. 49:23–24, palpable anxiety seizes two individuals due to the plight of Damascus:

Hamath and Arpad are shamed,
For they have heard bad news.
They shake with anxiety, like (in) the sea that cannot rest.
Damascus has grown weak,
She has turned around to flee;
Trembling has seized her,
Pain and anguish have taken hold of her, like a woman in childbirth.

In the following chapter, a report concerning the conqueror of Babylonia causes the king of Babylon to go into a panic. Though he is

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43. Gruber, *Aspects of Nonverbal Communication* (vol. 1), 363.
44. Cf. Erhard Gerstenberger, "The Woe-Oracles of the Prophets," *JBL* 81 (1962): 249–263. In 1QH 3, 7–12, the psalmist associates his torment with that of a woman who gives birth for the first time; see George J. Brooke, "The Book of Jeremiah and its Reception in the Qumran Scrolls," in *The Book of Jeremiah and its Reception*, eds. A.H.W. Curtis and Thomas Römer, (Leuven: University Press, 1997), 199.

the extolled ruler, the king does not know the content of the message.
This situation temporarily places him at the mercy of the messenger or
the unnamed individual who transmits the information. Simply hearing
about the impending conquest triggers a visceral reaction. The speaker in
Isa. 26:17 likewise uses the language of a woman in labour to capture a
simultaneous plea for righteousness and punishment of the wicked. The two
texts read respectively:

> The king of Babylon has heard the report of them,
> And his hands are weakened;
> Anguish seizes him, pangs like a woman in childbirth. (Jer. 50:43)

> Like a woman with child approaching childbirth,
> Writhing and screaming in her pangs,
> So are we become because of You, O Lord. (Isa. 26:17)

The type scene of embodied fear in the context of impending doom
is effectively conveyed in Isa. 13:7–8. With the Day of the Lord imminent,
that moment shall yield a day of judgment for the wicked. This passage
underlines the notion of conquest by a sovereign being who brings about this
event.[45] The military retinue of Yahweh is ready to act, and the perceived
doom is sufficient to induce overwhelming agitation. The exact details of
that portended day are not known. Nonetheless, this oracle specifies that the
defeat of the Babylonians on the Day of the Lord will entail the punishment
of Yahweh's enemies. Though the target here is not Judah like in Joel 2:6, the
verse reaffirms that Israel's prophets, the harbingers of the news, anticipate
the occurrence. According to Isa. 13:7–8:

> And overcome by terror,
> They shall be seized by pangs and throes,
> Writhe like a woman in travail,
> They shall gaze at each other in horror,
> Their faces "livid with fright."

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45. See Douglas Stuart, "The Sovereign's Day of Conquest," *BASOR* 221 (1976): 159–164.

Finally, the biblical embodiment of fear is encapsulated in the devastating effect that the message of the handwriting on the wall has on Belshazzar in Dan. 5:6, 9–10.[46] According to this text:

> Then the king's countenance changed
> And his thoughts alarmed him,
> His joints of his loins were loosed,
> And his knees knocked together.

The trepidation and alarm of Belshazzar evoke similar imagery of an individual's reaction to negative tidings.[47] The loosening of the joints parallels the Ugaritic phrase, *pnt ksl*. Furthermore, Aramaic זיו זיו in שׁנין זיוהי is a loanword from Akkadian *zīmu*, "appearance, countenance." The verb *ewû(m)* marks the semantic equivalent of שׁנה, "change the countenance, be gloomy." Taken together then, the three cognates are Akk. *zīmu nakārum*, Heb. שׁנה פנים and Ugar. *ʿtq bbt/ap*.[48] In Dan. 5, the king is panic-stricken and calls upon his advisors to decipher the omen, which has yet to be revealed. The unexpected presence of the written texts is analogous to the unplanned arrival of the divine messengers before Anat and Athirat. The terrifying presence of the handwriting sends Belshazzar into a state of shock, and in doing so, highlights the king's total lack of control.

IV. Humans and Gods who Fear in Mesopotamian Literature

Several texts from Mesopotamian literature also illuminate the embodiment of fear in the specific setting of receiving foreboding information. These passages represent an analogous set of documents to

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46. Cf. Shalom M. Paul, "Decoding a 'Joint' Expression in Daniel 5:6, 16," in *Comparative Studies in Honor of Yochanan Muffs*, eds. E. L. Greenstein and D. Marcus (Journal of Ancient Near Eastern Studies 22, 1993), 127. For the language of untying knots, see Al Walters, "Untying the King's Knots: Physiology and Wordplay in Daniel 5," *JBL* 110 (1991): 117–122; Nahum Waldman, "Akkadian *kaṣāru* and Semantic Equivalents," *JNES* 28 (1969): 251–252.
47. This passage should be compared with Dan. 10:8, 16–17, where the loss of physical strength is conveyed upon experiencing a theophany. Likewise, Eliphaz expresses fear at the appearance of a theophany of sorts in Job 4:12–15, after receiving a divine message.
48. Gruber, *Aspects of Nonverbal Communication* (vol. 1), 358–362.

consider in the larger analysis. However, the particular narrative contexts widen the scope of inquiry about fear and anxiety in Semitic literature, to include communication between humans, between humans and deities, and between deities.

In a remark by Esarhaddon in his "Gottesbrief,"[49] the panic and fear of the king is transmitted after hearing Esarhaddon's message. The text reads:

> "(When) he [the king] heard my [Esarhaddon's] royal message, which burns his enemies like a flame,

His hips collapsed,	*qabalšu imqussuma*[50]
His heart was seized,	*libbašu ṣabitma*[51]
His legs trembled,	*itarrura išdāšu*
His countenance looked bad.	*zīmūšu ulamminma*[52]

The external manifestation of internal fear includes a specific focus on the facial expression that reflects the individual's frightful disposition. This reaction to Esarhaddon's message calls to mind the change in the king's countenance in Dan. 5:6, 9–10. Here the context is the submission of a person to someone of superior status. This text should also be compared to Nehemiah 2:3—"but I answered the king: 'May the king live forever! How should my face not look bad when the city of the graveyard of my ancestors lives in ruins. . .'" While multiple generations are invoked in the reference to a graveyard, the immediate trigger of the subject's facial response is the subservience directed to the king. Concern for familial bonds is once again at the forefront of the fear, and anxiety is generated by the physical presence of someone perceived in a position of higher standing. Indeed the expression "the face is bad," פנים רעים, signifies a "gloomy face" in the

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49. Riekele Borger, *Die Inschriften Asarhaddons Königs von Assyrien* (Archiv für Orient-forschung Beiheft 9; Graz: Archiv für Orientforschung, 1956), 102 II i 1–4. This text is cited by Paul, "Decoding a 'Joint' Expression," 122.

50. Cf. *maqātu* in *CAD* M, 245.

51. Cf. *CAD* Ṣ, 7.

52. Cf. Paul 123, n. 16; *CAD* Z, 119–122 and Aramaic זיו; Stephen A. Kaufman, *The Akkadian Influences on Aramaic* (Assyriological Studies 19; Chicago: University, 1974), 113; *lemēnu* in *CAD* L, 118.

context of acquiescence and submission to the intermediary figure.[53] That individual embodies the potential for individual and familial harm, and conveys this reality without actually uttering a direct injunction.

Similarly, in an oracle to Ashurbanipal of Assyria concerning his future campaign, the goddess Ishtar of Arbela urges Ashurbanipal to remain at home and promises that she will ensure victory.[54] Ishtar declares:

Your face will not pale,	*pa-nu-u-ka ul ur-raq*
Your feet will not falter,	*ul i-nàr-ru-ṭa* GÌR^meš-*ka*
You will not wipe away your sweat,	*ul ta-šam-maṭ ẓu-ut-ka*
In the midst of battle.	*i-na* MURUB₄ *tam-ḫa-ri*

The context of this oracular dream is a military campaign where Ashurbanipal is likely to be defeated. Once again, one notes that the *topos* of news relating to a foreboding situation, here military in nature, is pivotal. However, there is also the factor of obeisance to an individual of higher stature, i.e., the goddess Ishtar. The embodiment of fear is denoted with an emphasis on anxiety-induced sweat. To this end, the progression from face to feet and back to face "describe[s] responses of fear 'in the midst of battle,' from which Ashurbanipal will be preserved."[55] The use of the verb *narāṭu* often refers to the human state of fear, as seen in a Neo-Assyrian royal text under Sargon. In *TCL* 3, 83, human fear is conveyed by *narāṭu* where the king's enemy sees the army's approach and immediately "his whole body start[s] to falter/shake," *irruṭū šīrūšu*.[56] The content of the enemy envoy has not yet been transmitted, but the very sight of his approach is sufficient enough to generate a physiological reaction.

Two additional references come from the Epic of Gilgameš. In OB II iv, 36–39, Enkidu exhibits a reaction of panic at the news of Gilgameš's fate.[57] According to the narrative:

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53. Cf. Paul 122, n. 15. The idiom of a "gloomy face" also conveys sadness and despair, cf. Gen. 40:7; Neh. 2:2. Note the verbal idiom *zīma lummunu*, "to make the face bad (i.e., gloomy)," as in *zīmūšu ulamminma rēšiš ēmēma*, "he assumed the appearance of a lowly person and thus came to look like a slave," cf. *CAD* Z, 120b; Gruber 365, n. 1.

54. Maximilian Streck, *Assurbanipal* Vol. II (Leipzig 1916), 114–119; "An Oracular Dream Concerning Ashurbanipal," translated by Robert H. Pfeiffer (*ANET*, 451–452).

55. Fleming, "By the Sweat of Your Brow," 96.

56. See Textes cunéiformes, Musées du Louvre (Paris 1910 ff.).

57. A. R. George, *The Babylonian Gilgamesh Epic: Introduction, Critical Edition and*

"By divine consent it is ordained;	*i-na mi-il-ki ša ilim*(dingir) *qá-bi-ma*
At the cutting of his (Gilgameš's) umbilical cord,	*i-na bi-ti-iq a-bu-un-na-ti-šu*
His (Gilgameš's) fate was decreed."	*ši-ma-as-súm*
At the man/fellow's words,	*a-na sí-iq-ri eṭ-li-im*
His (Enkidu's) face turned pale.	*i-ri-qú pa-nu-šu*

In this social encounter, the paleness of Enkidu's face embodies his fear and astonishment following his dialogue with a "civilized" individual. That visible rejoinder comes to a climax only after Enkidu has heard the man's message. He comes face-to-face with a divine being and turns pale, i.e., yellow or green, while confronted with an emotionally difficult situation.

An analogous facial response to fear is expressed by Gilgameš in OB VII iv 14–19. After dreaming on his journey to see Huwawa, Gilgameš awakens from his dream and shares the content of the dream with Enkidu. He says:

> [My friend], I saw a dream last night:
> The heavens [moaned], the earth responded;
> […] I stood [alo]ne.
> […] his face was darkened.
> Like unto […] was his face.
> […like] the talons of an eagle were his claws.

In this pericope, one notes that Gilgameš's reaction follows after the negative portent echoed in the moaning of the heavens.

Various deities also exhibit a facial reaction in accounts that parallel Enkidu's response. These texts portray the gods as the subjects of fear, whose faces pale at the sight of a messenger. Such a reply on the part of deities should be contrasted with Deut. 32:27, the single biblical passage where Yahweh is the subject of a verb meaning to fear, *gwr*, when He turns away from His anger.[58] By contrast, several Mesopotamian deities more frequently exhibit fear.

Cuneiform Texts. Vol. 1 (Oxford University Press, 2003), 178–179; Cf. Georges Dossin, *La Pâleur d'Enkidu* (Louvain: Imprimerie Orientaliste, 1930).

58. Korpel, *A Rift in the Clouds*, 178; Cf. Sanders, *The Provenance of Deuteronomy 32*, 403–405.

These texts include:

(1) The description of Ereškigal's face in the Descent of Ištar is noted when Ereškigal hears the news that her sister, Inanna, is at the gate.[59] The text reads: *kīma nikis* GIŠ *bīni arāqu panūša,* her face "turns as pale as the stump of a tamarisk tree."

(2) Likewise, there is a similar reaction by Namtar, queen Ereškigal's messenger in the Late Version of Nergal and Ereškigal, 3:211. At the sight of a visitor to the palace, Namtar's face changes: [*kī*]*ma ni*[*kis*] GIŠ *bīni arāqu panūš,* (his) face "turns as pale as the stump of a tamarisk tree."

(3) In *Atraḫasis*, after seeing how the younger gods have rebelled against the senior deities, namely Anu, Enlil, and Enki, Enlil is ready to punish them. Even though this younger generation has defied the authority of the older gods, Ea intervenes and convinces Enlil not to act. However, Enlil's advisor, Nusku, also had persuaded him not to enact revenge. Nusku decries:

> O my lord, your face is [sallow as] tamarisk!
> Why do you fear your own sons?
> O Enlil, your face is [sallow as] tamarisk!
> Why do you fear your own sons?[60]

Nusku pleads with his master, Enlil, precisely at the time when Enlil's house is surrounded with opposition. It is the physical presence of this confrontational party that generates a reaction of panic, which is literarily represented through Nusku's remark. The noise of the Igigi gods provokes fear in the great divine beings that remain subservient to the Igigi in this context. Enlil and Nusku, his vizier, stand at an impasse, just as Enkidu reacted at the news of Gilgameš's fate. The metaphor of one's "face is

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59. Erich Ebeling, *Keilschrifttexte aus Assur religiösen Inhalts* (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1919-23), 1/29; Cf. *pānū arāqu*: "the face pales," in *CAD* A/2, 232 s.v. *arāqu,* "to turn pale, to become green or yellow."

60. Stephanie Dalley, *Myths from Mesopotamia: Creation, the Flood, Gilgamesh and Others* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 11. The relationship between the older and younger generation of gods and the rhetoric of fear is examined in Rivkah Harris, *Gender and Aging in Mesopotamia: The Gilgamesh Epic and Other Ancient Literature* (University of Oklahoma Press: Norman, 2000), 77.

[sallow] as tamarisk" evokes the analogous idiom in the Descent of Ištar, and in Nergal and Ereškigal.[61]

(4) Maqlû III 101 reveals another example of the paleness of one's face as an expression of fright. In the third tablet of the anti-witchcraft ritual ceremony, the language of the incantation to undo the episode of witchcraft ends with the following line:

kaššāptu kīma siḫir kunukki annê liṣūdu li-ri-qu panūki
So that, O witch, like the rim of this seal, Your face melt (and glow) and become pale.[62]

(5) Finally, in tablet II of the Poem of the Righteous Sufferer,[63] a demon has taken hold of an individual who reacts with immediate fear. The physiological response of fear is described through language that progresses across the body, which echoes the role that the presence of another being has upon an individual. That person is constrained from any movement by the overpowering force of the demon, which has entered the person's body. As a result, the verse describes how he loses physical control:

(75) Numbness has spread over my whole body,
Paralysis has fallen upon my flesh.
Stiffness has seized my arms,
Debility has fallen upon my loins,
My feet forgot how to move.

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61. Cf. The lament for Unug: c. 2. 2. 25: "All the great gods paled at its immensity," ba-an-sig₇-ge-eš ("to be green").

62. This text is taken from Tzvi Abusch's translation in preparation, distributed Fall 2010 at Brandeis University in a course on magic and witchcraft in the ancient Near East. I wish to thank Professor Abusch for his permission to include this translation. See also the German translation of Maqlû in I. Tzvi Abusch (with Daniel Schwemer), "Das Abwehrzauberritual Maqlû ('Verbrennung')," in *Omina, Orakel, Rituale und Beschwoerungen, Texte aus der Umwelt des Alten Testaments, Neue Folge*. vol. 4, eds. Bernd Janowski and Gernot Wilhelm (Guetersloh: Guetersloher Verlagshaus, 2008), 128–186, esp. 150.

63. Benjamin R. Foster, *From Distant Days: Myths, Tales and Poetry from Ancient Mesopotamia* (Bethesda: CDL Press, 1995), 306. Note also the abstraction of fear compared to garments and clothing. In *Enūma eliš* IV 57, awe-inspiring terror surrounds Marduk as if he were clothed in a garment: *naḫlapti apluḫti pulḫāti ḫalip*, "(Marduk) is enveloped in an armoured garment of fear." See Nahum Waldman, "The Imagery of Clothing, Covering and Overpowering," *JANES* 19 (1989): 161–170.

V. Generating the Reaction of Fear: Re-examining the Social Dynamic

As these biblical and Mesopotamian examples elucidate, the literary *topos* of physiological response to anxiety is provoked in a specific narrative context. With the onset of undefined news or an unspecified event, the visible reaction of fear causes an imbalance in social relations. The exact reality of the news is not yet known although it is preemptively deemed disastrous. A contrast is thus created between the conscious and unconscious elements of fear. While the embodiment of fear indicates an apprehension of the unknown, there is a lack of embodiment when the object is known. The limited explicit references to fear by Ugaritic deities link the use of a specific verb to the event that poses a threat, as in KTU 1.5 II 6–7 and 1.6 VI 30–31. Contrary to the letters in KTU 2.16, 2.30, and 2.38 where fear is not embodied, the content of the portended information in the analyzed type scene is only divulged by the messengers after the physiological description of anxiety. This messenger may be defined as an individual or prophet, deity, divine emissary, or collective unit. Such conspicuous anguish encompasses the trembling of feet, convulsing of joints, and sweating or altered colour of one's face.

However, the receipt of news or the recognition of an imminent event does not have to stimulate fear. It could just as well yield rejection of the news or oppositional behaviour. This does not appear to be the case in numerous comparative examples.[64] By contrast, the embodiment of fear engenders a social dynamic due to the participatory nature of the exchange. By reacting to bad news through outward physiological responses, the subject perpetuates a relationship with the harbinger of the news. This is localized in the facial reaction, since the face is the body part that acknowledges the presence of the other being and visualizes the foreboding event.

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64. Cf. Anat and Athirat do not accurately perceive the type of message that is brought to them. Similarly, David awaits news of Absalom in 2 Sam. 18:19–33, and Adonijah awaits word about the crowned king in 1 Kgs. 1:41–49. They do not correctly detect the reason for the messenger's arrival. For a comparative analysis of the role of the messenger in the ancient Levant and the messenger's arrival, see Samuel Meier, *The Messenger in the Ancient Semitic World* (HSM 45; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988), 131–134.

In this way, the language of anxiety in Semitic literature is grounded in social relations,[65] a point that draws on the relationship between fear and communication within the field of psychology. Current research in the neuroscience of emotion has its roots in the James-Lange theory, which raises the connection between unconscious physiological behaviour and the conscious cognitive response of emotion. Of note is the claim that cognitive recognition of an emotion comes after people manifest the physiological component of the emotion, in this case, that of anticipatory anxiety.[66] William James and Carl Lange maintained, "That the conscious experience of emotion occurs only *after* the cortex has received signals about changes in one's physiological state."[67]

Argued differently, unconscious physiological changes in muscular tension or blood pressure precede the human awareness of the defined feeling.[68] The amygdala, a brain structure, plays a central role in the interaction between bodily states and cognitive reactions to the physiological responses. The James-Lange theory was subsequently confirmed by the work of Joseph LeDoux, who examines this coordination by the amygdala of the physiological expression of fear and the conscious realization of the fear. His work documents the manner in which "a frightening stimulus can cause our hearts to race and our palms to sweat before we consciously realize"[69] what is happening. Such an unmediated initial response to a

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65. Note that Hebrew *yr'* and Akkadian *palāḫu* both are recognized as meaning "to revere" and "to be frightened," cf. Mayer Gruber, "Fear, Anxiety and Reverence in Akkadian, Biblical Hebrew and Other Northwest Semitic Languages." *VT* 40 4 (1990): 411–422. The scope of the term *palāḫu* lies outside the analysis presented in this paper.

66. William James argued, "We first act instinctively and then invoke cognition to explain the changes in the body associated with that action." See Eric R. Kandel, *In Search of Memory: The Emergence of a New Science of Mind* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2006), 340–341.

67. Kandel, *In Search of Memory*, 340. Cf. William James, "What is Emotion?" *Mind* 9 (1884): 188–204; repr. in Wayne Dennis, ed., *Readings in the History of Psychology* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1948), 290–303.

68. See also Robert Plutchik, *The Psychology and Biology of Emotion* (New York: Harper Collins College Publishers, 1994); Ralph Hupka, Zbigniew Zaleski, Jurgen Otto, Lucy Reidl, and Nadia Tarabrina, "Anger, Envy, Fear and Jealousy as Felt in the Body: A Five Nation Study," *Cross-Cultural Research* 30/3 (1996): 243–264.

69. Kandel, *In Search of Memory*, 344; Cf. Joseph LeDoux, *The Emotional Brain: The Mysterious Underpinnings of Emotional Life* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1953); A. Etkin, K.

stimulus effectively captures the panic that seizes Anat and Athirat in KTU 1.3 III 32–35 and 1.4 II 12–20.

Conclusion

This paper demonstrates how the embodiment of fear by two goddesses, Anat and Athirat, generates a social dynamic between the participants. An analysis of several Mesopotamian literary accounts reveals how a relationship is created between the one who communicates news and the recipient of the news when an individual approaches or an oracle is transmitted. By expanding on the corpus of Mesopotamian texts that bolsters Hiller's initial argument, this discussion underlines how the embodiment of the anticipation of the message propels a sustained hierarchical interaction between the participants.

A comparative social dynamic occurs within a similar *topos* in the Hebrew Bible. Through fear of Yahweh and anticipation of the Day of the Lord, the people show their subservience as well as their obeisance to Yahweh. They thereby maintain the hierarchical disparity between themselves and Yahweh. The text's use of the language of physical embodiment to convey their reaction of panic recognizes that Yahweh is the one in charge. The type scene emphasizes the fact that the people do not have control over oracles transmitted by the prophets. To this end, the above analysis argues that the visceral display of anxiety in Ugaritic and Semitic literature is manifest in the recipient's visage and embodies the threat that the participant perceives. Ultimately, the Baal Cycle appends the goddesses' spoken, conscious responses to their physiological reactions. However, before that can happen, Anat and Athirat must break into an anxiety-induced sweat as they await the expected news.

C. Klemenhagen, J. T. Dudman, M. T. Rogan, R. Hen, E. R. Kandel, and J. Hirsch, "Individual Differences in Trait Anxiety Predict the Response of the Basolateral Amygdala to Unconsciously Processed Fearful Faces," *Neuron* 44 (2004): 1043–1055.

Reconsidering Religious Experience from the Perspective of Phenomenological Anthropology

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Although religious experience is one of the core issues in the study of religion, anthropological works have not devoted enough attention to lived or felt states of being in a religious context. Rather, scholarship concerned with religious practices in mainstream anthropology has taken either an interpretative approach, put forward by Geertz's essay "Religion as a Cultural System,"[1] or a social constructionist view, inspired by Asad's[2] critique of a universal definition of religion.[3] These have contributed a great deal to the understanding of the cultural and social context of religion, but have somehow neglected the subjectivity of religious experience or lived religiosity.

This essay attempts to address religious experience from a phenomenologically informed anthroplogical perspective. I contend that religious experience is first and foremost an existential modality of engagement with the world. Specifically, I will articulate this position by reviewing major contributions to the study of religious experience and add new insights to the current literature, and thereafter introduce some

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1. Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays by Clifford Geertz* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 90–91. The author describes religion as a system of symbols, which in turn serve as carriers of meanings that establish powerful moods and motivations in individuals.

2. Talal Asad, *Anthropological Conceptions of Religion: Reflections on Geertz* (Man, New Series, 1983), 18(2): 237–259.

3. The author focuses on the shaping role of power-institutions on religious knowledge. Precisely, he suggests to consider "what are the historical conditions necessary for the existence of particular religious practices and discourses," which social disciplines and social forces contribute to distribute and to authorize at different times. Asad, *Anthropological Conceptions of Religion*, 252.

instances from ethnographic studies. First, I will briefly revisit some of the major works on religious experience, which either support or question the authenticity of the sacred in relation to the sociocultural context. Here, drawing from the phenomenological standpoint of embodiment, I will suggest how the existential ground of religious experience can help us to better understand the relationship between felt states and their cognitive representation. Second, I will introduce some ethnographic studies that show how religious experience is an embodied reality. Before approaching religious experience from a subject-centred orientation, there are two main epistemological considerations to be made.

The first consideration refers to what kind of methodological standpoint we want to employ in order to understand religious experience. Here I embrace a phenomenologically oriented anthropological perspective, with special regard to the standpoint of embodiment. According to the idea of embodiment, the body is regarded as the existential ground of cultural phenomena, and embodiment is the starting point for approaching human experience, in this case lived religiosity. For this purpose, I will build on some notions Merleau-Ponty put forward in his *Phenomenology of Perception*, and on recent phenomenologically oriented anthropological contributions, suggesting how an existentialist-phenomenological anthropology may help us to reconsider religious experience in a new light.

The second epistemological consideration refers to the definition of religious experience itself. What features make a particular human experience distinctively religious? Several works have identified religious experience with the sacred, numinous, holy, and other similar dimensions, all referring to the sense of a superior transcendental being experienced by the subject. It is important to note though that most of these studies have focused on the perception of the sacred in religious traditions, overlooking the religiousness of other human experiences. Some authors pointed out that religious experience should not be identified uniquely with mystical states, nor should it be confined to a given religious tradition. King, for example, speaking of sacred experience, places the body along a continuum, which goes from the extreme of mild and frequent experiences to that of mystical states.[4] Yet, Simon suggests, "There are other traditions or movements

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4. Winston King, "Religion," in ed. Mircea Eliade, *The Encyclopedia of Religion* (New York: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1968), 282–293. Whereas the first category encompasses a

which may not normally be called religious but which nevertheless have formal characteristics making them analogous at least to religions, and which represent similar human feelings, impulses, and thoughts."[5] Rather than narrowing religious experience to the domain of the sacred in terms of an overpowering force, or to mystical states, this essay takes into account the existential ground that allows for different forms of religious objectification, including the sacred. Specifically, drawing from the idea of self as a processual whole determined by a constant feedback between embodied and cognized modes of experience, this essay considers how discontinuities of self intrinsic to our existential condition may be objectified as either an outer entity or integrated into self-representations in order to re-establish a sense of self-cohesiveness and to give meaning to alienated parts of the self.

The Phenomenological Standpoint of Embodiment

Like any other human experience, the religious one is also grounded in the body. In this sense, religious experience is a lived or embodied reality. In the last decades scholarly attention has been devoted to the role of the body in religion, not only for what concerns its symbolic representation in different traditions, but also, and more importantly, as a way to better comprehend the experiential foundation of religious phenomena. Studies concerned with religious experience have shown the inadequacy of the Western mind/body dualism rooted in Cartesian philosophy in acknowledging the importance of embodied dimensions of religion. For this reason, several of these studies have reformulated concepts from the phenomenology of perception Merleau-Ponty elaborated, for it provides a valid standpoint by means of addressing religion as a lived reality. Before considering current phenomenologically informed anthropological orientations, it would be

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sense of awe in the divine, a sense of joy and peace, but also intense physical sensations, just to mention a few, mystical experiences differ from the former in their irruptive qualities, which the author identifies with suddenness and spontaneity, irresistibility, absolute quality of conviction, and quality of clear knowledge. King, "Religion," 291–292.

5. Ninian Smart, "Understanding Religious Experience," in ed. Steven Katz, *Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 11.

useful to briefly sketch out some of the cardinal ideas Merleau-Ponty put forward.

Building on the postulate of "being-in-the-world" the phenomenologist Heidegger (1889-1976) put forward, which poses human being as an open realm to and a practical involvement with the world, Merleau-Ponty regards this condition as an open situation toward an infinite number of potential resolutions. Focusing on perception, Merleau-Ponty takes the existential condition of being-in-the-world as a preobjective view, which is prior to stimuli and sensory contents and independent of voluntary thought or consciousness.[6] According to the author, in fact, "It is because it is a preobjective view that being-in-the-world can be distinguished from every third person process, from every modality of the res extensa, as from every cogitatio, from every first person form of knowledge—and that it can effect the union of the psychic and the physiological."[7] Then, by turning to the level of spontaneous perception, that is, before the conscious elaboration and representation of objects, Merleau-Ponty attempts to collapse the mind/body dichotomy.

Precisely, the author suggests that since we perceive through our senses, the body is the existential ground through which we familiarize with the world and get knowledge. Nevertheless, unlike the attribution of meaning to certain experiences, which is elaborated at the level of consciousness through reflexive cognitive processes, perception places human agency as a set of open possibilities to the world. At the preobjectified level of perception there is no elaboration of objects or of us thinking about the object, but only the pure living experience of the unity of the subject. The object compares in a final stage through "a process of focusing, and retrospective, since it will present itself as preceding its own appearance, as the 'stimulus,' the motive or the prime mover of every process since its beginning."[8] Perception then is an impersonal, anonymous, undetermined, pre-objective, and pre-conscious state of being, where the subject is not a spectator but a whole engaged with and open to an infinite number of configurations—culturally patterned—in the encounter with the world.

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6. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Colin Smith (New Jersey: The Humanity Press, 1962), 78–80.
7. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 80.
8. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 239.

With respect to the issue here examined, an important implication of Merleau-Ponty's formulation is that at the preobjectified level of experience the body may be regarded not only as the existential ground of culture, being the fundamental existential condition for our interaction with the world, but also, at this level, the body may be an existential disposition prior to the separation between self-awareness in the form of consciousness and the representation of its objects, where thought is a secondary, reflexive process given by the projection of the body into the world. In fact, in the immediacy of perception of either our own body or external things there is no consciousness of fully determinate objects yet, but only an immediate sensation that will be objectified in different ways according to both the subject's personal experiences and the sociocultural context.

In the anthropological field, some scholars have reformulated the phenomenological ideas of being-in-the-world and embodiment. Jackson, for instance, acknowledges a phenomenological perspective in the methodological stance of lived experience.[9] Specifically, the author provides an all-encompassing conception of lived experience emphasizing its dialectical irreducibility. In fact, writes Jackson, "[It] accommodates our shifting sense of ourselves as subjects and as objects, as acting upon and being acted upon by the world, of living with and without certainty, of belonging and being estranged."[10] Then, recalling William James's suggestion that experience includes both "transitive" and "substantive" elements, Jackson points out the ambiguity of self that should not be treated as a constant and autonomous element among others. Rather, self "is a function of our involvement with others in a world of diverse and ever-altering interests and situations."[11]

On another side, drawing partly from Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of perception, Csordas proposes embodiment as a methodological standpoint through which to analyze cultural phenomena.[12] The body is regarded as the existential ground of culture, the starting point for comprehending

9. Michael Jackson, *Paths Toward a Clearing: Radical Empiricism and Ethnographic Inquiry* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1989).

10. Jackson, *Paths Toward a Clearing*, 2.

11. Jackson, *Paths Toward a Clearing*, 3.

12. Thomas J. Csordas, "Embodiment as a Paradigm for Anthropology," *Ethos* 18/1 (1990): 5–47.

various cultural objectifications of existential experiences. Through the presentation of some empirical examples from the domain of healing practice, Csordas aims to demonstrate how sensory experiences, grounded basically in one's body, can be culturally constituted and objectified in different ways. Csordas holds that at the level of perception, mind and body are not distinguished from each other, and it is starting from perception that we should ask "how our bodies may become objectified through processes of reflection."[13] Thus, following such an assumption, the author conceives of self as "an indeterminate capacity to engage or become oriented in the world, characterized by effort and reflexivity."[14] According to this view, indeterminacy is the existential ground of self, which through reflexive processes may result in the self-objectification of persons.

Yet, building on Csordas's phenomenological conception of embodiment, Seligman develops a model of self that encompasses not only cognitive and reflexive elements but also embodied aspects of experience.[15] One of the main arguments such a model conveys is that self is a locus of intersection between mind and body, "an emergent product of both cognitive-discursive and embodied processes."[16] By such a formulation, Seligman aims to explain that the sense of a coherent self is determined and maintained by the constant feedback between the cognitive and embodied level of experience.

Religious Experience and the Sacred Between Authenticity and Conventionality

The sacred is a cardinal dimension of religion and perhaps the most representative category employed by scholars to refer to the religious realm. Yet, it is also a particular mode of experiencing the world, which early

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13. Csordas, "Embodiment as a Paradigm for Anthropology," 36.
14. Thomas J. Csordas, *The Sacred Self: A Cultural Phenomenology of Charismatic Healing* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1994), 5.
15. Rebecca Seligman, "The Unmaking and Making of Self: Embodied Suffering and Mind-Body Healing in Brazilian Candomblé," *Ethos* 38/3 (2010): 297–320.
16. Seligman, "The Unmaking and Making of Self," 298.

theories of religion addressed in opposition to the profane.[17] Durkheim, for instance, views the sacred as the result of a projection and reification of the power of society, which is perceived by its members in a disguised form. Moreover, the alienated power of the social group is experienced individually with an intense emotional force, which Durkheim defines as a "state of effervescence" or "collective effervescence."[18] Yet, a similar distinction is emphasized in Eliade's phenomenological approach to religion, where each individual perceives the manifestation of the sacred in the world, namely "hierophany," as "the revelation of an absolute reality."[19]

In general, we can distinguish between two main categories of scholarship concerned with religious experience, with special regard to the sacred: works that emphasize its authentic and unmediated character and works that attempt to contextualize it.

Orientations belonging to the first category have focused on the emotional and intuitive character of mystical and transcendental experiences, which give meaning to the mysteries of human life. The origin of this position is perhaps Hume, who first pointed out that religious beliefs, rather than developing out of reason, stem from fear and uncertainties of life, and that they are experienced individually through emotional states.[20] It was, however, the work of Otto, "The Idea of the Holy," that provided a compelling analysis of how the individual perceives the sacred, conceived as a striking experience characterized by strong emotional states. Otto claims that religious experience stems fundamentally from a feeling of awe and mystery, from the individual perception of something numinous

17. Rudolf Otto, *The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the non-rational factor in the idea of the divine and its relation to the rational*, trans. John W. Harvey (London: Oxford University Press, 1958). Emile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, trans. Joseph Ward Swain (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1957). Mircea Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion*, trans. Willard R. Trask (Orlando: Harcourt, 1987).
18. Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, 422. It is precisely in rites that Durkheim indicates how this process works. According to Durkheim, in fact, rituals and ceremonies arouse a "collective sentiment" in which individuals perceive something larger than themselves and subordinate to this intense wholeness (413). This process corresponds to the identification of the individual with the force of the collectivity, which is the community in its projected form and which is experienced with intense emotional response.
19. Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane*, 21.
20. Brian Morris, *Anthropological Studies of Religion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 141-142.

or supernatural. This feeling, according to the author, can be defined as the experience of the holiness, an instinctual emotional drive that is essentially non-rational and intuitional.[21] Intuition is also regarded as the core of religion in Schleiermacher's thought, for he identifies the essence of religion with the "intuition of the universe" experienced as an individual and immediate perception.[22] Schleiermacher points out how religious experience is embedded in the senses, "it stops with the immediate experiences of the existence and action of the universe, with the individual intuitions and feelings."[23] Therefore, he suggests that intuition is intertwined with feelings, and that the strength of the feelings, which "are supposed to possess us," determines the degree of religiousness.[24]

Later psychological interpretations further stressed the emotional character of religious experience. At the beginning of the twentieth century, in his classic work "The Varieties of Religious Experience,"[25] James defines religion as "the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine."[26] In addition, the author points out how religious ideas are usually characterized by the belief that there is "an unseen order."[27] Similar to this view, Jung refers to the sacred as a psychological dimension, even though he emphasizes its universal character through the theory of "the collective unconscious" and the idea of archetypical models.[28]

In all the above theories, religious experience, specifically the sacred dimension, is characterized by extraordinary feelings independent of and preceding thought, in which something otherly is lived and experienced at the bodily level, usually accompanied by an overwhelming emotional

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21. Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*, 5.

22. Friedrich Schleiermacher, *On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers*, trans. Richard Crouter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 104.

23. Schleiermacher, *On Religion*, 105.

24. Schleiermacher, *On Religion*, 110.

25. William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1985)

26. James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, 34.

27. James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, 51.

28. In religious symbolism, Jung recognizes the same figures he met in the dreams and fantasies of his patients, arguing that such contents constitute archetypical models of psychic realities repeated among different cultures and times. Morris, *Anthropological Studies of Religion*, 167–174.

state. To a certain extent, this approach to religious experience suggests an ontological status of the sacred in human life, that is, a universal category independent of cultural context. Nevertheless, recent scholarship has questioned the universality of the sacred.

Taking into account what is commonly regarded as the quintessence of religious experience, a handful of edited works have shown the contextual character of mystical states.[29] Central to these works is the attempt to contextualize mysticism in relation to religious traditions in order to question the image that mysticism is an autonomous realm of experience independent of religious beliefs, practices, and communities. This endeavor has been supported by several contributions that have shown how the experience of the mystic is shaped by the concepts of the religious tradition the mystic belongs to. The mystic in fact is embedded in an educational process, wherein religious texts provide the concepts that somehow anticipate the experience reported. As Katz puts it, "There is an inherited theological-mystical education which is built upon certain agreed sources."[30] In a similar way, building on the thesis of Schleiermacher—religious experience as a sense of the infinite or a feeling of absolute dependence independent of culture—Proudfoot suggests that we cannot account for religious experience independently of concepts, beliefs, and practices.[31] Among others, the author supports the cultural shaping of religious experience by questioning one of the strongest drives of intuition, namely, emotion. He recalls the theory of Schachter, according to which it is the individual's beliefs about the causes of his arousal to determine the emotion he will experience. Therefore, the author concludes, "A person identifies an experience as religious when he comes to believe that the best explanation of what has happened to him is a religious one."[32]

If on one side these studies provide convincing arguments against a universal model of religion, they are nevertheless confined to the idea of religious experience associated with the sacred of the mystics. But religious

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29. Steven T. Katz, ed., *Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978). Steven T. Katz, ed., *Mysticism and Religious Traditions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983). Steven T. Katz, ed., *Mysticism and Language* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).

30. Katz, *Mysticism and Religious Traditions*, 6.

31. Wayne Proudfoot, *Religious Experience* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

32. Proudfoot, *Religious Experience*, 108.

experience does not cover solely the sacred dimension, nor can it be narrowed to those phenomena reported in mystical traditions. Moreover, although explaining how the sacred in mystic experiences is shaped by the doctrinal context to which mystics belong, these studies fail to take into account the fact that conceptualizations and theories found in the scriptural traditions are fruit of an experiential process. To put it differently, the same doctrines found in mystic traditions are rooted in human experiences, which have undergone a process of cultural objectification and secularization through religious scriptures and institutions. There is a need then for reconsidering the existential condition sacred experience stems from. I intend to move from these observations, but instead of attempting to address the genesis of religious experience, I will put forward a subject-centered approach informed by the standpoint of embodiment, by means of capturing the existential ground previous to different forms of religious objectification.

The Existential Ground of Religious Experience: The Embodied Self

Studies presented above show the common tendency in scholarship of religion to take human agency as a sort of black box influenced by either the feeling of something other or the cultural context. Regardless of whether the sacred is conceived as an emotional and intuitive force in control of one's self or as the product of an educational process, not enough attention is drawn to the role played by self-processes in mediating between felt and cognized forms of experience. In this sense, we may note how previous works are somehow embedded in the mind/body dichotomy. Thus, works that emphasize the non-rational and intuitional character of religious experience privilege body over mind. Opposingly, positions that focus on the role of the doctrinal tradition in the shaping of religious experience attach more importance to cognitive ways of elaborating the sacred. However, the standpoint of embodiment in a phenomenological sense can help us to collapse such a dichotomy.

In the light of the phenomenological ideas previously explained, we can say that the existential condition lying behind the cognized perception

of the sacred, as well as of other dimensions with similar characteristics, is the contingency and ambiguity of embodied or felt aspects of experience. We can even develop this idea further and say that both coherence and dissociation are intrinsic tendencies to our being-in-the-world. These tendencies operate at the intersection between embodied and cognized processes, making ambiguous and contingent felt states the bodily ground of objectified accounts—culturally patterned—according to both personal experience and sociocultural context. We can further articulate this formulation by elucidating a few cardinal concepts.

The first one is the definition of self. Previously, we have seen how self can be conceptualized as "processual" and determined by both reflexive self-representations or objectifications and embodied aspects that are prior to self-objectification.[33] Self then may be regarded as an emergent product of the constant feedback between cognitive-discursive and embodied processes. In this sense, embodied modes of experience can be objectified in different ways by reflexive cognitive processes so that the felt states can be self-represented as parts of a cohesive self or as alienated forms. This model of self is particularly instructive in explaining two fundamental phenomenological aspects often observed in religious experience: alterity and spontaneity.

"Alterity" is characterized by either the individual's generalized feeling of being overwhelmed by an upper and more powerful entity, or more simply by the sense of an intimate otherness. These dispositions can be viewed as two extremes of a continuum, wherein one pole is represented by an outer transcendental being, while the other pole can be identified with contemplative experiences, which unlike the former, do not produce an existential duality. Smart, for instance, elaborated this idea in his polarity theory of religious experience.[34] The theory frames experience in religious context within two main poles: the numinous experience of the holy—similar to the one previously described by Otto—and the contemplative or mystic experience, which in turn reflect respectively outward and inward oriented dispositions. Whereas numinous experience is characterized by a

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33. Csordas, "Embodiment as a Paradigm for Anthropology," Seligman, "The Unmaking and Making of Self."

34. Ninian Smart, *Dimensions of The Sacred: An Anatomy of the World's Beliefs* (Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1996).

tremendous feeling of the holy as an "outside Other," "the second is the contemplative or mystical experience which does not postulate an outside Other and which feels the disappearance of the subject-object distinction."[35] Thus, these two modalities of experience can be viewed as two different ways of self-objectifying embodied or felt states of being under cognized processes: the alienation of parts of the self in an outside or supra-human Other, and the integration of these parts into a cohesive self-representation.

The other core concept informed by a phenomenological standpoint and strictly connected with the previous one is "spontaneity" at the pre-objectified level of experience. This condition has been thoroughly explained by Csordas[36], who, in accordance with the work of Merleau-Ponty, has shown that bodily experiences, such as those related to the sensorial and perceptual spheres, are an indeterminate set of potentialities of engagement with the world prior to cultural classifications. In other words, "spontaneity" as a phenomenological condition refers to the immediacy of felt states of being, which is determined by the open horizon of the senses. In this sense then, spontaneity may be viewed also as the existential condition of bodily experiences prior to cultural configuration.

Embodying Religious Experience in Spirit Possession and Healing Ritual

In the last decades we have witnessed an increase of anthropological literature on spirit possession[37] and healing practices,[38] demanding for a reconsideration of the centrality of bodily experiences. Transformation of

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35. Smart, *Dimensions of The Sacred*, 167.

36. Thomas J. Csordas, *Body/Meaning/Healing* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).

37. Vincent Crapanzano and Vivian Garrison, eds., *Case Studies in Spirit Possession* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1977). Colleen Ward, "Thaipusam in Malaysia: A Psycho-Anthropological Analysis of Ritual Trance, Ceremonial Possession and Self-Mortification Practices," *Ethos* 12/4 (1984): 307–334. Ioan M. Lewis, *Ecstatic Religion: A Study of Shamanism and Spirit Possession* (London and New York: Routledge, 2003).

38. Edith Turner with William Blodgett, Singleton Kahona, and Fideli Benwa, *Experiencing Ritual: A New Interpretation of African Healing* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992). Elizabeth L. Lewton and Victoria Bydone, "Identity and Healing in Three Navajo Religious Traditions: Są'ah Naagháí Bik'eh Hózhǫ́," *Medical Anthropology Quarterly* 14/4 (New Series, 2000): 476–497. Csordas, *Body/Meaning/Healing*.

bodily states, performance, speaking in tongues, trance, mystical communion, transcendence of passion and desire, self-mortification, and self-restraint, among others, are the phenomena most frequently reported in mainstream literature. Instead of focusing on these phenomena, the examples presented below are concerned with the existential ground of modalities of experience central to spirit possession and healing processes.

In the previous section, with respect to religious experience, particularly the sacred, we have seen how approaches that take the self as a black box shaped by either intuitional forces or the doctrinal background risk overlooking the relationship between embodied and cognized aspects. In this regard, drawing from the phenomenological standpoint of embodiment, it has been suggested in what way the existential ground of religious experience can be read in terms of self-cohesiveness and self-dissociation. Whereas forces emotionally felt out of human agency's control represent dissociated and alienated parts of the self, awareness and cognition push toward self-cohesiveness through the attribution of meaning to such discontinuities. Spirit possession and healing rituals associated with phenomena of possession provide a case in point to capture the embodied nature of fragmented parts of the self and their integration into a meaningful and coherent self-representation. In what follows, I will examine a few significant cases informed by ethnographic studies.

Spirit Possession

In religious context, as well as in several traditional cosmologies, spirit possession is the condition in which forces outside the realm of human agency, usually identified with spirits or deities, possess the body of individuals. This phenomenon is frequently accompanied by what scholarly literature has labeled as altered states of consciousness (ASC) or dissociation, terms that indicate different grades of alteration in the "normally integrated functions of consciousness."[39] Crapanzano defines spirit possession as "any altered state of consciousness indigenously interpreted in terms of

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39. Seligman, "The Unmaking and Making of Self," 304.

the influence of an alien spirit."[40] In spirit possession, the possessing spirit may be viewed as either an outer entity or as part of the true nature of the individual. Yet, altered states of consciousness can be patterned in different ways depending upon the sociocultural context. In the introduction to her edited volume, Bourguignon recalls Ludwig's analysis of altered states of consciousness, noting that these states are ordered according to their neurophysiological underpinning rather than their sociocultural context. In this regard, she points out, "We may differentiate between the private, individual, unpatterned states and those that occur in culturally patterned, institutionalized forms."[41] Then, states can be culturally patterned in different ways, as either private or external, sacred or profane.

The phenomenological approach previously introduced allows us to see spirit possession in a new light. In fact, from the standpoint of embodiment—body as the subject of culture—we can examine the phenomenon of spirit possession at the preobjectified level of experience, that is, previous to cultural categorization. A few examples will help us to better comprehend this point.

Csordas provided an instructive work based upon his ethnography of a religious healing process of demonic oppression, showing how bodily sensations might be objectified in different ways.[42] Here the author approaches spirit possession drawing from the premise that both "demonic oppression" and "psychopathology" represent two cultural accounts or cultural objectifications of a common existential condition: the personal experience of suffering. The author outlines a series of sensory and bodily experiences and examines two cultural accounts of the same, conducted respectively by a group of charismatic healing ministers and a group of

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40. Vincent Crapanzano and Vivian Garrison, eds., *Case Studies in Spirit Possession* (Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, 1977), 7.

41. Erika Bourguignon, ed., *Religion, Altered States of Consciousness, and Social Change* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1973), 8.

42. Thomas J. Csordas, "The Affliction of Martin: Religious, Clinical, and Phenomenological Meaning in a Case of Demonic Oppression," in ed. Atwood D. Gaines, *Ethnopsychiatry: The Cultural Construction of Professional and Folk Psychiatries* (Albany NY: State University of New York, 1992), 125–170.

mental health professionals.[43] Central to this work is the premise that the common existential ground of both religious and psychiatric accounts is given by the subject's condition of suffering as an embodied experience. According to this formulation, body experience itself is the starting point for analyzing cultural phenomena, the existential common ground of different cultural elaborations, in this case, demonic oppression and psychopathological interpretation.

In the second part of the work, Csordas recalls the range of sensory and cognitive modalities engaged and developed by the subject in relation to the two cultural accounts. By so doing, the author is able to further explore the existential ground of demon and disease. Moving from the phenomenological premise that one's body is the subject of perception, the author describes the individual's preobjectified world of distress. Specifically, Csordas notes that the existential condition of distress affected all the sensory modalities so that the subject is not able to engage the world as an open horizon. In this regard, the author reports this impasse through linguistic accounts: the voice and imagery are thematized as a cruel friend; bodily sensations of pain alienate the subject from parts of his body, triggering a sense of "dismemberment" and of "dissolution of body boundaries"; the sense of thickness and heaviness expresses an image of immobility of the body, which can be objectified as a manifestation of oppression by an evil spirit.[44] Thus, by analyzing the preobjective experience of distress, the author shows how the two accounts of this experience, namely, religious and medical, account for a common existential condition.

Seligman has presented another compelling case. The author explores experiences of selfhood and suffering among adherents of Candomblé, an African-derived spirit possession religion in northeastern Brazil.[45] Seligman aims to show the deconstructive effects of suffering on self through "experiential-embodied dimensions" and the healing function of spirit possession. Specifically, the author is interested in addressing "how

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43. The range of sensitive and cognitive modalities the author describes includes: auditory, visual, tactile, gustatory, and distortions of thought and emotion. Csordas, "The Affliction of Martin," 131–135.
44. Csordas, "The Affliction of Martin," 154–157.
45. Seligman, "The Unmaking and Making of Self."

selves suffer discontinuities and how such discontinuities can be repaired."[46] Seligman moves from the model of self as an emergent product of both cognized and embodied processes, putting forward the thesis that "the mental, emotional, and interpersonal upheavals experienced by mediums prior to initiation and their somatic or embodied suffering are mutually reinforcing, and together, act to create profound ruptures in the taken-for-granted experience of self."[47] The author notes that spirit possession might create the experience of one's body as a foreign object because the subject experiences discontinuities of self, "an intensely and consistently felt displacement of their taken-for-granted sense of being in the world."[48] But what is more important is that the embodiment of this alienating bodily experience becomes spiritually meaningful in the religious context through its integration into the awareness of self-coherence. As Seligman puts it, self-awareness "not only reconciles this experience with cognized self-representations, but affects those bodily experiences themselves by shaping patterns of attention that in turn affect what information is processed."[49] In other words, the embodiment of qualities attributed to the possessing spirit allows the individual to divert attention from suffering to the self-regulation of arousal, integrating these experiences in a new self-awareness. By presenting two cases, the author describes how healing modalities of spirit possession help individuals to re-establish a sense of self-coherence. In the first case, the person identifies with the spirit reshaping her personality according to its characteristics. In the second one, the possessed identifies with some parts of the spirit while rejecting other parts. [50]

Healing

Similarly to what has been said with respect to spirit possession, also in religious healing bodily experiences that threaten the cohesiveness of the self constitute the core element of the therapeutic process itself. Also here,

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46. Seligman, "The Unmaking and Making of Self," 298.
47. Seligman, "The Unmaking and Making of Self," 303.
48. Seligman, "The Unmaking and Making of Self," 306.
49. Seligman, "The Unmaking and Making of Self," 306.
50. Seligman, "The Unmaking and Making of Self," 314.

the constant feedback between embodied and cognized processes determine how the therapeutic process is lived by each participant and how spiritual dimensions provide the suffering with a sort of self–re-orientation in the world and give meaning to the existential condition of distress. Various bodily experiences connected to the idea of the holy can be observed in religious healing.

Drawing upon his fieldwork in a Catholic charismatic religious movement, Csordas explores the therapeutic process and experience of the healing ritual, attempting to provide a phenomenology of experiential transformation among individuals who participate in the therapeutic process.[51] Csordas takes into account the interplay between embodied and cognized forms of experience. He describes such a relation as a "modulation of orientation in the world," for consciousness is modeled by somatic modes of attention and in turn shapes a new self-awareness so that the subject responds to them by modifying one's activities.[52]

It will suffice here to point out two core concepts elaborated by the author with regard to the existential ground of the sacred in the healing ritual: "habitual posture" and "incremental efficacy." "Habitual posture" refers to the fact that disability, rather than a wholly defined category, is a marginal condition regarded as "a habitual mode of engaging the world."[53] Healing, the author suggests, is an existential process that consists of exploring the margin of disability, while motivated by the conviction of divine power. On the other hand, "incremental efficacy" refers to the fact that a total healing does not occur at once during the ritual process, but it is through the repeated exploration of the margin of disability that the person continues the performance of healing. In other words, the person's engagement in the process is related to the incremental efficacy.[54]

Another example of religious modalities of engagement with the world in the healing process is given by the re-establishment of meaningful relationships within the cosmos. This aspect has been thoroughly explored by Lewton and Bydone in a study of Navajo religious healing. The authors attempt to shed light on the therapeutic process in the healing ritual by

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51. Csordas, *The Sacred Self.*
52. Csordas, *The Sacred Self*, 70.
53. Csordas, *The Sacred Self*, 72.
54. Csordas, *The Sacred Self*, 72.

analyzing the embodied aspect of the synthetic cultural principle of SNBH (Sąʼah Naagháí Bikʼeh Hózhǫ́). This acronym stands for a key concept in Navajo philosophy, encompassing cosmological ideas, spiritual beings, and interpersonal relationships. In this regard, the author aims to understand "the way it translates into the lived experience of Navajo individuals."[55] In these healing rituals the self is conceptualized and represented as a whole orientated toward the cosmos, an image expressed by the philosophical concept of SNBH. In fact, harmony and proper orientation in the cosmos constitute the precondition for the success of the therapeutic process. It is interesting to note that in this ritual setting spiritual dimensions are experienced as both the source of dissociative forces and the means through which the individual reconnects to the spiritual and material world in meaningful ways. In fact, Lewton notes that distress in most cases comes from unbalanced or disconnected relationships, and that the therapeutic process entails self–re-orientation—re-establishment of meaningful relationships—in relation to the environment.[56]

In sum, phenomena of spirit possession and religious healing provide instructive instances by means of analyzing the existential ground of religious experience. In these cases, felt aspects of knowledge can be either alienated from or integrated into cognitive self-representations. At the preobjectified level of experience, spiritual dimensions are embodied through the senses and impact the way the subject engages the world. At the conscious level, such sensations may be either alienated as threatening entities, as observed in spirit possession, or integrated into representations of self-coherence and self-integrity. Religious experience is determined by a constant feedback between these two levels and is played out in the shifting sense of self-orientation as subject and object, empowered and oppressed, coherent and fragmented.

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55. Lewton and Bydone, *Identity and Healing in Three Navajo Religious Traditions*, 479–480.
56. Lewton and Bydone, *Identity and Healing in Three Navajo Religious Traditions*, 492.

Conclusion

This essay has addressed the issue of religious experience from the perspective of phenomenological anthropology. Precisely, it has contended that religious experience is first and foremost an existential modality of engagement with the world.

In the first part, I introduced some core phenomenological concepts with respect to the standpoint of embodiment, specifically focusing on Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of Perception* and current phenomenologically oriented anthropological contributions. Then I reviewed major approaches to religious experience. Works considered reflect two main conceptualizations of the sacred: an intuitive and non-rational force characterized by strong emotional tones, and a cognitive product largely shaped by the doctrinal background.

I have pointed out that the attempt to emphasize either the emotional or the cognitive aspect of religious experience fails to capture the relationship between felt and discursive ways of knowledge, that is, how consciousness is embodied. In this regard, drawing from the phenomenological standpoint of embodiment, I have introduced a model of self that takes into account the role played by self-processes in mediating between embodied and cognized ways of experience. Precisely, it has been shown that whereas at the preobjectified level of experience there is an open-ended disposition of being-in-the-world, at the level of consciousness there are different ways of configuration, according to both the individual background and the sociocultural context.

Finally, I presented some anthropological works on spirit possession and religious healing, for they provide compelling instances of how religious dimensions are embodied and what kind of self-transformations they entail. In these cases, the existential ground of religious experience is the condition of suffering or distress, which impact sensorial modalities and influence the way the possessed engages the world. Ambiguous and contingent felt states of being may be objectified as either alienated parts of the self—spirits—or integrated into self-representations that give coherence and meaning to the subject. In this sense then, religious experience can be viewed as an existential modality of engagement with the world.

The Body of Christ as the Instrument of Timing in John Milton's *Paradise Regained*

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In *Paradise Regained*, John Milton dramatizes in brief epic the temptation of the Son of God in the wilderness, and the Son's resistance to temptation by dint of his perfect obedience. What makes the Son's obedience perfect, and therefore capable of withstanding Satan's temptations, is the Son's *sense* of right timing. It is for this reason that Milton's opening portrayal of the Son is that of a man waiting. The Son is waiting for the time to come to begin his work. How will he know when the time has come? The answer to this question appears in the Son's opening speech, made in solitude. The Son begins, "O what a multitude of thoughts at once / Awakened in me swarm, while I consider / What from within I feel myself, and hear / What from without comes often to my ears" (*PR* 1.196-199). At the end of his speech, all that he feels within and hears without resolves into a singular and wordless impetus: "And now by some strong motion I am led / Into this wilderness, to what intent, / I learn not yet, perhaps I need not know. / For what concerns my knowledge God reveals" (*PR* 290-293).

Hereafter, both the narrative and thematic arc of the poem are straightforward. The Son's resistance—that is the performance of his obedience—is made as a man. The perfection of his resistance is the fulfillment of his divine destiny.[1] To attempt an analogy: when the Son lifts his foot to step, he does so as human; when he brings that foot down, most

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1. In *Christian Doctrine* Milton writes, "His Nature is double, divine and human" and "the entire fulfillment of the Father's promise resides in, but is not *hypostatically* united with Christ as a man." In other words, Milton accepts the dual nature of the Son, but does not accept the orthodox doctrine of the trinity. *The Complete Prose Works of John Milton*, 8 vols. in 10, ed. Don M. Wolfe, et al. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953–82), 6:418–419, emphasis added. All citations to Milton's prose works are from this edition, hereafter cited in the text as Yale.

especially on the pinnacle, he does so as God. In *Paradise Regained*, it is his obedience that makes the Son step and it his sense of timing that makes him step when he does. As the poem dramatizes, Milton's concept of obedience is made efficacious by this "sense of timing," which functions as obedience's necessary mode, its way and method of being performed in-the-world.

Waiting, Hearing, Stepping

What I mean by timing is roughly Milton's sense of the classical concept of *kairos* as it is refracted in the Miltonic motifs of waiting, hearing, and stepping.[2] The conceptual heritage of *kairos* is complex, with antecedents in Homer's epics and also Hesiod's *Works and Days* (c.750–650 BCE).[3] The term becomes a concept as such around the fifth century BCE.

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2. Laurie Zwicky established the importance of *kairos* in "Kairos in Paradise Regained: The Divine Plan," ELH 31.3 (September, 1964). Northrop Frye pointed the way to a discussion of Milton and *kairos* generally in *The Return to Eden: Five Essays on Milton's Epics* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965). Edward Tayler's *Milton's Poetry: Its Development in Time* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1979) remains an indispensable guide to the development of Milton's idea of time and concept of timing, from the "Nativity Ode" to *Samson Agonistes*. Perhaps most influentially, Tayler argued that the distinction between *kairos* and *chronos* is at the heart of Milton's thinking on time (27–149). Following Tayler, Michael Schoenfeldt argues for the importance of the distinction between *kairos* and *chronos* in Milton's work. Schoenfeldt identifies *kairos* as the prelapsarian temporal situation and *chronos* as the postlapsarian temporal situation, or more simply put, what we call time. Schoenfeldt cautions against an overestimation of the distinction, however, because of its neat reductiveness. In other words, the distinction is accurate, if a bit of a simplification. See Schoenfeldt, "Obedience and Autonomy in Paradise Lost," in *A Companion to Milton*, ed. Thomas N. Corns (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 363–376. For the importance of *kairos* in *Paradise Regained*, see especially, Mary Ann Radzinowicz, *Milton's Epics and the Book of Psalms* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 62–69; Gordon Teskey, *Delirious Milton: The Fate of the Poet in Modernity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 164–176; and Zwicky, 271–277. Ken Hiltner argues that the temptations of *Paradise Lost*, *Paradise Regained*, and *Samson Agonistes* cannot be understood without continual reference to *kairos* (I agree): see Hiltner, *Milton and Ecology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 113–124.
3. Hesiod's use of *kairos* appears in *Works and Days*, 694. See Hesiod, *The Works and Days*; *Theogony*; *The Shield of Herakles*, trans. Richard Lattimore (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1991).

Pindar (522–443 BCE) and the Greek tragedians adopt the term as a literary motif, the itinerant Sophists as a term of rhetoric, as does Isocrates (436–383 BCE), who nonetheless defined himself against the Sophists; Plato (428–348 BCE), perhaps borrowing the term from the Sophists, deploys it as a term denoting political expertise, along the lines of "correct timing."[4] Thereafter, the word appears in the Gospel of John (7.6), and then is established by Paul as a fundamental if somewhat elusive aspect of Christian theology.[5]

In English, the word has been translated variously as: due measure, fitness, opportunity, mark, target, opening, improvisatory readiness, and in the definition that most fully accords with Milton's usage, "the moment of opening rightness," as Gordon Teskey calls it.[6] For his concept of timing, and its motifs, Milton draws on nearly all of these connotations of the term.

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4. Pindar, Aeschylus, Euripides, Plato, and Paul, all of whom Milton read extensively, each contributed substantively to the conceptual development of *kairos*. For Isocrates' use of *kairos*, see *Panathanaicus and Against the Sophists*, in volume 2 of *Isocrates*, trans. George Norlin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1929). For a gloss of Isocratic *kairos*, see Michael Cahn, "Reading Rhetoric Rhetorically," *Rhetorica* 7.2 (Spring 1989), 133. For the development of *kairos* in Ancient Greece and Rome, I am indebted to Richard Broxton Onians, *The Origins of European Thought: about the Body, the Mind, the Soul, the World, Time, and Fate* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954), especially 343–351.

5. Cf. 1 Timothy 6.14–15.

6. Teskey, 169. In the last forty years there has been a good deal of work done on *kairos*, most notably by rhetoric and composition scholars. Their interest in *kairos* dates to James Kinneavy, *A Theory of Discourse* (1972; rpt. New York: W.W. Norton, 1983). For a good recent study, see Christopher J. Keller and Christian Weiser, eds., *The Locations of Composition* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002). In *The Locations of Composition* see especially Thomas Rickert, "Inventions in the Wild: On Locating Kairos in Space-Time," 71–89. According to Rickert, "in most of the scholarship that has appeared since Kinneavy's call, *kairos* is understood more or less in line with his original definition: *kairos* 'is the right or opportune time to do something'" (Rickert, 71; Kinneavy, "Kairos: A Neglected Concept in Classical Rhetoric, 80). Although Kinneavy's translation is apt along rhetorical lines, and among scholars of rhetoric and composition, because I am interested in the poetic, philosophical, and theological sense of the word, more precisely, in Miltonic *kairos*, I prefer Teskey's formulation. Finally it should be noted that in William Race's view, most translators and commentators have overemphasized the temporal sense of the word at the expense of its normative sense. As an example, Race translates *kairos* in its normative sense as "proper amount," and offers several examples, drawn primarily from Aeschylus and Euripides. Most recently, however, Melissa Lane has argued against Race, noting that "even where, as sometimes happens, the explicit reference (to *kairos*) is not temporal, temporality provides a necessary context in almost all cases for the notion of the *kairos* to make sense":

If we think of timing as the mode of Milton's concept of obedience, waiting, hearing, and stepping may be understood as modes of that larger mode. The waiting is a state of readiness, ready to hear the will of God, and thus confirmed by that hearing.[7] Hearing the will of God then becomes stepping (acting) in accordance with the will of God. So the waiting is a devout waiting, a waiting to discern the divine will. The hearing is the discernment of divine will. The stepping is the action which follows the hearing of the divine will.

Poetically, these three—waiting, hearing, and stepping—are the motifs Milton uses to organize *Paradise Regained*. Further, they serve as central motifs throughout the corpus of Milton's work, from the "Nativity Ode" (1629) onward. They work in concert, revolvingly, and are as much about Milton's very Pindaric sense of his own poetic destiny, as they are motifs of and in the poems themselves.[8]

Waiting appears in Milton's early work, and he returns to the idea with striking presence in the later poems. Hearing and stepping are the animating principles of this waiting, without which waiting is for Milton misguided, or outright meaningless. As Northrop Frye wrote more than forty-five years ago in *The Return of Eden*:

> In the temptations of Adam and Samson the same theme recurs of an action not so much wrong in itself as wrong at that time, a hasty snatching of a chance before the real time has fulfilled itself. Christ is older than Milton was at twenty-three when he wrote his famous sonnet, and Satan is constantly urging him, from the first temptation on, to be his own providence, to release some of his own latent energies. *The discipline of waiting is not only more difficult and inglorious, but constantly subject to the danger of passing insensibly into procrastination.*[9]

Lane, *Method and Politics in Plato's* Statesman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 132. See also 132–135, in which Lane considers each of Race's "normative" examples.

7. The formulation corresponds to Luke 8.8: "He who has ears to hear, let him hear."

8. Pindar distinguished the true poet by his inborn sense of *kairos*, and *kairos* as moments of ripeness preceded by long periods of waiting. When Milton famously remarks in *An Apology for Smectymnuus* (1642), "that he who would not be frustrate of his hope to write well hereafter in laudable things ought himself to be a true poem" he has begun fully to imagine himself as the poet of perfect timing, both in his career, and in his poems (Yale 1:890).

9. Frye, 136 (emphasis added).

The sonnet Frye refers to is Sonnet 7 (1633). It is a sonnet of remarkable transformation. It begins with belatedness; it ends with readiness. It is almost as if Milton is inscribing his destiny, or the next long step of it. The sonnet itself also has a destiny. It begins, "How soon hath Time the subtle thief of youth." In the first eight lines or octave of the sonnet, this particular, personified version of Time corners the speaker (23-year-old Milton) with a blank appraisal: if you were really meant to be a great poet, you would have produced something great by now. But at the turn, or volta, to the sestet, Time personified is replaced by timing. In other words, Milton stops thinking about himself and his destiny in terms of time, and starts thinking about himself and his destiny in terms of timing, and the corner becomes a vista (at least for the moment) of an as yet undisclosed promise overseen by a rigorously attentive God. The destiny of the poem is also the poet's destiny, made clear: "Apparent delay becomes appropriate preparation. Time the thief becomes Time the guide."[10] And time as guide calls Milton to attention.

This kind of attention—steady, alert—Milton figured as angelic in his poetry written before Sonnet 7 ("Nativity Ode"), after it as chaste (*A Masque Presented at Ludlow Castle* 1645), and then as explicitly self-directed and potentially heroic in human terms (Sonnet 19). In the "Nativity Ode" (1629), Milton's first great poem, waiting is the work of angels, and is vigilant: "the spangled host keep watch in squadrons bright" (l.21). And the famous final line of the ode (l.244) distills the angelic waiting just quoted (line 21) to the will of God: "Bright-harnessed angels sit in order serviceable." The angels are harnessed by the brightness of God. Their enormous angelic energy is equipped for divine service. They are ready to serve, alert and waiting to be so called.

In *A Masque Presented at Ludlow Castle* (1634) Milton associates waiting with the virtue of chastity. The elder brother's confidence in the ability of his sister, the Lady, to spiritually withstand Comus's proto-Satanic heat, rests squarely on his estimation of purity and on his belief in his sister's purity.[11] For the Elder brother, "He that has light within his own clear breast

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10. William Kerrigan, John Rumrich, and Stephen M. Fallon, eds., *The Complete Poetry and Essential Prose of John Milton* (New York: Modern Library, 2007), 134.

11. I say Comus's "proto-Satanic" heat to emphasize A Masque's relationship to *Paradise Regained* as the prototype for it, from the characters of the Lady (the Son) and Comus (Satan),

/ May sit i'th' center, and enjoy bright day" (ll. 381-382).[12] The lines resonate with both line 20 and line 244 from the "Nativity Ode," particularly with its use of "bright," but also of "sit." Together the words suggest radiant poise, again, a steady alertness. This time, however, the alertness belongs not to the realm of angels, but to humankind (albeit humankind in the excessively virtuous figuration of the Lady).[13] And the use of "enjoy" and "bright" with "day" signals an important development in Milton's conceptual formulation of waiting. "Enjoy" implies a pleasing physically at-home calm, a receptivity to the day's offering ("and enjoy bright day"). For Milton the waiting is alert, but it is not anxious.

Finally, the troubling designation of virginity in the masque becomes less troublesome when it is aligned with Milton's conceptual priorities. If what makes the Lady a virgin is her chastity, what makes her chaste is her obedience (to the will of the divine). Her obedience is characterized by waiting, as much a physical disposition as it is a spiritual commitment. Her waiting, her ability to not-act, is a force which Comus feels and fears and cannot counter. Like Satan in *Paradise Regained* for whom he is the rehearsal, Comus in his temptation of the Lady meets with (the Lady's) imperviousness. What Comus wants is the Lady's consent. What he gets is her refusal, and then her disdain. Thus (again like Satan) he must amplify the rhetoric of his temptations. He must dislocate her from her virtue, from her ability in obedience to wait. So he presses on, mystified maybe, and ends his appeal with an almost coy, "Think what, and be advised, you are but young yet" (l. 755).

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to the shared themes of temptation and resistance.

12. The Elder brother is in these lines referring to his sister. The lines correspond with Luke 11.34: "The light of the body is the eye: therefore when thine eye is single, thy whole body also is full of light."

13. Milton's first sustained formulation of purity—the Lady in *Masque*—a condition critical to his understanding of obedience, is in fact a misreading of chastity. The Lady's chastity is a "defensive virginity" dependent in large measure for its efficacy upon a separation of spirit and matter that Milton opposed in his mature poetry and prose. See J.M. Evans, "*Lycidas*," in *The Cambridge Companion to Milton*, 35–50; Stephen Orgel, "The Case for Comus," *Representations* 81 (Winter, 2003), 31–45; Kimberly Reigle, "Defensive Virginity from Spenser to Milton," (PhD diss., University of North Carolina Greensboro, 2010 http://libres. uncg.edu/ir/listing.aspx?id=3698); and Debora Shuger, "'Gums of Glutinous Heat' and the Stream of Consciousness: The Theology of Milton's Maske," *Representations* 60 (Autumn, 1997), 1–21.

Young or not, the Lady is inside herself as bright-harnessed as an angel, thus a figure of force, contained. Just as Comus is a prototype for Satan in *Paradise Regained*, so the Lady is a prototype for the Son. And the debate (a mild word perhaps for such a moral showdown) between the Lady and Comus prefigures that between the Son and Satan in *Paradise Regained*. When the Lady replies to Comus with the full force of mockery at her disposal, she is prefiguring the Son's response to Satan in *Paradise Regained*.

Understood as such, the famously obscure "sage and serious doctrine of virginity" (l.787), which the Lady speaks to Comus, may now be understood to refer for its power not to mere virginity but to the rapt and focused condition of waiting, an embodied aptitude for devotion. The doctrine is serious because of its commitment to waiting; it is sage because of the visionary aspect of this waiting. The waiting is visionary because it is connected as if by an invisible, *unbreakable* thread—what the Lady calls the "sun-clad Power of Chastity" (l.782)—to what is not but what will be, to the fullness of time expressed as the sum of all the moments of right timing. It is connected by the activity at the center of waiting, that is, a rapt and quiet listening for, which becomes a hearing of.

If in Sonnet 7 Milton first admitted in a poem his fear of belatedness, of having missed his mark (a catastrophic possibility of disobedience), in Sonnet 19 (c. 1652), Milton returns to the theme, this time as a blind man in his early forties, a revolutionary, a regicide, a widower. The possibility is catastrophic because for Milton, missing his time would have meant failing to hear the will of God, thus failing to act in accordance with the will of God, thus being disobedient to the will of God.

Like Sonnet 7, Sonnet 19 begins in near despair, as Milton ponders again, with suspicion, his own belatedness: "When I consider how my light is spent, / Ere half my days, in this dark world and wide, / And that one talent which is death to hide, / Lodged with me useless" (ll.1-4).[14] What makes the openings of the two sonnets different is that the stakes of Sonnet 19 are so very much higher. The belatedness described in the first lines of Sonnet 7 is the belatedness of the young and mightily ambitious poet whose creative sap may be congealed, and whose dream of fame is vanishing

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14. In line 3 Milton is referring to the Parable of the Talents, Matthew 25.25–30.

("My hasting days fly on with full career, / But my late spring no bud or blossom showeth"). For a fleeting moment, the speaker of the poem (young Milton) admits the terrible possibility that he has overestimated his poetic gift, and its resultant destiny. The moment registers as genuinely existential, but it registers as such in the limited and entirely self-referential realm of a young poet: I thought I was destined for singular poetic greatness; am I wrong? Sonnet 19, on the other hand, begins where Sonnet 7 ends: "All is, if I have grace to use it so, / As ever in my great *Taskmaster's eye*" (emphasis added). The stakes now are nothing less than the judgment of God, bearing down on the poet who hid his God-given talent, rendering the talent useless by lodging it in the dimmest inner reaches of a blind and exasperated self (ll. 3–4).

Just like Sonnet 7, however, Sonnet 19 turns at the octave/sestet division. Once Milton acknowledges the prospect of a "murmur" (the Puritan concept of complaint against God) he calls himself to right attention by reminding himself that "God doth not need / Either man's work or his own gifts." Necessarily, the reminder begs the question (well, what does God require then?) that the following two lines address, "Who best / Bear his mild yoke, they serve him best" (ll.10–11).[15] The lines echo back to the "Nativity Ode" ("Bright-harnessed angels sit in order serviceable") and forward to the triumphantly patient conclusion of Sonnet 19, "They also serve who only stand and wait" (l.14). With this line Milton has completed the transfer of waiting, from the angelic realm, through the excessively idealized human realm, to the merely human realm. If in "Nativity Ode" waiting is the disposition of angels, in Sonnet 19 it has become the disposition of men and women.

However, the line ("They also serve who only stand and wait") begs a critical question: how is it that waiting serves? We know "they" serve because serve comes first in the sentence, unadorned to describe what "they" do. And we learn at the conclusion of the sentence that their service is performed by "waiting." To know how they serve then depends upon the quality of the waiting, of what that waiting is comprised.

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15. Cf. Matthew 11.29–30: "Take my yoke upon you, and learn of me; for I am meek and lowly in heart: and ye shall find rest unto your souls. For my yoke is easy, and my burden is light."

The answer to this question brings us to the second key motif in Milton's conception of obedience: hearing. It is listening that promotes waiting to the rank of service. Then it is hearing that makes of waiting, service. One serves by waiting to hear what is, in terms of service, to be heard: the will of God. The service is rendered legitimate, however, not by the hearing (the intended *outcome*) of the waiting, but by the quality of the waiting itself.[16] The quality of the waiting is comprised of a necessary condition and then, an intentional agency. The condition of the waiting must be one of embodied ease (as opposed to dis-ease). The agency of the waiting is a rapt listening, a vigil illustrative of the Great Commandment, as given in Matthew: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and all thy mind." In *Paradise Regained*, the Son cites the commandment to illuminate the force and reason of his waiting, and thus to refute Satan's temptation to rush:

> But I endure the time, till which expired,
> Thou hast permission on me. It is written
> The first of all commandments, Thou shalt worship
> The Lord thy God, and only him shalt serve.'
> (PR 4.174–177)

Whenever Milton uses the motif of waiting, hearing is always, if sometimes silently, being used as well. In those cases, in which waiting is used without explicit reference to hearing, hearing is an implied motif. In those cases in which hearing is written, it is done so in reference to waiting. Further, hearing as a motif is given both by the word itself ("hearing") and by its associative emblem, "ear(s)."

In the "Nativity Ode" Milton asks prayerfully the "crystal spheres" to "once bless our human ears" (ll.125-126). Crystal spheres refers to the music of the spheres, the angelic harmony usually beyond the realm of human hearing.[17] So the disposition of the hearing is angelic in the Ode, just as the

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16. Cf. Acts 1.7: "And he [Christ] said unto them, it is not for you to know the times or the seasons, which the Father hath put in his own power."

17. As the editors of the Modern Library Milton point out, "Each of the planetary spheres was believed to produce a unique note of the overall 'music of the spheres' normally inaudible on the fallen Earth. Here Milton imagines that vast music joining in the higher harmony of the *angelic symphony*" (MLM 24, n. 125).

disposition of waiting was angelic. Further, the object of the hearing is itself angelic, belongs to and comes from that higher realm.

Like waiting, hearing oriented in this fashion—as a kind of prayerful longing to hear divine harmony, figured as external and far—appears throughout and is developed in Milton's early poems: as for example, in "The Passion" (ll.1–2), *Arcades* (ll.62–64), "At a Solemn Music" (ll.17–24) and "Upon the Circumcision" (ll.1–3).[18] The speaker in all of these poems (versions of Milton as a young man) waits to hear the music of the spheres, and understands that "melodious noise" as external, far. The point bears repeating because it indicates that hearing, as waiting before it, is first formulated by Milton as an angelic disposition (a profound otherness, second only to the otherness of God). The speaker in these poems does not pray so much to be angelic, so to hear the harmonious sphere, as to be either visited by the spheres as by an angel, or momentarily possessed by the angelic spirit capable of hearing the harmonious sphere.

Having transferred his motif of waiting from the angelic to the human, as discussed above, Milton now does the same with hearing, beginning with the early prose tracts, the workshops for Milton's mature concept of obedience. The transfer made is an inward turn, resonant with Milton's prioritization of conscience, in terms of obedience. In *The Reason of Church Government Urged Against Prelaty* (1642), Milton addresses his fundamental reason for writing the tract, more generally for entering the dispute over prelacy (one might say, for stepping in):

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18. "Erewhile of music, and ethereal mirth, / Wherewith the stage of air and earth did ring" ("The Passion" ll.1-2); "then listen I / To the celestial sirens' harmony, / That sit upon the nine enfolded spheres" (*Arcades* ll.62-64); "That we on earth with undiscording voice / May rightly answer that melodious noise; / As once we did, till disproportioned sin / Jarred against nature's chime, and with harsh din / Broke the fair music that all creatures made / To their Great Lord, whose love their motion swayed / In perfect diapason, whilst the stood / In first obedience" ("At a Solemn Music" ll.17–24); "Ye flaming Powers, and winged warriors bright, / That erst with music, and triumphant song / First heard by happy watchful shepherds' ear" ("Upon the Circumcision" ll.1–3).

> But this I foresee, that should the Church be brought under heavy oppression, and God have given me ability the while to reason against that man that should be the author of so foul a deed, or should she by blessing from above on the industry and courage of faithfull men change this her distracted estate into better daies without the least furtherance or contribution of those few talents which God at that present had lent me, *I foresee what stories I should heare within my selfe.*[19] (Yale 1:804)

In other words, in his disposition of bright attention—serving by waiting—Milton heard (the version is obviously Milton's, thus strategic and maybe self-valorizing). What he heard as recounted in *Reason of Church Government*, is not however the clarion absolute of divine will, but some faint sound of it powered by visionary fear ("I foresee") of disobedience, as threatening a potential fate for burying talent, as it is in Sonnet 19. So Milton's timing—from waiting, to hearing, to stepping (in this case, stepping into the political and ecclesiological disputes of his age)—in part results from his now elusively but nonetheless *persuasive* fear of its absence, of missed timing. By extension, one might suggest that Milton's visionary obedience develops out of his vision of disobedience.[20]

It is important to note that hearing, as a motif developed by Milton, transpires in worlds of noise, from the clamour of *Masque* to the discordancy of England on the verge of civil war, and the momentous events following it—the "barbarous dissonance" of Restoration culture Milton implicitly invokes in the invocation to Book 7 of *Paradise Lost* (7.32). That is, the context for hearing (as motif of Milton's concept of timing) is noise, the sheer din within which one must discern the beckoning of divine will. And since the motif of hearing becomes figured inwardly by Milton, the context of noise must also be figured inwardly. Otherwise, the hearing would be without its justifying context. This work—the internal realization of hearing as productive aspect of timing, and the interiorizing of noise as its necessary context—is the work of the Son in *Paradise Regained*. His body becomes the repository of all the world's noise, and the bright ease which is his obedient

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19. Milton's mention of "talents" hearkens back to his meditation on that subject in Sonnet 19.
20. The point then would seem to suggest that *Paradise Lost* (the epic of disobedience) necessarily came before *Paradise Regained* (the brief epic of obedience).

response to that noise. To risk the obvious: He embodies fully both divine and human. Hearing corresponds to his divine nature; noise to his human nature. The Son's timing develops out of his dual condition, or rather out of the condition (waiting), the act (hearing), and the context (noise). Moreover, it is in the Son's experience of his dual condition that his timing begins.[21]

The Pinnacle

Milton's sense of *kairos* redacts the concept as it is used and developed, most especially by Pindar, by Plato, and then by Paul. The intended valences of the concept are those of the poetic (Pindar), the political (Plato), and the Christian (Paul). For Milton at least, the last designation of the concept (Christian) necessarily includes the first two (poetic and political). Pindar's "in-born" poet corresponds thematically to the idea of a begotten divinity. Plato's *Statesman*—his ideal ruler—could serve as a description of Christ on earth. Both correspond prototypically to Milton's characterization of the Son, and by extension, to his characterization of Christianity in its early and formative experience of the temptation. Finally, the poetic, political, and therefore Christian valences of *kairos* point to the three forces which shaped Milton, and which he in turn shaped. As we've seen, the motifs by which Milton represents *kairos* in his work are waiting, hearing, and stepping. The first two—waiting, hearing—correspond to the sense of due measure. They are the alert and elegant poise out of which *kairos* comes. However, neither is *legible*: Neither waiting nor hearing can be externally adjudicated as real. For example, the seemingly apt waiting Milton proclaims in Sonnet 19 either is or is not authentic *kairos*.[22] Only God knows (for Milton God knows). More to the point, since waiting is an internal disposition, it cannot be publicly verified in rational and/or discursive terms. Any description of it would be just that, a description mystical or poetical, and perhaps depending for its authenticity as much upon the disposition of the reader as the force of the mystical or poetical vision.

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21. Cf. *Paradise Regained* 1.196–199.
22. "They also serve who only stand and wait" (Sonnet 19 l.14).

With stepping—the third of Milton's motifs of timing—*kairos* becomes potentially legible. It must be understood as *potential* because in the very moment of stepping the divine (in *Paradise Regained*, the Son) and the human (Adam and Eve, thereafter, Samson) experience of *kairos* differentiate precisely along the threshold that separates them. For the Son, his stepping is eternally and verifiably guaranteed by the Father, even though he makes the step as human. And his stepping produces the demonstrable effect of Satan's falling—he *sees* it happen.

This kind of verification is not available to humankind. Ideally, obedience to the will of God may produce stepping that is of right timing. But the verification of it, the rightness of the stepping will not be legible in discursive terms. When the Son steps, obedience is perfected by this perfect moment of timing. When humankind steps, obedience to the will of the divine may be fulfilled, or it may be transgressed. At the end of *Paradise Regained*, however, the reader may speak with absolute assurance of the Son's stepping; and from the Son's stepping, may retroactively read the Son's waiting and hearing as authentic in terms of *kairos*. In *Samson Agonistes*, waiting and hearing cannot be retroactively made legible and verified from the position of a perfect step. This is the case because Samson's "stepping"—introduced in the opening line as "a little onward lend thy guiding hand," and completed by Samson's destruction of the temple—may or may not be authentic in terms of *kairos*. If it is, then Samson is being obedient to the will of God. If it is not, he is at the very least being delusional, and is possibly being disobedient to the will of God. For Milton, Samson's condition is the condition for all humankind, in terms of obedience and act. The sheer existential pressure Milton puts on "stepping" illustrates the importance of timing, and the magnitude of the situation of humankind in either obedient or disobedient relation to the divine. In Milton's view (as for any Christian) what makes the pressure bearable, if not the yoke mild, is the example of the Son, most especially the example of the Son against Satan.

Not coincidentally, stepping is the last of Milton's motifs of timing to develop. Further it does not appear in his writing to any noteworthy effect until Milton considers the fall; that is, until he comes to write *Paradise Lost*. I say not coincidentally, because stepping represents that part of Miltonic timing that most illuminates postlapsarian humankind. *Paradise Lost* ends with Adam and Eve, leaving Eden, "hand in hand, with wand'ring steps and slow" (12.648-649). Their steps begin as wandering, for wandering is

a condition of their exile. They cannot wait for the spirit to lead them, but must proceed. This condition of wandering sums up the very pain of their exile. To borrow from Samuel Beckett, they cannot go on (having no idea how to proceed), they must go on. In *Samson Agonistes*, the first half of the formulation (cannot go on) has been dropped. Samson goes on: "A little onward lend thy guiding hand / To these dark steps, a little further on" (*SA* 1–2). Apparently he is being led. By whom? One can't precisely say. If he is talking to himself, he is either being led by himself, or perhaps by the spirit of God. If he is not talking to himself, it may be the Chorus leading him. The point: Samson may be in a condition of right proceeding. But of course, this condition is a condition of unknowing, his blindness its emblem.

Between Adam and Eve, and Samson, stands the Son, in *Paradise Regained*. When we first encounter him, we find him "Musing and much revolving in his breast, / How best the mighty work he might begin" (1.185–186). The mighty work in question is the salvation of humankind. The Son's musing on how to begin this project is a waiting, in terms of *kairos*. He will wait—he will embody waiting—until he hears the prompting of the Father. He must begin in perfect accord with the will of the Father. To put it simply, he must get the timing of this beginning right (he must not rush it, or otherwise be distracted from hearing it when it comes). He must get the first step right because the first step is the designating precedent for all the steps in his experience of the temptation to come. If the first step is *kairos* his destiny aligns with resistance, rather than with temptation. Thus, bright, he waits. Then "One day forth [he] walked alone, the Spirit leading" (1.189).

Thereafter the Son's thinking is step-like, and his steps are contemplative. The synchronization of step and thought, of the body and the word, indicates the incarnate nature of Christ: "Thought following thought, and step by step led on, / He entered now the bordering desert wild" (1.192–193). Further, the synchronization of step and thought indicates that for the Son, waiting, hearing and stepping are also now completely synchronized, revolving harmoniously. The hearing and the stepping happen at once. As he is hearing the will of the divine, he is stepping in accord with the will of the divine. And this stepping is also simultaneously a waiting for the will of the divine, in the greater terms of refuting Satan.

Once the Son has made his initial step into the wilderness, his temptation begins. And in this temptation he will, again and again, be tempted not to

wait, hear, step, but to rush, proprietarily, to take the world.[23] Satan tempts the Son. In response, the Son waits (to Satan it appears as a doing nothing). In response to the Son's waiting, to his seeming inaction, Satan progressively intensifies his temptations, from a banquet feast to worldly ambition. The amplification of his temptations reveals Satan's misapprehension. For to the Son, all the temptations are one temptation: the temptation to transgress the will of God, to be disobedient, in terms of *kairos*, to either rush or drag, either way to be out of step with the timing of the will of God. Thus, the Son waits, saying, "All things are best fulfilled in their due time, / And time there is for all things, truth hath said" (3.182–183). "Due time" Satan does not understand. Thus, he does not understand fulfillment as the expression of "due time," and therefore as a sign of truth, that which is and accords with the will of God, of *logos* ("truth hath said").[24]

In response, Satan takes "the Son of God up to a mountain high" (3.252). The only strategy Satan has at his disposal is apparently greater and greater temptation. He just needs to tempt with more, is his thinking. Again, however, his thinking is without the critical understanding that the Son's obedience to God, his very being, depends on and is defined by timing. In other words, the temptations as distinct offering are not the point with regard to the Son's ability to resist them. His timing is the point, and is that which Satan misses. They are on the mountaintop looking down. To the Son, Satan says,

> All this fair sight; thy kingdom though foretold
> By prophet or by angel, unless thou
> Endeavor, as thy father David did,
> Thou never shalt obtain; prediction still
> In all things, and all men, supposes means;
> Without means used, what it predicts revokes.
> (3.351-356)

From one perspective, Satan's rhetoric is strong here, particularly in its allusion to David, and sophisticated in its suggestion that if the Son does not *take* the throne by striving, he will forfeit his destiny as the Son: If he

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23. As Zwicky notes, "Satan's constant effort is to get Christ to act before his time or *kairos*, and thus pervert God's plan": Zwicky, 276.
24. Cf. Ecclesiastes 3.

doesn't get to it, he'll find himself with nothing. But from the perspective of the Son's obedience to the will of the divine—functionally, his commitment to *kairos*—Satan's rhetoric here, as everywhere in the poem, distills to babble. It is noise, all of it, breaking against the will of God manifesting in the Son. The Son replies to Satan "My time I told thee (And that time for thee / Were better farthest off) is not yet come" (3.396–397). Satan amplifies his temptation again, this time offering up the Roman Empire. Again, the Son refuses. Satan bellows:

> Since neither wealth, nor honor, arms nor arts,
> Kingdom nor empire pleases thee, nor aught
> By me proposed in life contemplative,
> Or active, tended on by glory, or fame,
> What dost thou in this world? The wilderness
> For thee is fittest place, I found thee there,
> And thither will return thee.
> (4.368–374)

The critical moment of this passage is at line 372: "What dost thou in the world?" What the Son does is embody the will of God. How he does it is by waiting to hear, neither of which are legible to Satan, neither of which can even appear as activities of any demonstrable worth in and to the "world" (in quotation marks here because Milton intends it to be understood as Satan's term). The Son is ruled by God. The means of Satan's misrule is the world. For Milton, the distance between them is the distance between good and evil, the pinnacle and the pit of hell. The Son's refusal of Empire exasperates Satan. "What dost thou in the world?" signals that exasperation.

So, what he cannot achieve by guile, Satan will approximate by force. Once he has the Son back in the wilderness, and the Son is alone, hungry, tired, and then asleep, a figure of human vulnerability, Satan resorts to all the terror at his disposal:

for at his head
The tempter watched, and soon with ugly dreams
Disturbed his sleep; and either tropic now
'Gan thunder, and both ends of heav'n, the clouds
From many a horrid rift abortive poured
Fierce rain with lightning mixed, water with fire
In ruin reconciled: nor slept the winds
Within their stony caves, but rush'd abroad
From the four hinges of the world, and fell.
(PR 4.407–415)

But the Son sleeps on. His sleeping is the purest elegance of waiting. It refutes Satan's terror. Morning merely comes.

Out of devices, out of temptations, Satan brings the Son to the Holy City, to the pinnacle, and "added thus in scorn: / 'There stand, if thou wilt stand'" (4.550–551). The Son does, in the precise and absolute fullness of time. For Milton as for any Christian, the pinnacle is the maximum moment and place of dialectical compression. The Son stands on the pinnacle simultaneously. He makes (is made) as Christ; he unmakes (is unmade) as merely human. He becomes the "True image of the Father whether throned / In the bosom of bliss, and light of light / Conceiving, or remote from Heav'n, enshrined / in fleshly tabernacle, and human form" (*PR* 4.596-99).

This moment of timing—of *kairos*—is the embodied perfection of the Son's obedience. From the broader perspective of Milton's corpus, it may also be seen as the moment in which Milton reconciles his dual heritage (something like Paul before him), Classical and Christian, by illuminating *kairos* (Classical) as the essential and necessary mode of obedience (Christian). In other words, Milton's concept of obedience is made efficacious by *kairos* and its aura of the heroic—of the classical age of heroes, gods, and philosophers, of both the pitiable vulnerability of human beings, and also, of their greatness. The traditions resolve in the body of the Son. And so while it is true that the Son rejects Classical learning, he rejects Classical learning presented as a *temptation*, and further, it is by dint of a Classical idea—*kairos*—that the Son resists the temptation, and stands.

Personhood, Practice, and Transformation

Ravi Ravindra, *Dalhousie University, Canada*

Editorial note: The 2012 McGill Centre for Research on Religion Graduate Students' Conference took place on October 19th-20th at McGill University in Montreal. Dr. Ravi Ravindra kindly agreed to be the keynote speaker for the conference, and we are including his opening address in this volume for the benefit of our readers.

Dr. Ravindra's academic career combines a deep, long-standing interest in both natural science and the humanities. Dr. Ravindra is Professor Emeritus at Dalhousie University in Halifax where he served for many years as a Professor in the departments of Comparative Religion, Philosophy, and Physics. Dr. Ravindra obtained a M. Tech. from the Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur, and an M.S. and Ph.D. in Physics from the University of Toronto, where he also completed an M.A. in Philosophy. Dr. Ravindra has held post-doctoral fellowships in Physics at the University of Toronto, in History and Philosophy of Science at Princeton, and in Religion at Columbia University.

Dr. Ravindra has been a member of the Institute of Advanced Study in Princeton, as well as a Fellow of the Indian Institute of Advanced Study in Shimla. He was also a member of the Board of Judges for the Templeton Prize for Progress in Religion, and is the founding director of the Threshold Award for Integrative Knowledge. Dr. Ravindra is currently a Fellow of the Temenos Academy in England.

Throughout his academic career Dr. Ravindra has had a deep interest in the mystical teachings of the Indian and Christian classical traditions. He is the author of several books on religion, science, mysticism, and spirituality. Dr. Ravindra's best known work is The Yoga of the Christ *(published now in the USA as* The Gospel of John in the Light of Indian Mysticism*), and in its annual meeting in 2009, the Catholic Theologians' Association of America had a special session dedicated to a discussion of this work. His latest book,* The Wisdom of Patañjali's Yoga Sutras, *offers a new translation and commentary on Patañjali's* Yoga Sutras.

The theme of personhood, practice, and transformation is central to the great traditions. Let me begin with a quote from the Rig Veda, the oldest text in any Indo-European language and the seminal text in the Hindu tradition.

> na vijānāmi yadivedamasmi niṇyaḥ saṁnaddho manasā carāmi.

> I know not whether I am the same as this cosmos: a mystery am I, yet burdened by mind I wander. (Rig Veda 1.164.37)

There are two great mysteries: *idam* and *aham*, this all (cosmos) and myself. What indeed is the person in this vast cosmos?

The same question is raised in Psalm 8.

> When I consider thy heavens, the work of thy fingers
> The moon and the stars which thou hast ordained;
> What is man, that thou art mindful of him?

The only thing searchers of Truth need is to take themselves seriously. Then one wonders, "Who am I?" or "What am I?" The Sanskrit equivalent, "*koham*?," is regarded as the fundamental existential question in the whole of the Indian tradition. And the associated question naturally arises: "Why am I here?" All of myself together is the instrument of knowing anything about the Truth. If I do not know the instrument, its possibilities and its limitations, I cannot be clear about the sort of knowledge this instrument can have.

If I take myself seriously, I realize right away that before I am a student or a professor or a scientist or an artist, I am a human being in a whole network of relationships—with the air, with other creatures, with other human beings, with the cosmos. I am a child, a parent, a lover, a friend, someone who breathes the air that is also breathed by other creatures, and needs the light produced by the sun and the earth to stand on. I cannot possibly exist without all these relationships. A few minutes of thought will show that I am a very minute part of an intricately interdependent net of relationships in this cosmos. I am not an independent being. The Buddhist idea of co-dependent origination is simply common sense.

It is worth pondering: "Is the body the person?" "Where do you end and where does the air begin?" "Where do you end and I begin?" To see the interconnectedness of all there is has a large effect on our attitude to nature and to the others. A very common idea is that *prāna* is in me and I am in *prāna*—as long as we realize that *prāna* is not simply the ordinary breath but that it is a whole spectrum of subtle energies. This is repeatedly emphasized in the Indian traditions, as also in China as *qi*. *Prāna* is the connecting link between the level of the Earth and of Heaven. As is said in the Torah, God made man from clay, from the earth, and breathed His own breath into him. It is no wonder that so many meditational practices focus on paying attention to breath. In all ancient languages the words for "breath" and "spirit" are intimately connected.

One of the ideas common to all the great traditions is that the death of the body is not the death of the person. There is something non-biological and non-physical that is necessary to being a person. In fact, the spiritual aspect, which is subtler than the body and the mind, is considered to be the most essential part of the person.

Every tradition has insisted that there are many levels of reality—corresponding to different levels of consciousness—from the Highest Spirit to the dead matter. These levels are outside us as well as inside us. And there is a correspondence between the interior and exterior levels. In the spirit of St. Paul, with a slight paraphrase, we can say that "the eyes of the flesh see the things of the flesh; the eyes of the spirit see the things of the spirit." To develop the eyes of the spirit is the project of spiritual disciplines. It is useful to recall that there are very few remarks of Christ that can be found in all the four canonical gospels; among those few statements is "You have eyes but you do not see; you have ears but you do not hear." Furthermore, this remark can be found in Prophet Isaiah as well as in a letter of St. Paul. It is clearly important for us to take it seriously and wonder how the eyes of the spirit can be opened. This naturally brings us to considerations of practice and transformation.

All great teachers have said that human beings do not live the way they should, and the way they could. In a Christian context we would find suggestions that in general human beings live in sin, but that they could live in the grace of God; in a Buddhist context the suggestion is that we live as if asleep, but we could wake up. This is what the Buddha did. In fact the very word "buddha" means "one who is awake." Similarly, in other

traditions there are ways of indicating the gap between the way we live and the way we could. To live rightly needs education, *teriqua*, transformation; this in turn needs a discipline, a spiritual path, a yoga. Science is interested in discovering the way it is; spiritual traditions can hardly ignore the way it is, but they are more interested in assisting an aspirant to discover the way it could be. This requires a radical transformation of a person's entire being—mind, body, and heart.

Why is transformation needed? When we look at ourselves without self-pity and self-justification, we find ourselves conflicted, doing things that we do not want to do, and saying what we do not want to say. "I do not even acknowledge my own actions as mine, for what I do is not what I want to do, but what I detest," says St. Paul. "The good which I want to do, I fail to do; but what I do is the wrong which is against my will" (Romans 7:15–20). Similarly, Arjuna asks in the Bhagavad Gita (3:36), "Krishna, what is it that makes a man do evil, even against his own will; under compulsion, as it were?" Why do we do wrong, even against our own better judgment? Simply because we are self-centered and self-occupied. This is what *tanha* means in the famous Noble Truth of the Buddha, which speaks of *tanha* as the cause of *dukkha* (suffering). Being full of ourselves, we don't let Truth or God or Reality guide or run our life. There is a simple Hasidic saying, "There is no room in him for God who is full of himself."

If we become aware of the strong forces that keep us away from the Real, a deep-seated part in us, a particle of Divinity, wishes to be free of these constricting forces. Within each human being there is an element oriented to the Truth, to God, or to Brahman. As St. Augustine said, "Our soul cannot be at rest until it is stayed in God." Whatever other characteristics soul may have, it cannot not be drawn to the Source, just as a magnetic compass cannot not point to the magnetic north. However, if there are other magnets near the compass, or there are magnetic storms, the compass is unable to point to the true north. This why great spiritual texts such as the *Yoga Sutras* attributed to Patañjali recommend the practice of *vairagya* (detachment, non-attachment) to everything visible or known. Or to use the felicitous expression in *The Cloud of Unknowing*, all things must be placed below the *cloud of forgetting* so that our soul can keep returning to its inherent love for God who is on the other side of the *cloud of unknowing*.

In addition to the force of repulsion from the unbecoming or non-harmonious situation in oneself as well as in the world, there is a force of attraction resulting from a vision of something sublime, or an experience of true love, beauty, or harmony. "The higher *vairagya* arises from a vision of the Transcendent Being (*Purusha*) and leads to the cessation of craving for the things of the world" (*Yoga Sutras* 1.16). Or we begin to sense the truth of the universal testimony of all the sages in the history of humanity that the entire space is permeated with subtle and conscious energies—variously called the Holy Spirit, Allah, Brahman, the Buddha Mind, or simply the One or That—and we wish to be in touch with that all-pervading Reality. We can be more and more convinced that transformation is needed in order to realize what the sages have attested from their experience as the Truth. Practice is needed in order to prepare one's whole being—body, mind, and heart—so that one can be in contact with the Holy Spirit.

We cannot create this subtle Reality, but we can become receptive to it. This demands a lot of preparation and sacrificing of what one is attached to and ultimately of me-me-me. Prophet Isaiah speaks of hearing the voice of the Lord asking, "Whom shall I send? Who will go for me?" Only after his lips had been cleansed by a burning coal he could say, "Here am I. Send me" (Isaiah 6.6–8).

It is important to note that all spiritual disciplines aim at freedom not *for* myself but *from* myself. Christ said, "Everyone that exalteth himself shall be abased; and he that humbleth himself shall be exalted" (Luke 18:10–14). "If anyone would come after me, let him deny himself and take up his cross and follow me. For whoever would save his life will lose it, but whoever loses his life for my sake will find it. For what will it profit a man if he gains the whole world and forfeits his soul? Or what shall a man give in return for his soul?" (Matthew 16:24–26).

This freedom from oneself is sometimes described in stronger terms of dying to oneself. "I die daily," said St. Paul (1 Corinthians 15.31); and there is a remarkable reminder from the Sufi tradition: "If you die before you die, you will not die when you die."

There are many obstacles (*kleshas*) to transformation. The most important one being ignorance (*avidyā*), primarily of our true nature and of our relationship with the cosmos. It is because of this deep-seated ignorance that we take the transient parts of ourselves—such as the body and the mind—for what is said by all the sages to be eternal, namely, the spirit. If

we begin to see more and more subtly, we begin to realize that human beings are the organs of perception of the cosmos. As is remembered in the Islamic tradition, "Allah said, 'I was a hidden treasure and wished to be known. Therefore, I created man.'"

Human beings have a special calling. They can be not only organs of perception in the cosmos but also instruments of right action. With more and more spiritual development, they can invoke the help of higher levels within themselves as well as outside—the *devas*, angels, God—and fulfill their proper role, remembering that without God it cannot be done; without human beings it will not be done.

It is important for us not to fix an anthropomorphic image of God, as is sometimes necessitated for the purposes of transmission of culture and of visual arts—as we can see in the painting of Michelangelo in the Sistine Chapel, ironically in the citadel of a tradition committed to struggle against making graven images of God. It is, of course, easier to be against other peoples' images than our own. This is why a continual turning to an impartial self-knowledge is the *sine qua non* of any serious spiritual discipline. As Christ said, "The Kingdom is inside you, and it is outside you. When you come to know yourselves, then you will be known, and you will realize that it is you who are the children of the living Father. But if you will not know yourselves, you live in poverty, and you are the poverty" (Gospel of Thomas II, 2:3).

Theologia Germanica reminds us: "As God is simple goodness, inner knowledge and light, he is at the same time also our will, love, righteousness, and truth, the innermost of all virtues." The realization of this truth, vouchsafed to the most insightful sages in all lands and cultures needs to be continually regained, lived, and celebrated.

Ultimately we return again and again to the Great Mystery "What am I?," "*Koham*?" Unlike scientific mysteries, real spiritual mysteries cannot be solved even in principle, but by a steady practice of contemplation the mind and the heart can soar to another level of insight and love where the mystery is dissolved. Then one does not deny it, or reject it, and is not frightened by it. One celebrates the Mystery in song or dance or poetry or philosophy or physics. However, the person has been transformed by the mystery, somewhat freed from oneself, and born of the Spirit.

Only thirteen days before his death, the celebrated poet Rabindranath Tagore wrote a short poem in Bengali, his native language, which in an English translation would read:

> In the beginning of my life,
> With the first rays of the rising sun,
> I asked, 'Who am I?'
> Now at the end of my life,
> With the last rays of the setting sun,
> I ask, 'Who am I?'

Epistemological Agreement Between Eastern and Western Christian Personalisms

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The theological traditions of both the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox Churches affirm a special dignity for divine and human persons. The dignity of the person is not a particularly new development in Christian theology, but its articulation over the last century or so has kept pace with contemporary developments in the philosophical conversation. In both Catholic and Orthodox theology, Christian personalism has been defended through the idiom of phenomenology. Despite this similarity between the Catholic and Orthodox traditions, certain Orthodox theologians have used personalism as a particularly vehement rhetorical tool with which they have castigated the Western philosophical tradition for its inherent objectivization of the person.[1] This paper cannot cover the historical contexts in which this polemical personalism has developed, but will rather analyze the epistemological contributions of one significant thinker from each camp: Max Scheler (Germany, 1874–1928), and Christos Yannaras (Greece, 1935–). Through this analysis I hope to contribute toward a greater mutual awareness between the Christian personalisms of the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox traditions by showing significant agreement in their epistemological foundations.

Scheler and Yannaras were not contemporaries. Scheler was influential in the development of both phenomenology and personalism in the West at the beginning of the twentieth century. He influenced Martin Heidegger, Edith Stein, Nikolai Berdyaev, and many others, not least of whom Pope John

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1. This is Berdyaev's term, though he seems the least inimical to the "West." Georges Florovsky, Vladimir Lossky, John Romanides, John Zizioulas, and Christos Yannaras are all examples, to varying degrees, of an anti-Western personalist accusation from an Eastern Orthodox perspective.

Paul II.[2] While Scheler eventually left the Catholic Church, his influence on Catholic personalism should not be underestimated.[3] Yannaras has flourished in the second half of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first. He has mounted perhaps the most virulent charges against Western objectivization while articulating the clearest philosophical expression of Eastern Orthodox personalism. He was certainly influenced by Husserl and Heidegger, but does not to my knowledge mention either Scheler or the personalist writings of John Paul II. This is most intriguing as Yannaras was educated in Scheler's homeland, Germany, and his career overlapped significantly with the late Pope. In the absence of any direct address between these two personalist thinkers, the similarity of their epistemological methods and personalist conclusions will be investigated here.

In spite of Yannaras's polemic against Western objectivization, I will show strong parallels between these two authors on three important epistemological points. First, they both reject what they call "rationalism." Second, they both affirm a phenomenological interpretation of empiricism. And finally, they both argue for what I will describe as an apophatic knowing of persons: not as objects, but through personal actions and energies.

1. The Rejection of Rationalism
1.1 Scheler

In his book *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values*,[4] Scheler attempted to surpass Kant's formal ethics and assert the possibility of a non-formal ethical personalism. Scheler's primary concern with Kant's

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2. Manfred Frings, *The Mind of Max Scheler* (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1997), 10, 16.

3. For Karol Wojtyła's relationship with Scheler's thought see among others: John H. Nota S. J., "Max Scheler and Karol Wojtyła," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 60 (1986): 135–147; Andrew N. Woznicki, "Revised Thomism: Existential Personalism Viewed from Phenomenological Perspectives," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 60 (1986): 38–49; Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, "The Origins of the Philosophy of John Paul the Second," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 53 (1979): 16–27; and Stephen A. Dinan, "The Phenomenological Anthropology of Karol Wojtyla," *The New Scholasticism* 55 (1981): 317–330.

4. Max Scheler, *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values*: *A New Attempt toward the Foundation of and Ethical Personalism*, trans. Manfred Frings and Roger Funk (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973).

formal ethics was what he saw as the inherent depersonalization contained in Kant's rationalist assumptions. In order to establish what he called "the foundation of an ethical personalism," Scheler first critiqued Kant's rationalist epistemology to provide an alternate way of knowing that would make room for a non-objectified person as a valid content of knowledge. Scheler then made use of this phenomenological method to argue for the true being of the person and the consequent need for a non-formal ethics appropriate for personal dignity.

In his helpful book entitled *Scheler's Ethical Personalism*, Peter Spader explains the significance of Scheler's critique of Kant's epistemology.[5] The argument goes as follows: A rationalist epistemology like Kant's severs a priori rational essences from a posteriori sense data and requires the transcendental structures of the mind to unite the two in synthetic knowledge. Such an epistemology ultimately reduces reality to the set of "whats" corresponding to those a priori essences. The significance of this for many personalists, especially Scheler, is that if the person is real, it must be a particular "what," defined by its correlation to certain rational essences. Furthermore, a personal "what" of this sort could never be different from any other impersonal "what." Scheler notes the impossibility of such a distinction in Kant's system, against Kant's supposed defense of the dignity of the person. "But, logically, the homo noumenon is nothing but the concept of the unknowable constant 'thing in itself' applied to man. The same unknowable constant also pertains…to every plant and every rock. How could this constant render man a dignity different from that of a rock?"[6] In other words, any real person is essentially the rational concept "person" so that all persons are conceptually equivalent with each other.

Scheler rejected this "whatness" of personhood in the form of the Kantian "ego," which is still an "object among objects."[7] In order to do this, Scheler changed Kant's "direction of fit" regarding the identity of objects. Scheler paraphrased Kant as having argued, "Identity is not (as it is for us [Scheler]) an essential characteristic of the object…. Hence, identity is

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5. Peter Spader, *Scheler's Ethical Personalism: Its Logic, Development, and Promise* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002). Throughout this paper, I am indebted to the insights of Peter Spader.

6. Scheler, *Formalism,* 373.

7. Ibid., 375.

originally in the ego, and it is from the ego that the identity of an object is borrowed."[8] Scheler rejected this claim that the identity of objects is borrowed from the identity of the ego. Instead, he argues that the ego is itself constituted as an object through its being given as the content of the act of inner perception.[9] Scheler argued that Kant's position is therefore self-contradictory. The ego's identity, like all object-identities, is derived from an act of perception. He states, "Its identity exists only insofar as identity is an essential characteristic of the object."[10] Thus the direction of fit must move rather from object to ego. If this is the case, the ego could never be elevated above objects as their unifier. "On the other hand, we can see that Kant's definition contains a contradiction. For if the object is nothing but something identifiable, the 'ego'—whose own identity is supposedly the very condition of the object—must then be an object, though the ego as a 'condition of an object' cannot be an object."[11] Here, Scheler has dismissed the Kantian ego as sufficient for personhood since the ego itself remains an object.

Kant's ethics posed an equal problem for Scheler's concern for dignity. As he argued, the rationality of the Categorical Imperative's formalism can be no safeguard for personal dignity, as neither freedom nor uniqueness are indicated by rationality itself. Rather, Kant's acceptance of the Aristotelian definition of man as a rational animal precisely precludes any free self-expression from the person by essentially reducing the person to "a logical subject of rational acts," which by their very essence are universally interchangeable. Scheler accuses Kant's formal ethics of being as depersonalizing as an ethics of goods and purposes "by virtue of its subordination of the person to an impersonal nomos under whose domination he can become a person only through obedience."[12] Formal ethics proceeds from an erroneous view of persons: "its implicit material assumption that

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8. Ibid., 374.
9. "For 'the ego' itself is still an object…." Ibid. "Nevertheless every ego is given in the form of only one kind of perception, namely, the act-form of inner perception and the form of the manifold corresponding to it by essential law…. The ego itself is, rather, only an object among objects." Ibid., 375.
10. Scheler, *Formalism,* 375.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., 370.

the person is basically nothing but a logical subject of rational acts."[13] This is depersonalizing because it makes the person a logical attribute (and therefore identical and interchangeable with others) of actions instead of the primarily existent actor. "The person could not even be 'obedient' to the moral law if, as its executor, he were created, as it were, by this law. For the being of the person is also the foundation of any obedience."[14] In other words, if one witnesses rational actions, one may logically infer a rational subject of those actions, deeming this subject a person. Consequently, in order to "count" as a person, one must act rationally, as one's personal dignity is bestowed by conformity to the laws of reason. Scheler claims that this leads to the positions of Fichte and Hegel wherein the person's moral being is determined by an external and impersonal rational law.[15] Such external determination would be particularly offensive to a personalist sense of dignity, being what personalists generally preclude from requirement for personal dignity.

Scheler clarifies and counters the central threat that rationalism brings to bear against personhood: "The person must never be considered a thing or a substance with faculties or powers, among which the 'faculty' or 'power' of reason etc., is one. The person is, rather, the immediately coexperienced unity of experiencing; the person is not a merely thought thing behind and outside what is immediately experienced."[16] This concern with mental "thingness" and the importance of immediate experience in the epistemology of personhood constitutes a marked similarity between Scheler and Yannaras.

1.2 Yannaras

Yannaras's personalism is also motivated as a reaction against rationalism, but stems from a different political context. Yannaras stands in a line with other Orthodox authors responding to the political ideology surrounding the Russian Revolution and fueling the Cold War. Both

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13. Ibid., 371.
14. Ibid., 372.
15. Scheler here accuses Kant's formal ethics of depersonalizing personhood itself "by virtue of its subordination of the person to an impersonal nomos under whose domination he can become a person only through obedience." Ibid., 370.
16. Ibid., 371.

Marxism and capitalism sit squarely in his sights as depersonalizing Western philosophies recently imported into Eastern European culture. Yannaras's personalist critique is directed broadly against the whole tradition of Western rationalism, naming especially the German idealists Fichte, Hegel, and Marx[17] more than Kant himself, as well as the whole Western scholastic tradition. As mentioned above, Scheler noted Fichte and Hegel as embodying the most extreme ethical dangers of Kantian formal ethics. Yannaras's concerns are also ethical. He sees the danger of a rationalist epistemology as the subjugation of persons equally to the state, as in communism, and to the market, as in capitalism; this subjugation, for him, is the inevitable ethical demand of an epistemology that locates truth in the sublime regions of universal reason. Yannaras's arguments to this end must be the subject for another study. Of importance here are his specific epistemological critiques against rationalism directed towards the establishment of the person as a being of ultimate value.

As with Scheler's, Yannaras's work is motivated primarily by the rationalist threat of depersonalization. Yannaras is concerned particularly with the depersonalization of God by Western rational theology, and God's consequent removal from the existential relevance for human persons. Yannaras explains that the rationalist quest for objectivity, for the knowledge of things in themselves, is opposed to the very possibility for meaning: it limits the subject to one's own mental conceptions of essences, apart from empirical reality and any existential relevance for human persons.

> If the concept corresponds to the object of thought…individual comprehension of logical statements expressing truth suffices for human beings to know truth. Experiential participation, the dynamic immediacy of our relationship with what we know, becomes superfluous. The apophatic character of the expressions of truth, which the Church considered essential to an experiential knowledge of revelation is discarded…The Church's Gospel…was transformed into a rationalistic structure…able to convince the individual intellect.…It was turned into a sacred science…which neglected experience and empirical evidence.[18]

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17. Yannaras includes here Marx as an idealist because his economic materialism betrays the ultimacy of rational determinism in his system. Christos Yannaras, *Person and Eros* (Brookline, MA: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 2007), 284.

18. Christos Yannaras, *Orthodoxy and the West* (Brookline, MA: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 2006), 35.

Similar to Scheler's criticism of Kant, Yannaras's complaint here is against the location of knowledge within the realm of concept instead of in the relatedness of knower and known. In this rationalist epistemological framework, according to Yannaras, knowledge is not the knower's relatedness to the known, but instead the knower's private mental comprehension. For the purposes of theological knowledge, this entails a drastic loss of personal relevance for the God who is now reduced to a concept.

Yannaras argues that the logically deducible concept of God is "unrelated to historical experience and the existential condition of human beings," and he agrees with Nietzsche "that logical proofs for the existence of God refute god as an objective, real presence."[19] The resulting death of God proclaimed by Nietzsche's madman in *The Gay Science* is only the inevitable fulfillment of the Western metaphysical God of conceptual certainty. This logically necessary God is "guaranteed" to exist and to be the cause of all. But the strength of this God is identical to the irrelevancy of this God. The logically necessary God is impervious to any particular experience precisely because this God resides safely among conceived essences, and is therefore impossible to experience. This is the God of rational certainty, the God of conceived truth. As conceived truth, this God is a propositional construction of the human mind in reflection upon the experience of physical causality, of natural existence. This is a God that is known in and identified with the Being of the natural world through the natural laws conceived by created minds to articulate and organize our human experiences of the created universe. This is not a God of direct empirical knowledge and could not be personal in any existential meaning of the term. As such, the ultimate question of the rational God's existence is exactly as irrelevant as it is certain.

If one related Yannaras's concerns to Scheler's, a definite agreement would be found between Yannaras and Scheler as they both reject rationalism in order to defend the dignity of persons. Scheler defends the human person against being conceived as a substance with faculties including reason,[20] and Yannaras defends the divine persons from an equally substantial and rational conception. The rationally deduced God is a mental object had by "logical subjects of rational acts." In the rationalist framework, commonly

19. Christos Yannaras, *On The Absence and Unknowability of God* (New York: T&T Clark, 2005), 23–24.

20. Scheler, *Formalism*, 371.

critiqued by both authors, neither God nor humans can be in personal relation with an other as both are governed by the determinations of reason. The very dignity of persons, personal freedom, valuing, and loving, are endangered by this rationalist epistemology.

2. Phenomenology

Scheler and Yannaras both embrace phenomenology as an epistemological alternative to rationalism. Both authors defend phenomenology in order to establish an epistemological space for the knowing of persons as non-objects. Each author will be discussed in turn.

2.1 Scheler

Scheler critiqued rationalism as unable to see beings as anything but objects, and he rejected the "whatness" of this rational ontology in order to re-establish the dignity of free and unrepeatable persons. Scheler accomplished two things towards personal dignity. First, he transferred the dignity of the "a priori" from mental concept to "empirical given." Second, he expanded empirical knowledge from the exclusive domain of the quantifiable senses to include also two very significant subjective givens: the experiences of preferring values and executing acts. His first step towards this restoration was the vindication of a more authentic theory of knowledge that could account more fully for the breadth of personal experience—namely, phenomenology.

Through a less constricted openness to the given, Scheler's phenomenology could account for the realities of values and acts known non-objectively. This openness required an awareness of the "how" as well as the "what" of the given. The preferring and executing of values and acts are different from the apprehension of object-essences; nonetheless, they allow access to their respective givens just as "knowably" as does the knowledge of objects. As Spader explains, Scheler's main concern in advancing phenomenology was to relocate the prestige of the a priori from the internal mind to the whole realm of the various phenomena, without differentiation between internal and external perceptions. Scheler avoided Kant's limitation of the a priori to mental formalism and instead included all

"immediate intuitive content." The "apriorism" of the given now dignified the whole of human experience and not only the rational faculty.[21] At the same time, Scheler was reclaiming empiricism from the overly narrow confines of the quantifiable senses. Spader explains that Scheler recognizes a limiting presupposition in sense-empiricism: "As I see it, the proton pseudos of this identification is that one asks what can be given instead of simply asking what is given. One assumes in this fashion that nothing 'can' be given at all when sensory functions…for it are lacking."[22] Sense-empiricism is here called out for its self-contradictory a priori assumptions. Thus, Scheler's phenomenology is a more "radical" empiricism in its openness to what is given without the filter of what can be given.[23]

Again, Scheler's objective was to avail the whole person of participation in knowing, not just the rational aspect of the human organism. Scheler's phenomenology thus expanded to include what "counts" as given from the mere "what" to also the "how" of experience. The effect of Scheler's phenomenology was the expansion of the domain of knowledge to include not just all contents of human experience but also the manner of that experience itself, without requiring any recourse to a priori essences in order to constitute knowledge. This is why Scheler can say that a priori non-formal values can be known in the act of preferring, and that acts themselves are never given in perception but only in their execution.[24] Ultimately, this is why the person cannot be given as any object, but only in its "coexperienced unity of experiencing."[25]

By transferring the a priori from the mental to the phenomenal, Scheler allowed for experience itself to constitute knowledge, thereby expanding the realm of the known well beyond the limits of object-essences as required by rationalism's a priori assumptions.

2.2 Yannaras

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21. Spader, *Scheler's Ethical Personalism,* 54–57.
22. Scheler, *Formalism*, 55; discussed in Spader, 51–54.
23. Spader, *Scheler's Ethical Personalism,* 55.
24. Scheler, *Formalism*, 374–375.
25. Ibid., 371.

Yannaras relocates the domain of knowledge from proposition to relation for a purpose similar to that of Scheler, specifically to recalibrate "what counts" as personal knowledge from conceptual understanding to immediate experience. The phenomenological empiricism of Yannaras is similar to that of Scheler, although Yannaras generally uses the term "apophaticism" instead of "phenomenology." Yannaras positions this apophatic empiricism against that of propositional or rational knowledge. "Apophaticism is the denial that we can exhaust the truth in its expression, a denial that we can identify the knowledge of truth simply with an understanding of its declamatory logic."[26] And elsewhere, "Apophaticism is...an utterly consistent empiricism, an unyielding adherence to the absolute priority of experience as the way to, and possibility of, knowledge." Yannaras explicitly distances Eastern Orthodox apophaticism from the Western *via negativa*, on the grounds that Orthodox apophaticism is the rejection of the propositional statement's suitability for truth. In his view, saying what God is not is not apophaticism because this approach leaves the being of God in the propositionally defined space between our negative statements. For Yannaras, apophaticism is the recognition that saying anything at all, either positive or negative, is only a mental reflection upon the primary truth of related experience. Thus an apophatic epistemology considers truth to be only the experience of relatedness. Truth is the direct experience of relatedness, disregarding both positive and negative propositional concepts. Yannaras develops his concept of relatedness through consistent use of Heidegger's concept of "disclosure." It is our mutual relatedness to phenomena that constitutes our knowledge of truth.

Yannaras's understanding of "hypostasis" is central to his rejection of rationalism. Hypostasis in Yannaras, as in the Orthodox tradition generally, denotes what is underneath, what "gives standing" to nature. Hypostasis, as primary substance, "recapitulates" secondary substance: the whole or the universal human/divine nature. In this sense, a hypostasis is not an instantiation of a universal, as if the hypostasis were only a part "participating" in the universal whole. Rather, Yannaras is emphatic that the hypostasis constitutes the universal in itself; every hypostasis is a unique and unrepeatable expression of the universal nature. Nature as such, the essence in itself, does not exist; it is only a propositional reflection upon

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26. Yannaras, *Orthodoxy and the West*, 25.

what is real, which is the hypostasis, or primary substance. Because universals or natures only exist in hypostases, propositional knowledge of natural reality can only be an abstraction from the primary reality of the hypostasis, reflected upon but not exhausted in propositional form. As such, propositional knowledge is not real knowledge, but rather reflection or verbal expression. Propositional knowledge must cede the dignity of "knowledge" to apophatic experience (phenomenological empiricism). Rationalism, therefore, seeks an abstraction from reality, not the reality of the hypostasis itself. A rational theological method uncovers a truth of a similar nature: a rational conception of God abstracted from the primary truths of experience. For Yannaras, this abstractly conceived God can only be an idol standing in place of the actual (active) divine hypostases of Father, Son, and Spirit.

The significance of Yannaras's epistemology, in agreement with Scheler's, is that real knowledge can only be considered to be the experience of relatedness with the given. Apprehension of essences does not count as knowledge. Under this framework, the person becomes knowable directly through naïve experience, and not through a rational analysis. In other words, the person is known through acts, without any requirement for essential knowledge. As further discussed below, for Yannaras, this is apophatic knowledge: a knowing of energies, but not of essence; for Scheler, this is the lack of necessity for positing the person as something "'behind' or 'above' acts, or something standing 'above' the execution and processes of acts."[27] Both authors thus use phenomenology as a way to reconstitute knowledge as the direct experiencing of the given instead of a rationalist conceptualization.

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27. Scheler, *Formalism*, 385.

3. The Knowing of Persons

3.1 Scheler

Scheler worked to establish the authenticity of phenomenology in order to make room for a non-objectified content for knowledge. Scheler's phenomenological method revealed a significant new category of knowns, the act, which is known non-rationally in its direct execution. The non-objectness of acts is important for Scheler's understanding of persons. Scheler articulates the impossibility of ever conceiving of acts as objects, and specifies the same for persons as the unity of different act-essences. "We can now enunciate the essential definition in the above sense: The person is the concrete and essential unity of being of acts of different essences which in itself…precedes all essential act-differences."[28] Further,

> An act is never an object. No matter how much knowledge we have of an act, our reflecting on its naive execution…contains nothing like the objectification which marks, e.g., all inner perception, especially all inner observation. If an act can therefore never be an object, then the person who lives in the execution of acts can a fortiori never be an object.[29]

Defining the person as the unity of acts safely precluded the objectness of the person. Providing for the knowability of acts through the naïve experience of phenomenology safeguarded the knowability of the person. But this is a knowledge that is very different from the knowledge of object-essences. It is a knowledge that is immediately experienced without recourse to rational concept. As Spader explains, the person *is* the way in which acts are experienced, not any abstracted thing above or beyond the acts themselves.

> In Scheler's view, the person is not something separate from the acts—the person is in the acts. There is no need to posit something above or behind or separate from the acts. The person is the acts, but not acts abstracted. The person is the acts unified, acts of essentially different natures unified in a particular concrete way: acts *are* the person.[30]

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28. Spader, *Scheler's Ethical Personalism,* 104; Scheler, *Formalism*, 383.
29. Spader, *Scheler's Ethical Personalism,* 104–105; Scheler, *Formalism*, 387.
30. Spader, *Scheler's Ethical Personalism,* 104.

Scheler contrasts the phenomenological given person with the Kantian ego discussed above. If we are given the spatio-temporal manifold in perception, we are likewise given the form of its unity in the ego, which is a content of perception and therefore an object. If we are given the experience of our own several acts, we are therein given the unity of those acts, but not as the content of inner perception. Acts are given in their execution, and cannot be objectified in subsequent reflection. The same holds *a fortiori* for persons who are given their unity in the immediate execution of these acts. This process cannot be conflated with the givenness of the ego through the spatio-temporal manifold of perception, for act and object are utterly distinct. Scheler then defines the person as this unity of the several act-essences, a non-objectifiable yet phenomenologically accessible reality. The person is known in each of the acts without being exhausted in any of them. Knowledge of persons is therefore the experience itself of their acting, whereas knowledge of the person's whatness, or objectness, is inherently nonsensical, as such an essence could neither apply to any act nor therefore to any person. According to Scheler, the knowledge of persons is accessible only through a phenomenological, not a rational, epistemology. The knowledge of persons through their acts is required to preserve the validity of ethics as a discipline without "squashing" persons into objects through formalism.[31] Without any epistemological access to the person, such an ethics would certainly be impossible.

3.2 Yannaras

The person's total knowability in, without exhaustion by, particular acts in Scheler's formulation is reminiscent of the fourteenth-century Byzantine saint Gregory Palamas's (1296–1359) distinction between the divine essence and energies, particularly as this is employed in the writings of Yannaras. There is remarkable compatibility between Scheler's position and that of Yannaras's reliance upon St. Gregory. St. Gregory had taught that God could be visibly known in the divine energies even as the divine essence remains so unknowable as to be conceptually nonexistent.[32]

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31. Spader, *Scheler's Ethical Personalism,* 105, commenting on this observation by Nicolai Hartmann.

32. "For if God is a nature then no other thing is a nature; but if all others are natures then God is not a nature; just as He is not being if other things are beings; but if He is being,

Yannaras applies this distinction to anthropology and develops the notion of ecstasy as an experiential bridge between persons. For Yannaras, the truth is only the experience of a hypostasis, taking this genitive both subjectively and objectively. While the uniqueness and incommunicability of persons would seem only to prevent persons from obtaining knowledge of one another, especially barring the admissibility of conceptual knowledge, here Yannaras develops the theme of ecstatic self-transcendence as the means by which persons are known by persons in their energies and not as abstracted essences. This is equivalent to Scheler's view that persons are known in the experience of their actions. Here Yannaras explains the dependence of his epistemology on the traditional Orthodox separation between the hypostatic essence and energies of God.

Following Gregory Nazianzen, Ps. Dionysius, and especially Gregory Palamas, Yannaras explains the ecstatic capacity of hypostases to reach beyond themselves in interaction with the other. It is here that "nothingness" proves to be the *sine qua non* of Yannaras's theological method. (Yannaras is not overly shy in his use of Heidegger, but thoroughly integrates his agreement with Heidegger into his understanding of the Orthodox tradition.) The divine hypostases, in creating the universe, call forth from the nothing all that is. In this ecstatic self-transcendence, the divine energies extend beyond the incommunicable hypostases themselves into the nothingness beyond God, in order to call into being that which is not.[33] A clear distinction between God's essence and energies is established in the Orthodox tradition through the experience of relatedness to these divine energies that call into being, enliven, and deify the Christian.

Yannaras argues that the Orthodox tradition clings to the immediate empirical God. He grounds this position in St. Gregory's defense of the Holy Hesychasts' empirical vision of the uncreated divine energies. The "what" of God, the rationally deducible first cause of Western metaphysics, is rendered epistemologically irrelevant in that it is totally unknowable. It is only the "who" of God, the energetic actions of God in relation to us, that we can truly know. We know that God reveals Godself through the invitation to love. In this ecstatic love, both the human and divine persons literally stand

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then other things are not beings." Quoted in Basil Krivosheine, *The Ascetic and Theological Teaching of Gregory Palamas* (London: Geo. E.J. Coldwel, 1954), 17.

33. Yannaras, *On The Absence and Unknowability of God*, 73–81.

beyond themselves for the sake of interpenetrating the other's energies. Their *eros* goes forth from their essence to relate with their beloved's energy. From this hypostatic ecstasy, the person's self-transcendence into relatedness with the other, there is excluded any abstracted universal such as the transcendental ego. The apophatic knowledge of hypostases requires the ecstatic potential of the person. This is predicated upon the distinction of essence and energies in God. It is the ecstatic energies of God, their "essential" nothingness, that reach outside of God to create the world as other. We therefore know both divine and human persons in relationship with their personal energies, but conceptually as "no-thing."

4. Conclusion

Despite the noticeable anti-Western polemic in Yannaras, there are significant similarities between his view of the non-objective knownness of the person and Scheler's. There is a basic parallel between Scheler's distinction between objects and acts and Yannaras's distinction between essence and energies. In both personalisms, the person is no-thing, and yet known fully in act and energy. Furthermore, in both Scheler and Yannaras, these distinctions require an equivalent replacement of rationalism by a phenomenological empiricism in order for the non-objectified person to qualify as a known content of knowledge. Both authors intentionally argue for a reformulation of epistemology along phenomenological lines. From this methodology, they both argue for the consideration of "naïve" experience as truth. For Scheler, this enables the person to be known in the phenomenological experiencing of acts; for Yannaras, this allows the person to be known in the apophatic ecstasy of energies.

The significance of this agreement is two-fold. First, it shows that both Orthodox and Catholic personalist traditions are responding to the same objectifying threats of Kantian rationalism. In other words, both traditions equally safeguard the experiential dignity of persons as irreducible to concept or essence. Second, it calls into question the validity of certain Orthodox accusations against the "Western Philosophical tradition" as a whole. The similarity shown between Scheler and Yannaras demonstrates that the "West" itself was also responding to the same objectifying

threats that Yannaras accuses the West of introducing. In Yannaras's use of phenomenology, under the guise of apophaticism, as a weapon against Western rationalism, he equally shows himself to be essentially in agreement with, not in opposition to, contemporary Catholic thinking on personhood. Hopefully, this observation is a contribution to the growing awareness among scholars that an overly strict distinction between "Eastern" and "Western" metaphysics would be seriously flawed.

God's Relation to Dialectical Volition According to Blondel and Hegel

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In the "Translator's Preface" to Maurice Blondel's dissertation *Action (1893): Essay on a Critique of Life and a Science of Practice*, Oliva Blanchette remarks that in "some respects Blondel was to French Catholicism what Hegel had been to German Protestantism."[1] Blanchette then goes on to caution, however, that the similarities between the two thinkers may end with their shared attempt to rekindle the study of religion within the bounds of philosophical inquiry. On the one hand, this serves as a prudent road sign for a comparative study. Not only does the amount of Hegelian texts that Blondel read remain unknown,[2] but also in many ways the concerns, concepts, and conclusions of both philosophers are wholly diverse. On the other hand, many of the striking similarities in the nineteenth-century works of each thinker challenge whether or not their confluence really ends so abruptly. In particular, both (1) understand phenomenology to be a necessary, but only partial constituent of the whole of philosophy; (2) are wrongly interpreted as defending a crude idealism; (3) proceed, contra Descartes, by admitting and working through contradiction, falsity, and negation;[3] (4) believe that philosophy deals scientifically with necessity

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1. Maurice Blondel, *Action (1893): Essay on a Critique of Life and a Science of Practice*, trans. Oliva Blanchette (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), xix.
2. Olivia Blanchette, *Maurice Blondel: A Philosophical Life* (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2010), 110.
3. *Action*, 12: "We must…take in all the negations that destroy one another, as if it were possible to admit them altogether. We must enter into all prejudices, as if they were legitimate, into all errors, as if they were sincere, into all passions, as if they had the generosity they boast of, into all philosophical systems, as if each one held in its grip the infinite truth it thinks it has cornered." Cf. Georg Wilhelm Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic: Part I of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences with the Zusätze*, trans. T. F. Geraets, W.

and universality; (5) employ a form of dialectic that is neither sterile nor merely formal but dynamic and morphological;[4] and (6) are concerned with what necessarily follows from freedom's unfolding in the family, society, and state.[5] At the very least, such parallels suggest a broader comparative horizon for the work of Hegel and Blondel, within which a focused analysis might move.

By means of distinct dialectical methods, both Hegel and Blondel describe the human person as a subject that thinks and wills in a variety of different contexts, each more expansive than the last. Furthermore, the trajectory of such thinking and willing—the insertion and concretization of freedom in the world—immanently involves God. How does each philosopher conceive of the will's action in the world?[6] How does God cooperate with or bring to fulfillment the final causes of the will? In an attempt to begin to answer such questions, this essay will first examine portions of Blondel's *Action* and describe its portrayal of God's relation to human willing. Next, drawing primarily from the "Introduction" to *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* and *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, Hegel's notion of the will and its unity with the panentheistic God[7] will be outlined. Finally, and rather briefly, the dominant threads that both nineteenth-century conceptions of the role of

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A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1991), §83 Addition 1.

4. Cf. Peter Henrici, *Hegel und Blondel: Eine Untersuchung uber Form und Sinn der Dialektik in der 'Phanomenologie des Geistes' und der ersten 'Action'* (Pullach bei Munchen: Berchmanskollege, 1958); Jaime D. Gonzalez, "La Dialectica de la Acción según Blondel," *Revista de Filosofia de la Universidad de Costa Rica* 14 (1976): 49–60; and chapters 10–12 of G. R. G. Mure, *An Introduction to Hegel* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1948).

5. Cf. Léo-Paul Bordeleau, "Une genèse de la vie sociale selon Maurice Blondel," *Philosophiques* 2, no. 1 (1975): 55–82; *Action,* Part III, Stages 4–5; and Georg Wilhelm Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, ed. Allen W. Wood, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), Part III, Sections 1–3.

6. While this essay will bracket the more specific question of the metaphysical status of the will in favour of describing its *activity*, the nineteenth-century psychologies of each philosopher notwithstanding do not render their work irrelevant for contemporary issues. Cf. for instance, Fichra Long, "The Postmodern Flavor of Blondel's Method," *International Philosophical Quarterly* XXXI, no. 121 (March 1991): 15–22 and "Why Hegel Now?" in Gianni Vattimo, *A Farewell to Truth*, trans. William McCuaig (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 130–140.

7. Glenn A. Magee, *The Hegel Dictionary* (New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2010), 101.

providence in willed transformation share will be highlighted, followed by critical questions for further study.

1. The Will's Relation to God According to Blondel

Blondel's then-controversial dissertation *L'Action* constitutes a rigorous and highly original attempt to explain the source, movements, motivations, means, and end(s) of human willing. Fifty years prior to Sartre's publication of *L'Être et le Néant*, Blondel begins his first tome with existential audacity: "Yes or no, does human life make sense, and does man [sic] have a destiny?"[8] The first two parts anticipate negative replies to this question from the aesthete, *flaneur*, pessimist, and fatalist. Against these, Blondel sets forth arguments against the possibility of conceiving, willing, or doing nothing; one cannot have a clear and distinct idea of nothingness, much less a substantial will for it. Thus, before setting to work on his positive phenomenology, a minimum of givenness that all inevitably affirm must be posited, namely, "'*Il y a quelque chose* (there is something).'"[9] The third part of *L'Action* opens with arguments for the necessity of a unique, novel science of subjectivity, since: (1) sensation and the mathematical are irreducible to one another; (2) science is always "already more than it knows;"[10] and (3) that mediating and free conscious action which gives rise to science itself must be known as it originates from and reinserts itself into the general determinism of the world.[11] Since one *must* will something, and since that which wills cannot be dealt with *as such* by the diverse positive sciences, a new approach must be found. This task of grasping the will as such is the primary concern of Blondel's phenomenology of action.

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8. *Action*, 3.

9. Michael A. Conway, "A Positive Phenomenology: The Structure of Maurice Blondel's Early Philosophy," *Heythrop Journal* XLVII (2006), 579–600. Also see *Action*, 52.

10. *Action*, 88.

11. For more on Blondel's contribution to philosophy of science see Raymond Jahae, "The Concept of Positive Science in the Main Works of Maurice Blondel," *Gregorianum* 85, no. 3 (2004): 539–558 and Adam C. English, "'Science Cannot Stop With Science': Maurice Blondel and the Sciences," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 69, no. 2 (April 2008): 269–292.

These aforementioned arguments concerning matters of existential import as well as the philosophy of science prepare the way for a thorough phenomenology of action. Blondel's centrifugal phenomenology covers the first threshold of individual consciousness to embodied and social action, and "the driving principle, that ultimate source, Blondel names Desire,"[12] or the willing will. The emergent dialectic between the willing will (*la volonté voulante*), or "what proceeds from the will," and the willed will (*la volonté voulue*), or "what becomes the object of the will,"[13] underlies each of the successive ambits of the core of Blondel's text. Where an equation between one's restive willing and that which is willed might be expected, the circuit in fact remains open, and the lack of a resolution propels the phenomenology to broader networks of praxis in which the fundamental "disconcerting and inexplicable disproportion"[14] remains. The willing will could neither remain solely within itself nor ever fully cognize its various unconscious intentions and embodied actions. In other words, "The will progresses over a double movement of immanence and of transcendence… that is no more than the result of the dialectical tension between thought and praxis which can never arrive at adequation in itself."[15] Thus, by itself human action knows no completion.

Freedom, according to Blondel, emerges from natural necessity and serves as the locus of life's drama.[16] One cannot escape this freedom, the options that are presented to it, the exigencies that it feels, or the duties that are found within it. Whether one unknowingly begins to will a previous concession, initiates a new project, makes arbitrary decisions, or submits to a pragmatic rule, each of these inevitably involves the free action of the

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12. Jean Lacroix, "Blondel et la dialectique du Désir," *Revue Philosophique de Louvain* 71 (1973): 681–697. My translation of « Ce principe moteur, cette source ultime, Blondel l'appelle Désir. »

13. *Action*, 134.

14. *Action*, 4.

15. Isaac R. Fernández, "Filosofía de la praxis en M. Blondel," *Espiritu* XXX (1981): 19–39. My translation of "La voluntad progresa sobre el doble movimiento de la inmanencia y de la transcendencia…que no es más que el resultado de la tensión dialéctica entre pensamiento y praxis que jamás llegan a adecuarse entre sí."

16. On the roles of "existence" and "life" in the context of Blondelian thought, see Clara Mandolini, "Blondel and the Philosophy of Life," *Phenomenology and Existentialism in the Twentieth Century: Book I: New Waves of Philosophical Inspirations* CIII (2009): 253–273.

will. The infinity of possible moments of freedom finds itself prepared by the external determinism of the natural world. And, insofar as free action returns to what metaphysicians have called the "community of causes," or, if free action abides by the necessity of reasonable, practical morality, it can be said to pass from its infinite potential back to necessity.[17] At each further stage of the will's dialectic, however, the problem of its inability to equal itself still remains. "Before we will and in all that we will, then, there inevitably subsists something which, seemingly, we do not will."[18] Even socio-political action, common morality, and participation in many religious ceremonies do not carry the willing will to fulfillment.

The forgoing conflicts and dialectic of the free will lead it to the necessary option presented to praxis. At this juncture, one can either opt for or against "the one thing necessary," or God. Blondel writes, "Voluntary action is made equal to itself in consciousness only inasmuch as we recognize in it the presence and the cooperation of the one thing necessary."[19] The idea of the infinite, of perfection, of the Good, and of God either lead to a positive, cooperative, and willed assent of human to divine action, or, rendered illusory abstractions, are brushed aside as having no source and term. According to *L'Action*, the "proof" for the necessity of this alternative lies not in detached, formal argumentation, but rather (within the context of life itself) in each stage of the will's infinite and insufficient dialectic. What, then, might willing the affirmative alternative entail?

In opting, willing, and hoping for the cooperation of one's will with God's will, the coaction of both constitutes a synthesis while nevertheless not resulting in apotheosis. Persons find the culmination of action in the bond between human and divine willing through mortification, revealing doctrines, seeking the good, putting faith into action, and despite the temporary and edifying trials of suffering. In this willed unity-in-difference

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17. Cf. *Action*, 125: "In short, in order to act we have to participate in an infinite power; to be conscious of acting we have to have the idea of this infinite power. But it is in the reasonable act that there is a synthesis of the power and of the idea of the infinite; and this synthesis is what we call freedom."

18. *Action*, 302.

19. *Action*, 333. For an analysis of the presuppositions of this argument, see "Die Kritik der Voraussetzung Gottes in Blondels 'Action'" in Ulrich Hommes, *Transzendenz und Personalität: Zum Begriff der Action bei Maurice Blondel* (Bamberg, Germany: Vittorio Klostermann Frankfurt Am Main, 1972).

between the human and the divine, one acts and becomes *as if* one were God.[20] Moreover, and despite bracketing ontological questions during his employment of a method of immanence, Blondel argues that opting for the supernatural implies God's working in each mundane action:

> In a sense, action has to be entirely from man [sic], but it must first be willed as entirely from God. In this perfect synthesis of one with the other, one cannot say that the first part of the act comes from one and the second from the other. No, each has to act for the whole. There is a communion of two wills only on this condition: the one cannot do anything without the other. And action, a common work, proceeds nevertheless in its entirety from each.[21]

The dialectic between the willing will and the willed will, then, culminates authentically in opting for and working "alongside" the one thing necessary. And this coactive volition, which provides a new hermeneutic and direction for praxis, in many ways gives birth to God in the world.

2. The Will's Relation to God According to Hegel

Hegel's *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, which outlines his philosophy of objective spirit, charts the concretization of freedom during the various moments of its unfolding. This text of practical philosophy, which incorporates his logic of the concept, deduces and demonstrates the necessity of freedom's realization in the world—first as right (*Recht*), and then in its particular social determinations, such as the family, civil society, and the state. While it does not proceed like Blondel's dissertation by way of a phenomenology of action, it nevertheless demonstrates the progressive manners in which Spirit objectively particularizes itself by means of free will. In order to clarify Hegel's understanding of the necessary realization of free will in relation to God, the concept of freedom in and for itself as

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20. *Action*, 386. The number of times in which Blondel makes use of the words "as if" here evinces that the human and the divine have not wholly dissolved into one another, but that the absolute goodness of the latter can still only be understood metaphorically, subjunctively.
21. *Action*, 354.

dialectically presented in §§5–7 of the "Introduction" to *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* must be presented.[22]

After a brief description of the aim of a philosophy of right and its relation to positive law, Hegel begins his deduction of right from freedom. Specifically, he articulates the three syllogistic moments of this concept of freedom (in which both cognition and volition are operative) in §§5–7. In these three sections, Hegel sets forth the abstract concept of free will in itself. In §5 he writes, "The will contains the element of *pure indeterminacy* or of the 'I''s pure reflection into itself, in which every limitation, every content…is dissolved; this is the limitless infinity of *absolute abstraction* or *universality*, the pure [affirmation or] thinking of oneself." This constitutes the moment of *universality* in §§5–7 and describes the infinite indeterminacy of the "I''s pure reflection into itself. "The original (moment of the) I is nothing other than the 'I' as having and being and positing *only itself*…without any otherness."[23] In his remark, Hegel describes this aspect of the "*Ich*" as able to abstract from every determination (*Bestimmung*) and limitation and to flee from particular contents. This universal and indeterminate freedom, however, remains *negative* (as opposed to the *positive* infinity of Fichte's conception of the "I") and often realizes its being-there in a purely negative or deleterious way, as exemplified by religious fanaticism or *la Terreur*.[24]

Section six marks the transition of the infinite and indeterminate "I" in its most abstract universality to its moment of particularization and determination, akin to the movement from the major to the minor premise of the standard syllogism: "'*I*' is the transition from undifferentiated indeterminacy to *differentiation*, *determination*, and the *positing* of a determinacy as a content and object…Through this positing of itself as something *determinate*, '*I*' steps into existence [*Dasein*] in general…" Here, the abstract and universal "I," which, as Aristotle notes of the *nous*, can in principle consider all things, wills *something in particular*. Thus, a "will

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22. *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, 25–64. It should be kept in mind that, just as Plato's model of dialectic differs from that of Kierkegaard, so too does Blondel's dialectical presentation of the will differ from that of Hegel's dialectic. Whereas Hegel might expect a moment of sublation in Blondel's method, only to find a deficiency wrought by the *Verstand*, Blondel might view Hegel's dialectical method as honourable but too facile and robotic.

23. Adriaan Peperzak, *Modern Freedom: Hegel's Legal, Moral, and Political Philosophy* (Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001), 195.

24. *Modern Freedom*, 491.

which, as described in the previous paragraph [§5], wills only the abstract universal, wills *nothing* and is therefore not a will at all. The particular [thing/action/event] which the will wills is a limitation, for the will, in order to be a will, must in some way limit itself" (§6). In other words, in choosing and willing this particular *X*, the universal "I" actually delimits and determines itself by means of a realized act of (the indeterminate) will.

Section seven, the result and sublation of the forgoing two sections, constitutes the restoration of the previous abstract/universal (§5) and particular (§6) moments. This section serves as the result of a double negation in which the will is grasped in its free self-relation: "The will is the unity of both these moments—*particularity* reflected *into itself* and thereby restored to *universality*." In this final phase of the development of the abstract concept of right, the "I" recognizes that it is *both* finite and limited and nevertheless universal and with itself. And, in this sublation, objective Spirit emerges.

In everyday, societal affairs, the abstract and conceptual structure provided above is not fully realized without the guidance of a subject's free and rational willing. The immediate will, with its natural drives, desires, and inclinations, for example, which are neither good nor bad in themselves, must be integrated by a "reasonal"[25] and free will. Similarly, one must understand choice (*Willkür*), which is both "independent of *and* bound to natural drives"[26] as distinct from the will (*Wille*) in its rational, actual, and transformative freedom. Hegel's further description of the actualization of the concept of free will in §§10–24 provides an account of human willing that: (1) calls for a rational unification of the will's being-in-itself and being-for-itself (§17) and a purification of the drives of one's immediate will (§19); (2) acknowledges that the will seeks happiness and requires education (*Bildung*) (§20); and (3) denominates the will which has being in and for itself as *truly infinite* (§22).

While free will in this practical philosophy serves as the means by which Spirit realizes itself in laws, ethicality, the state, and world history,

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25. This is Adriaan Peperzak's neologistic translation of the term "*vernüftig*," since "reasonable" and "rational" carry diverse connotations that do not fit Hegel's (onto-)logic. For a brief discussion of *vernünftig* and *verständig*, see *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, 352, n. 43.
26. *Modern Freedom*, 204.

this exhausts neither the meaning of Spirit nor of freedom.[27] While the equivocal term "spirit" may signify, depending on the context, the psychological, the realm pertaining to subjective spirit, or the creation of art, it also serves as "a name for the One that is the Whole," or God.[28] Understood as God, Spirit operates, reveals itself, and incarnates itself in the world. Spirit does not transcend the world as a being beyond the totality, since this would *differentiate* it from the world, thus rendering it finite, but rather envelops the world, guiding its self-completion. In regards to free will, such providential enveloping constitutes the *sine qua non* of objective Spirit. In this respect, Hegel "replaces the traditional conception of God as existing apart from creation, perfect and complete, with one which claims that God only truly becomes God *through* creation."[29] Despite this novel panentheism, however, Spirit nevertheless maintains many of the divine attributes found in classical, Western (onto-)theology.

Succinct, key nuances of Hegel's understanding of the free will's relation to God can also be found in *The Encyclopaedia Logic*.[30] Sections 233 to 234, for example, describe willing as the converse of thinking's mediation of representations and otherness. To will is to attempt to determine the world according to the ideas one has of it. But the externally transformative movements of the will and cognition's appropriation of the world contradict one another, thus giving rise to the distinction between "is" and "ought." The good as it is actualized through this contradiction brings about the notion of infinite progress,[31] and without this contradiction the need for willing would disappear altogether.[32] In the "Addition" to §234, Hegel claims that one cannot stop at this finitude of the will; rather, the mature person

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27. While this essay focuses largely on free will as Hegel describes it as the condition of objective spirit, for an analysis of it within subjective spirit, see Damion Buterin, "Knowledge, Freedom and Willing: Hegel on Subjective Spirit," *Inquiry* 52, no. 1 (February 2009): 26–52.

28. *Modern Freedom*, 160.

29. *The Hegel Dictionary*, 99.

30. While the limits of this essay do not allow for a full treatment of the differences between volition in *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* and *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, a helpful reconstruction can be found in Hector Ferreiro, "Reconstrucción del Sistema de la Voluntad en la Filosofía de Hegel," *Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía* XXXV, no. 2 (2009): 331–361.

31. *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, §234.

32. *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, §234, Addition.

trusts in providence's working and strives to reconcile the will's finitude by returning to cognition. This return receives narrative expression in Hegel's interpretation of the first creation myth of Genesis. Here, the human will, tempted to eat from the tree of the cognition of good and evil, falls into sin, yet, by virtue of being created in the image of God (Gen. 3:22), can be healed again *through cognition*. "It is thinking that both inflicts the wound and heals it again."[33] As the culmination of *The Encyclopaedia Logic* with the Absolute Idea suggests, Spirit immanently actualizes all reality, up to and including the "healing" of the will by means of the divinization of self-thinking thought.

Concluding Remarks

The foregoing has highlighted the distinct and similar manners in which Blondel and Hegel conceive of God's relation to the will's dialectical moments. While the former believes that the finite will's dialectic, through thinking, leads one to an ultimate decision posed to the will, the latter ultimately preferences cognition over the will. Also, although the unity between the subject and God remains central to the texts analyzed, for Blondel such unity always concernedly maintains the transcendence of God, whereas Hegel's Spirit unifies all reality in a radically immanent way. But, Hegel would agree with Blondel that "The idea of God…is the inevitable compliment of human action,"[34] while Blondel would agree with Hegel's claim that "All labour is directed only at this or that goal; and when it is attained, we are amazed to find just what we willed and nothing more."[35] In the deduction, definition, and/or description of these processes, however, the two philosophers part ways. Let us conclude with a few comparative, critical questions posed to both thinkers, if not to a variety of Christian philosophers in general: While Blondel and Hegel remain concerned that determinism, pessimism, and/or empiricism might disrupt a holistic,

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33. *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, §23, Addition 3. See also Georg Wilhelm Hegel, "The Story of the Fall" in *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion One Volume Edition: The Lectures of 1827* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 442–446.

34. *Action*, 326.

35. *The Encyclopaedia Logic* §237, Addition.

dialectical philosophy of the will's relation to providence, do these in fact pose the greatest challenge to grasping this human-divine relation? Does not inexplicable, event-like tragedy pose the primary obstacle? In other words, does not the unpredictable shattering of the tragic event—to which Blondel's account of suffering[36] and Hegel's understanding of evil[37] do not do justice—grind to a halt the ascendant dialectical philosophies of each?

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36. Cf. *Action*, 350 ff. It simply does not seem to be the case that "La souffrance est la voie qui marche et qui monte; et pour beaucoup avancer, il suffit de vouloir bien se laisser porter." Maurice Blondel, *L'action (1893): essai d'une critique de la vie et d'une science de la pratique* (Paris: Quadrige/Presses universitaires de Franc, 1950), 383.
37. *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, §139.

Book Reviews

The Spirituality of Shi'i Islam: Beliefs and Practices.
Mohammad Ali Amir-Moezzi. London: I.B. Tauris, 2011.
ISBN: 9781845117382. Pp. xi + 585.
Reviewed by Adam Asgarali, University of Toronto

Only in recent decades has the study of Shi'i Islam become a significant field of inquiry within academic discourse. So observes Mohammad Ali Amir-Moezzi in the preface of his book, *The Spirituality of Shi'i Islam*, which, in contrast to the abundance of scholarly literature on Sunni Islam available in European languages, is one of only a handful of detailed expositions of Shi'i doctrine and practice available in English. As the author notes, Shi'i thought was viewed throughout Islamic history as suspicious at best, and as heresy or "extremism" (*ghuluww*) at worst, contributing to the censorship and loss of many works considered Shi'i in nature (xii). These circumstances combined with the highly esoteric and "secretive" quality of much of Shi'i belief serve to explain the historical shortage of critical engagements with the Shi'i tradition and highlights the timely nature of Moezzi's study.

The first section of the work opens with an exploration of the origins of Shi'i Islam. Examining the concept of *dīn 'Alī* (lit. "religion of 'Alī") in early historiographical works, Moezzi argues that 'Alī ibn Abi Talib was the only early Muslim figure, aside from Muhammad himself, to be so frequently associated with the term *dīn* (8). Used by his enemies to differentiate his cause from their conception of Islam, 'Ali's supporters equated this term with *dīn Muḥammad* or Islam proper. Highlighting the Qur'anic depiction of the hereditary transference of worldly and spiritual authority amongst the Israelite prophets, Moezzi notes the use of this concept by the family of 'Alī as evidence of their rightful custodianship of Islam after Muhammad. Following this is a discussion of pre-Islamic Arab notions of lineage and kinship as well as how existing concepts such as *ahl al-bayt* (lit. "people of the house") were reinterpreted within Shi'i thought to denote the exalted station of 'Alī and his descendents within the Muslim community. Finally, Moezzi analyzes the influence of pre-Islamic Iranian religions on Shi'i belief through the figure of the Sasanian princess Shahrbānū, traditionally held to be the mother of the fourth Imam, 'Ali Zayn al-'Abidin. The combination of the royal lineage of ancient Persia and Muhammad's spiritual authority within the figure of the fourth Imam was an

important factor, Moezzi argues, in garnering legitimacy for Shi'ism, particularly in Iranian lands.

The second section deals with the metaphysical nature of the Shi'i Imams and delves deeply into questions of ontology and epistemology. The author begins with a discussion of the sayings of the early Shi'i Imams in which they are depicted as possessing the divine attributes. Here, Moezzi highlights the esoteric notion of the "Perfect Man" (*al-insān al-kāmil*) and its embodiment in the Imams, rendering them the only knowable source through which the ineffable God can be accessed (104-105). This is followed by an exploration of the Imams' pre-eternal nature, in which Moezzi pays particular attention to the notion of the pure and immaterial "light" of the prophetic family. Here, Moezzi highlights the belief in the role of the pre-eternal Imams as the spiritual guides or "initiators" of the primordial believers, that is, those beings who swear fealty to the Imams prior to materiality in the physical world. As well, the author touches upon the depiction of the Imams' precognition of all states and affairs prior to creation of the worldly domain. After this, Moezzi turns to questions of the heavenly ascension and presence of the first Shi'i Imam, 'Alī, within the paradisiacal realms, followed by an analysis of the Imams' charismatic and supernatural abilities as illustrated within Shi'i *hadith* literature. The section ends with a discussion of the complex and notoriously difficult-to-translate concept of *walāya,* particularly as it applies to 'Alī and his descendants, and an examination of the spiritual divisions of humankind according to Shi'i exegetical thought.

In the third section, the author begins with an exploration of the pivotal role of the first Imam, 'Alī, as the ultimate source of esoteric interpretation (*ta'wīl*) of the Qur'ān, looking at a poetic piece by the famous seventeenth-century Iranian philosopher and theologian Mulla Sadra. This is followed by an examination of modern-day accounts of mystical encounters with the Imams, traditionally thought to constitute a means of "accessing" the otherwise inaccessible and incomprehensible divine reality. Moezzi notes that it is through the spiritual organ known as the "heart" (*qalb*) that the devotee can experience the Imam's metaphysical reality (340). The section closes with a brief analysis of supplication (*du'ā'*) in Twelver Shi'i thought, drawing largely on the writings of the French scholar of Islam, Henry Corbin (d. 1978).

The fourth and final section of the work provides a survey of Shi'i conceptions of eschatology. Moezzi begins with a discussion of the messianic role of the Hidden Imam in Twelver Shi'i doctrine, whose re-appearance within temporal history serves a two-fold purpose: first, to bring about the "end of time" (*ākhir al-zamān*), leading the forces of "intellect" (*aql*) to victory against those of "ignorance (*jahl*), ending the primordial battle between light and darkness and returning the universe to its original state (*ma'ād*); second, to guide the faithful to the fulfillment of their pre-eternal covenant with the celestial Imam (429). The author continues by forwarding

a classification of encounters with the Hidden Imam as recorded in Twelver Shi'i sources and touching upon their soteriological implications. Lastly, Moezzi briefly looks at esoteric interpretations of the Occultation of the Hidden Imam within the writings of the Shaykhiyya school of Shi'i thought.

Although the majority of Shi'i primary sources consulted by the author were penned by figures in the Twelver tradition, many of the narrations quoted from these works are attributed to 'Ali ibn Abi Talib, extending their significance to Zaydis, Ismailis and other Shi'i groups. Additionally, narrations from figures such as 'Ali Zayn al-'Abidin, Muhammad al-Baqir, and Jafar al-Sadiq within these sources, take on religious and spiritual significance within a broader conceptualization of the Shi'i faith than the author implies. Nevertheless, it is to Moezzi's credit that he states (albeit in a later footnote) that most of the traditions attributed to early Imams such as Muhammad al-Baqir and Jafar al-Sadiq are common to both Twelver and Isma'ili Shi'ism (245).

The strength of Moezzi's work lies in its ability to not only bring together a spectrum of secondary sources on Shi'i thought in various European languages, but also to critically engage with Arabic and Persian primary texts, many of which may be previously unknown to non-specialists. Further, discussion of the censorship of well-known beliefs and practices by non-Shi'i authors, such as pre-Islamic kinship rituals between Muhammad, 'Ali, and Muhammad's grandsons Hasan and Husayn, highlights the need to critically re-assess existing understandings of Shi'ism within the discourse of Islamic history. To this end, *The Spirituality of Shi'i Islam: Beliefs and Practices* is a perfect starting-point.

Religion and Human Rights: An Introduction.
John Witte, Jr. and M. Christian Green (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. ISBN: 9780199733446. Pp. 416.
Reviewed by Richard Greydanus, McGill University

A downside to the present proliferation of edited collections, purportedly organized around single topics, is the loss of inter-textual coherence. But the reality of academic specialization seems to mean that no one author will any longer dare attempt to tackle the multiple problematics arising out of any given issue. This impressive volume, introducing historical, theoretical, and contemporary considerations of the relationship between religious beliefs and the legal rights accruing to human beings *qua* human being, compiled by John Witte, Jr. and M. Christian Green, manages to accomplish the sort of integral purpose that typically requires a single author. Guided by the considerations, more obviously, that human rights are indispensable

to democratic regimes and, less obviously, that human rights and religion need each other, the volume aims "to provide authoritative but accessible treatment of... [the] fundamentals of religion and human rights" (xv). Each essay responds to a secular undertow dragging rights discourse towards individualism, the libertarian privatization of religious beliefs, and the exaggeration of the role of the state *vis à vis* other forms of community. The result gleaned by an attentive reader is a thickly woven conception of human life that brings together personal and communal aspirations, is unafraid of traditional inheritances, and, perhaps most importantly, interrogates assumptions regarding the relationship between religious beliefs and secularity.

This volume extends the presentation of an earlier volume, *Religious Human Right in Global Perspective* (1996), edited by Witte and Johan D. van der Vyver, which focussed solely on the western revelatory monotheisms. The *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (UDHR) (1948) is never far from the thoughts of the editors and essayists, the status of its supposedly secular pedigree subject to question. To combat simplistic accounts of secularity *as* the eventual displacement of religious belief, those articles of the *Declaration* that respond constructively to religious beliefs are analyzed. Representatives of many of the major religious traditions on the drafting committee, who shared in common a set of practical ideals, defended religious interests by promoting freedoms of association and conscience.

Divided into two parts, the volume tackles the problematic status of the concept religion from complementary vantages. The first half treats the possible relationships between different religious traditions and the international legal tradition stemming from the UDHR. Individual essays examine human rights discourse in the context of the three revelatory monotheisms, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, three of the eastern wisdom traditions, Buddhism, Confucianism, and Hinduism, as well as native (or indigenous) spiritualities. Whether human rights should be seen as a universal good or as a product of a particular culture context receives attention from the various contributors. David Novak, for example, negotiates a Jewish perspective which holds that all human beings were created in the image of God, but the people of Israel, for better or worse, were singled out by God as his chosen people. Exploring the potential contributions Hinduism makes to human rights discourse, in particular the altruism entailed by the essential oneness of all things, Werner Menski fights against Western conceptions of Hinduism as essentially contrary to human rights. Joseph Chan similarly works to place some distance between his readers and conceptions of Confucianism as inherently authoritarian, to develop a more nuanced account of human rights as a legal fallback position, required when and where virtuous relationships between persons no longer flourish.

The second half of the volume questions whether the right to freedom of religion is merely the sum of other rights, like the freedoms of association,

conscience, expression, self-determination, and thought, or whether, though it borrows heavily, it is more than simply the sum of other rights. In Articles 2 and 18 of the UDHR, freedom of religion is placed alongside the freedoms of thought and conscience, but leaves very little by way of clues to help distinguish the former from one or both of the latter. A tight conceptual definition is not forthcoming, but absent freedom of religion, a number of the contributors argue, claims to possess other freedoms tend to lose their potency. Steven Smith describes how the right to freedom of conscience, whereby one dissents from commonly held opinions, has been eclipsed by the strict religious neutrality of rights to equality. The intimate connection between the freedoms of association and religion, explored by Natan Lerner, is underscored when state law encroaches upon the autonomy of religious communities. Contra a tendency towards secular homogeneity, a number of the essayists call attention to the distinction drawn in the UDHR between the freedom of religion or belief and the freedom to manifest one's right or belief. The first may be termed an absolute right, but the second is only a derivative, and so a relative, right, subject to constraint from collective concerns like the common good.

What is perhaps most remarkable about this carefully compiled volume is that the individual voices of the authors, reflecting particular concerns and interests, are not suppressed by editorial intentions. Questions of cultural particularity and universality or individual and communal rights are left open-ended by the editors, allowing the authors to explore the problematics arising out of them. The editors nonetheless retain their conviction that religion and human rights discourse should inform each other, rather than be held at arms length from each other. Borrowing wisdom found in a famous turn of phrase offered by a Catholic philosopher sitting on the UDHR drafting committee, Jacques Maritain, human rights are universal in aspiration, even if not in acclamation or application, "as long as no one asks why" (20). Not the conclusion to the matter, this observation serves as the springboard for further questions. What will happen when increased globalization forces the "why" question? Is the normative content of particular religions to be set aside, or is it to be plumbed for further inspiration? Witte and Green suggest that contemporary human rights occupies a middle position, in Antique terminology, analogous to that of common law between natural and civil law, responsive to matters of both transcendent and immediate import.

The Faith of the Faithless: Experiments in Political Theology.
Simon Critchley. New York and London: Verso, 2012.
ISBN: 9781781681688. Pp. 281.
Reviewed by Ali Jones, University of Alberta

Simon Critchley's *The Faith of the Faithless* begins, rather fittingly, in a parable. Crafting a self-consciously poetic conception of meaning, he constructs a modern attitude of faithless faith and a deeply personal account of how to live an ethical life in a modern, secular context. The text is a series of meditations on what Wilde's phrase "everything to be true must become a religion" (3) might mean in our contemporary political world. This "experiment" begins after the death of God, and stems from the need to address and to try to remedy the contemporary "dilemma of politics and belief" (3). Overall, Critchley has written an incredibly creative and engaging text, well grounded in both contemporary scholarly debate and canonical philosophical literature. It propounds an infinitely demanding ethics through a call not only to political subjectivity but also to an ontology of love.

The text can only be read as a continuation of Critchley's previous work *Infinitely Demanding*, which attempts to address and remedy a "philosophy [that] begins in disappointment" (ID1). In this earlier text, he identifies "religions and politics" as the two most urgent manifestations of this "taxonomy of disappointment" (ID2), which clearly lays the groundwork for this second text. Indeed, *Faith of the Faithless* itself lacks clearly stated definitions of the terms "ethical" or "infinite demand," which forces the reader to rely heavily upon this earlier text for clarification. Critchley continues this earlier project by responding to this ethical demand with the notion of a faith that "does not give up on truth, but transfigures its meaning" (3) into a "faith for the faithless." Relying largely on Rousseau, his general goal over these texts is not only to "arrest [the] slide" of political life "into demotivated cynicism," but also to create an artificial "motivating and authorizing faith which, while not reducible to a specific context, might be capable of forming solidarity in a locality" (4).

The text also situates itself in the lively contemporary scholarly discussion about secularism and the "return of religion." This debate exists among scholars as diverse as Talal Asad (2003), Judith Butler (2011), Charles Taylor (2007), Jürgen Habermas (2010), Hent de Vries and Laurence Sullivan (2006), and Slavoj Žižek (2000–2012), to name only a few. Critchley also relies heavily upon Heidegger, Rousseau, Kant, and, I shall argue later, implicitly upon Nietzsche. As we shall see, his foray into these debates provides some of the most engaging and creative parts of this text. Furthermore, such a debate is quite timely, for as he explains, "[s]omehow, we seem to have passed from a secular age, which we were ceaselessly told was post-metaphysical, to a new situation in which political action seems to

flow directly from metaphysical conflict" (8). However, Critchley questions whether we must now "either defend a version of secularism or quietly accept the slide into some form of theism? This book refuses such an either/or option" (8). Instead, he attempts to create a third way, creating a political and ethically responsible attitude of faithless faith that is consciously self-chosen, with symbols and meaning purely of "my own creating" (4) without relying on an external God. This, in his argument, is thus more rigorous, and "arguably truer" than traditional belief, as it relies only upon itself to "proclaim itself into being at each instant without [the] guarantees or security" provided by "creedal dogma" or "the institution of the church" (18). Such a faithless faith requires a constant and active self-creation, and thus is far more subjectively ethical than the passive acceptance of an external faith system.

The text is structured in "four historical and philosophical investigations into the dangerous interdependence of politics and religion" (8), which he argues are not necessarily united, but instead are "relatively self-contained" (20). The first, Chapter Two, investigates Rousseau's argument for a civil religion, in order to "bind together a polity and ensure that its citizens will take an active interest in the process of collective legislation that constitutes a self-determining political life" (9). Of particular interest is his argument that a society of "the festival is just the presence to itself of the people in the process of its enactment" (56). The basis of his argument is a radically individual conception of self-creation, which he explains is both "diagnostic and normative"(10) to create a "supreme fiction." This "fiction of the absolute…would be a fiction that we know to be a fiction and yet in which we believe nonetheless" (93). This is comparable to Kant's poetic truth that shows "the radical dependency" of our systems of thought upon "the creative, ultimately imaginative activity of the subject" (91). In addition to a reflection upon subjectivity and the origins of this fiction, Critchley explores questions of sovereignty and the creation and origin of political subjects as a body.

Chapter Three examines the notions of original sin in politics, and is most notable for the dualism he establishes between John Gray's "political realism" and Carl Schmitt's "state authoritarianism." If politics are needed by humans to defend themselves from their own sinful nature, then Schmitt's concepts of dictatorship are justified. Similarly, Gray's "passive nihilism" argues that due to our sinful nature, nothing can be done, so we should retreat to mysticism, poetry, pleasure, and the "politics of the least worst." Any further action only "momentarily stav[es] off the threat of meaninglessness" (114).

Critchley sets up this rigid dualism in order to then argue that there is a third path, that of an "ethical neo-anarchism, in which anarchist practices of political organization are coupled with an infinitely demanding subjective ethics of responsibility" (117). While his conception of this attitude of an "ethics of responsibility" is fascinating and richly rewarding, the text lacks a sustained

examination of what this would look like in practice. His examination of the historical and mystical Movement of the Free Spirit and the evisceration of the self is interesting, but offers little suggestion of relevant or contemporary practice, except pointing vaguely toward an attitude of love. Indeed, it seems that much of Critchley's argument can be summarized as simply that of an ethical attitude of love and responsibility, with the details to be worked out later.

Furthermore, the somewhat simplistic dualism established between Gray and Schmitt not only relies heavily upon and repeats his previous examinations of "active and passive nihilism" in *Infinitely Demanding*, but also seems to neglect its obvious origins in Nietzsche's notion of "active" and "passive" nihilism in *The Will to Power* (22–23). Indeed, his "active nihilism" mirrors what Nietzsche describes as the totalitarian urge of "a violent force of destruction" (*WP* 23), which in Critchley's words seeks "to destroy the world and bring another into being"(*ID* 5). "Passive Nihilism," or "the weary nihilism that no longer attacks; its most famous form, Buddhism" (*WP* 23) parallels Gray's interest in Taoism and Nietzsche's critique of "European Buddhism," which Crichtley does cite (115). Indeed, the entire notion of a self-willed supreme fiction, poetic but therefore affirmative, echoes Nietzsche's own solution to these two forms of nihilism. Bernard Reginster's (2006) text *The Affirmation of Life* could have been helpful in this context. Critchley does acknowledges that the "philosophical task set by Nietzsche and followed by many others in the Continental tradition is how to respond to nihilism, or better, how to resist nihilism" (*ID* 2), but then does not explicitly rely on his thought to any extensive degree after that. Instead, Critchley seems to evade using Nietzsche, instead relying on Kant for the aesthetic and poetic notion of creative fiction. He does not justify why such obvious reliance is unmentioned, but perhaps should, in order to explain why his solution is not simply a recapitulation of Nietzsche's proposed revaluation of values.

Perhaps, however, Critchley is tiptoeing around Nietzsche because his next meditation begins a dense but provocative reading of Heidegger and Paul, which roots authenticity in an "affirmation of weakness and impotence"(14). Critchley might be avoiding tackling the jarring discord between Nietzsche's affirmative strength and this Heideggarian emphasis on weakness. In his examination of Heidegger's use of Paul, he explores how the human being is "defined by an experience of enactment"(14), and the self must "proclaim itself into existence in a situation of crisis where what is called for is a decisive political intervention"(13). Emphasizing Heidegger's "affirmation of weakness"(181) and the "orientation of the self towards something that exceeds oneself"(182), Critchley continues his explorations of original sin, locating the self in a sense of debt. While this emphasis on weakness and debt make sense as the foundation of an ethics of radical responsibility, unfortunately, the lingering residue of original sin can leave a bad taste in readers' mouths.

Furthermore, a reader is left to wonder why the only possible conception of faith must necessarily be Christian, and cannot escape this sense of original sin. Even though Rousseau's appeal to Voltaire stated that "there should be a catechism of the citizen, analogous to the articles of Christian faith"(9), Critchley's solution could have been greatly enhanced by considering other notions of religion as a way of life, especially the poststructuralist Judaism of Jacques Derrida or Judith Butler. An engagement with literature such as Caputo's (1997) *The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion Without Religion* could have provided an excellent avenue for investigation that does not have to re-create a baggage-ridden neo-Christian faith.

As compensation for these frustrations, Chapter Five begins the most lively and engaging part of the text, as Critchley enters the debate around Benjamin's notion of violence. With a nod to Judith Butler, he examines Levinas and the inherent fragility of the notion of ethical and divine violence. Particularly interesting is his engagement with "the neighbour" as a threat to and violence toward the "autonomy of the self" (223). This is especially fascinating when read alongside Reinhard, Santner, and Žižek's (2006) debates on the subject. Critchley turns the absolute command "thou shall not kill" into a "plumb line" or "rule of thumb"—a model but no longer a blanket command to be followed blindly (221-227). Indeed, he explains, ethical "action is guided by taking a decision in a situation that is strictly undecidable, and where responsibility consists in the acceptance of an ineluctable double bind" (221). This critique of "simple-minded, blanket denunciations" (18) leads back to his long-standing debate with Žižek. In a brilliant retort, Critchley the patient parent places the angry teenager Žižek on a couch and calmly explains that totalizing demands are the demands of an immature, perfectionist quietism. This naïve stance demands "all or nothing" solutions, fantasizes about glorious violence, and refuses to acknowledge the intricate nuances of a political reality that does not always adhere exactly to an obsessive, black and white and perfectly tidy theoretical stance. Instead, Critchley advocates a more mature attitude of ethics, which would allow varied, situation-specific, and effective responses that actually contribute to the "concrete struggles in which we are engaged" (18). Such a short summary cannot do justice to what is an incredibly witty, fascinating, and timely chapter, and which allows the reader to really enter the debate with Žižek in a balanced manner. Critchley's text is worth reading for this chapter alone.

The text ends with love as the motivating force for this ethical politics. Critchley presents a parable to neatly return to his poignant introductory note that "when it comes to the political question of what might motivate a subject to act in concert with others, rationality alone is insufficient" (19). Instead, in a world that seems to have wholeheartedly returned to religion, it only seems fair that an ethic of resistance also utilize the tools of passion, emotion, and belief—an argument that also resonates with Critchley's critique of Žižek. To adopt this loving attitude willingly

is, in Critchley's argument, a stronger, more rigorous, and more ethically demanding action. This affirmative stance unites his deeply personal, highly engaging, and compelling account of a post-Christian ethics and a faith for the faithless.

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The Early Text of the New Testament.

Charles E. Hill and Michael J. Kruger (eds.). Oxford: OUP, 2012.
ISBN: 9780199566365. Pp. xiv + 483.
Reviewed by Brice C. Jones, Concordia University

According to the introduction ("In Search of the Earliest Text of the New Testament"), the editors state that the main goal of this volume is "to provide an inventory and some analysis of the evidence available for understanding the pre-fourth-century period of the transmission of the NT materials" (2). The book is divided into three main sections: (1) "The Textual and Scribal Culture of Early Christianity"; (2) "The Manuscript Tradition"; and (3) "Early Citation and Use of New Testament Writings."

The essays in the first section are devoted to various topics concerning the literary culture of early Christianity, with essays on "The Book Trade in the Roman Empire" (Harry Y. Gamble), "Indicators of 'Catholicity' in Early Gospel Manuscripts" (Scott Charlesworth), "Manuscripts and the Sociology of Early Christian Reading" (Larry Hurtado), and "Early Christian Attitudes toward the Reproduction of Texts" (Michael J. Kruger). The second section is comprised of essays that are more specifically focused on the evaluation of individual manuscripts of the early papyri (and a few early parchments) of the Gospels (Tommy Wasserman, Peter M. Head, Juan Hernández Jr., Juan Chapa), Acts (Christopher Tuckett), Paul (James R. Royse), the Catholic Epistles (J. K. Elliott), and Revelation (Tobias

Nicklas), as well as one final chapter on the early versions (Peter Williams). The essays in the final section examine the text of the New Testament in early Christian writings, such as the Apostolic Fathers (Paul Foster), Marcion (Dieter T. Roth), Justin (Joseph Verheyden), Tatian's Diatessaron (Tjitze Baarda), Apocryphal literature (Stanley E. Porter), Irenaeus (D. Jeffrey Bingham and Billy R. Todd, Jr.), and Clement (Carl P. Cosaert), with one essay devoted to citation techniques in the second century (Charles E. Hill).

If there is one term that keeps resurfacing in this book it is "early." Not only do we find the term in the title of the book, it is also present in the titles of fourteen of the twenty-one essays. The agenda of the volume seems to be reflected in the title of the introduction: "In Search of the Earliest Text of the New Testament." While the individual authors express different views concerning concepts such as the "early text," "original text," "initial text," or *Ausgangstext*, the editors in the introduction state clearly that the traditional goal of New Testament textual criticism, namely, seeking the "original text," should be upheld (4). This thinking goes against the grain of the "new textual criticism" (a phrase used by J.K. Elliott elsewhere), where working toward an original text has been generally subordinated (though not completely abandoned) to other objectives that focus on plotting out the history of the text. The book's emphasis on the "early" manuscripts of the New Testament, i.e., manuscripts dated before around 350 CE, is also problematic, since an early date is not necessarily determinative of textual quality. As Elliott rightly states in his chapter, "to emphasize their [i.e., the papyri] early dates is deceptive. The age of a manuscript is of no significance when assessing textual variation, unless we know how many stages there were between the autograph and that copy and also what changes were made at each of the intervening stages. No one has such information" (223). I am still waiting for the day that textual critics give as much attention to the many later majuscule manuscripts as they do the papyri, which continue to take the spotlight, but I will not hold my breath.

In stressing the "early" and the "original," one gets the overall impression that the motives of the editors may be apologetic in nature. In addition to the introduction, two other essays evince further an apologetic tone. Co-editor Michael Kruger's essay attempts to combat the view that the early text was unstable and corrupt by showing that "this is not necessarily how early Christians viewed these texts or how they approached their transmission" (65). Kruger provides several examples from early Christian writings as evidence, such as the *Didache*, Revelation, Irenaeus, Dionysius, etc.; however, not all of the examples he provides are as "express" as he claims. For example, in Gal 3:15, Paul's reference to the annulment of a covenant does not refer in any way to the text of the New Testament, yet Kruger lists it in his "select examples" (73) that are said to reflect the attitude toward the reproduction of the New Testament. He also cites (75) as another example a passage from the *Epistle*

of Barnabas (19.11), which states, "You shall guard what you have received, nor add or take away." Kruger then argues that that which is received "likely" signifies written traditions about Jesus. However, it is not at all clear that the phrase "what you have received" is referring to a New Testament text. It could just as well (and more likely does) refer to some kind of catechetical teaching, extant or otherwise, written or oral. We simply do not know to what the phrase is referring. So, to say that these examples serve as evidence that "early Christians, *as a whole*, valued their texts as scripture and did not view unbridled textual changes as acceptable" (79; italics mine) is both dubious and reductionistic.

In his essay, Scott Charlesworth takes two indicators of "catholicity," the codex and *nomina sacra*, to be a corrective to Walter Bauer's thesis that second-century Christianity consisted solely of Christian diversity or heterodoxy without any form of centralized theological uniformity. His two scribal "indicators," however, are not valid criteria for arguing for "catholicity" (on his definition) over against Bauer's thesis. Bauer was mainly concerned with ideological/theological diversities, and while I agree with Charlesworth that his two indicators do seem to reflect some systematic uniformity early on, early Christian collaboration on issues related to *text-production* (Charlesworth's two indicators) does not necessarily imply collaboration and consensus on matters theological. It is true that some scholars have argued that the codex and *nomina sacra* carry certain theological implications (e.g., the "Four Gospel codex," *nomina sacra* as expressions of Christian piety), but scribal conventions generally do not tell us anything about theological unity or diversity in early Christianity. Christians could have agreed on certain scribal methods and practices related to text-production early on without agreeing on the larger theological issues, practices, and beliefs.

The introduction (written by the co-editors) and the essays by Kruger (a co-editor) and Charlesworth are, therefore, perhaps suggestive of the underlying motives of the editors: (1) to privilege the "early text," (2) to argue that the Christians copied their texts with care and that these "attitudes" about their texts have "broad attestation" (79) and are "remarkably uniform (ibid.)," and (3) to argue that the "earliest papyri" overthrow Bauer's thesis of early Christian diversity, since these papyri "are indicative of 'catholic' collaboration and consensus, presumably among the 'orthodox'" (47). The conservative and apologetic undertones in these arguments are clear. None of the arguments, however, is tenable.

Lest the above assessment sound too unfavorable, I must state that the volume as a whole is excellent. The essays in section two provide detailed analyses of each pre—fourth–century papyrus for each book of the New Testament, which can be used as a kind of reference for the early papyri of the New Testament. The approach and layout of each chapter in this section was apparently left up to the authors (other than the discussions of the Alands' judgments about the freedom or

strictness of each text, which every contributor was asked to include [18]), since there are various points of focus, such as textual analysis, scribal habits, variants, etc. Elliott's evaluation of the papyri containing the Catholic Epistles stands out from other chapters in terms of approach, in that it examines how the text of the papyri relate to the text established by the *Editio Critica Maior*. In his evaluation of the text of Matthew's Gospel, Wasserman adopts the method of Kyoung Shik Min, which maps the correspondence between the text of the papyri and that of the NA[27]. Here I should say that I found the approach and format of Wasserman's essay to be the most clear of all the essays.

Overall, this book is an important addition to our field and thus is to be recommended to anyone interested in the text of the New Testament, in spite of the apparent apologetic predispositions on the part of the editors. It should be noted that there are numerous typographical errors, which I list here: "Papryi" (p9); "P.Papyrus inv. 2" (47); "διαθήκη-γ˝ρ" (73); "δεκαπντε" (92); incorrect chart (97); "7/1" should be 7/12 in chart (98); "Manuscript" (105); "suggests that were" (109 n.2); "edition." (114); P in "P⁴⁵" is without Unicode (115); "ι<ει" (127); "Jesus affirmation" (149); "identity" should be "identical" (164); "Leonidas" should be "Leonides" (187 n.49); Coptic conjunction "AYO" should be "AYW" (243); "collection of come kind" (267); "what he though" (274); last word of *Did*. 3b in Table 15.1 is ὑμᾶς but should be ὑμῶν (286); "κριθῆτε.ε᾿ν" in Matt 7:1 in Table 15.2 (289).

The Thunder: Perfect Mind: A New Translation and Introduction.
Hal Taussig, Jared Calaway, Maia Kotrosits, Celene Lillie, and Justin Lasser. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
ISBN: 978-0230105638. Pp. xii + 189.
Reviewed by Stéphanie Machabée, McGill University

This book is a collaborative volume between Visiting Professor of New Testament at Union Theological Seminary in New York, Hal Taussig, and a team of students, who selected *The Thunder: Perfect Mind (Thunder)* from the Nag Hammadi corpus as the major text for their semester work in 2007 (xi). This book is divided into ten chapters and includes the Coptic version of *Thunder*, along with the editors' English translation of the text. This volume is a close literary analysis of *Thunder* and provides reflections on the meanings it has "in relationship to society, gender, violence, and identity through the ways in which it has been written and performed" (viii).

Thunder is the second text in codex VI of the corpus of manuscripts discovered at Nag Hammadi in 1945. The voice of *Thunder* uses "I am" statements in a powerful

and paradoxical way, expressing bold and shocking statements, such as "I am the whore and the holy woman / I am the wife and the virgin." The first chapter of this collaborative volume provides introductory remarks on *Thunder*, including the editors' strong concern with the text's intense focus on gender. They feel that the standard G.W. MacRae translation under-translates the gendered dimensions of *Thunder*. They remark that the voice of the text also actively identifies itself as masculine, occasionally adopting the Coptic masculine copula "pe" self-referentially. These editors therefore strive to reflect these Coptic nuances in their English translation.

The second chapter discusses *Thunder*'s literary genre. *Thunder* seems to be an overlap of two major ancient literary traditions: aretalogies and wisdom mythology. While *Thunder* shares many similarities with these genres, simultaneously, it also subverts them. The listener of *Thunder* is presented with images that are often "puzzling, contrasting, and offensive" (18). The third chapter disputes the tendency in scholarship to characterize *Thunder* as "Gnostic." Applying this suspect category to the text places it in "the kind of oversimplified category that the poem is actively seeking to disintegrate" (28).

The fourth chapter surveys the literary patterns, such as paradox, inversion, and contradiction, which strategically function in *Thunder* in order to subvert and challenge social understandings. The fifth chapter focuses more closely on the involvement of gender within the work. The common tendency of invoking *Thunder* "as a positive imagination of the feminine divine" (42) is acknowledged, but so are the complications in these kinds of readings. The editors apply postmodern gender theory to *Thunder* and view the text's interest in subverting binary categories of logic as bespeaking "deconstruction rather than 'empowerment'" (43).

The sixth chapter applies a generalized sociocultural analysis to the text's language. Its language is situated within the prominent honour-shame and patron-client systems of the ancient Mediterranean world. It is concluded that *Thunder* actively focuses on these systems, along with the category of gender, making these categories "less eternal and more vulnerable to shifts and ambiguities of power, status, and identity" (60). The next chapter discusses the intersection of violence and identity in *Thunder*. The voice of the text is the victim of violence, and therefore "identity itself is a kind of violence" in *Thunder* (62). The dynamics between the "I" and "You" of the text confuse the constituents of existence.

The eighth chapter looks at the poetic quality of *Thunder*. In their translation, the editors make the first attempt to present the Coptic text in poetic format. This is an interesting decision that appears successful, for it highlights well the ample parallelisms and contradictions of *Thunder*. The ninth chapter contemplates the performance of *Thunder* in the ancient world. It discusses the probability of *Thunder* being performed and what kind of performance it may have been. This chapter is

only a preliminary study, but it does bring attention to the tendency in scholarship to treat such texts as solely written material. If *Thunder* was performed, it is fascinating to think what kind of reaction it may have wished to incite in its audience.

The final chapter concludes some of the discussions of the previous chapters and reflects on the role of *Thunder* in today's society. The text's challenge and critique of gender and other social categories can also be applied to modern issues regarding identity. Lastly, there is the Coptic edition of *Thunder* and the editors' own English translation. These are accompanied by extensive annotations that justify some of the editors' unconventional translation decisions and demonstrate knowledge of other existing translations.

This volume represents the first book-length treatment in English of *Thunder*. In summary, it applies various methodologies to the text and approaches it by looking at different issues that affect the ancient meanings of *Thunder* and the potential interpretations for today's world. At times the chapters can be repetitive, where the editors discuss issues that were dealt with in previous chapters, with the insights worded only slightly different. Overall though, this volume brings attention to some issues that have not been dealt with adequately in the scholarship on *Thunder*.

This volume is commendable for not simply treating *Thunder* as a "Gnostic" text, as is often the tendency in scholarship. The editors have done great work in opening the door for the scholarship on the performance of *Thunder*, where much potential lies. The editors make some fascinating observations regarding gender blurring and destabilization due to the presence of both masculine and feminine copulas in the Coptic text, but some of the arguments begin to fall apart when one considers that *Thunder* is likely a Greek to Coptic translation. These observations may not hold up as well with the non-gendered ἐγώ εἰμι of Greek. The editors have chosen to highlight the gender nuances found in the Coptic that are difficult to translate in English, a decision which may be controversial to other scholars of the field, but it offers a fresh perspective on *Thunder* that paves new possibilities in understanding the intent of such a bizarre, yet fascinating, ancient text.

The Salvation of the Flesh in Tertullian of Carthage: Dressing for the Resurrection.
Carly Daniel-Hughes. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.
ISBN: 9780230117730. Pp. 192.
Reviewed by Jennifer Otto, McGill University

It is a pleasure to review *The Salvation of the Flesh in Tertullian of Carthage: Dressing for the Resurrection*, the first monograph by Carly Daniel-Hughes,

Assistant Professor of Early Christianities in the department of Religious Studies at Concordia University, and a friend and colleague of the Faculty of Religious Studies, McGill University.

In this focussed study, an adaptation of her Harvard dissertation, Daniel-Hughes re-examines Tertullian's treatises on dress (*On the Pallium*, *On the Apparel of Women* 1 and 2, and *On the Veiling of Virgins*), contending that far from being frivolous, Tertullian's interest in bodily adornment is deeply connected to his understanding of the salvation of the flesh. She further argues that Tertullian's treatises on women's dress must be read in light of the strict moral hierarchy that he establishes between male and female flesh, conceiving the flesh of the Christian woman as historically and ontologically inferior than that of the Christian man, who has been remade in the image of Christ, deeply imbued with the shame of Eve's sin. Approaching these treatises from an explicitly feminist perspective, Daniel-Hughes attempts to retrieve the voices of the women addressed by Tertullian, asking, "what did women in Tertullian's community do, indeed what could they do, with the semiotic burden that he, like so many church fathers, invested in their corporeal performances?" (12).

Chapter One begins with a survey of Imperial sources, both literary and material, which are put to use to illustrate the function of external dress and behaviour as an extension of the individual's moral virtue in Roman discourse. Drawing on recent research in Classics and Fashion Theory, Daniel-Hughes demonstrates how dress and adornment were employed to re-enforce gendered conceptions of morality. A proper matron's restrictive dress, including the *vittae*, *palla*, and *stola*, announced her modesty (*pudicitia*) and sexual exclusivity, while the toga-clad man demonstrated his control (*imperium*) over himself and others via his mastery of the proper folds and draping of his costume. Excessive or ostentatious clothing worn by both women and men were invoked as evidence of Oriental influence that introduced a threateningly effeminate luxury to Rome.

Chapter Two examines Tertullian's short oration *On the Pallium* as an instance of refashioning masculinity in opposition to Roman conceptions of manliness symbolized by the toga. Daniel-Hughes demonstrates how Tertullian recasts the semiotics of the *pallium* as the appropriately simple dress of the Christian man who does not seek political glory. In this speech, Tertullian reverses the established gendered connotations of the *pallium* and the toga, associating the latter with luxury and incontinence, while imbuing the *pallium* with discipline and virility. On Daniel-Hughes's reading, *On the Pallium* reflects "Tertullian's reconfigured masculinity [which] encompassed virtues, like patience and even submission, which were once conceived of in Roman gender ideology as feminized" (60). In spite of its absorption of "feminine" traits, Daniel-Hughes shows that Tertullian's construction of masculinity persists in its assertion of male privilege and female subordination.

Tertullian's two treatises *On the Apparel of Women* are the primary focus in Chapter Three, which Daniel-Hughes opens by quoting Tertullian's inflammatory accusation, "Don't you know that you are an Eve? Don't you know that you are the devil's gateway?" (63). She begins by attempting to reconcile this misogynist charge with Tertullian's "seeming commitment to the salvation of women and men alike," drawing on a selective reading of *On the Resurrection of the Dead*, *On the Flesh of Christ*, *On the Soul*, and *Against Marcion* to argue that Tertullian "suggested that a qualitative difference pertains to male and female fleshly bodies and souls that reflects and thus supports a gender economy figured in a hierarchical mode" (67). Daniel-Hughes reads the distinction between male and female flesh as actively informing Tertullian's understanding of the incarnation, in which men's flesh is remade in the sinless image of Christ, while women's flesh, conceived primarily as the locus of birth (and, therefore, the cause of death) persists in bearing the burden of shame. She reasons:

"A man's freedom results from the fact that no humility is incumbent upon Christ, after whom he is modeled. Christ's death unmoored the stain of sin from the flesh, his virginal flesh promises the very glory of heaven itself. What garb, indeed, could improve on that (Cor. 14.3-4)? [sic.] Yet a woman's flesh is not made in the image of Christ. Women have, like Mary, absorbed shame in their flesh—the price paid to preserve Christ's purity and his redemptive power. Their fleshly bodies stand, it seems, on the other side of the redemptive equation from Christ and men's own, as a testimony to the necessity of salvation" (72).

Daniel-Hughes proceeds to read the treatises *On the Apparel of Women* according to this gendered hierarchy, where men's flesh is symbolically charged with glory, women's with shame. Tertullian, she argues, insists "that women's moral decrepitude is revealed on their fleshly bodies" (73). Cosmetics, jewellery, and costly clothing is wasted, "tantamount to decorating something that is dead and dying" (76). According to Daniel-Hughes, Tertullian promotes modest dress as "the recitation of a woman's shame through its constraint" (82).

Concluding that "it is hard to imagine such hyperbole would persuade a female audience," Daniel-Hughes suggests that Christian women likely attached alternative meanings to their own adornment (82-83). Surveying sartorial artefacts and portrait busts, Daniel-Hughes concludes that "women enjoyed fashioning themselves as an assertion of their wealth and status" (83). Although maintaining that "there are countless reasons why [women] would don handsome clothing and ornamentation, and indeed, too, why they would not see such practices as incommensurate with their religious life" (90), Daniel-Hughes articulates only pleasure and the assertion of wealth and status. Given the strongly ascetic ethic attributed to second-century Christianity in many of our extant sources, Daniel-Hughes's claim that the women's adornment was not "incommensurate with their religious life" would be more

persuasive if buttressed by supporting evidence from early Christian texts or demonstrably Christian material culture.

Chapter Three ends with the speculation that Tertullian's criticism of extravagant female dress indicates an attempt to maintain power over a large and potentially threatening subset of his community consisting of wealthy women. This possibility is further explored in Chapter Four, which turns its attention to *On the Veiling of Virgins*. Daniel-Hughes rightly points out that the treatise hangs on the interpretation of scripture, namely, on the meaning of γυνή in 1 Corinthians 11. Tertullian aims to discredit his opponent's claim that virgins are not "women" according to the definition of the apostle Paul and, thus, continent women are not required to veil themselves in the Christian assembly. Daniel-Hughes is more successful in retrieving the voices of these unveilers than she was those of the ostentatious dressers, as she makes use of the *Gospel of Mary Magdalene*, the *Acts of Thecla*, and the *Martyrdom of Perpetua and Felicitas* to argue that Tertullian's opponents understood their sexual continence to mitigate against the femininity of their flesh. She helpfully explains how Tertullian puts Stoic materialist theory of vision to use, arguing that male gaze upon the unveiled head of a virgin is a form of penetration, so that "every public exposure is the experience of sexual violation to a good virgin" (111, citing *On the Veiling of Virgins*, 1). Likewise, Tertullian describes the experience of being seen as active, rather than passive, constituting a threat to the continence of the virgins' brothers in Christ. By urging virgins to remain veiled, Daniel-Hughes contends that Tertullian attempts to limit the possible significations of their flesh, so that it continues to be regarded by the community as embodying shame and requiring constraint and submission.

Carly Daniel-Hughes contributes a provocative monograph that will be of interest to scholars of gender in early Christian and Roman imperial contexts. Throughout her study, however, Daniel-Hughes's reading of Tertullian minimizes the occasional and rhetorical contexts of Tertullian's writings that have been emphasized by scholars such as Geoffrey Dunn.[1] Tertullian's claims are presented as revealing his fixed position on a given issue, rather than as occasional arguments intended to persuade an audience. For example, Daniel-Hughes takes Tertullian's claim in *On the Military Crown* that "the Christian man is as free as even Christ is" as indicative of a consistent theological system in which men (and men only) have already undergone the transformation of their flesh. Daniel-Hughes does not engage with the immediate context of the citation, the practice of donning laurel crowns signalling submission to military commanders, a practice that Tertullian's

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1. Geoffrey D. Dunn, "Rhetoric and Tertullian's *De Virginibus Velandis*," *Vigilae Christianae* 59/1 (2005): 1-30.

Alexandrian contemporary, Clement, also condemns while making use of different arguments.[2]

Daniel-Hughes is to be commended for foregrounding the ways in which Tertullian constructs gender and employs those constructions in his rhetoric. As a result of her decision to read Tertullian's treatises through the lens of gender, however, Daniel-Hughes minimizes other factors that impinge upon Tertullian's argumentation in these texts. Thus, *On the Apparel of Women* is read primarily as the attempt by a man to control the practice of women, rather than, for example, as a proponent of asceticism railing against the temptations of artifice and luxury, despite the prominence of this theme in the work.[3] Similarly, *On the Veiling of Virgins* is interpreted as the complaint of a misogynist rather than of a (Montanist?) rigorist interpreter of Paul. Further, Daniel-Hughes does not pose the question of whether some women may have agreed with Tertullian.[4] The net result is that a reader unfamiliar with Tertullian's treatises would come away with a rather unbalanced impression of their contents.

Daniel-Hughes argues persuasively that Tertullian conceived of women's bodies as "perilous indicators of destruction and demise" more strongly associated with sin and death than those of men (116); whether the soteriological implications of that distinction are as extreme as she contends is left to the reader to determine. Still, Daniel-Hughes's monograph is a valuable contribution to the growing literature on the role of dress and adornment in the construction of early Christian identity.

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2. *Paed*. II.8. Although Daniel-Hughes's decision to limit her study to the works of Tertullian is understandable, a comparison with Clement, who treats similar issues in *Paedagogus* II.8, 10–13, III.1–3 and *Quis dives salvetur?*, would have provided a fuller picture of this debate in late second–century Christianity.

3. See especially 2.9, where Tertullian refers to men who have "sealed themselves up to eunuchood for the sake of the kingdom of God" and other mortifications of the flesh, including abstinence from wine and meat. I am also reminded of the famous quip of the Pythagorean Theano, who responded to a compliment on the beauty of her arms with the retort, "but they are not meant for public viewing." Plutarch, *Conjug. praec*. 142 D.

4. ". . . it is difficult to imagine a woman would comply with the advice offered in them or that she would willingly perform her shame and degradation" (72). This comment ignores Christian ascetics of both genders who have "performed their shame and degradation" in myriad ways over the centuries.

Dreams that Matter: Egyptian Landscapes of the Imagination.

Amira Mittermaier. Los Angeles and Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 2011.
ISBN: 978052025850/1. Pp. xv + 308.
Reviewed by Jessica L. Radin, University of Toronto

When picking up *Dreams that Matter*, it should be impossible to forget that Egypt right now is not quite the same Egypt in which this text was written. The extent to which Egypt has changed, and the nature and content of those changes, is still, at this point, in a constant state of flux. But this is a unique text, one that speaks both to an Egyptian winter that preceded the Spring, and offers interesting possibilities for thinking about the politics of imagination in post-Tahrir Egypt. This is not a book about the content of dreams, for a number of solid theoretical and practical reasons, but it is a book about the work that dreams do, and the way people interact around dreams. And since dreams are unlikely to disappear, neither will their power, and their importance, in Egypt today.

Mittermaier takes care to organize this text carefully, acknowledging from the outset that an analysis of dreams, or more precisely the landscape in which dreams have power both in themselves through their interpretation, is complicated and multi-layered. Chapter One, "Dream Trouble," lays out the historical background of dream interpretation within Islam, and specifically in the Muslim context. The primary focus of the chapter is on the nature of authority in dream interpretation and the extent to which dreams, and their interpretation, have been understood as a part of "true Islam." Dreams appear, in this chapter, to pose challenges to both reformists and strict traditionalists: to reformists because dreams operate outside the system of conventionally understood rationality, and to strict traditionalists because dreams and the ways that they can be interpreted can give rise to understandings of religious practices that differ from the understanding advocated by orthodox religious institutions. Introduced in this chapter, the particular challenges that dreams and their interpretations pose to both reformists and the strictly orthodox is a theme that continues throughout the book. Chapter Two focuses primarily on the dream interpreters themselves, their personal, intellectual, and religious background as well as their physical location in the geography of Cairo and the community concerned with the interpretation of dreams, including the physical location of dream interpreters, and the ways that dream interpretation often takes places in spaces that are simultaneously both public and private. Chapters Three and Four focus specifically on the ways that dreaming, both when awake and when asleep, challenges the primacy of visual evidence. Chapter Five has a more specific focus, and looks specifically at the ways that visitational dreams inform people's behaviour,

not only with the dead but with the living; visitational dreams, Mittermaier suggests, have the practical effect of reinforcing the necessity of important social behaviours. Chapter Six examines Western theory concerning the role and importance of dreams, and particularly the seminal role of Freud in defining the European understanding of dreams. Importantly, this chapter lays out the ways that Egyptian interpretations of Freud have rendered the relationship between Muslim dreams and Freudian psychoanalysis more complicated than a simple binary opposition. In the Afterward, Mittermaier begins to address explicitly what she calls there "The Politics of Dreaming," in a short conclusion whose thrust is largely to the point that the politics of dreaming do not simply concern those conditions in which dreams speak directly to those in power, but also to all the dreams that bear upon the relations between people.

Mittermaier describes her work not as an ethnography of dreams themselves—an analysis of their content—but as an "anthropology of the imagination" (15). Western thought, typified by Aristotle, Rousseau, and perhaps most importantly, Freud, understands the imagination "as a faculty anchored within the individual subject" (17). As a faculty of an independent and autonomous subject, an examination of the imagination reveals, at most, things about the subject that condition the possibility and meaning of that imagination. The writings of Foucault, Mittermaier suggests, shifts the focus on imagination from understanding the nature of imagination (i.e., as a faculty) to understanding the work that imagination does. Rather than interpreting dreams as indicative of psychological features, this approach anchors the meaning of dreams in the social, interpersonal, and political contexts and effects of their interpretation.

The interpretation of dreams, it seems, is simultaneously highly personal and highly public. It is personal in the sense that, ideally, the dream interpreter should be intimately familiar with the dreamer and because the dreamer is to keep that dream private from all but the appropriate interpreter. Dreams are not to be told, because they achieve a sort of inevitability through their enunciation. Yet at the same time dreams are extremely public; not simply because modern media provides for the interpretation of dreams on satellite television shows and via websites—after all, one of the more traditional sites of dream interpretation for Mittermaier is a shrine in which dreams are often presented semi-publicly—but also because the interpretation of dreams in the modern context are not limited in their effect to the locality in which they are interpreted (a shrine, for example) and often become public in ways that greatly amplify their political effect.

At the beginning of Mittermaier's fieldwork, for example, a dream was making the rounds of Cairo, a dream whose principle trope was a breast-feeding moon, and it was widely understood that Shaykh Hanafi, one of Mittermaier's interlocutors, had interpreted the dream as indicating the imminent arrival of the Mahdi (31–33).

The Mahdi is a figure who, by his very nature, supersedes the authority of those in power and indicates the arrival of a new world order. The subversive and possibly anarchic force of this dream, which had acquired an apocryphal but authoritative interpretation, was so subversive that it was actively suppressed. In the Egypt of 2003, under Mubarak, the potential political impact of this dream was such that, despite Sheikh Hanafi's protests that he had never made such an interpretation, the television show on which he had interpreted dreams was cancelled and al-Azhar issued an opinion forbidding the interpretation of dreams before the masses.

At the same time, the political force of dreams is not limited to the macro-political level concerned with the leadership of the country or its government. Insofar as one of the primary requirements of dream interpretation is that it leads towards the good, towards greater understanding and towards peace, dreams interpreters notably act as the axis of forms of informal social services (80–82). The mediations performed by dream interpreters are not simply mediations between what is visible to all and what is visible only to some, or to those in certain states, but a material mediation between those who have and those who have not—between those who are in need and those who have the ability to give. The giving of food to the poor at Ibn Sirin's shrine, the assistance that Shaykh Nabil provided to those with mental, physical, or familial problems, and the various ways in which the community of dream interpretation organized social relations, speaks to the ways the politics of dreaming takes effect at the micro level.

It is interesting to note that there is, as far as can be ascertained from this text, nothing particularly "democratic" about dream interpretation. The majority of dream interpreters are professionals—both by virtue of the study that they have devoted to the topic, and by definition—and while the interpretation of dreams may not be determined by political figures, these interpretations are certainly not arrived at via a process of majority decision-making. In that sense—and this is something that Mittermaier is entirely aware of—dreams are not an antidote to totalitarianism, at least insofar as it is theoretically possible for the structure of totalitarian authority to be reproduced within the context of dream interpretations. Insofar as the civil force of dream interpretation is inextricable linked to what Mittermaier refers to as "the shaykhs high spiritual state" (125), dream interpretation remains always inextricably linked to a particular and authoritative figure.

At the same time, Mittermaier makes an important point about the flexibility of dream interpretations and the ways that dream interpretation is focused on ethical concerns, and how, insofar as it is always political, dream interpretation is in some ways representative of the form of politics that is inextricably intertwined with ethical concerns. The challenges that the interpretation of dreams poses to political orders is not, Mittermaier seems to be suggesting, a conventional form of resistance, but

rather a form of interaction whose focus on the ethical de-centers explicit questions of power in favour of ethical concerns (161-63).

Even knowing that the Egypt of today is—one way or another—significantly different from the Egypt in which the fieldwork that grounds this text was conducted, the reader of *Dreams that Matter* is less tempted to claim that the research contained within it has been rendered irrelevant by recent events in Egypt than they are to clamour for further research. Did people dream in Tahrir Square? What dreams, if any, circulated before and during the Egyptian revolution? After the revolution, during the period of military rule and the highly contentious presidential elections that are still underway at the time of this writing, were people still going to dream interpreters? Did dreams become more or less explicitly political? And, for that matter, what posture do the candidates and parties vying for a controlling interest in post-Revolutionary Egypt take towards the interpretation of dreams? The questions that are being asked today about the future of Egypt, and the future of the Egyptian Revolution, are endless. But Mittermaier makes an important and stimulating case, whether it was her intention or not, that some part of the answer "might lie in the imagination...[because] besides revealing emergent possibilities, dream-visions contribute to their actualization" (238).

The degree to which dreams have contributed to recent transformations in Egypt remains unknown, but all readers who take this important book seriously will take seriously the possibility that in and after Tahrir, dreams and the imagination have only come to matter more.

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> 1. Stanley Fish, *Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities* (London: Harvard University Press, 1989), 123.

2. M. Jimmie Killingsworth and Jaqueline S. Palmer, "Millenial Ecology: The Apocalyptic Narrative from Silent Spring to Global Warming," in ed. Carl G. Herndl and Stuart C. Brown, *Green Culture: Environmental Rhetoric in Contemporary America* (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1996), 21–45.

3. Pierre Hadot, *The Veil of Isis*, trans. Michael Chase (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006), 18.

If a complete bibliographic reference has already been given in a previous footnote, use the following short form: author's last name, main title, page number.

4. Fish, *Is There a Text in This Class?*, 124.

5. Killingsworth and Palmer, "Millenial Ecology," 34.

6. Hadot, *The Veil of Isis*, 25.

Ancient texts may be cited parenthetically or in noted references. Citations should include the author's name, the title of the work, and the numerical references (book, chapter, verse, etc.) using Arabic rather than Roman numerals, separated by periods. When a translation is not that of the author of the article, the translation should be cited in full as a modern work.

3. For questions of style, punctuation, and spelling not covered here, please refer to the *Chicago Manual of Style*, 16th ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010); and the *Canadian Oxford Dictionary*, 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press, 2004).

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