Journey toward Meaning

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EDITORIAL.... E.J. FURCHA

To expect a Faculty of Religious Studies to produce poetry and visual art maybe utopian, even when the working title of the publication is *The Creative Imagination And Religious Expression.*

Yet, when we announced the proposed theme for the 1982 spring issue of ARC the response was most encouraging. Several persons offered poetry; some were willing to reflect--creatively, of course. One person was prepared to design the cover page. Before the deadline for submission had passed we had received more than enough material to choose from.

The topic of a contemporary act of worship which uses excerpts and images from Elie Wiesel, *Night*, and Ann Holm, *I Am David*, suggested itself as the theme for this issue, *Journey Toward Meaning.*

On behalf of the community of scholars at McGill's Faculty of Religious Studies we invite you to come on a stretch of this journey with us to dream, think, act, suffer through to a moment in your experience when living yields some meaning and that meaning suggests life--at its beginning, in the struggles for survival, or on the threshold of another dimension, at death.

There is no attempt in the following pages to express a common mind nor do we necessarily agree with the views expressed, other than our own perhaps (but ask us again, some other day; we may beg to differ then). We do hope, however, that the images and ideas of our contributors elicit a creative response in our many readers and aid them in their own creative work.

In the section «Journey toward Meaning» the excerpt from Elie Wiesel's *Night* is from Discus Books edition (Avon Books, 1969), translated from the French by Stella Rodway. The excerpt from Anne Holm's *I Am David* is from the Penguin Books edition, translated from the Danish by L.W. Kingsland (translation copyright: Harcourt Brace & World Inc., 1965).

IMAGINATION AND CREATIVITY

MORNY JOY

The relationship between imagination and creativity, particularly from the contemporary philosophical perspective, is an especially intriguing one. While psychology has tended to focus on personality factors and conditions that foster creativity, philosophical inquiry still wrestles with the nature of the creative impulse itself. This exploration is not without controversy. Indeed, the two principal theories of imagination in philosophy illustrate a marked divergence, if not unresolved tension, in contemporary attitudes to creativity. This article will be a brief survey of these two movements in philosophy, their basic differences, and the problem thereby defined. One of these movements is located within a Platonist worldview that emphasizes an esoteric and revelatory dimension in words and symbols. The other, emerging from the post-Kantian critical tradition, finds its most cogent expression in the work of Paul Ricoeur.

The Platonist Theory of Imagination

Within this movement imagination is regarded as the agency of both personal illumination and creative expression. While ostensibly an off-shoot of that Romantic idealization of the «royal road of the imagination,» this understanding of imagination has earlier roots in the Western tradition. Renaissance Platonism, whose particularly complex system has been illuminated by the careful studies of D.P. Walker *(i)* and Frances Yates, *(ii)* incorporated into its repertoire certain apocryphal second and third century A.D. treatises whose potent mixture of magic, mysticism and Platonist symbolism had an irreversible effect on Western thought. These works, variously attributed to Zoroaster, Hermes, Orpheus, were accepted as authentic. D.P. Walker has coined the term *theologia prisca* to refer to them collectively as «a certain tradition of Christian apologetic theology which rests on misdated texts.» *(iii)* Renaissance thinkers, such as Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499), embellished the system of magical correspondences in these works, attributing to the *vis imaginativa* a potency and status previously unacknowledged in Platonic theory. Imagination ascended from its comparatively low-berth in the philosophical hierarchy to become regarded as a vehicle of power and creativity, and finally the prime agency of divine communication.

The humanist element of the Renaissance, however, also had an impact on this theory. This is illustrated particularly in the evolution of the thought of Giordano Bruno, well documented in the study of his ideas by Frances Yates. *(iv)* Bruno (1548-1600), together with Cornelius Agrippa (1487-1535) and Paracelsus (1493-1541) can be regarded as magician-philosophers in the line of Renaissance Magi descending from Ficino. Their Christian orthodoxy and magical practices both became increasingly suspect. The shift in emphasis reflected in their work is from a traditional theurgic relationship, where the Magus was a hierophant, to an increasingly self-referential system, where the Magus himself became the source of power. The powers of inspiration and creativity were no longer attributed to a transcendent power to whom man had formerly related by means of magical incantations and talismans. These powers now resided in that

creative potential within each individual, the imagination. As the initial proponent of this heretical position Bruno sealed his fate at the stake.

This initial association of imagination and creativity has not been without interesting consequences. Since the Renaissance this tradition has sprouted both secular and spiritual off-shoots, mirroring those respective strains that are the Renaissance heritage. Though both tend to maintain a monistic framework, the former option virtually posits humanity as the centre of the cosmos. The latter option, in contrast, retains the Platonist system with a transcendent referent, though its vocabulary varies with different esoteric subgroups. This somewhat ambivalent understanding of imagination underwent a further process of revitalization (without further clarification) at the hands of the Romantic era's poets and philosophers, who were basically idealists of one sort or another. Such a diverse range of possible interpretations of imagination still obtains within this tradition today. As a contemporary ethos its appeal is considerable, encompassing groups and individuals in varying degrees of affiliation. Its adherents number Mircea Eliade, Ananda Coomaraswamy, Owen Barfield, James Hillman and a coterie of Jungians, along with the British poet, Kathleen Raine.

In this way the Platonist understanding of imagination appears to fill a need in contemporary consciousness. On the one hand it can serve those such as Owen Barfield *(v)* who are quite content within the more «orthodox» format of the Platonist worldview, where imagination is equated with the soul as an agency of spiritual perception. On the other hand, it can also accommodate those, such as James Hillman, *(vi)* who do not subscribe to the tenets of Christianity nor of Platonic contemplation. The reason that they still subscribe to this view of imagination is that they detect in the unconscious and its symbolic forms entities for which only a Platonist model allows. This is because these thinkers wish to acknowledge that imaginative constructions have equal standing with rational and reflective procedures. In their view neither realist nor critical philosophies provide structures that support this contention. It is only within a Platonist model that they find a vindication of their appreciation of the creative and dynamic process that has been called imagination. The further problem of the reconciliation of the Platonist model and its transcendent referent with an autonomous creative power must await future treatment.

The Theory of Imagination in Paul Ricoeur

The other contemporary movement in philosophy concerned with imagination and creativity is represented by the work of Paul Ricoeur. Ricoeur's monumental effort to wed «poetics» (here understood as having wide-ranging application to all creative acts) to the structures of intentional consciousness and to their resultant expression through the medium of imagination has preoccupied him for the last thirty years. His voyage from eidetics and empirics to the hermeneutics of expression in text and metaphor has been variously documented. *(vii)*

Ricoeur's philosophy, with its self-confessed post-Hegelian Kantian orientation, locates imagination at the very heart of all creative acts of knowledge. This act involves a nexus of creative tension that incorporates diverse modes of thinking and expression. The linguistic component is a vital part of this process, for from his studies of the Anglo-American school of ordinary language philosophy, Ricoeur has come to appreciate the essential role of our verbal articulations of intellectual insights and experiences.

Ricoeur's dynamic understanding of imagination uses metaphoric knowledge as its paradigm of the creative act of knowledge. His intricate analysis of the creative moment sees imagination as the means by which contradictory elements can be entertained at many levels. These comprise:

(1) The lexical level of word, where there is contradiction between the old meaning of a word and the new meaning implied in a metaphoric usage.

(2) The semantic level of sentence, where there is propositional contradiction. This occurs at the level of reference. Metaphors take on full resonance only at the level of a sentence, i.e. in a contextual setting.

(3) The existential level, where there is contradiction between a given perception of reality or world-view and the change in perspective that a radical metaphor can effect.

The imagination would also appear to have a catalytic effect in this situation, provoking the depiction, understanding and appropriation of new ways of interacting with reality.

There are repercussions of this dynamism at both the ontic and ontological levels. This is because Ricoeur sets the process within the Kantian framework of limit, but also because he incorporates the notion of a referential dimension. Ricoeur places this whole capacity of imagination to «redescribe» and restructure reality at the edge of our knowledge and awareness not just with reference to existential reality, but with reference to those values and beliefs we accept as absolute.

Ricoeur does not seek to accord imagination a privileged place. He sees the dialectics of both the rational (speculative knowledge) and the imaginative (poetic knowledge) as essential ingredients in all acts of creative knowledge. He also acknowledges that without dialogue with the rational, productions can degenerate into utopian fantasies. The implication of this is that a final conceptual formulation should be the result of further reflection, discrimination and judgement on the insights that result from metaphoric/creative moments.

Ricoeur's total vision and philosophical vindication of this understanding of imagination has not yet been published. His volume on the «poetics of experience» is eagerly awaited. Yet his painstaking studies that have contributed to his forecast programme in this direction point to the basic philosophic positions that will support the anticipated developed arguments.

Conclusion

It is obvious that there has been a remarkable change in perspective which underlies both these conceptual frameworks for understanding the place and role of imagination. Such a change reflects the transition in contemporary scholarship from an emphasis on reason as the absolute criterion of truth. Imagination is no longer defined as an aberration from purely rational procedures, as mere fancy or harmless daydreaming. It has an essential role to play as a full-fledged participatory member in those heuristic acts of knowledge that initially pose their insights in imagistic form. Such a statement is inevitably generalized and needs further refinement, but it allows for a broadly based understanding of human creativity. This understanding can encompass both that traditional view of creativity which has been confined (for better or worse) to the domain of aesthetics, and the more controversial view emerging from the philosophy of science that depicts scientific models as metaphoric modes akin to those of art and poetry. *(viii)* Our response to this portrayal of human creativity and our acceptance of any of the above versions of the role of imagination depend upon our inclination to place imagination and its fellow-travellers of myth, metaphor and story within the bounds of metaphysics or mythopoetics. Such radical revisionings of our world-views are in themselves according to Ricoeur innately creative and, as an ironic after-thought, cannot be accomplished without the aid of that gadfly, imagination.

Footnotes

i. D.P. Walker, *Spiritual and Demonic Magic* (Nendelm, Liechtenstein, 1969; rpt. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975).

ii. Frances Yates, *Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition* (New York: Random House, 1969).

iii. D.P. Walker, *The Ancient Theology* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), p. 1.

iv. Yates, *op. cit.*

v. Owen Barfield, «Matter, Imagination and Spirit,» *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 42, 4 (Dec. 1974), 621-629.

vi. James Hillman, *Revisioning Psychology* (New York: Harper & Row, 1975).

vii. D. Ihde, *Hermeneutic Phenomenology* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971).

L. Dornish, «Introduction,» *Semeia* 4 (1975), 1-19.

M. Gerhart, «The Question of 'Belief' in Recent Criticism: A Re-examination from the Perspective of Paul Ricoeur's Hermeneutical Theory,» Diss. Chicago 1973, 126-243.

viii. I. Barbour, *Myths, Models and Paradigms* (New York: Harper & Row, 1974).

THE ARTISTIC IMAGINATION AND THE HOLY

VERA LESKOV

For many today the religious dimension in our desacralized world is accessible only through the arts or the artistic experience, including the literary. In recognizing this, many academic theologians have undertaken a systematic study of imaginative literature.

In this pursuit theological truths are being disclosed in the concrete reality of earthly existence, and the contemporary theological act must deal with an «I-thou» situation such as that postulated by Martin Buber. It is being understood that «holy» language or the language of «divinity» is not the only language that can deal with the deepest dimensions of human reality and the questions concerning the meaning of human existence.

Theology is seen as a form of conversation or dialogue. The language of «divinity» itself is conversation and dialogue, an attempt to converse with those speaking within the church and with those representing the major intellectual disciplines and artistic enterprises which interpret man as he encounters reality. This kind of on-going conversation leads to renewed assessments of what is important in human life. For «if Christ is truly the *Logos*, then He is witnessed to in all apprehensions of truth, whether they occur within a framework of Christian concern or not.» *(i)* American theological education at least has shown itself to be a complex interdisciplinary enterprise studying not only the traditional theological areas but also other intellectual disciplines that are involved with general culture and its deepest issues.

In its inquiry into the modern cultural scene vis-ă-vis the Christian tradition, theology is focusing on the aesthetic realm, especially imaginative literature, and how it presents the modern human experience. This is being prompted, argues Nathan Scott, not

> by any unprincipled whoring after what is momentarily prestigious in the cultural Establishment, as a certain kind of snugly hostile secular observer may suppose. It springs, rather, from a profound recovery of the real intention of biblical faith and from a consequent change in theology's estimate of what ought generally to be the response of the Christian imagination to the cultural life of our time. It springs from a deep conviction that, by its own inner logic, Christian faith is required not only to «turn inward upon itself, asking what is authentically and ultimately its own kind of truth» but is also required «to move out into... 'a lover's quarrel with the world.'» Athens, in short, is seen now to have a good deal to do with Jerusalem. *(ii)*

In pointing to «the real intention of biblical faith,» Scott brings out its emphasis on the concrete present and the real world. Biblical faith locates God, the Presence, the «I am who I am» in the dynamics of history, of events, and in actual human «victories and calamities.»

> So faith--that radical kind of faith which enables a man to endure all the shocks and vicissitudes of life with an ultimate nonchalance and cheerfulness and hope--for the biblical community, does not belong to a sphere above or outside the realm of time and history: for them it is not (as Gerhard Ebeling puts it) «a kind of speculative soaring into transcendence. But it determines existence as existence in this world, and thus it is not something alongside all that I do and suffer, hope and experience, but something that is concretely present in it all, that is, it determines all my doing and suffering, hoping and experiencing.» (Ebeling's *The Nature of Faith*, pp. 159-60) In the biblical perspective, the *material of faith* (in Dr. Ebeling's phrase) is simply this actual world--there where a man must hold out against this and take a stand against that and resist whatever threatens to strain or contradict or blaspheme the Glory. The sphere of faith, in other words, is the shifting, conditioned, ambiguous site of history itself. *(iii)*

Neither in the Old Testament nor in the New is validity given to a distinction between the sacred and the profane, argue modern biblical scholars (von Rad, Buber, Heschel). Nor is there a distinction between time and eternity in primitive Christianity, postulates Oscar Cullman in his *Christus und die Zeit*. Modern radical biblical scholarship has de-emphasized the supernatural or transcendental in interpreting Christian faith. This drift in recent biblical studies does not indicate a disavowal of the place of God in the Gospel. What is important in these recent studies for systematic theology is the suggestion that a theology wishing to be faithful to *sola scriptura* will do away with the old «metaphysic of distinction between the place of God and the place of man,» *(iv)* because it goes expressly counter to traditional biblical faith. Gregor Smith points out that for the people of Israel transcendence is not exalted «at the expense of the reality of the events.» The two are related and «are woven together in an inextricable wed which is itself the one single reality for Israel.» *(v)*

Dietrich Bonhoeffer seems to have most sensitively perceived the whole problem of faith vis-à-vis human experience. He rejects the doctrine of two realms, the natural and the supernatural, the temporal and the eternal. Man has «come of age» and is no longer *homo religiosus*, and so God must be talked about in a «non-religious» way. This stratagem is required to open man to the world and to inspire in him a deep solicitude for it. The genuine Christian must live «a 'worldly' life» which is a life deeply rooted in the historical present and in the human situation, for this is where we encounter the Holy. This is a world come of age and looks for a «religionless» interpretation of faith which does not distinguish between the place of God and the place of man. Man in this world asks how he can face his future responsibly, with trust and hope. This is Bonhoeffer's testimony to us.

So the word of God is being heard, according to many modern theologians, not only in gospel and sacrament, but also in relevant intellectual and artistic aspects of modern culture as they are reflected in man's encounter with his humanity and his world.

A comprehensive theological anthropology must focus on issues of ultimate concern which are being dealth with by the great literature of the modern period exemplified by such artists as Dostoyevsky, Baudelaire, Sartre, O'Connor, Kafka, Rilke, Mann, Joyce, Faulkner, Stevens, Brecht, Yeats and Eliot. The issues dealt with by this «modern canon» are also issues which traditionally it has been the office of «religion» to deal with. Many of the writers who have shaped modern sensibility can be described as truly «spiritual» writers because they have written about man's quest for God and are therefore spiritual in the sense given to the term by Catholic theology.

And so the theological community is attempting to encounter what is prophetic in modern literature as it documents and reflects the spirit of the age and the deep interior «spaces» of our psyche, our fears and hopes, our nightmares and dreams. Art offers theology an index to the real world lived in by us and thus has an important theological function. Faced by the obscenities of Auschwitz and the Gulags and the *anomie* being disclosed in our technocratic society, we can no longer find consolation or power in the traditional Christian supports and tenets of belief. A feeling becoming epidemic in the world is a profound *apatheia* described in Camus' *The Stranger*. A theology uninformed by the artist's vision of the existential situation cannot speak with cogency to contemporary man. Art enables theology to read general culture more closely and to develop an orientation towards the world that grapples with the meaning of actual experience.

Northrop Frye very perceptively points out that literature is related to theology as mathematics is to the physical sciences.

> Just as «pure mathematics enters into and gives form to the physical sciences,» so the literary imagination vitalizes meditation on matters of ultimate concern by making concrete before the immediate gaze of the mind the real cost of a given life-orientation. It does not «line up arguments facing each other like football teams,» (N. Frye's *The Educated Imagination*, p. 126), but rather--in the terms of drama and symbolic action--it *dances out* (as Kenneth Burke would say) the real entailments of «religiousness A» and «religiousness B», and thus it can be considered perhaps a radically *experimental* theology, dwelling (like pure mathematics) on the postulatory side of what formal theology (like the physical sciences) addresses itself to in its existential dimension. *(vi)*

The danger to be guarded against in formal theology is the reification of its categories, so that theology does not rest at being «formal» and thus irrelevant to the actual conditions of life. To circumvent this sort of contingency, imaginative literature as a kind of experimental theology can give theology vital information and help it to interpret the varying beliefs and life-attitudes reflected in the modern experience.

A difficult new literature which does not lend itself easily to Christian evaluation has emerged today and represents «a radically protestant imagination, wanting not to invoke old values and to honor old sacraments, finding no stable

center in the funded deposits of cultural memory, but wanting to search out undepleted orders of meaning in 'the tradition of the new.'» *[vii]* The kind of fiction produced by the late Flannery O'Connor deviates sharply from recognized norms.

Mary Flannery O'Connor was a «Southern lady,» an orthodox Christian, and a deeply religious writer whose work has been mistakenly characterized as nihilistic. Her own comment on her work was this: «I don't think you should write something as long as a novel around anything that is not of the gravest concern to you and everybody else and for me this is always the conflict between an attraction for the Holy and the disbelief in it that we breathe in with the air of the times.» *[viii]* She perceived in the ethos of the 1950's «an imperturable smugness, a flatulent optimism, and a crass self-righteousness so deeply entrenched as to be movable only by the harshest kind of attack,» and «an utterly fatuous belief in the omnipotence of a highly rationalized, technological society.» *[ix]* She saw our contemporary affliction as being «a deathly incapacity for existence in depth,» and she virulently attacked the secularism which characterized both the religious and the atheistic.

The artist and the believer today find themselves involved in the same human reality, but the artist has greater freedom in dealing with it. Even the theologian cannot deal so freely or directly with this reality hemmed in as he is by proprieties, social and religious, to which the artist is indifferent. It is good that theology has turned towards the great realities in the arts, for it cannot but see that this other dimension provides it with invaluable data and insights that it might not otherwise have. This other dimension relates the fatalities that often encompass and obstruct our lives yet incredibly and paradoxically bring out our most deeply human potentialities and our best works.

So, although the arts are a manifestation of our secular culture, the theologian on entering the creative dimension of this modern secularity has the opportunity of exploring the world in depth, thus becoming *homo viator* himself. Theology and the Church must stand with the world, not against it, because this is where Christ stood. He stood, not as a cautious observer on the safe periphery of life, but as an involved participant at the hurting centre, the vital throbbing vortex of life, which draws us all, where we shall all willy-nilly soon be forced to stand.

Footnotes

i. Nathan A. Scott, Jr., *The Broken Center: Studies in the Theological Horizon of Modern Literature* (New Haven, 1966), p. 200.

ii. Nathan A. Scott, Jr., ed., *Adversity and Grace* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 16.

iii. Ibid., p. 6.

iv. Ibid., p. 8, quoting R.G. Smith, *The New Man* (New York: Harper, 1956), p. 108.

v. Ibid., p. 9, quoting op. cit., pp. 28-29.

vi. Ibid., p. 22.

vii. Ibid., p. 25.

viii. Preston M. Browning, Jr., «Flannery O'Connor and the Grotesque Recovery of the Holy,» ibid., pp. 134-35, quoting John Hawkes, «Flannery O'Connor's Devil,» *Sewanee Review*, 70 (Summer, 1962), 397.

ix. Ibid., p. 135.

SING TO HIM...STAND IN AWE OF HIM

Psalm 33: 3,8

Wholeness abiding in unborn stars
revealing the icon of world with child
worlds in gyration baptizing mind
into submission to childlike delight

sheaths of winter memory
frozen over violet puddles
melting in dew drops of morning light
wrung from longlasting darkness

delicate crocus splendour
breaking through blue waning night
snowbells rising from fields of whiteness
hyacinths gathering scent from the sun
currents of freewelling energies
swelling in clusters of maple buds
like waters slowly evaporating
returning in larch branches greenery
silent oblation swinging in willow trees
egg sheltered cells knowing their moment
geese flying victory into the skies
hummingbirds playing with time
larks out of dawn responding in song
to unfolding wonder of world in birth

vortex of breath shrouded in holiness
irrupting through chaos and death
infancy growing into haloes of hope
flares of glory consuming primeval fears
lifting the mist of amber tears
into the source of unborn wholeness.

Jutta Benfey

SOME REFLECTIONS ON POETRY, RELIGION AND TRUTH

E.J. FURCHA

Ich sehe nichts von diesen
Wasserluegen; nur Menschenaugen
lassen sich betruegen.
Mephistopheles (Faust,II,V)

Preface:

We all claim to transmit truths or at least to point to the truth whether we are pre-occupied with texts, interpret history, or unfold the systems within which our future pastors are to operate. Scientists also claim access to truth, often with equal dogmatism and frequently with greater dedication to the rigorous demands of truth; so do poets, visionaries, and sometimes, very rarely, so do politicians. Where is truth to be found?

The following reflections are not intended to stake out an unmistakable claim nor to restate the theological assertion of having access to revealed truth which is qualitatively different from other expressions of what is true. As a church historian I am simply interested in relationships, and as one who seeks to communicate the gospel to contemporary *seekers after truth* I am fascinated by writers and thinkers (most of them non-theological and many antagonistic or indifferent to Christianity) who appear to be totally involved in the quest for truth and whose works reveal a striking degree of theo-logical awareness; they seem to be engaged in God-talk in a consciously secular context. The poetry I read (and sometimes write) and the literary productions of Wiesel, Patrick White, Solzhenitsyn, Camus, Kafka (to name only a few of the many contemporary story-tellers) seem to be totally involved in the search for truth and value. It would appear fitting therefore to explore possible relationships and discover points of contact between poetry, religion and truth.

Since the paper first took shape as a discussion starter in a largely Hindu context in Calcutta some statements may appear overly simplistic in our own context. Nonetheless, the basic assertions appear to be valid still. I trust that my intention is sufficiently clear even though the arguments may not be convincing enough to lure others onto the same fascinating path of exploration and encounter.

John Robinson of HONEST TO GOD-fame coined the truism, *the approach to truth for our generation starts from life rather than dogma.* The reminder is most timely, although not as unanimously accepted in theological circles as one might like to see it. Religious practices in the West, and hence the framework within which many religious persons seek to carry out their religious activities, have been determined for centuries by close ties to Tradition and by a penchant for dogmatic system and order. The result, not infrequently, has been a virtual subservience of ecclesiastical structures to dogma. This, in turn, found expression in liturgies that tended to clothe reality in dogmatic antiquities with the result that even personal confessions of faith and prayers, though intended to be existential responses to the divine self-disclosure, often need careful analysis and exegesis to be understood.

People whose conduct is circumscribed by dogmas and decrees (however venerable these might be), must be reminded from time to time that genuine being, integrity of existence, a living response to life itself, can be found only in encounter with and participation in the divine and not in statutes and ordinances. And that, as Medieval mystics well knew and many a saint inside or outside the Church discovered, begins in concrete encounters with persons: In sorrow and pain, joy and exaltation, in humiliation and despair, in the ability to confront death and by powers of life to overcome its sting, there one discovers truth. *(i)*

We know, of course, that millions of people daily grope for such encounters burrowing, mole-like, through their respective tunnels of anxiety, indecision, hopelessness, utterly incapable of sight or cognition. Ignorant they may be; insensitive to the prompting of the Spirit, perhaps. Yet they are human beings whom the creation myth of Genesis describes as having been created in the image and likeness of God. If that means anything at all, it ought to mean, above all else, that such beings are capable of experiencing and responding to God, able to make a response to his truth in their essential humanity.

Daily experience and, I daresay, knowledge of ourselves, however, teach us that the "truth is not in us". Most of us do not despair because of this discovery. Nor do we turn into utterly immoral creatures who tear at each other in destructive denial of community or value. We have learned to live with the recognition that fulness of life is not within reach of mortal beings in their existence on earth and we "know" that the road to attainment of such fulness, when we shall know the truth which will liberate us (to paraphrase words ascribed to Jesus in the Gospel of John), is narrow and steep.

It is John also who most effectively localizes truth when in presenting the Passion of Jesus - that great drama of liberation - he gives a detailed account of a confrontation between Jesus and Pilate. The latter is burdened

with the task of sentencing Jesus of whom he knows nothing derogatory. He seeks to gain time or a more convincing case perhaps, much in the manner of the interrogator in Solzhenitsyn's *Gulag Archipelago* by letting the prisoner make statements which could then be used against him (a technique at once effective and utterly diabolic, since whatever the accused may say will keep him under sentence of condemnation). Now Pilate asks a penetrating question, indeed. Were it not for the fact that he does not await an answer, it might strike one as genuine. But before "What is truth?" has echoed in the judgement hall, he rushes out to the waiting throng, seeking to get a decision of sorts from the crowd while he himself washes his hands in a symbolic gesture of innocence.

Has he succeeded in drowning out the answer that might have come in response to his question by thus indulging the thunderous shouts of the masses? Is he merely a victim of his own game of deceit, as he stands there in that strange reversal of roles which myth and history alike so often play out for the discerning onlooker? Could it be said that Pilate engages in frivolous word play at the very moment when truth manifests itself in the truthful life of an innocent yet submissive sufferer?

It becomes clear, I believe, that Pilate does not fully escape the responsibility of an answer, either through his action or by his attitude, for the one who stands before him makes bold to claim of himself and his mission, "My task is to bear witness to the truth" (John 18.33).

A formidable claim, indeed, to be witness to the truth. And over against that claim stands the representative of the power of the sword, about to pass judgement on the witness to truth. Yet, in that fleeting moment of encounter with the other person, Pilate experiences true being. If ever so briefly, the man of authority and power reveals his inner struggle to a socially inferior person who, in turn, shows him the divine quality of life. In this exposure of his "Seinsangst" Pilate also discovers the gateway that might lead him to liberation from its bondage.

Perhaps we are making too much of the dialogue between Pilate and Jesus. Yet it seems to demonstrate an element of "ultimate concern" which symbolizes the struggle of everyman at some stage in the process of self discovery and spiritual awareness. Pilate is the hero figure of popular fancy whose tragedy becomes apparent in inner conflicts and unresolved relationship between power--a politically and sociologically given fact--and the inability of a human being to contain such power within him in more than a transitory or superficial sense.

Pilate's inability or unwillingness to enter into further dialogue on the meaning of truth seems to be rather characteristic of the human dilemma in general. He turns to the masses (others after him have turned to ideologies or memoirs to white-wash the sepulchre of their shattered dreams and ideals), for the kind of ego-bolster which is to sustain him throughout the farce.

To the crowd, forever blinded by the glitter of momentary splendour, he remains master of the situation, even though to himself (if, indeed he possesses sufficient integrity or has attained a liberating degree of self-knowledge), he stands exposed as one who had contracted himself to the devil.

By his ultimate refusal to "hear" an answer to his question, Pilate not only excludes himself from the realm of truth, but becomes the archetype, as it were, of all persons in authority who, having raised the question of truth, turn with an air of authority and under cover of "political necessity" toward the systematic elimination of the very truth which stands so plainly before them.

We need not dwell further on this particular encounter; it has served us rather well at the outset of our discussion since it penetrates to the very core of the matter before us and (to a Christian at least) carries a great deal of existential weight, in addition. The encounter between Pilate and Jesus contains elements of the poetry of life in its portrayal of the life-death conflict between a truthful life, on the one hand, and brutal force, on the other.

As should be the case in a carefully designed drama, there is a proper denouement. Truth, though vanquished and physically destroyed, rises phoenix-like from the ashes, reborn to new life; brute force, on the other hand, though temporarily victorious, is negated by the very victim over whom it has claimed the right to pass judgement.

The literary work we have drawn on is found in the Sacred Scriptures which have informed and inspired the social structures and the arts of Christendom. It presents a concept of truth which is realized in personal surrender and decision. Hence it is essentially bound up with the historical process, manifest in a person and given as a Thou-truth (this term to the best of my knowledge was coined by Emil Brunner in *Revelation and Reason*). Although circumscribed by time and place, it claims universal validity and promises to overcome the potential dualism of life and truth in the One who can say, "I am the truth and the life". The idea of truth lodged in the redeemer figure is, of course, not an invention of the first century Church. Revealed truth as a happening in love--the love of God directed to his creation-- is a prominent motif of hope in Judaism. We cannot at this point attempt a sketch of the history of transmission of this concept and its subsequent effect on Christendom. What is of some interest to us, however, is the unique fusion of truth and life in a person--the person of Jesus Christ--and the witness to this truth and its manifestation in religious practice and art. *(ii)* To the extent that the arts and religious expression existed in close proximity throughout prolonged periods of the history of Western civilization, their interrelation is worthy of attention. *(iii)*

Unfortunately, the relation of religious expression and art (in the broadest sense of that term), has often been such that the arts existed in subordination to institutionalized Christianity. Their validity and acceptability was largely determined by their usefulness to popular piety and to visual expression of those spiritual truths that were judged welcome and acceptable by the intellectual (or should I say, priestly?) hierarchy of the Church. *(iv)*

Beginning with the Italian Renaissance, however, but present in embryo even before then, a weaning process had begun which resulted in the almost complete severing of the umbilical cord between Christian religion and the arts. *(v)* In fact, not only did the arts develop independent and sometimes in judgement of organized Christianity, but at times, it would appear, Christianity herself withdrew, as if in the last stages of progressive senility, to the rest homes of hallowed structures and institutions where she seems to have dwelt content in lofty exclusion from any significant dialogue with the forces which meanwhile continued to shape Western social structures. *(vi)* It is conceded, of course, that the arts largely encouraged such withdrawal of their former mistress. But the beholder is left wondering about the nature and duration of this apparently inevitable separation. Many religious people (dare I call them "believers"?), are intensely pre-occupied with the possibility of re-establishing the relationship. What conditions must prevail in order to rebuild the bridges between art, music, poetry and the formalized modern expressions of adoration, praise, ascription of worth to a deity? *(vii)*

Two paths appear to be open to us on which we may venture toward reconciliation of religion and the arts. I shall attempt to sketch these briefly with particular reference to poetry and related literary genres. One is the path of negation. It has been traced brilliantly by W.B. Yeats.

> Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
> Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
> The blood-dimmed tide is loosed and everywhere
> The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
> The best lack all conviction, while the worst
> Are full of passionate intensity.

What may have been prophetic when Yeats first wrote these lines, seems to have become reality now. We have since experienced the process of disintegration in the work of Kafka, the hopelessness of it all in J.P. Sartre's *No Exit*, the reality of Nietzsche's "God has died". After Buchenwald and Auschwitz and the vastly silent Siberian death camps, little, if anything, is left to the imagination. Yet the human spirit is such that few people have chosen this path of negation, for its end is an abyss of meaninglessness which to face is not given to many a person without destroying the very core of his being.

The second path by which the estrangement of poetry and religion may be overcome is one of empathic correlation--the discovery that religion and art express essentially the same human strivings and aim to understand and interpret life. At the lowest level this may be little more than Byron's lines (The Castle of Chillon),

> At last men came to set me free;
> I asked not why and reck'd not where;
> It was at length the same to me;
> Fettered or fetterless to be,
> I learned to love despair.

On a more spiritual level, T.S. Eliot has given expression to this empathic correlation in *The Rock*

> In this street
> There is no beginning, no movement, no peace
> and no end
> But noise without speech, food without taste.
> Without delay, without haste
> We would build the beginning and the end
> of this street (Chorus of workmen)

The common meeting ground for rediscovering one's truth according to this poet's vision is the rather ordinary task of building the street. In such endeavour the unchanging struggle between good and evil unfolds.

> The world turns and the world changes,
> But one thing does not change.
> In all my years, one thing does not change.
> However you disguise it, this thing does not change:
> The perpetual struggle of Good and Evil (The Rock)

This "good news" by the Rock of Eliot's vision who "will perhaps answer our doubtings", may not be quite the terminology of John on the Island of Patmos. But who is to say that it does not come to terms with the dilemma of the human situation in our so-called post-Christian era? There is implied in lines like these the conviction that truth will not be vanquished even though some thought systems may have been superseded; even though religion, for long acknowledged the nurser of truth, may have aged and become incapable of providing succour to her children. The poet seems to call for new expressions of community, urbane and human, no doubt, yet open to offer value and meaning to generations of modern men and women who "have come of age". In other words, the poet seems to affirm that truth--that which is ultimate for me--is of the very essence of life and cannot age therefore. This truth, of course, is not to be sought in the supra-human realm; it dwells among us and is "open" to our searching.

Now there can obviously not be two independent centres of truth--if these are in essential opposition to each other. Hence religion and poetry must be reconcilable. Perhaps the reconciliation has already begun and may be realized when the trend toward secularization in Christianity and the apparently increasing pre-occupation with theological questions in literature and poetry converge.

Two questions force themselves upon us at this point: first, how may a reconciliation between art (poetry in particular), and religion (we mean the Christian religion), come about? Secondly, why do some forms of poetry appear to serve truth while others seem to be devoid of religious or spiritual content?

To respond, we must turn our attention to various possible levels of the relationship between poetry and religious expression. Three such levels come readily to mind (although further examination may lead to others). On the first level we would place poetic expressions which treat of human experience and concern, with no specifically religious content. T.S. Eliot's *Prufrock and other Observations* (1917) and his *Poems* (1920) belong here, as do other treatments of beauty, love, patriotism, etc. Each poem in this group is an expression of value and may be significant, without, however, referring to religious rites or symbols or to what might be termed "ultimate concerns".

The second level includes poetry which treats of religious themes, yet without employing a specifically religious style. Goethe's *Faust* may serve as a case in point. Much of the dramatic action here focuses on love, greed, prestige and power, yet at its core is a profound understanding of grace, liberation, the meaning of life and death, hardly equalled anywhere else in literature. Much of the poetry of Hoelderlin, and Rainer Maria Rilke should also be placed on this level.

On the third level we wish to put poetic expressions which are religious in style and content. Eliot's *The Rock* comes to mind at once or Sean O'Casey's *Riders to the Sea*. In form they resemble medieval mystery plays; yet they are as modern and profoundly religious as a twentieth century *Rock Mass* in its own genre.

The poetic works on each of the suggested levels carry meaning for a large number of people, often to the point of an intense religious experience. This seems to be true in some poetic expressions even which create image-less sounds without any obvious content or significance beyond that of a vague aesthetic pleasure. The reason for this significance may lie in what Hopper described as the three-fold task of the poet on the journey "toward meaning" (S.R. Hopper, *"On the Naming of the Gods in Hoelderlin and Rilke"* in *Christianity and the Existentialists*, p.177).

Hopper designates the three movements as I) acceptance of descent--a move into the human predicament, not a flight free from it; 2) metamorphosis--a night of universal blossoming--and 3) the ascent--to become a bee of the invisible. In this three-fold task of re-collecting, Hopper (following Heidegger), sees the attainment of true freedom, for "where I create, I am true, and I want to find the strength to build my life wholly upon this truth...that is sometimes given me" (quoting Rilke).

We have digressed sufficiently in response to the first question that raised itself to turn to the second question, at this point.

Several factors, it would appear, come into play here. There is, on the one hand, the fact of poetic laws and conventions to which a poet consciously or otherwise subscribes. Shelley is said to have stated this submission to laws of poetry when he called the poets "the unacknowledged legislators of the world". A second fact is the possible barrenness of the poet. Did not Goethe coin the well-known phrase that "one must *be* something in order to *make* something"(italics mine)? Plato, of course, knew this also when he quipped, "operatio sequitur esse" (as a being is, so he acts).

Thirdly, the nihilism of our age, and most significant of all, the absence of any large-scale homogeneous community within which poetry might take root and elicit meaning, goes a long way in suggesting why some poets succeed better than others in unearthing truth. A fourth factor is those poets who create sounds by association without much concern for meaning beyond that of eliciting some visceral pleasure.

Just as it seems difficult and well-nigh impossible for many contemporary worshippers to sing praises to God because of wide-spread discrepancies in their respective conceptions of him, so it seems almost impossible to convey universally valid expressions of meaning through any given poetic form or image. Our age seems to have cut itself loose from the bedrock of common myths. Thus it is not easy to find meaning in the poet's images and symbols. When there is no commonly acknowledged expression of reality, it is difficult to share in the interpretative symbols of it.

Though what we have said here be true, we hasten to maintain that life cannot remain image-less for too long, lest it flounder in the quicksands of meaninglessness. Even a people come of age must have had a childhood. And the myths of such childhood (the innocence of faith in truthful lives and beautiful persons), however fleeting or remote, must be rekindled and recalled, if we are to escape the corrosive effects of cynicism and despair.

At such juncture it is the poet rather than the systematic theologian, the dreamer, rather than the recorder of laws and ordinances who can best undertake the task of image-making, since it is he who "names the holy" (paraphrasing Heidegger), who gives ex-pression to the un-named, form to the formless. *(viii)* It is he, to quote J.M. Robinson, "who harkens to the

silent tolling in things as their being unveils itself". *(ix)* And as he speaks these things, his poem--that which he makes--transcends the humdrum affairs of daily living, achieving integration and wholeness which, at its finest, is divinity personified.

Our treatment of the matter before us has been much too cursory and our pre-occupation with some of the aspects of poetic expression too brief to allow for any conclusions at this point. However, some assertions may be in order, provided they are taken to be no more than suggestions for continued reflection and pointers in the direction in which our common paths should take us in search of the truth that claims us all. Here then are my statements along with a brief commentary:

1. Poetry and Christian teaching (and perhaps religious teaching in general) are related in their basic aims.

They both participate at a deep level in that which is genuinely human, by speaking of and, indeed, expressing that which moves persons and lifts them from despair to rejoicing, from enslavement to the vision of liberated existence. Their inherent structures are not superimposed laws, but emerge creatively and for each individual anew in meaningful dialogue and encounter. To the extent to which this humanity is essentially related to the divine ground of existence which Christians call God and worship as personal being who "chooses and wills, suffers and conquers, loves and hates", at the same time transcending all these human qualities, it may be systematized in theo-logy and harmonized or expressed in the language of the heart which is poetry.

2. Poetry and Christian teaching speak of the essence of the divine.

I may be taken to task here, since there is some poetic expression which neither intends to speak of deity nor, in fact, resembles anything religious, in the traditional sense of the term; the same would hold true, in reverse, for many a theological system. Outwardly and on a superficial level neither poetry nor theology, in some of their respective expressions, show enough affinity to warrant my statement. However, to cite J. Maritain, both theology and poetry work with concepts which are "representative signs, drawn from things, intended to introduce into a created mind the immensity of that which is". *(x)* By implication then it may be argued that theology or poetry the moment they cease speaking of the immensity of that which is, cease to be serviceable and become mere exercises in words and images which, since empty of content, may amuse, but cannot edify.

3. Poetry and Christian teaching operate on the principle of imitation.

This implies transmission of a "given" as well as transformation of the same. They take, to put it differently, that which has been received and transform it in creative metamorphosis into analogy of being, indeed, into being itself, provided we recall and preserve here the relativity of all human endeavours.

4. Poetry and Christian teaching are inherently different.

Without attempting to create unnecessary paradox, we have now reached the point at which we must note differences between these two forms of creative human expression. Again, we shall quote Maritain. What he says shows profound insight about metaphysics, but may be applied with equal validity to theology or Christian teaching. He writes, "Whereas metaphysics stands in the line of knowledge and of the contemplation of truth, poetry stands in the line of making...The difference is an all important one...Metaphysics snatches at the spiritual in an idea, by the most abstract intellection; poetry reaches it in the flesh." *(xi)* Maritain expresses a fundamental truth, given the acceptance of his definition of poetry as not limited to the workshop of so-called poets. By poetry he means that spiritual quality which ennobles, elevates and transforms and ultimately carries in the technically well crafted construct of words communication of the divine-human, the ultimate reality of which we are able to partake in limited portions only and then always ambiguously.

Yet even here, if I may make so bold, Christian teaching and poetry are more alike than might appear on the surface. Does not the very doctrine of the Incarnation in its Chalcedonian form, perfect God and perfect man, unmingled yet united in the one manifestation of the God-Man, incorporate contemplation and action? And does not this statement about the place of God in the world, the event in which he may be known, point to the one historical locus in which alone the divine and the human meet unambiguously? *(xii)*

Here then is the meeting point at which truth may be found; the point at which even secularized man must experience truth: in the personal encounter of the eternal Logos, eternally manifest only in that person Jesus; within human grasp in the One only who stands before us asserting his task to be that of "bearing witness to the truth". This leads me to my final assertion. It is as follows.

5. Poetry and Christian teaching share an ultimate unity of purpose.

Their respective aim is "to reconcile the powers of imagination and sensibility with the powers of faith, to rediscover the whole man in the integral and indissoluble unity of his twofold nature, spiritual and carnal". *(xiii)*

Let us recapitulate the steps we have taken. Poetry which creates images of a world transfigured and Christian teaching, pointing to the "end of the ages"--a kingdom of justice and peace--are fundamentally one in their aims and aspirations; this, despite apparent dissimilarities on a superficial level. They look for the manifestation which traditionally tended to be described as "heaven" and which in many contemporary writers is stated as the full humanization of man, a state which (some dialectical materialists notwithstanding), is ultimately a spiritual one and can be realized most fully in the paradox of the God-Man.

This God-Man, as we have seen, is the source and author of truth. He is the one who said of himself, "I am the way, the truth, the life". To attempt, even in outline, a definition of this paradox would lead us too far afield in this paper and ultimately into heresy of one form or another. However, it should be said that whatever else this claim implies, it must involve the acknowledgement of historical reality (in time and place and in that sense true); it must, in addition, become a concrete or existential encounter of everyman (universal, and in that sense true).

Whether this further necessitates the positing of a cosmic Christ myth or acceptance of the statement, Jesus the Man for others, whether it means accepting the reality of Christ in persons like Helen Keller, Mahatma Gandhi, the Doctor of Lambarene, Mother Theresa and any other 'beautiful person', must be left to the investigation and reflection of systematic theologians.

Suffice it to say here that the claim to truth made by theology should also be in the fullest sense a prerogative of poetry. The poetry of the Incarnation, annunciation, conception, virgin birth, poverty-stricken infancy, manhood and premature death and subsequent elevation to glory, is powerful expression of all that is most deeply human and thus also most fully divine.

There is perhaps no more rewarding a way to knowledge of God than the way through knowledge of and participation in such a life (this is not to plead for a narrowly conceived acceptance of a Christian Credo). What is meant, may best be described as a universally valid cognition that total experience of humanity involves elements of lowliness yet exaltation, poverty yet riches, rejection yet conquest of estrangement and the discovery of new forms of life. Such life ought to be experienced as free from provincialism, party spirit or caste consciousness (be this in the context of so-called imperialist forms, within the struggle for classlessness, or in a hierarchy of an established order of birth). This way is supremely the life ascribed to Jesus the Christ through whom a believer may come to true knowledge and love of God because God has chosen him initially to be his gift to enslaved humanity.

To put it differently: any statement about persons and their relation to the divine must be a true reflection of life; it must partake of the essence of that which we call human, yet transcend the humanity of any one person or even that of an entire social community or era. Simple prose cannot express this truth adequately. By the same token, a poet, in order to say something significant about life, ought to rise above mere sounds or association of sounds and ideas; his words must participate in the living word, in the reasoning principle which the Greeks called the Logos and which Christians have identified with the Word of God, incarnate in Jesus. To speak thus is to realize what Boccacio attempted to say in his Commentary on Dante's *Divine Comedy* when he claimed that "poetry is theology". It is the phenomenon which Maritain chose to call the "metaphysical transcendence of poetry". *(xiv)* To have reached such convergence of human aims and aspirations is to have arrived at the point at which the greatest expressions about God are poetry and the finest poetry is that which says something theo-logically.

Footnotes:

i. The Book of Job may be taken as a poetic representation of truth in existential encounter. Emil Brunner, *Truth as Encounter*, is a most poignant contemporary expression of this reality.

ii. With E. Brunner, *Revelation and Reason*, London, SCM, 1947, p. 363 ff we distinguish scientific and revealed truth by defining the former as essentially impersonal and the latter as essentially 'truth in encounter'. Beyond this fundamental distinction we do not wish to press the matter at this point.

iii. Sir Kenneth Clark, *Civilisation* (a BBC TV production, published in 1969). A similar case could undoubtedly be made for the Christian East.

iv. Cf E. Brunner, *Christianity and Civilisation* and *Anfaenge der Dialektischen Theologie*, 2. Teil (ed. J. Moltmann). Note especially, the article by R. Bultmann, "Religion und Kultur" in which he asserts a religious basis for almost all human endeavours, including the primitive scientific quest.

v. P. Tillich, "Existentialist Aspects of Modern Art", in C. Michalson (ed), *Christianity and the Existentialists*, p. 128ff.

vi. Secularism may provide the new basis of such encounter; however, many contemporary Christians take flight from this threatening arena into extreme right wing movements.

vii. R. Otto, *The Idea of the Holy* (1923) gives a penetrating analysis of the relation between the numinous and human awareness thereof.

viii. With regard to the practice of immersing the image after Pujah (a time of celebration) in popular Hinduism the question arises whether it should be interpreted as a beginning, from which the joyful celebrant may come away, assured of an abiding presence and of the potential of new birth of god or goddess.

ix. J.M. Robinson, *New Frontiers in Theology*, 1, New York, Harper (1963), p. 50.

x. J. Maritain, *Art and Scholasticism and the Frontiers of Poetry*, New York, Scribners (1962), p. 120.

xi. Ibid, p. 128.

xii This may in some sense be a denial of metaphysics, but is it not a truthful statement, nonetheless, about the kind of God who alone is worth encountering?

xiii. Maritain, Op. Cit. p. 149 The author quotes P. Claudel.

xiv. Ibid, p. 134.

APOLOGIES

In the autumn 1981 issue of ARC it was noted that Phyllis Smyth's article «Theological Reflections on Palliative Care» would appear in the Spring 1982 issue. Unfortunately, the exigencies of publication have once again obliged us to postpone publication of this article. It will appear as soon as possible. Meanwhile, we offer apologies to Dr. Smyth for this delay and thank her for her patience.

MUSIC AND PICTORIAL ART ACCORDING TO KARL BARTH

GRANT LEMARQUAND

(I) *The Place of Music in Worship*

(a) *Barth and Music*

Aesthetics, including music, does not receive a great deal of attention in Barth's works. There is, however, one major exception to this rule: Barth was enraptured by the work of Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart. Around the time of the 200th anniversary of Mozart's birthday in 1956 Barth wrote a number of articles, addresses and even a small book on Mozart. Barth also devoted a short excursus to Mozart in his *The Doctrine of Creation.* *(i)*

In a radio interview on a classical music programme shortly before his death Barth discussed his life, his work and--Mozart.

> I hear in Mozart a final word about life insofar as this can be spoken by man. Perhaps it is no accident that a musician spoke this word. *(ii)*

Although Barth was not a gifted musician and took great care in his theology not «to identify salvation history with any part of the history of art,» *(iii)* he had a difficult time restraining his praise when talking about Mozart.

> He has produced...music which for the true Christian is not mere entertainment, enjoyment or edification but food and drink; music full of comfort and counsel for his needs...always...free, liberating, because wise, strong and sovereign...Mozart has a place in theology... although he was not a Father of the Church, does not seem to have been a particularly active Christian, and was a Roman Catholic, apparently leading what might appear to us a rather frivolous existence when not occupied in his work...Hearing creation unresentfully and impartially, he did not produce merely his own music but that of creation, its two-fold yet harmonious praise of God. (III/3, 279-98)

Mozart may have been «impartial», but Barth was not when it came to Mozart. Mozart was for Barth the only musician who had got it right. Mozart's music reflected God's good creation, «and,» said Barth, «I wonder whether the same can be said for any other works before or after.» (Ibid., 299). Mozart even made his way into Barth's innermost sanctum: «There are probably few theologians' studies in which the pictures of Mozart and of Calvin can be seen side by side at the same level.» *(iv)* In fact Barth once remarked that «if I ever get to heaven, I shall ask first after Mozart, and only then after Augustine and Thomas, Luther and Calvin and Schleiermacher.» *(v)*

When we hear such high praise of Mozart's music it may come as a surprise to see Barth's evaluation of the use of music in worship.

(b) *Music in Worship*

Twice in the *Church Dogmatics* Barth speaks of the use of music in worship. In IV/3, 865f., Barth discusses music in the context of a section on «praise» as one of the twelve forms of the ministry of the community. In III/3, 471-474, Barth deals with the use of musical instruments for worship in the context of a discussion of the music of the angels in heaven.

In both discussions Barth shows his high regard for the gift of music. In IV/3 Barth extols the value and need of singing for the Christian community, saying that the community «is not a choral society» yet «singing is the highest form of human expression.» (IV/3, 866) Singing in church is not be admired for the singing as such. The singing of the community is praise; and like John the Baptist, Barth might say, it must point away from itself to Jesus. Yet, although singing is not an end in itself, the Christian community must sing, for «the community which does not sing is not the community.» (Ibid., 867).

In III/3 Barth recommends music, in this case, as an appropriate reflection of God's creation. The angels, Barth reminds us, have harps in heaven.

> Surely the playing of musical instruments is a more or less conscious, skilful and intelligent human attempt to articulate before God this sound of a cosmos which is otherwise dumb. Surely the perfect musician is the one who, particularly stirred by the angels, is best able to hear not merely the voice of his own heart but what all creation is trying to say. (III/3, 472)

Barth is unwilling, however, to conclude in these two discussions that musical instruments are necessarily helpful or legitimate for use in human worship. «It is hard to see any compelling reason why it (the community) should have to be accompanied in this (singing) by an organ or harmonium,» says Barth in IV/3, 867. «We are well advised not to draw hasty conclusions from this fact (of the music of the angels) as to the form of divine service (e.g., the use of organs).» (III/3, 472) Instruments are so suspect to Barth that he is unsure whether their sounds invoke «clean or unclean spirits.» (IV/3, 867) He seems to be willing to allow the instruments to stay, but closes the door on music which does not accompany singing in the context of worship. «There should be no place for organ solos in the church's liturgy.» (Ibid.) Perhaps Barth is concerned here about pride overshadowing praise, or aesthetics overshadowing true religion expressed in the singing of words. Certain questions are raised, however, about his position in this regard.

(1) First, whereas Barth has raised the issue of the pre-eminence of words over music for the worship of the community, a preoccupation which may be present because of the centrality of the concept of the «Word» in his thought, Barth has not expressed sufficient worry about the limitations of speech in the context of worship.

Barth himself has pointed out how limited human speech is because

> ...even though it (the Christian community) speaks with tongues, it cannot transcend human speech...all religious language is also and indeed primarily non-religious...It cannot escape, then, being secular. (IV/3, 735)

God does indeed sanctify our human language, says Barth, but the limitation is always present. Human speech can always be misunderstood, just as music can be misunderstood even when played with the best of intentions. But, for the Christian, human speech can never adequately express the gratitude and praise which God is worthy to receive. When words fail we have other modes of praise, including music: It too is limited, but it must not be denied lest our praise be impoverished.

(2) Another issue which must be raised in this connection is the question of gifts, «charismata». In guarding against the possibility of pride being expressed in music Barth has thrown out the proverbial baby with the bath water. Pride must go; God's good gift must not. Public worship is not entertainment, it is «not a concert». (IV/3, 866) But public worship should also not be boring. There is a difference between music being used as an entertaining, prideful show and music being used in the service of joyful praise to God by those gifted by him to do so.

(3) A third point concerning Barth's view of music in worship is his own inconsistency in this matter. The Barth who is unhappy about the use of musical instruments in worship is the same Barth who wrote that «the song of birds and similar things...cannot be affected by any confusion with nothingness.» (IV/3, 698) The Barth who allowed no room for non-vocal music in worship is the same Barth who wrote that Mozart «simply offered himself as the agent by which little bits of horn, metal and catgut could serve as the voices of creation.» (III/3, 298) One wonders if Barth laughed with the angels in heaven upon learning that a portion of Mozart's work was performed at his funeral service--a service of worship! *(vi)*

(II) *The Place of Pictorial Art in Worship*

(a) *Barth and Pictorial Art*

As with music Barth did not spend much of his time and energy writing about pictorial art. When he did write concerning this subject his interest was primarily «Christian art», i.e. art depicting Christian themes.

An important discussion of Christian art, especially art depicting Christ, is presented in *Church Dogmatics* IV/2. Barth gives us a long paragraph dealing with «the difficulty of representing Jesus Christ in the plastic arts.» (IV/2, 102) Barth's case here is that representing Jesus Christ in pictorial form is not only difficult but almost impossible because:

> ...every picture in pencil, paint or stone is an attempt to catch the reality portrayed, which is as such in movement, at a definite moment in that movement, to fix it, to arrest or 'freeze' its movement...the picture of Jesus is far too static as a supposed portrayal of the corporeality of Jesus Christ in a given moment. (Ibid.)

It is for this reason--art is static and Christ is not--that Barth can say that the claim of the artist to portray Christ «is so pressing as to be quite intolerable.» (Ibid.)

The practical ramifications of this position Barth is willing to point out. They are two-fold. First, though «we certainly cannot prevent art or artists from attempting this exciting and challenging theme» (IV/3, 868) of depicting Christ, artists must not be encouraged to do so. In the past artists have been «incited rather than discouraged by the church.» This must stop, thinks Barth. Secondly, there is the question of using art as a teaching aid. «It is clear», says Barth, «that from the point of view of Christology there can be no question of using the picture of Christ as a means of instruction.» (Ibid.) This conclusion leads us to our next section.

(b) *Pictorial Art in Worship*

It must first of all be stated that I am not here questioning whether art may legitimately be used as an object of worship or even as an aid to help in focusing worship. Barth does not even raise this issue and I would share his concern about the possibility of idolatry at this point. My concern is rather whether it is legitimate to make representations of Christ or to have representations of Christ in the worship assembly.

In *Church Dogmatics* IV/3 Barth suggests that pictorial representations of Christ in the assembly would not only be inappropriate but would actually compete with preaching:

> ...it is almost inevitable that such static works should constantly attract the eye and therefore the conscious or unconscious attention of the listening community, fixing them upon the particular conception of Jesus Christ entertained in all good faith no doubt by the artist. (IV/3, 867)

Preaching is an event; art is static. Preaching is action; art is frozen. So says Barth.

This position with regard to art is well stated by another theologian who is more explicit about his Puritan leanings, J.I. Packer says that the use of pictures of Christ does two things: (1) «they dishonour God, for they obscure His Glory,» and (2) they «mislead men» because «they convey false ideas about God.» *(vii)* Both Packer and Barth see these consequences as inevitable. What are we to say to this?

(1) First, concerning the idea that art is static and preaching is dynamic, I would be willing to grant that if one's conception of Christ was informed by only one pictorial representation of Him, that conception would not only be static, but stagnant and impoverished. On the other hand, if one's conception of Christ was informed by having heard only one sermon, that conception of Christ would likewise be static, stagnant and impoverished. It is one's relationship with the living Christ which is dynamic. That dynamic relationship may be nurtured by good preaching (or good art) but it is not the preaching (or the art) which is the relationship. Here again we may be witnessing Barth's preoccupation with the «Word», this time in the form of the preached word, resulting in somewhat distorted practical consequences. Christ, the living Word, is dynamic. One picture may present a distorted or misleading conception of Christ, but the truth of God is still present in the history of Christian art. One theologian's work may likewise present a distorted or misleading view of Christ, but the truth of God is still present within the Christian theological tradition. Just as there seems to be little sense in trying to stop theologians from conceiving God in their small way with his help, there is little sense in prohibiting Christian artists from conceiving Christ on canvas merely because they will be unable to present the whole truth in one painting.

Barth would have made a more helpful contribution to those gifted in pictorial art if he warned against bad, untrue and blasphemous pictures of Christ (which Barth well knew could appear in print as well as on canvas) instead of throwing doubt on the whole artistic enterprise.

(2) Secondly, Barth's condemnation of Christian art seems to lend itself to a subtle form of Docetism. In his preoccupation with the preached word has Barth forgotten that Jesus Christ is the Word *made flesh?* Jesus Christ is human, he was made concrete, touchable and drawable and the events of his life lend themselves easily to artistic expression. Of course there is the danger of misrepresenting Him, but this same danger is also present to those who preach.

(3) The third point which must be raised is that Barth might once again be accused of inconsistency. Already in his *Epistle to the Romans* Barth had pointed to the work of Matthias Grünewald as a significant artist whose faith in Christ had found expression in his work. *(viii)* In fact in *Church Dogmatics* I/2 Barth makes the amazing statement that

> ...the condition under which alone Christology is possible takes visible form in the main picture on the altar at Isenheim by M. Grünewald. Its subject is the incarnation...A wretched, crucified, dead man. This is the place of Christology. It faces the mystery. (I/2, 125)

Barth not only admired this painting, but he seems, consciously or unconsciously, to have used it for inspiration. It achieved a place of prominence in his study along with the portraits of Calvin and Mozart.

Would Barth deny us the opportunity of being taught by such a work of art? Could it not be true that, if as the writer of John's gospel tells us, all the books in the world would not be able to hold all that could be said of Christ, it might also be true that all the art galleries and museums could not hold all that could be drawn, painted or sculpted?

(III) *Conclusions*

(a) *Barth on Music and Pictorial Art in Worship*

Karl Barth's theology of worship has practical implications which not only restrict aesthetics and those gifted in the arts, but may also impoverish or impede the worship of the Christian community. Barth's theology points to a bare artless church architecture with unaccompanied singing.

What does this teach us about God? Is our creator God incarnate in Jesus Christ best worshipped in this way? Barth's theology would restrict Christian artists and musicians from using their gifts to enrich the worship of God's people, thereby impeding not only those who would benefit from their work but also the artists and musicians who would be disallowed from offering their gifts of praise to God.

We have pointed to Barth's emphasis on the «Word» as a contributing factor in the formulation of his theology of worship, but there may be more to it. S.W. Sykes' article «Barth on the Centre of Theology» *(ix)* points to another factor to which we have previously alluded. This factor is Barth's ecclesiastical tradition.

> ...in Barth's ecclesiastical tradition the discipline of theology is brought into much closer proximity to its object than in a tradition in which greater weight is placed on liturgy or on the sacraments. What takes place, in other words, is a radical elevation of theology in its association with preaching...from the moment when he emphasized...that...the objectively clarified preaching of the Word is the only sacrament left to the Reformation Church...he announced a consistently pursued ecclesiastical identity, whose implications cannot but have left their imprint on his theology. *(x)*

Barth's theological emphasis on the Word and his ecclesiastical emphasis on preaching are obviously related. For our purposes it matters little which emphasis influenced the other. What matters here is that the aesthetic element in worship has been unnecessarily guarded against in Barth's theological writings.

How then can we reach a Christian theology of the aesthetic and a Christian theology of worship?

(b) *Towards a Christian Aesthetic*

In formulating a Christian aesthetic two aspects of Christian truth must especially be remembered. One is that God is the creator; the other is that God became a man.

That God is the creator and that He created the human race in His own image is a significant statement for aesthetics. In an essay entitled «On Fairy-Stories» J.R.R. Tolkien distinguishes between two worlds, the Primary world of the universe created by God and the Secondary world created by the imaginations of human beings--no less «real», but only in a secondary sense. «What reallly happens», says Tolkien, «is that the story-maker proves a successful 'sub-creator'.» *(xi)* Tolkien's insight into story-making has an analogy to other art forms as well, for to be in God's image is to be a «sub-creator». As Dorothy Sayers has written: «This word--this idea of Art as creation is, I believe, the one important contribution that Christianity has made to aesthetics.» *(xii)*

That God became a man is the other point that must be made in relation to aesthetics. God makes Himself known not only through concepts or words, but He Himself has become flesh. This Word become flesh, Jesus Christ, *is* described in Scripture with words. But they are words which create pictures in our minds, pictures of a Sovereign Lord or of a Lamb. These pictures must never take the place of the Lord, but we need them to help us to grasp who He is. Art must not express untruth or blaspheme, but it ought to be allowed in the Church since we human beings do not understand only with our minds, but also with our ears, our eyes and our hearts.

(c) *Towards a Christian View of Worship*

Unfortunately most of Barth's discussions of worship take place as sub-sections to some other issue, so that he never seems to have given the subject sufficient attention in itself. If, as I have hinted, worship is more than a human event, what is it?

I believe that the Eucharist may be helpful in aiding our understanding of worship. In the Lord's Supper the Church remembers the offering of Christ on the cross for us. In the light of this offering the Church offers itself back to God to be used in His service. This simple two-way movement is a paradigm of worship. God's offering and the human response--this is worship. The picture of the elders in the book of Revelation (4:10) who are given crowns by God but fall down and lay them at His feet is a perfect picture of worship. God offers and we offer back what is given to us.

If this is what worship is, it has implications not only for Sunday worship but also for daily life. As a seventeenth-century monk once said, «our sanctification depends not upon changing our works but in doing for God what we ordinarily do for ourselves.» *(xiii)* This is worship--offering our ordinary lives to God because He has given His life for us.

This idea of worship also has implications for Sunday worship. For Sunday worship is not merely a gathering together in order to sing, listen to a sermon and pray. Worship is the offering of ourselves to the self-offering God. This means that the gifts of the whole community are important. This implies that the artist's work has a place and that the musician may offer his music to God.

If this idea were more prevalent in the Church perhaps we would learn «to live for the praise of His glory.» (Eph. 1:12)

Footnotes:

i. *Church Dogmatics* III/3, pp. 297-99. All subsequent references to the *Church Dogmatics* are included in brackets within the text.

ii. Karl Barth, *Final Testimonies* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977), pp. 20-21.

iii. Quoted in Eberhard Busch, *Karl Barth: His Life from Letters and Autobiographical Texts* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976), p. 410.

iv. Ibid., p. 410. See the picture of Barth's study on p. 419.

v. Ibid., p. 409.

vi. Ibid., p. 499.

vii. J.I. Packer, *Knowing God* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1973), pp. 45, 47.

viii. Karl Barth, *The Epistle to the Romans* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1933), pp. 117, 141.

ix. S.W. Sykes, *Karl Barth's Theological Method* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), pp. 17-54.

x. Ibid., pp. 51-52.

xi. J.R.R. Tolkien, *The Tolkien Reader* (New York: Ballantine, 1966), p. 47.

xii. Dorothy Sayers, *Christian Letters to a Post-Christian World* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1969), p. 77.

xiii. Brother Lawrence of the Resurrection, *The Practice of the Presence of God* (New York: Image Books, 1977), p. 48.

JOURNEY TOWARD MEANING

(Suggested order of worship--Thoughts and Prayers on Contemporary Words about persons, meaning, and God)

Note: Worshippers are invited to come on a symbolic journey with two contemporary writers, Anne Holm and Elie Wiesel. Feel free to participate as fully as you can in their search for meaning. Only one of the authors seems to have found God, the God whom both Jews and Christians have chosen to serve, but then...

Musical Introit (choice of organist)
Leader: Come with us on this journey; leave behind the excess baggage you intended to take with you. Just come, in trust and expectation that we may walk together for a stretch and there, along the road, might find the hidden depth of meaning.
Response: All of us travel in some direction. We seek out goals, some distant, some within easy reach on safely structured roads.
Opening Hymn: "Guide Me, O Thou Great Jehovah".
Leader: Often I walk alone, and then again with many companions who ease the burden of my toil.
Response: We all have groaned under the burden of despair; we all have tasted the fruits of good and evil.
Leader: Dare we reach out to one another; dare we seek God?
Response: Together we have come; let us together question in fear and wonder...together let us aspire to truth that in our leap of faith we may together find anew the way to live today.

A Space for Attentive Listening:
Suggested Music: *The Kol Nidrei* by Max Bruch.
Leader: Lift up your hearts.
Response: We lift them up unto the Lord.
Leader: Let us give thanks to our Lord God.
Response: It is right and good to do so.
Leader: Let us pray.
Unison Prayer: Upon your ways with us, O God, we meditate: Forgive us our transgressions that we may enjoy your favour and by your holy spirit guide us that we may, in the midst of temptations, continue to honour you by following on your path and by heeding your law. In you, O God, the creator and governor of all humankind we find our sustenance and strength: Praised by your Holy Name. Amen

Readings: From the Old Testament: Psalm 22:1-21
Excerpts from Elie Wiesel's *Night*

I witnessed other hangings. I never saw a single one of the victims weep. For a long time those dried-up bodies had forgotten the bitter taste of tears.

Except once. The Oberkapo of the fifty-second cable unit was a Dutchman, a giant, well over six feet. Seven hundred prisoners worked under his orders, and they all loved him like a brother. No one had ever received a blow at his hands, nor an insult from his lips.

He had a young boy under him, a pipel, as they were called--a child with a refined and beautiful face, unheard of in this camp.....

One day, when we came back from work, we saw three gallows rearing up in the assembly place, three black crows. Roll call. SS all around us, machine guns trained: the traditional ceremony. Three victims in chains--and one of them, the little servant, the sad-eyed angel.

The SS seemed more preoccupied, more disturbed than usual. To hang a young boy in front of thousands of spectators was no light matter. The head of the camp read the verdict. All eyes were on the child. He was lividly pale, almost calm, biting his lips. The gallows threw its shadow over him.

This time the Lagerkapo refused to act as executioner. Three SS replaced him.

The three victims mounted together onto the chairs.

The three necks were placed at the same moment within the nooses.

"Long live liberty" cried the two adults.

But the child was silent.

"Where is God? Where is He?"someone behind me asked.

At a sign from the head of the camp, the three chairs tipped over.

Total silence throughout the camp. On the horizon, the sun was setting.

"Bare your heads" yelled the head of the camp. His voice was raucous. We were weeping.

"Cover your heads!".

Then the march past began. The two adults were no longer alive. Their tongues hung swollen, blue-tinged. But the third rope was still moving; being so light, the child was still alive....

For more than half an hour he stayed there, struggling between life and death, dying in slow agony under our eyes. And we had to look him full in the face. He was still alive when I passed in front of him. His tongue was still red, his eyes were not yet glazed.

Behind me, I heard the same man asking: "Where is God now?"

And I heard a voice within me answer him: "Where is He? Here He is--He is hanging here on this gallows..."

That night the soup tasked of corpses.

Musical Interlude (*suggested solo "The Sky Above the Roof"* by Verlaine)

The sky above the roof
Is calm and sweet:
A tree above the roof
Bends in the heat.

A bell from out the blue
Drowsily rings:
A bird from out the blue
Plaintively sings.

Ah God! a life is here,
Simple and fair,
Murmurs of strife are here
Lost in the air.

Why dost thou weep, O heart,
Poured out in tears?
What hast thou done, O heart,
With thy spent years?

Reading from Anne Holm, *I Am David*

You must get away tonight...just before the guards change. When you see me strike a match, the current will be cut off and you can climb over--you'll have half a minute for it. No more .....Just by the big tree in the thicket that lies on the road out to the mines, you'll find a bottle of water and a compass. Follow the compass southward...till you get to Italy and when you get there, go north till you come to a country called Denmark. You'll be safe there. (David was afraid to find a trap, a bullet or a bomb, someone who would chase him and call him back to the concentration camp, but when he reached the roundshaped bundle he found, the bottle, a compass, a box of matches, a large loaf of bread and a pocket knife. Before too long he lost his compass; it was at this point that he realized, he had apparently lost everything to safeguard his freedom). Then David decided he must have a God. It was important to have the right one.

What gods did he know of? The one the Jews had made so many demands to in return for his help? And what had David to give? Nothing! And if you were not a Jew, perhaps you had no right to choose him. The God of the Catholics seemed to leave things to a woman called Mary. Not that David had anything against women, but as he knew so little about them it might be better to choose one who looked after things himself. Johannes should have taught him something about God. Instead, he had only told him about a man, also called David, who had lived a long time ago. David dug into his memory;...Suddenly it came back to him. That other David had said of his God, 'He maketh me to lie down in green pastures, He leadeth me beside still waters.'
He was the one he would choose!
I'm free I can think about him again. I am David. Amen.

Congregational singing (possibly "The Lord's My Shepherd")
Reflections: JOURNEY TOWARD MEANING

Life is a journey. For some it is an aimless running about from morn to night to morn again in endless succession of the same routine activities that fill our living days and take us through to the moment of death.
For some others it is a journey with a destination or aim, chosen by themselves (or so it would seem to many of us) or imposed upon them by powers outside their control. Nonetheless, it is a journey from God to God, one during which people learn to acknowledge a good creator and a gracious sustainer who at the end of the journey, and frequently at way stations along the way, provides visible signs of his presence.
The pilgrim nature of human kind is stressed in much of the Biblical tradition that is venerated by Jews and Christians alike as word from God for the several stretches of life's journey.
There is challenge, defeat, victory, comfort and ultimately a vision of a gracious end when the forces of good conquer the principalities and powers of the world, thus setting the pilgrim free from all bondage and establishing him in peaceful existence with the Almighty.
For us moderns it is not always easy to rejoice in the challenge a pilgrim existence offers to us.
Except perhaps for those among us who empathize deeply with the oppressed or who are able through the power of literary imagination to penetrate the veneer of materialist abundance and discover underneath those human qualities which, when nurtured, give meaning, depth and purpose to our journey, however dark certain stretches of the way might be.
Some very fortunate ones perhaps never notice on their journey of meaning either the almost frightening precision of the atomic age or the nearly chaotic reality of human interaction in which crosses of

suffering and death stand out not merely as symbols of a refined salvation theology, but as stark reminders that salvation is a costly won liberation in human experience, in every new generation. And in the course of each journey through life the question arises--and must surely be responded to--IS THE JOURNEY TOWARD MEANING, THE PILGRIMAGE TO GOD--ONE THAT MUST NEEDS GO THROUGH THE DARKNESS OF HUMAN DEPRAVITY?

The question is not always clearly before us, perhaps rarely ever in quite this straightforward form; but somehow it is and must be our question to which we are called to find an answer--and the answer, if we search truly, will be one that comes to every traveller on the road of life through the encounters we have, with one another and with God.

In the two novels which we excerpted in our act of reflection today, the central figure is a child in a crisis situation--a crisis related to warfare and strife. The journey toward meaning leads to an end. In the one case it is near despair--the anguish of knowing death, witnessing its cruel indifference, experiencing its destructive force. And yet, even there one cannot but feel that the author in his agnosticism, yes in his very denial of God, finds meaning, some kind of liberating experience that enables him to survive even the death of God.

The God--Man confrontation is described in secular terms: it is genuine and real.

The journey which that child had to undertake took him from the sheltered religious Rabbinic home of his parents to the furnaces of Auschwitz and Buchenwald. One is told in agonizing detail how one after another of the way stations crumbles under the pressures of hatred. The dominant mood is a philosophy of life in which everyone is for himself.

Vicarious suffering is revealed as a lie. God seems to have died.

Anne Holm's novel *I Am David*, by contrast, is a simple, yet moving expression of the age old theme of a caring shepherd. The journey of David--many allusions to the Biblical character throughout the simple plot--begins in bondage (literal and allegorical). There is cruelty all around, but there is also a John (a forerunner, a protector--though he is but a shadowy figure whose memory alone lingers).

The route plan is simple: get across the wall in a split second, then to Italy and eventually to Denmark (there you will find the mystery of life resolved).

The only tools on the journey: a compass, a bottle of water, a loaf of bread and a pocket knife and the deep seated, almost subliminal notion that one needs a god on the journey of life.

The key to it all: the child knows his own name, is aware of himself as a person and this gives him confidence.

There is a moving passage how the child chooses his god (p. 46) and then sticks with the commitment all through life.

Not unlike his shrewd namesake of Biblical days, the child bargains with his god, fair and square, and wins.
He makes a leap of faith which sets him onto a path that in the end opens life in beauty and strength.
Why choose secular literature to reflect on the meaning of liberation, to discover a highly relevant theology of the cross?
For one, both novels draw heavily on the Judaeo-Christian religious tradition. In both we discover awareness of and concern for the interaction between God and humankind.
In both novels the reader becomes conscious of the dilemma in every person's faith journey: for one the search to find God ends in the night of the soul--a denial of God, meaning and life; for the other a similar journey leads to love, forgiveness, healing.
The choice is not inherent in the beginning and it is not entirely our own; what is ours, however, is to commit ourselves to be men and women of courage, to walk on the paths of life in singleness of heart in the confidence that God is with us--in life, in death and even beyond death. Thus the journey of life reveals along the way the signposts of a divine presence and the tools of living become sacraments of liberating grace that enable the traveller to discover himself, to mature in trust and hope and come to a meaningful end.

Dag Hammarskjoeld: *The longest journey Is the journey inwards.*
Of him who has chosen his destiny
Who has started his quest For the source of his being.

Unison Prayer (adapted from *I Am David*)

God of the green pastures and the still waters, I am not praying for help because I am...(name)...and that can't be altered. But I want you to know that I have found out that green pastures and still waters are not enough to live by, and neither is freedom. Not when one knows there is love....now I want to thank you because you did not help me; because I have found something I can do for you. I have learned about happiness and found out how to smile. I am... (name)... Amen.

The service may be concluded by an appropriate hymn and where necessary with the saying of a Benediction; it is however most effective if after the prayer, the service simply concludes with appropriate organ music and people are invited to leave the place of worship in silent reflection.

The above service was designed by E.J. Furcha.

GREAT AND HOLY FRIDAY

A deep quiet dark river
Flows through the universe.
In it are submerged the millennia
Of creation.
The quiet chanting flows
Through the night.
Candles and the blackened catafalque
And in the late spring snow
Scattered along gutters
And whisking at street corners
The smell of frozen earth
Mingles with odours of rose oil,
Incense and wax,
Charcoal from steak houses
And stale beer at the doorways
Of taverns.

The honk of car horns
And screeching of tyres
Are strangely muted.
But there is a deeper silence
Huddling in the world,
A long exuding breath
From the dark river,
So utterly resigned
That mind and body
Both grow quiet,
Rest in a movement
Beyond sleep and time
Empty of dreams and illusions.

In this time, aeviternal,
Moving eternally along
The boundaries of time
The stars are caressed
By black waters
And the cosmos contracts
And expands
To a rhythm not to be
Measured by time,
Rather a lullaby
At the graveside of God
Softer than human touch
Of lips upon eyelids.

And alone you enter
The tunnel
where no one but you
Can go,
Longing to touch
Those you have touched,
But knowing
That in those caresses
Of body or of mind
You touched no one,
Not even yourself.
Still, there is the sense
That the passage
Is not empty,
That some, perhaps many,
Have gone before
And faced
As you will face
The ultimate emptiness
That gapes
After the expulsion
Of the last sacrifice.

From the desolation
Flows out
The dark river,
A chasm in the universe,
Yet alive and flowing,
Returning and bringing back
To the unbegotten Bosom
The death of God before all creation:
The love of the Father
Utterly renounced
In love for the Son,
The love of the Son
Now renouncing
In love for the Father.
The love of the Spirit
Renounced and renouncing,
Flowing black
With the cosmic blood of creation
Streaming back
To the Source and Origin
Archaic beyond telling
Of the agony that loves
In being loved
Beyond end and beginning
Trinity signed forever

Across and through
The inconceivable Being
Who chooses in love
Never to awake
In a universe without dimensions.

Richard Cooper

From deep within the Heart of Being
(beyond the grasp of creatures' greeds
but anxious to support their needs)
beyond all measure freely streaming
a treasure-source of urging kindness
(pulsating, like-wise, through the stars and genes)
is sending forth rotating tracers
in search of tear-shaped waiting faces,
in patience turning towards the touch.

Upon the reach, the healing streamers
(reflected through the eyes of brothers)
proceed, like understanding friends,
to gently penetrate all fate-inflicted purple spheres,
to lighten, caringly, collected amber shades,
to dwell, below chameleons' fearful surface changes,
within the waiting faces' tear-freed centre chambers,
their membranes' chapels, raised for grace.

Jutta Benfey

THE SYMBOL-STONES AND CROSS-SLABS OF PICTLAND

GEORGE JOHNSTON

I

If I were operating as a Tour Guide to Scotland I should want to take you to the ancient country of the Painted People (Picti), north of the Clyde-Forth line as far as the distant Orkneys and Shetland. These people were first called *Picti*, the tattooed or painted folk, so far as our sources go, in A.D. 297. They were raiders into Roman Britain south of Hadrian's Wall and allied sometimes with the Scotti (pirates?) who lived in Northern Ireland (Ulster). Like the Scots, the Picts were a Celtic people but probably their forebears included non-Celtic migrants of the Iron Age.

Before the débâcle of the western Roman Empire about A.D. 405-450, the Picts or a group of clans to which they belonged, called Caledonians by the Romans, may well have occupied all or most of modern Scotland, including Skye and the Hebrides. But they lost Argyll and Kintyre to the Scots of Ireland (Dal Riada) centred in Dun Add and the holy isle of Iona; Galloway and the south-west to «Welsh»-speaking Britons whose capital was at Dumbarton on the river Clyde; and the Lothians with the south-east to the Anglians of Northumbria, whose power centre was near Arthur's Seat at Edwin's town (Edinburgh).

So my adopted province of Fife, ancient Pictish kingdom of Fib, where St. Andrews is located, is in Pictland. From there I can take you to Abernethy, and across the Tay to Dunottar and Aberdeen. Or we may travel to Meigle, Perth and Dunkeld (the second great church capital of the early Church in Scotland) and then north to Inverness and beyond that to Nigg and Tain, Goslspie and Thurso whence we can sail across the Pictland Firth (now called Pentland) to Orkney. On the mainland Orkney we must visit the Brough of Birsay and Deerness, two very early Celtic Christian monastic sites. By sea or air, probably from Edinburgh, we can venture farther to see Papil and St. Ninian's Isle in Shetland (which I hope to visit in July, 1982).

If we go, we shall meet many other tourists from the U.S.A., Canada, Germany, France, England and elsewhere; and they tend to be knocked over by the sheer beauty and wild grandeur of Pictland: its mountains and plains and its marvellous rivers and lochs (lakes). It is unusually rich in antiquities that date back into the third millennium B.C. Gradually the Picts were evangelized in the seventh and eighth centuries, partly from Iona, partly from Strathclyde, by devoted missionaries: St. Columba, St. Kentigern or Mungo, Sts. Drosten, Etharnon, Machar, and Maelrubha. Until A.D. 710 and the later eighth century the Pictish Christians belonged to the Celtic branch of the western Catholic Church, and they were open to influences from Gaul and Spain, and even from Coptic Egypt and the eastern Mediterranean. Then they conformed in monkish tonsure, the Date of Easter, the Liturgy and the Episcopal structure of the (Roman) Catholic Church to what had become the accepted rule.


0 50 miles
0 80 km.
• Single incised stones
• Two or more stones
The Shetlands
PICTLAND
TAY
FORTH
ANTONINE WALL
BERNICIA (LANGLAW)
STRATHCLYDE
DALRIADA
ULSTER SCOTS
Hadrian's Wall

In A.D. 843 the Picts and the (Irish) Scots finally became one kingdom and the Picts (alas!) seem to have been lost to history. None of their chronicles and no literature in their language have survived; only a few inscriptions.

What they have left us, however, is a remarkable set of carved standing-stones. Some of them bear unique and puzzling symbols (Class I symbol stones). Others have on one side a Christian cross incised in relief and, as time went on, almost getting free of the slab but never succeeding (unlike the very famous free-standing high crosses of Ireland, Iona and Islay). The cross is decorated with typical Celtic curvilinear designs of great complexity. On the other side, there are symbols of the same type as Class I stones. They overlap in date: thus Class I probably belong to the sixth (just possibly the fifth) to eighth centuries; Class II cross-slabs to the seventh to ninth: they seem to lose the old symbols about A.D. 850.



Figure 14 Class I Pictish symbols (After Henderson)

II

The non-Christian symbol-stones are to be found in fields, churchyards and in churches, by the roadside, and collected into Museums (see the *Map*). They are boulders of sandstone and granite.

The symbols consist of (1) *geometrical shapes*, including a decorated Crescent with a floriated V-rod (possibly a broken arrow and a broken spear); a Double-Disc with a floriated Z-rod; other discs, arch, rectangle;

(2) *living or grotesque creatures:* boar, bull, eagle, horse, wolf, serpent and stag; later, a centaur, sea-horses, and a lion;

(3) *real objects* like mirror and comb, anvil, hammer, the so-called «flower»; and later a crozier, pincers and shears.

Symbols never occur singly.

Perhaps the most intriguing is the «elephant» or «swimming elephant» with crest, long jaws and scroll feet (perhaps an artificial concoction in the Celtic mode, as R.B.K. Stevenson has tried to demonstrate). One is reminded of medieval *Bestiaries*, Celtic metal-work, Carolingian ivories, and the beasts of great MSS such as Durrow, Lindisfarne and Kells, where Celtic work is combined with Anglian motifs.

Many different types of Cross appear; many of them have the Celtic «Ring of Glory», which may have been derived from the Chi-Rho within a wreath (as at Lullingstone in Kent). The Crucified never appears, however. In late examples one notes the Boss Style which came probably from metal-work.

Space will not allow much discussion of the Cross-Slabs, but it may be noted that these Pictish sculptures are unique in Western Christian Art and constitute a major contribution from a people who are otherwise very strange to most of us.

No one has been able to decipher what the Symbols mean, or what function the boulders served. Class I stones may have been (according to the scholars) tombstones, or boundary markers, or memorials, or signs of marriage alliances. Their symbols may point to totems, or legends and myths, or to their religion. The elaborate carving has been compared to a form of embroidery on stone, and it has been suggested that they were like banners to flaunt the National pride of the Picts. Much of this is fanciful. Some of it is sheer guesswork. The fact is that no single explanation will suit all the stones and the cross-slabs.

I have often tried to relate the symbols to religious motifs: e.g. the Crescent to the Moon-goddess, traces of whose worship remain among Celtic Scots today:

Thou white bright Moon of the seasons,
Bright white Moon of the seasons.

Is the Disc a sun-god representation? The Horse, Epona the Celtic horse-goddess; the Stag, Celtic Cernunnos; the Hammer, a sign of Sucellus; and the Bull a god of a cult similar to those known from Asia Minor and Mithraism? (The Bulls all come from Burghead which had a seaport and Roman fort at one time.)



Figure 15 The 'declining' Pictish symbols (After Henderson)

(The decline in the artistic shapes is thought by some to indicate a chronology: the latest stones have the poorest shapes. Note the «elephant» in the fourth line above.)

Figure 17 Fantastic animals on Class II stones. (1)–(2) Rossie, Perthshire; (3) Gask, Perthshire; (4) Woodwray, Perthshire; (5) Meigle; (6) Gask (After Henderson)

III

One of the most striking facts is the simplicity, sureness of touch, and high standard of the carving: so the Stones and the Slabs really ought to be a great tourist attraction! Let me quote the late Nora K. Chadwick:

> The originality and beauty of the work is matched by an impressive mastery of execution. While sandstone is most commonly used, many of these curvilinear designs are incised on granite, that most intractable form of stone. Yet they are for the most part executed with unhesitating assurance and perfection. Only a people with a high standard of material culture could have produced the tools, supported the highly trained and skilled class of artists and technical experts, and financed so great a number of surviving examples--the immortal memorial of a great nation *(Celtic Britain*, London: Thames and Hudson, 1963, p. 129).

I have borrowed and gratefully acknowledge the use of maps and illustrations from Lloyd Laing, *Late Celtic Britain and Ireland*, London: Methuen, 1975; and Charles Thomas, *Britain and Ireland in Early Christian Times*, London: Thames and Hudson, 1971. I have myself a large collection of slides and photographs to illustrate this subject, on which I lectured at the University of St. Andrews summer holiday residence series in June and July, 1981.

LITERATURE:

J. Romilly Allen (and J. Anderson), *The Early Christian Monuments of Scotland.* Edinburgh, 1893; the classic book.

S. Cruden, *The Early Christian and Pictish Monuments of Scotland.* Edinburgh, 1957.

Isabel Henderson, *The Picts.* London, 1967.

F.T. Wainright, ed. *The Problem of the Picts.* Edinburgh, 1955; new edition, Perth, 1981. See especially the essay on «Pictish Art» by R.B.K. Stevenson.

BAROQUE ART AS AN EXPRESSION OF FAITH

ASA W. SPRAGUE

The term «baroque» comes to us from the Spanish word «barroco». It was a large pearl, irregularly shaped, very costly but not well-proportioned and therefore bizarre rather than beautiful. During the course of the seventeenth century, the name came to be given to all those new palaces and churches which fundamentally had remained faithful to the architectural principles of the great classical masters, but which under the stress of the circumstances had acquired certain extravagant elements which were to give the whole era of the Baroque a somewhat restless connotation. It was born out of the practical need to impress the multitude--to make the public gape at the many unnecessary but expensive ornaments, and at the same time feel awe and admiration.

Baroque art dominated in Western Europe for a period of one hundred and fifty years from about 1600-1750. Though «baroque» at various times meant bizarre, flamboyant and elaborately ornamented, modern art historians use it simply to indicate a particular style.

Baroque art is a complex mixture of rationalism, sensuality, materialism and spirituality. Where it was more intense and dramatic than any art of earlier periods, it strove to incorporate the beholder as a vital part of the creative process.

To evaluate this predominantly emotional art it is important that the part played by religious events be considered. The crisis which threatened the Church during this century was the most pernicious to be experienced. The sixteenth century Reformation had rudely shattered the medieval dream of a united Christendom. «Sects» were bidding against each other for domination over the minds of the people. Out of these arguments and others, «arose a century of strife that the world had rarely seen.» *(i)* The end was a complete stalemate. After thirty years of fighting, a truce resulted that divided and sub-divided all of Europe into small principalities, each with a religion of its own and each one «the sworn enemy of all its dissenting neighbours.» *(ii)*

The Roman Church of the 17th century was in a quandary. In order to maintain its prestige, it had to impress people; the Church was obliged to do this in order to keep its spiritual hold upon the part of Europe that had been exposed to the acclamations of Martin Luther. Popular education became once again one of the most important concerns of the church. All the arts--architecture, music, sculpture, painting--had to be enlisted and fully utilized to impress parishioners with the beauty and the power of the Church. The piety and co-operation of the people could no longer be taken for granted; the Church had to preach to them firmly and fervently. Churches had to be built with a maximum of floor space and audience space--church decorations took on emotional character. In fact, the very form of the buildings intended for worship was emotionalized. The painters and sculptors, architects and musicians of this era no longer worked exclusively to the greater glory of a universal God. They became showmen.

The Baroque style in all the arts--painting, architecture, sculpture and even music and literature--shows the artist as primarily individualistic. He looked at the world in terms of recognizable and realistic detail and sought to extend it. The effects of light and shade, of colour and form, of curves contrasted with straight lines and angles--all these, along with the subject matter of sensual splendour, display of wealth, free expression of «higher living», and ecstasy of the sacred as well as the profane, shaped the Baroque style. A painting became propaganda. A church ceased to be a house of worship for all; instead it became a meeting place for those who happened to belong to the same religious sect. Both Church and State set out to impress the people until they were overpowered by the majesty and splendour of their spiritual and worldly masters. The Baroque artists, for example, were supposed to paint pictures that would look well in churches and palaces of vast proportions. Their work was not meant to be displayed in small private chapels where a few worshippers could study it carefully. They were required to conform to the canonical form of Biblical stories and the official interpretation of dogma for the purposes of propaganda. All art required the approval of the bishop. The rules were strict, but within these bounds they produced an art which stirred the emotions and senses of the people and related religious art to life. Music, painting and architecture therefore reflected the social conditions of the time.

The faith of this age, then, was nearly wholly dependent upon Church and State for its very existence. In the arts, something was presumably lost in naturalness, initiative and energy by their being protected, directed and controlled by the central power of church and government. But with this direction,the Baroque era produced an art that had an enormous influence upon the spiritual life of the world at that time. The worship of a universal God was secondary to the master craftsmen who built, composed, wrote and painted for the sake of art, not to the greater glory of God.

Beneath all these extravagances, however, developed an idea of faith which was a highly desirable and practical one for the people of the Baroque. They had a goal, and it gave meaning to their existence, however shallow. In the creation of that goal, which was the style of unity of feeling, Baroque art was produced by both the lowest ranked amateur and the highest paid professional.

The materialism of the Baroque era was sanctioned by the Church, notably in its permission to use images and in the dogma of transubstantiation. It substantiated a faith that was being attacked by the Protestants, and of a militant Church within itself. At its height, the Baroque era depicted a sincere regeneration of the Christian faith; and as long as this spiritual love lasted, the art was vital and sincere. It was a defence of the Roman Catholic Church when it chose the Baroque style, for it had to proclaim and defend all the dogma and doctrines rejected and criticized by the Protestants. Baroque was up-to-date and its appearance was pompous and impressive.

Protestants in the Zwinglian tradition forsook art as a vanity and dispensed with the warmth and colour that art could provide. For fear of losing God in the enjoyment of God's creation they suppressed the sensual and mystical values

of religion in favour of the moral values; therefore, the churches were purged of images, iconic paintings, and the ritual of the Mass.

In these Protestant churches, art no longer had a recognized functional place in divine worship. The church was no longer a large sacramental work of art that drew all the arts into its service. Now the artist had to stand face to face with the Gospel and interpret it as he felt it. With the Reformation organized religion had turned against art for the first time in many centuries and denied its virtue of efficacy. Protestant churches destroyed the art that religion itself had created and that had been one of its most potent agencies of operation.

Footnotes

i. Hendrik Willem Van Loon, *The Arts* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1937), p. 349.

ii. Ibid., p. 350.

EXISTENTIAL DESPAIR OR SERENE ACCEPTANCE? A NOTE ON ATTITUDES TOWARDS DEATH IN THE OLD TESTAMENT

ANTONIO R. GUALTIERI

I have for several years taught a course on death and afterlife predicated on the premise that death is generally experienced as a profound existential anxiety to which the religious traditions respond, in various ways, with a «coping mechanism» or therapeutic strategy. But is this so? Do all traditions, in fact, view death as terror and a problem with which they must deal? Specifically is it true of the Old Testament? The conventional judgement has affirmative. Death--the loss of life-force and the fate of Sheol--is viewed with anxiety; it is something one wishes to avoid. For death means separation, first, from the community which gives identity and meaning to the individual and, second, from God himself. «In death there is no remembrance of thee, in Sheol who can give thee praise?» (Ps 6:5).

A challenge to the view that the Old Testament exemplifies this understanding of death as threat is offered by Lloyd Bailey in *Biblical Perspectives on Death.* *(i)* He argues that apart from a narrow stratum of late literature (notably the Book of Daniel) which represents a shift from the normative and dominant Old Testament view to an apocalyptic eschatology, the Old Testament confronts death in an unagitated and accepting way. The reason for this serenity is the Old Testament's understanding of death as a natural process consistent with the original will of God in creation. *(ii)*

Such distress about death as does appear in the Old Testament pertains not to death as an existential human condition, but to certain unfortunate conditions of death. Bailey lists the conditions that make for a «bad» death: it may be premature; it may be violent; it may leave no surviving heir. He then enumerates the conditions of a «good» death, which are the opposite of the conditions of a «bad» death. A good or timely death comes peacefully at the end of a long life leaving progeny to carry on one's memory and name.

Bailey's interpretation of the Old Testament's perspective on death is amplified somewhat by his discrimination between two strands in the Genesis myth which he terms «folk explanations» of death.

(1) The first sees death as an intruder upon human paradisal bliss, an intrusion precipitated by the sin of pride. Without sin, humanity would have been immortal.

(2) The second view sees death as a natural outcome of mankind's creation out of clay. Because man, like the animals, is fashioned out of clay, he must like the animals, return to the ground in death. Thus death is both natural and acceptable.

Bailey argues that though the first view (death as punishment) became central in Christian thought it played no role in subsequent Old Testament literature and a very small role in Rabbinic literature. The intent of these arguments is to

demonstrate that death as such is not viewed as an absurd enemy, but only its untimeliness. When death occurs at the right time, in the appropriate conditions, then it is not only natural but also a friend. But there are some problems or inadequacies in Bailey's thesis.

1. *Logically unwarranted inferences*

First, and most briefly, the arbitrary nature of some of the extrapolations from the Genesis story of creation must be noted. These extrapolations, which constitute the second or «natural» explanation of death, rest in fact on two non-sequiturs. The assumption that creation from clay signifies mortality may be countered with the claim that when inspired by the divine Spirit clay may, indeed become immortal--apart from the effects of sin.

The second assumption that the kinship of man with the animals signifies mortality, begs the question whether the animals--again, apart from the ecological ramifications of human sin--were also intended to be immortal.

So far we have left aside the question whether the inferences contained in the second (natural) aetiology of death are drawn by Bailey or by the Old Testament writers themselves. Whether these authors are as sanguine about death as Bailey, however, is a doubt raised by assertions he himself makes. For example:

> To be sure, this explanation [death as natural] has been merged with the one previously discussed, so that as the entire chapter now stands, the statement about returning to dust appears to be punishment, to be a fate not intended for the humans. (p. 38)

If the canonical understanding of death is that evinced by the completed text as just indicated, I am perplexed how the claim can be made that «mortality as the Creator's design for humans seems to be the basic perspective of the Old Testament literature....» (p. 38).

2. *Ineluctable «untimeliness» of death*

The second reservation about Bailey's argument is that it assumes that the Old Testament ignores one of the most distressing traits of death that gives it its power to instil terror. I mean its *unpredictability*. Since death can strike at any moment, and not only when we are aged and weary and our work done, it can never be deprived of its terror. Even if we are ripe in years and accomplishments, we still fear for our children: will they survive the capricious possibilities of death?

In a sense, all or most death is «bad» death which makes us anxious, inasmuch as we can experience proleptically the termination of our human relations and creative tasks long before we are prepared to relinquish them. Even if with good luck some of us should arrive at a «good» death at the end, we should have lived a great deal of our life in terror and apprehension that a bad, i.e. untimely, death might strike us or our loved ones down.

The same hermeneutical problem that we noted in the first objection emerges here. Is the failure (on my premises) to acknowledge the unpredictable and proleptic quality of death Bailey's or that of the Old Testament authors? Is Bailey simply the careful describer of the Old Testament's view (regardless of what judgement we might subsequently wish to make upon it) or has his procedure in fact entailed a misleading interpretation of selected passages? In the light of his shortcomings in dealing with the distinction to which I now turn, it is reasonable to postulate that the Old Testament, rather than expressing a serene acceptance of the naturalness of death, shares a near universal apprehension about it that calls forth a consoling response.

3. *Initial vs. transformed interpretations of death*

The major weakness of Bailey's analysis of the biblical view of death is its failure to distinguish clearly between an existential attitude (in which death may be understood as pain and problem) and a soteriologically transformed attitude in which the experience and meaning of death is altered in the direction of acceptance or triumph. One of the purposes of religious traditions being precisely to deal with the anxiety of death, one would hardly expect that the convinced religious consciousness would evince the same understanding of death as that held prior to the internalization of the transformative religious message.

Thus even the element of (relative) nonchalance in some strata of the Old Testament regarding death (or «timely» death) should not automatically be construed as invalidation of the thesis that death is normatively experienced as existential threat. Rather, the heroic acceptance of death is made possible by the internalization of the conviction that an individual's death finds its antidote in certain theological affirmations.

Bailey concedes this point when he addresses himself to the question of how the ancient Israelites were able to cope (apparently) successfully with mortality. He mentions:

(1) Their reliance on God's sovereign wisdom, care and power. Bailey cites Job: «The Lord gave, and the Lord has taken away; blessed be the name of the Lord» (Job 1:21). He then concludes: «Death therefore was not an irrational, intruding enemy but part of an ordered, controlled, harmonious creation» (p. 57).

But this confidence that God has a benevolent purpose even in our dying represents precisely a «coping» strategy. It does not invalidate the interpretation that death is lamentable; it does assert, however, that there is a divine remedy for the plight of death.

(2) Bailey also points out that the conviction that human destiny is tied up with the larger group's fate rather than the individual's plays a role in in mitigating the threat of mortality. But this again is precisely the point: death would be intolerably threatening for many if it were not countered with the conviction that though they will as individuals perish,

the group, the tribe, the nation, will prevail. It is this collective survival which bestows meaning and value, not the survival of discrete individuals.

(3) Bailey draws attention to the therapeutic value of recognizing that one's deeds and reputation will survive death in the memory of one's descendants.

> The memory of the righteous is a blessing, but the name of the wicked will rot. (Prov. 10:7)

Moreover, says Bailey, «Even the persons without offspring could participate in the ongoing life of the community, through their influence, *and be comforted*» (p. 59, my italics).

The conclusion to be drawn is not the simple one that the ancient Israelite consciousness of death was serene and undistressed. Rather, it is that through their convictions about God, community and personal memory they inhabited a cosmological realm in which the existential, i.e. universal, anxiety of death was transformed into triumph over death.

It is only along the lines suggested by this distinction that one can hope to speak of a coherent Old Testament view or perspective on death. *(iii)* Otherwise, one is left with contradictory evidence. Bailey disputes the traditional conception of the Old Testament's understanding of death but his more heroic and optimistic interpretation is contradicted by some of the texts he himself cites (e.g. Ps. 22:14-15, Ps. 102:1-4, Isaiah 14:9-10). Conversely, an interpretation that sees only unrelieved despondency in the face of death fails to accommodate the textual evidence of the resolution of death-anxiety through faith in God and participation in his community.

By acknowledging that the Old Testament (like most religious traditions) contains both views, sometimes dialectically related, but more typically representing a «raw» existential confrontation with finitude and mortality, on the one hand, and the internalization of a transformative message, on the other, one can accommodate the diverse scriptural testimonies.

Footnotes:

i. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979.

ii. Bailey does not claim to be innovating «this much rarer approach». He explicitly associates his views with those of Walter Brueggemann: «A substantial challenge to the ubiquitous claim that the fear of death is universal (and is of such severity that it is repressed) is presented by Walter Brueggemann's assessment: within the biblical historical context and faith-understanding, death was 'not particularly feared'» (p. 4).

iii. It is true that Bailey alludes to a «range of reflection» upon death within the Old Testament. But there is little doubt which dimension is regarded as predominant and normative: It is that which affirms «death

as a natural event» with the result that «the Yahwists of ancient Israel seem to have been less anxious about mortality than were their neighbours» (p. 101).

TO A SON GROWING, GOING

(Christophorus)

and there we stood, we sat, we met
our membranes touching, webbed
through patterns grown in company
we wept not openly
but knew about our tears
yet spared each other
being speared
by the inevitable parting
you want
you have to
go
my son
to find your distant self
which so securely blossoms
deep in your inmost core
you only shed some petals
of growing buds along your ways
which I shall keep
for both of us
beyond our journey's different pace
the fruit is yours in future years
well tended
by the love transcending
both of us.

Jutta Benfey

DEAN'S DESK .....

Since the last issue there has been a most encouraging response to our appeal for financial support of ARC. To all donors we say a hearty «Thanks!» not only for the money but for this tangible feedback about the importance of our publication for alumni/ae and friends. Given the increased cost of postage it is obvious that such ventures in communication, however modest, have constant difficulty in a time of inflation. This is true also, of course, of most of what we do in the Faculty now that budget cuts are so severe.

To date, including our planning for next year (beginning June 1), the budget stringency has been difficult to live with but without substantive effect on staff and student life. If the cuts continue - and we have been assured that at least two more years are definite - it will mean serious effects on programme staffing and campus life in general. A major financial appeal is being planned to the private sector (including every reader of this magazine!) which should result in a better balance between public and private funding, more in line with McGill's tradition. So you will doubtless hear from us in that connection.

Faculty

Our teaching staff seem busier than ever, partly because administrative procedures escalate when budgets are shrinking. This bureaucratic phenonemon (more information for the gnomes in Québec Cité, more memos for the James Building) could stand alongside the laws of Parkinson and Peter (perhaps Joseph's Rule?). Academic work continues, however. The annual meeting of the American Academy of Religion (San Francisco, December) saw Profèssors *Culley*, *Wisse* and *Young* journey to that prestigious circus, where former students were entertained to a McGill dinner--*David Lochhead* (Ph.D. '66), *Bennett Falk* (Ph.D. '79) and *Morny Joy* (Ph.D. '81).

The Canadian version of AAR, the «Learned Societies», meets in early June in Ottawa. This is the 50th anniversary of The Canadian Society for Biblical Literature, of which *Professor Culley* is President. A special evening in which sister societies will join (Canadian Theological Society; Canadian Society for the Study of Religion) is planned to mark the occasion.

On the home front, the new *Institut de Théologie de Montréal* formed as a co-operative Francophone endeavour by the Affiliated Colleges and the Faculty, under the supervision of the Joint Board of the Colleges, is engaged in theological programmes which include special lectures (e.g. *André Lacocque* of Chicago this spring, *Samuel Terrien* in October) and formal courses such as Bible Ouverte for laity. Francophone Protestant theologues may avail themselves of this structure which, along with approved courses from Université de Montréal, assists them in a truly bilingual theological programme. *Mme. Cosette Odier* is now the Institut's Animator, with office in the United Theological College.

Master of Divinity

At last this new programme is properly launched. The official signing of the documents will take place at the Faculty in March. At that time representatives of McGill University and the Joint Board of the Colleges along with the Principals of our three Affiliated Colleges will affix their signatures to the legal Agreement authorizing the granting of the *M.Div.* degree as the professional degree of the Colleges. So we come full circle from the old *B.D.* days (still granted by Presbyterian College until it entered the Faculty in 1969) to a new system with different nomenclature (*B.Th.*, *M.Div.* will be the normal thing from now on) in which the Colleges play a stronger part in the total professional education for ministry of their students.

Travel Diary

Other news of Faculty doings should be reported elsewhere in this issue, notably *Professor Wisse's* conference in Rome. Two conferences on theological education occur in June. The Biennium of the Association of Theological Schools (our accrediting body) meets in Pittsburgh, with *Dr. Arthur Van Seters* accompanying me to represent our Consortium. Preceding that is a Canadian conference at Huron College, London, Ontario, which our three College Principals plan to attend along with *Professor Boorman* representing the Faculty.

In April I hope to spend a pleasant and stimulating week at the Académie Internationale des Sciences Religieuses, the branch of the International Institute of Theoretical Studies dealing with religious studies. It will meet - for the second time outside Europe - at Princeton, in collaboration with the new Center of Theological Inquiry developed by President James McCord of Princeton Theological Seminary. The meetings will bring together European and American theologians (and at least one Canadian) to discuss the theme of «Creation». The past President of the Académie is Dr. Thomas F. Torrance of Edinburgh, who with James McCord will be joint host for this meeting.

Toward the end of May our Dean has been invited to travel to the Far East to help celebrate one hundred years of theological education in Taiwan. En route I shall visit theological centres in Osaka, Japan, and Seoul, Korea. In Taiwan there will be the opportunity to give a lecture series at the two Colleges (Taipei and Tainan) and to address the centenary convocation in Taipei on June 10. Naturally it will be a great experience for one who has not visited this area before. At present are matters of travel planning, research on the centres to be visited, and arranging for various injections, although the preparing of special lectures occupies my subconscious.

Best summer wishes to you all - I hope to see you at the Birks Event on October 4 and 5!

J.C. McLelland

BOOKS ON REVIEW

PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

Richard of St. Victor. *The Twelve Patriarchs, The Mystical Ark and Book Three of the Trinity*. New York: Paulist Press, 1979. Trans. and Intro. by Grover Zinn.

The ambitious series «Classics of Western Spirituality» holds many surprises for those who assume that mystics are either boring or inarticulate about their ineffable experience. Richard, the twelfth-century Victorine, is a master of contemplation whose allegorical and anagogical commentaries illustrate the soul's journey toward union with God. But along this mystical way a solid contribution to theological reasoning is provided which Western philosophers of religion have usually ignored (but not with «learned ignorance»). Richard in particular develops a theory of knowledge which turns on the intuitive (and auditive) mode in which thought terminates on objective reality (rather than on mere names). This attempt to blend realism with empiricism was of influence among the Nominalists, and later was espoused by John Major, teacher of both Loyola and Calvin in Paris. The present book thus offers food for pilgrims of varying journeys: Benjamin is born only when Rachel dies.

Thomas F. Torrance. *The Ground and Grammar of Theology*. Belfast: Christian Journals, 1980.

T.F. Torrance's recent works have shifted from Calvinist and Barthian themes to truly «catholic» pursuits. Ecumenism for him means not only the reconciling of Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox, but even more, bridge-building between theology and «other sciences». This «philosophy of *theology*» as he terms it offers an alternative to traditional philosophy of religion in its reconstruction of the theory of knowing God, arguments for theism and theodicy. All the agenda are here, though in refreshing recapitulation of neglected Patristic and later doctrine. His enemy is «dualism», chiefly that dualistic theism which splits divinity from humanity at the crucial point of ability to suffer (*passibilitas*). He wishes to free theology from its marriage to dualistic ontology, including Newtonian deism, and introduce it to a new partner (less demanding, more of handmaiden) in the *persona* of relativity theory with its onto-relational modes of reality. These essays reflect this stance, e.g. «Emerging from the Cultural Split», «Creation and Science», «The Transformation of Natural Theology».

Hans Küng. *Does God Exist?: An Answer for Today*. New York: Doubleday, 1980.

At last a translation of Küng's important work on fundamental theology or philosophy of religion, *Existiert Gott?* The section on Freud was translated and published as *Freud and the Problem of God* in 1979. Starting with Descartes he locates the key to modern thoughts on God in the «postatheistic» mood following the «loss» (Pascal) or «death» (Hegel) of God. Hegel provided a «new paradigm» for philosophy of religion: post-Hegelian theology cannot go back

before him to supernaturalism or deism, «We must go beyond Hegel to God, who is seen in a new way to be a *living* God.» And so to critiques of the critiques of Feuerbach, Marx, Freud and Nietzsche. I consider this a superior work to Küng's previous *On Being a Christian*, not least in its depth of concern with those who answer this question differently.

J.C. McLelland

PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS

Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981.

Is the Aristotelian notion of virtue still tenable in today's world? MacIntyre addresses himsef to this question in *After Virtue*. His conclusion is that it is indeed tenable, and he demonstrates this by an analysis and criticism of emotivism as the source of indecidability in contemporary ethics. In doing this, MacIntyre has much of interest to say about the controlling attitudes of modern culture--particularly the dominance of the bureaucratic mentality. This important work cannot be too highly recommended.

Richard Cooper

THE ETHICS OF RECONCILIATION

Karl Barth. *The Christian Life: Church Dogmatics IV/4. Lecture Fragments.* Trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1981.

What constitutes good human action in the context of the reconciliation of the world with God in Jesus Christ? This is the question which governs Barth's treatise on *The Christian Life*. This book consists of fragments of lectures on «The Command of God the Reconciler,» the theme of the ethical chapter which would have completed Volume IV of the *Church Dogmatics*.

In the introductory section Barth reiterates his understanding of good human action as obedience to God offered in response to the goodness of God as Creator, Reconciler, and Redeemer. In an earlier chapter (*CD* III/4) obedience to God as Creator was depicted in terms of a life of *freedom*. Now, in response to God as Reconciler, in the special context of the fellowship between God and man as partners in the covenant of grace, obedience takes on the additional character of a life of *invocation*. «This life of calling upon God will be a person's Christian life: his life in freedom, conversion, faith, gratitude, and faithfulness» (p. 44). Since the self-evident model for a detailed discussion of the Christian life is provided by the Lord's Prayer, a study of the themes suggested by this prayer forms the main portion of the ethics of reconciliation. Unfortunately, Barth was able to complete only the sections on the invocation and the first two petitions. A section on «Baptism as the Foundation of the Christian Life,» previously published as *CD* IV/4: *The Christian Life (Fragment)* and omitted from the present work, forms the prologue to the main

portion. A concluding section on the Lord's Supper as the renewal of the Christian life was planned as the epilogue but was never written.

Turning to the Lord's Prayer, Barth first discusses the ethical significance of addressing God as «Father.» Those who invoke God in this way must know themselves as God's *children*, the «brothers and sisters» of Jesus Christ. They are people who come before God only as *beginners*, as little, weak, and poor people in continual need of liberation. The child-like life of invocation is Not a particularly religious *(geistig)* life but rather a «spiritual» *(geistlich)* one, a life lived in fellowship with the Holy Spirit. At the same time it is a life of service with social, political, and cosmic dimensions. As a prophetic minority of aliens, exiles, and pilgrims, God's children are called to stand in solidarity with their neighbours and to witness to the one true Liberator.

The first petition of the Lord's Prayer points up the situation of ambivalence with regard to the hallowing of God's name in the world, in the church, and in the personal life. Side by side with knowledge of God and sanctification of his name, there stand atheism, religion (idolatry), self-deification, apostasy, and sin. In praying the first petition, Christians find the godlessness and the consequent inhumanity that characterize this paradoxical situation intolerable. Rather than make peace with and adapt to the status quo, Christians will rebel and resist against this evil *simul* of light and darkness, humanity and inhumanity, righteousness and sin. They will ask God to disperse the darkness, and in their «zeal for the honor of God» in every sphere of their existence they will seek to give precedence to the Word of God, the Word of the cross.

The Christian action suggested by the second petition takes the form of a revolt against the kingdom of disorder and human unrighteousness which stands in opposition to God's kingdom. It is a revolt against the rule of the «lordless powers» - political absolutisms, Mammon, ideologies, *chthonic* forces - which afflict and oppress people. Thus, Christians pray for the coming of the kingdom of divine righteousness. «The fact that they call upon God with this prayer becomes and is a proof that he, God, resists the torrent of human injustice and evil, and therefore that they as people cannot cease to oppose it as well in their own place and manner» (p. 234). This means that Christians will not presume to build God's kingdom or to execute divine righteousness but rather will be content to engage in a struggle for *human* righteousness. In solidarity with their fellow human beings they will fight for human rights, human freedom, and human peace.

Two striking features of this book deserve special notice. First, the characterization of the Christian life as a life of invocation underscores the *relational* nature of Christian ethics. In Barth's understanding ethics is primarily a matter not of prescription or of deliberation but of discerning the will of God within the context of the divine-human *encounter*. Thanksgiving, praise, and especially petition are therefore intrinsic to the Christian moral life. For Barth the *geistlich* life and the moral life are inseparable in much the same way as are the «prayer and righteous action among men» about which Bonhoeffer wrote

from prison. The vertical and the horizontal are reciprocally united. The spiritual divorced from the moral lacks breadth, the moral divorced from the spiritual lacks depth.

Second, what Barth has to say about politics, eschatology, and the kingdom of God reveals his profound impact on much «post-Barthian» theological discussion. His use of the language of oppression, resistance, liberation, solidarity, and hope invites comparison with its use by contemporary «political» theologians. There is probably some truth in David Tracy's claim that many of the new political theologians of *praxis* do not challenge the basic adequacy of a neo-orthodox model for theology but seek to transform the model by means of theoretical clarification and symbolic enrichment (*Blessed Rage for Order*, pp. 30, 242-43). This transformation is most apparent in their social and political enrichment of Christian eschatological symbols. In terms of the political implications of the kingdom of God, for instance, where Barth speaks of solidarity with humanity, liberation from inhuman powers, and the struggle for human righteousness, the theologians of *praxis* tend to speak of solidarity with the poor, liberation from human oppressors, and the creation of a just society. The nuance is certainly significant from a practical point of view, but it seems clear that the thought of Moltmann, Braaten, or Cone, among others, is not far removed from Barth's basic position. Conversely, in light of recent studies on his socialist commitment it may not be inappropriate to understand Barth's entire theological enterprise as political theology, and perhaps even in a special sense as a radical theology of freedom.

William Van Gelder

SPECIAL ARTICLE

WARRIOR AND FARMER: FUNDAMENTAL RELIGIOUS PARADIGMS

ROBERT LUYSTER

This paper attemps to wed certain abstract considerations regarding the possible range of religious experience to data regarding that experience supplied to us by the history of religions. Its basic contention is that there are in principle only two fundamental forms of experiencing and therefore of religious experiencing: one based upon the subject's consciousness of itself as over against its object; the other based upon consciousness of the object to the exclusion of the subject. The suggestion is then advanced that the essentially subject-oriented consciousness is the nucleus of warrior cultures and religions, while that oriented toward the object is the germ of farming cultures and religions.

Subject and Object

It is a tradition within the philosophical literature that consciousness is bipolar in structure; that a knowing, perceiving I or subject can be distinguished from that which it knows or perceives, its object. The object, it is sometimes said, literally «objects» to or confronts the knowing subject, and knowledge is constituted by the relationship between the two. *(i)* The same dichotomy is expressed in depth psychology by the distinction between the ego («I») and the id («it»). Here again there is the confrontation between the I and an other, a not-I, something experienced as lying beyond the boundaries of the self. In philosophy the analysis of the other is normally formalistic in character, content with defining the properties of the object without reference to the colours and pressures of actual lived experience. In depth psychology, however, the other (eros, libido) is considered in a much more contextual sense and versions of its nature are therefore much more influenced by our emotional apperception of the not-I than in philosophy. For Freud the id was principally a biological and emotional phenomenon, rooted in the body and its instinctive needs. Life or vitality at the organic level and the drives for survival and pleasure which it generated formed the foundation upon which the events and characters of the outer world were arranged and interpreted.

The distinction between subject and object generates in turn that between subjectivity and objectivity. Subjectivity is the subject's sense of its own interiority or its release of that interiority into its object-field; objectivity the effort to suppress one's individualness, to be informed by the object rather than imposing one's own form upon it. To put it in another way, in its objective mode the subject is or attempts to be essentially passive; whereas subjectivity results from the activity of the subject, either upon its world or remaining within its own ego-boundaries. In religious terms we may therefore distinguish between fundamentally subjective or objective modes of religious consciousness. Subjective religious consciousness may be defined as

that in which whatever others may or may not be involved, the subject is essentially experiencing itself, its own inwardness; objective religious consciousness as that in which the focus of attention is rather the object, perceived in what are regarded as its depths.

Let us now attempt to extrapolate from these definitions a more concrete picture of the modes of religious consciousness we have contrasted. Specifically, how would we expect an object-oriented religiosity to appear? If it were consistent with itself, what would be its leading characteristics? In order to reply, we must enquire first in what ways it is that the ego is «objected» or confronted. The most general analysis of man's object-field yields two general subdivisions: internal and external. The other, that is, may present itself to us either inwardly or outwardly. By outward we mean the other perceived as an existence outside of our own body. The furniture of the natural world--trees, buildings, other persons--offer examples of the external other. But the natural world, as well as being viewed externally, may also be experienced from within. As various philosophers have pointed out, the only object in nature which not only confronts us externally but which may be known from the inside is our own body. The other objects known by the self, therefore, are events within the body: the organic drives, their frustrations and gratifications, states of pleasure or pain, physical changes, and so on. These others are experienced in a generically different way than the first set.

The body may be regarded as the ultimate other. It is, to begin with, that through which all external objects are perceived. It is through the sense of the body that they are grasped and filtered, mediated; yet they are nevertheless known only indirectly and at second-hand. It is only the reports of the body concerning them that are known directly and immediately. More importantly, however, the biological drives seem to be known with an urgency and depth that external others lack. Indeed, Freud and may others have regarded man as hardly more than a puppet tugged at constantly by the strings of the vital instincts. Various theories have been advanced regarding the nature of man's vitality by Schopenhauer, Freud, and so on, but they all fundamentally agree that the desire for sensual satisfaction is the underlying goal of human activity. The erotic in particular has been singled out for centuries as the principal among man's passions, for the life-energy of the body seems to be aroused and expressed by sexuality to a degree not easily attained by other means.

If all this be granted, then let us return to our question: what specific form would an objective or other-oriented religious consciousness take? We may observe, to begin with, that considering its dedication to the given, it will be essentially passive in its stance. It will regard surrender or submission to the other as the essence of religion. Ultimate bliss will consist in being swallowed up by the other, totally immersed in its depths, whether through contemplation from afar or union in some sense. Possession by the other, sometimes thought of as spirit-possession, will be the definitive religious act of ultimate significance. But attention, in order to be directed

toward the object, must be directed away from the subject. Hence this will involve, conversely, a gesture of self-renunciation or self-loss on the part of the individual. The sensation is variously described as a «melting,» «letting go,» or «release» from the boundaries of the ego. As a means of achieving such states, we may expect also that the virtues of spontaneity and instinctiveness will be extolled.

If religion in its objective mode is defined, then, by an outflow of consciousness into some suitable receptacle, what may we say of that receptacle, the object? While in theory any object may legitimately serve as a repository for consciousness, in actual practice certain categories of objects will be more charged than others. We hardly need the insights of depth psychology to inform us that man's principal other («id») will be biological in character. For a living being the life that indwells and surrounds him must always be his primary object. In accordance with our previously stated distinction, then, we may divide the religious object into two categories, outer and inner. The former will be the animating principle and its embodiments outside of our body; the latter will be based upon its experience within our body. Man's principal external other, that is, will necessarily be the living natural world that surrounds him, and the expression of this in cultic terms will be what is called nature worship or naturism. The experience of Eros or life-energy inside the body and indulgence in the emotional spectrum that it generates will give rise to what may be called religious eroticism. It will be seen that fundamentally these two forms rest on the same foundation, the vital principle in nature; hence I shall refer to them collectively as vitalism. Thus what may from a purely formal point of view be regarded as objectivism in religion, the orientation of consciousness towards its object and its immersion in that object, becomes vitalism when regarded from a more experiental viewpoint. We may expect, finally, that the ideology of a consistent vitalism will be positive and immanent in character. For, after all, the universal presence of the godhead in the inner and outer world cannot properly lead to other than the most profoundly affirmative of attitudes toward life in their midst.

We turn now to subject-oriented or subjective religious consciousness and inquire what its leading traits might be. We may observe initially that since subjectivity results from the activity of the subject, the subjective religious consciousness will be in the essentially active mode. It will regard not submission to the other but overcoming the other as its goal, for it is just in that felt resistance to its being that the self experiences itself most keenly. Ultimate bliss will depend in turn upon the total domination of the other. No other act could bring home to the ego more effectively its own strength and reality. Through no other act can the ego realize itself with more directness or satisfaction. The stuff of this process can be variously denoted as action, struggle, or work. Such work will be telelogical in nature, having for its goal the experience of power over the other, with all the surcharge of self-awareness that it produces. Will, or the will-to-power, is indeed the hallmark of the subject and the subjective, just as feeling or empathy is of the objective. *(ii)* The powerful subject will characteristically be glorified in this approach, although its guise may vary depending upon the modality of the action involved.

The intrinsic dialectic of willing generates an ultimate subject, just as the suspension of the will generates the body as the ultimate object. The will that desires initially simply to conquer the other, that is, must finally come to realize that its strength and independence can be realized in an even more radical way--the total elimination of the object. The achievement of a pure and unalloyed subjectivity, or what is sometimes called the transcendental ego, becomes the ultimate goal of any fully developed subjectivity. *(iii)* Here the ego, as it were, lifts itself up by its own bootstraps in order to render itself superior (in a double sense) to what is finally regarded as contamination by the other. (The concept of height or flight will in one way or another continue to symbolize this process.) At last the ego will desire not merely to transcend the conventionalized other but even itself in its most immediate manifestation, that of willing. Hence the task of the ultimate ego is finally to conquer itself, to become will-less and immaculate. Pure, objectless consciousness represents the pinnacle of self-realization.

Expressed at the historical level the conquest of the other may be regarded as war; at the level of social custom by the word «law»; at the psychological level as repression. To conform to a social code, to do one's duty, in other words, is synonymous inwardly with the inhibition of the other as impulse or desire. Whether regarded externally or inwardly the act is generally seen as an index of one's will or will-power. The concept of a repeated test (or trial, or ordeal) as the supreme indication that the subject is in fact the master of the object will be central in the ideology of the subject for evident reasons. As the ego enters upon the evolutionary process described, furthermore, the negation of the object expressed in repression will become ever more radical. At a certain point, as mentioned, the ego begins to transform itself into object, in order to negate itself: that which it previously willed it now wills even more strongly not to will. The more it leaves the world behind, the more it scales the mountain of its own awareness. Only through denial of its world in the most total sense can the subject totally rid himself of it and thus arrive at what he is, independent of it. The subjectivist *Weltanschauung*, therefore, will be transcendent and negative in character. All Being will be negated in the effort to ascend to that which lies not only beyond but above it--the transcendent, non-Being, the Void. Purged of all positive attributes, it will itself be describable only in terms of negation.

Agricultural Consciousness

We turn now to the two economic modes which dominated ancient culture prior to the rise of urbanism: agriculture and pastoralism. Our contention is that the religious consciousness which accompanies these modes not only exemplifies the ideal forms we have sketched, but also arises from the modes themselves. Consider the situation of the agriculturalist. What does it mean for one's survival to depend totally upon that which emerges from the earth? To be unalterably attached to one spot upon, even within it? What effect must this have upon one's fundamental orientation towards Being and one's existence as a whole? Conversely, how must the situation of the nomadic pastoralist influence

his consciousness? To wander constantly over the face of the earth, guarding one's own livestock or raiding those of another, seeking always for fresh grazing areas and wresting them from those who occupy them--what form of mentality does this produce? What outlook upon the world? It is evident that any answer must necessarily be speculative, but we would at least claim that the following speculations are the most natural in the light of the circumstances involved.

To be a farmer under the most primitive of conditions is to be totally dependent upon the vagaries of nature generally, the earth in particular. It is necessarily to be totally attentive to the inner life of the earth, the mystery of generation, the miracle of birth. Upon these dark and primordial processes the very existence of the farmer hangs, and they must and do form the core of of his world-view, his religious practices, his practical activity, and his whole awareness in the broadest sense. The earth is the womb of all living beings, their true source, and when they die it becomes their tomb. The life of the farmer is thus a constant waiting upon, a constant service of this almighty power. In himself he is impotent. All of his techniques are of little avail unless the life-energy resident within the earth deigns to blossom for him. Must we not say, then, that agriculture is finally a wise passivity, little more than a gracious invitation to nature to do what man cannot, give birth to his food-stuffs? Like the plants which he tends, the agriculturalist is rooted: his whole way of life presupposes a sedentary existence. His nourishment and very being stem from the earth.

Is it too much to see here, then, a supreme illustration of the orientation toward the other described earlier? We are suggesting that the passivity analysed there is the essential, defining trait of the agricultural mentality, at least in its formative stages. We now wish, more specifically, to review certain information about agricultural religions and will go on to inquire whether it also conforms to the abstract analysis of religious objectivity presented beforehand.

The religious awareness of the farmer is focused upon the nexus of the mother-and-child. The earth is the mother of all that dwells upon it, animal as well as vegetable. Its life is transposed into theirs. The classic examples of the life-child come to us from the Ancient Near East: Attis, Adonis, Osiris, Dionysus, and others. Its mythology revolves around the mystery of death-and-rebirth, the tragic annual death of the vegetation, followed by the joy of its resurrection. *(iv)* We are concerned here, however, less with the details or variants of the tale than its functioning within the consciousness of its audience. The point worth stressing is the severely passionate character of the cultic response to these facts of agricultural existence. Commemmoration of the downfall of the divine child was marked by signs of the most extreme grief and desolation, as the community joined together in rites of the most unmitigated sorrow. When his glorious rebirth was announced, moreover, celebration became as unbridled and extreme as the anguish it replaced.

The same charged emotionality permeates the myths and rituals of the life-mother. The distinctive emphasis in the latter was sexual in nature. For before the earth could bear its divine plenty, it must conceive, it must be impregnated. Because it was the rain which produced the desired vegetation from her fertile loins, the storm was often, though not exclusively, regarded as earth's lover. Again, however, it is less the specifics of the story than its reception that interests us. The crucial factor is the intense eroticism which it generated. *(v)* Sometimes whole communities, sometimes their royal or priestly representatives, engaged in sexuality that was usually wildly licentious and orgiastic in character. Activities ran from mass matings in the fields, to phallic processions and songs in the villages, to collusions of kings and princes with their royal courtesans in specially selected sacred enclosures. The festival in question was normally carnival-like, with all the usual social restrictions relaxed and libertinism of every kind given free rein. The underlying supposition was that the exhilaration which animated the worshippers proceeded from the life-energy of the gods they impersonated. At the moment of orgasm they were totally possessed by it, filled with the divine pleroma, and substantially one with their god.

Do we not have here in concrete form the same blend of ingredients derived earlier on theoretical grounds in our analysis of objectivity in religion? In the worshipper's throes of passion over the fate of the life-child and the engorgement of his being by the vitality of the life-mother we have instanced exactly that total immersion in the object described then. The recklessness of carnival is the institutionalization of the spontaneity we mentioned. It was stated as well that the religious object will in one way or another be associated with the principle of life in external nature. But is not devotion to the earth and all that springs from it exactly that? And that the internal component of this would culminate in exaggeration upon the libidinal, is this not exactly what farming cults manifest in the most extreme ways possible? We submit, therefore, that the paradigmatic instance of a consciousness and accompanying religion based on the dominance of the id, it, or object, is to be found in the models provided for us by practitioners of agriculture. In the myths and rituals of the farmers we find exactly what we would anticipate as the result of our abstract analysis.

Before passing on, let us briefly trace the evolution of object-orientation into more limited though equally significant religious forms. The most straightforward progress along these lines may be found in the Orient. The outward element in agricultural feeling, the idealization of external nature, may be found most clearly developed in Taoism and Zen Buddhism. Particularly in the poetry and graphic arts of these two movements and those inspired by them, nature is celebrated to a degree and with a vivacity scarcely equalled in all of world art. Taoist nature landscapes and Zen haiku especially demonstrate an intuitive approach to their subject that is all we would expect of the most sharply honed objective awareness. (We may note, furthermore, the stress in both Taoism and Zen upon the notion of non-effort, *wu-wei*, their version of the passivity or surrender to the object that has characterized this mode all along.)

In the bhakti (love) cults of India we find various sublimations of the emotionality inherent in the rites of the dying-and-reviving vegetation god. Here, however, the approach is more sentimental, even more romantic, in character, as the fertility associations of the gods fade into the background and are replaced by their role as saviours. Finally, the eroticism of mother worship is itself transformed into a vehicle of salvation in Indian Tantrism, where cultic *maithuna* (sexual intercourse) becomes the principal means of religious realization. Consonant with our earlier claims, each of these forms has evolved from an agricultural base and in each the fundamental dynamic is the same: in the act of worship one «melts into» the other. *(vi)* In each egoism is disparaged as the fount of irreligion, and salvation consists in ego-loss through one technique or another.

Warrior Consciousness

We ask now the same equestion we posed before: how does the concrete situation of the pastoralist affect his world-view? Our answer must emerge from the foremost characteristic of that situation: the pastoralist is footloose, deracinated, a nomad. His flocks and herds are constantly exhausting their grazing grounds, and he is thus compelled incessantly to discover fresh pasturage for them. He engages in no loving exchange with the earth, as does the farmer, but instead drifts homeless across its surface, foraging for himself and his livestock as he goes. If the earth is exhausted or inhospitable in one area, he will explore another. Now everything depends upon him, his initiative, his determination, his fortitude. For it is not only with the barrenness of the earth that he must contend, but the desire of other men to retain the lands into which he is ever intruding. Their desire to expel him, the outsider, from soil they regard not only as their home but their mother compels the pastoralist to become a warrior as well. His survival and success depend upon his own ability to seize what he wishes, not only from the settlers in his path but his fellow pastoralists as well. The tradition of cattle-raiding, along with the family and tribal hostilities that it generates, forms an important element in his life. He must be able not only to vanquish all those who stand in his path as he roams fattening his flocks and herds, but defend them as well against the trepidations of the «cattle-rustlers» among his cohorts, or even add to their number through his own forays. His way of life and his consciousness, therefore, are necessarily individualistic, heroic, and violent--traits that are the antithesis of those defining the farmer.

In the pastoralist warrior we see instantiated the subjective mode of consciousness analysed earlier, as well as the bent towards activism that it implied. The «cowboy» intuits his world as a scene of unending conflict, in which one either overcomes or is overcome. Ego-strength and the pride it generates are the foundations of that world, the world of the unending frontier. In this mode the «other» exists merely as a challenge to the subject. The religious dimension of pastoralist cultures, furthermore, may be seen to conform to this analysis. The classic cases of pastoralist cultures in the ancient world are the early Semites and Indo-Europeans. We note initially that both are expansionist and military in character, glorifying battle and the individual who

excels in it. Not passivity but conquest is the prime virtue, and most admired was he who achieved it most strikingly. The Hero--whether it be David, Sargon, and Gilgamesh in the Semitic traditions or Beowulf, Achilles, and Siegfried among the Indo-Europeans--was the paradigm of being at its most authentic. We would expect the gods of such heroes, intent upon superiority, overcoming, and ascension, to be themselves lofty, and this is indeed what we find. The Biblical God is not only a «God of hosts» (armies) but a god who «art in heaven,» whose home is in the sky. Other prominent storm- (Baal) and sun- (Marduk) gods among the Semites may be adduced in the same connection. The pantheon of the Indo-Europeans is likewise dominated by sky- (Varuna, Zeus, Odin), storm- (Indra, Thor), and sun- (Mithra, Apollo) gods, who are also mighty heroes.

Such gods may be said to constitute the celestial reflection at the level of divinity of the men who praised them. They were, after all, like their followers, not only detached from but *over* the earth, its lords and masters. Their worship involved no mystical loss of selfhood or immersion in the godhead, but was compounded rather of respectful obedience to their codes of honour and behaviour, encomiums to their mighty deeds of valour, and sumptuous banquets in which they were thought to partake, *primus inter pares*. At the same banquets lengthy epics presenting the exploits of their human correspondents competed for attention, but again the underlying message throughout was the absolute centrality of the willing subject, the ego, whether divine or human. Worship in this modality, therefore, amounts finally to the celebration by the ego of its own functioning, self-glorification in the most literal sense. Its opponents are not only human and bestial, but internal as well. Immersion in the earth amounts at the personal level to subjection to the body, the instincts, but subjection in any form is interpreted as weakness. The result is that warrior spokesmen consistently inveigh against eroticism and the orgiastic cults to which it gives rise. Such practices were described as effeminate and disgraceful, fit only for weaklings. The true hero represses not only the beast but the bestial within, the drives and feelings of the libido. He is, in short, a puritan: willing to kiss his horse but not his sweetheart, to whom he must remain always distant--as distant as the sky.

We should like again to make some suggestions regarding later evolutions of the warrior mentality in the cultures we have identified. The pre-condition of these developments was the renunciation of the frontier, the adoption by the warriors of a sedentary existence, as the landed aristocracy of the areas they had overwhelmed and subdued. Unfortunately, this left an ethos based on conquest without its customary purchase in the external world and compelled the warrior to internalize his grasp of life-as-conflict. From this point onward the real enemy could only be himself, or at least what he came to regard as the «lower» portions of his being. Hence the dichotomization, not only of his own but of all being, into inferior and superior, unreal and real, fallen and transcendent. As before, the task confronting the individual lay in overcoming, but this was now interpreted as a self-overcoming. Increasingly man's flesh was opposed to his spirit, his libido to his reason, and all vitalistic exhibitions (or their sources: alcohol, music, dancing, violence, sexuality, even

meat-eating) condemned as leading to perdition. «Surrender» to the body was defeat; the successful exertion of will against its claims victory. Puritanism--the desire to be rid of this seditious alter ego, to be «pure»--became explicit at last, albeit in various forms. The warrior was transformed into a priest, even a monk. In Israel Sadduccees and Pharisees clung fast to a Law (Torah) whose essence was to render man «pure» or «clean» (kosher) not only dietetically and ritually but in all aspects of life. In Greece travelling *katharmoi* (Purists) offered a *katharsis* (purification) of sins of every type, while in India Brahmans, Buddhists, and Jains joined forces in a common front against irrationality, however displayed. Throughout these areas religion became a matter of control, will, sublimation. *(vii)*

In the Bible man's dissociation from himself in order to overcome himself is disguised and frustrated by the projection of his spiritual being beyond his ego boundaries. The history of the Bible is the history of the increasing transcendence of that ideal being, God, to the point that it is no longer willing to acknowledge its own genesis in the consciousness of its worshippers. As a result the path to self-overcoming is blocked, and biblical man falls back instead into self-abasement, self-alienation. He is compelled to identify exclusively with the lower, physical dimensions of his being, because true knowledge, goodness, and worth are God's alone. As a result he «despises» himself and calls out, «Who will deliver me from this body of death?» *(viii)* In Hellenic and Hellenistic cultures, however, the evolution of the ego was facilitated by a more straightforward dualism, in which man's ideal possibilities remained grounded in the structures of the lower or empirical ego. A variety of groups--from the Orphics to the Manichaeans--divided the world and man himself into two warring halves and encouraged man to subordinate the world of the senses and the feelings to which it gave rise to a higher world and the rational or spiritual faculties that participated in it. In India, finally, came the most radical and overt rupture with the phenomenal ego and its world. In a process antithetical to that of Biblical man, the ego of the Upanishads and related movements has not only overcome but refuses now to identify with or recognize its rootage in the lower self. Through knowledge, yoga, and a variety of other techniques, the transcendental ego (Atman, Purusha, etc.) seeks to sever itself entirely from what is now regarded as a false identification with its vital origins. Spirit alone is real. Far from cringing before it as an entity external to himself, or despising himself, man now negates and despises his world and declares that in his essence he is not only above it but divine. In the last stage of his evolution, therefore, the warrior becomes actually what he has been in principle all along--a mystic. *(ix)*

Subject and Object: The Historical Dialectic

We wish now to step back a few paces, as it were, and view our topic from a more general historical perspective. The contrasting forms of consciousness that we have identified, subjective and objective, offer a useful perspective from which to view history and its convolutions. From the beginnings of time to the present, that is, we may witness the constant interweavings of these two modes as they alternately preside over, mingle with, and then give way to their

complement. To illustrate, we may take the earliest hunting-gathering cultures as a mixed affair, involving both aggression and receptivity towards nature and its foodstuffs. The hunting of wild game represents in its earliest format the attitude of the warrior, struggling to subdue wildlife for the sake of his own survival. The religious expression of this drive, the shaman, expresses in its most primordial form the ideology of ego-transcendence that we have thus far examined in somewhat more advanced versions. The shaman purports to be able to abandon his body at will, to be able as unfettered spirit to soar to the «real» world beyond this one, and once there to overcome the hostile spirits that oppose man's enterprises on earth. Here, then, at its most pristine we find the taproot of all later cultural and philosophic *Weltanschauungen* based upon the meaningfulness of individualism, struggle, bravery, overcoming, and triumph, as well as the bifurcation of man and world that provides him with a higher realm toward which to aspire. When man's drive to dominate the animals teaches him that domestication is more effective than capture, the same mentality will be subsumed at a higher level.

In the gathering of plantfoods, however, man soon discovers that no amount of rapacity, heroism, or strength is of any avail. What does succeed, on the other hand, is patience, observation, and an attitude of communion rather than competition towards its object. When this ripens into the sense of a deeper unity between man and the earth, the acknowledgement of man's absolute dependence upon it, and knowledge of the appropriate avenues to its bounty, the practice of agriculture will be born, and along with it the premium upon vitalistic celebration already described. For millennia it will develop side-by-side with its pastoral counterpart, each of them slowly evolving the cultural and material structures that are their foundation and expression. During the third millennium B.C., however, their normally peaceful coexistence will be broken by the first major incursions of Semites and Indo-Europeans into settled, farming areas, and these invasions will intensify during the second millennium B.C. Classic confrontations between the two outlooks occur at several points, among which we may mention the clash of Mycenaeans versus Minoans in Greece and Aryans versus Dravidians in India among Indo-Europeans, and for the Semites that of Babylonians against Sumerians and Hebrews against Canaanites. The pastoral warriors consistently appear as crude barbarians to those that they invade, while they in turn see the agriculturalists, amid the gleaming richness of their cities, as so many fat cattle, ripe for plunder.

At this point the struggle is joined. While the warrior cultures generally overrun and become the ruling nobility of the farming substratum, in time the repressed class and its characteristic outlook re-emerge and the result is a mixed emphasis upon both heroism and fertility, overcoming and submission. The resultant history of both East and West may be seen as the dialectic of these complementary states of mind. In a general way, however, it may be observed that the ideology of domination and repression has on the whole been the guiding force behind world culture for the last four to five thousand years, despite occasional relaxations in its rule. As regards the West alone we note that throughout the so-called Dark Ages the warrior ethos reigned supreme, as expressed by the many epics and sagas that stem from this period. But the

modern era perpetuates the same fundamental set of values, despite the enormous advances wrought by the humanistic rationalism of the last few centuries. In capitalism as an economic form and imperialism as a political one we have the moulding forces of modern history, and what do they imply ultimately other than the same blind will-to-power that has characterized the warrior throughout his career, whatever his guise? Whatever difference may exist results principally from the substitution for the individual as the focus of competition (although individualized hero-worship still abounds) by the team, whether on the battle-field, or in the stadium, market place, or laboratory. The social, personal, and ecological devastation imposed by this unmitigated premium upon strength and success have now become so apparent to all that the complement formation is again slowly gathering. As we would expect from the analysis offered earlier in the paper, its emphasis is upon harmony with and reverence for, rather than subjugation of, the earth («biosphere»). Its values and teachings are the perennial agricultural (objectively-oriented) ones: the beauty of nature, the goodness of all that is natural or organic, the joys of sexuality and the naked human body, the legitimacy of feeling and sensual pleasure, the necessity of decentralized, non-competitive, communal living.

It would be futile to pretend that appreciation of and union with the earth, the collectivized object, is in any way intrinsically preferable to its control or transcendence. Man's history and survival presuppose his ability to interfere in the processes of nature and turn them to his own advantage, to overcome them as it were. The desire to persist as a self necessarily involves selfishness, the demand that the object be conformed to subject rather than the reverse. It is when this natural and legitimate insistence by the ego upon its own portion of the cosmic banquet swells into the arrogant effort to glut oneself upon the whole of it that conflicts ensue. At this juncture two possibilities remain. Either the ego will itself be devoured by one still more powerful and thus perish in its obstinacy, or at last recognize the equality of the object's claim to being and have the wisdom and grace to acquiesce before it. With the latter movement of consciousness, of course, the pendulum embarks upon its reverse swing, and the phenomenon that we have termed vitalism begins to become manifest. The other, the object, now emerges to the fore as the focus of attention and worth. The subject, attracted by its power rather than his own, seeks to be immersed, to become wholly absorbed in it. For a time it may indeed be abosrbed and blissfully so, may lose itself and the anxieties of self-constitution in the dark, illimitable depths of the other. Finally, however, whether through sheer exhaustion of ecstacy, through some imperfection or failing in the object, or through some nameless, obscure urge to return «home», the subject will turn back upon itself and the pendulum again reverse. In this subtle dialectic in the deepest, most silent and obscure stratum of consciousness we find the hidden, subterranean source of much of the turmoil of individual and social history.

Footnotes:

i. «The self implies, and has no existence apart from, a not-self, and it is only in the contrast with the not-self that it is aware of itself as a self»: A.E. Taylor, *Elements of Metaphysics* (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1903), p. 336. Cf. his discussion in Book IV, Chapter III («The Place of the Self in Reality»), particularly pp. 336-47.

ii. The supreme exposition of will or the will-to-power as the essence of selfhood is probably Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1969). In the section «Of Self-Overcoming» he defines the underlying assertion of the work as a whole: «Where life is there is also will: not will to life, but--so I teach you--will to power!» (p. 138). He insists also that, as we point out, the ultimate form of willing or overcoming is self-overcoming: «Whatever I create and however much I love it--soon I have to oppose it and my love: thus will my will have it» (p. 138). Cf. the discussion in Chapter 6 («The Discovery of the Will to Power») of Walter Kaufmann, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist* (New York: Meridian Books, 1956), pp. 152-81. The contrary approach, which exalts the claims of the other over against the self, underlies the views of Friedrich Schleiermacher. In his *On Religion*, trans. John Oman (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1955), he divides consciousness into activity, perception, and feeling. By the first he means what Nietzsche means by will to power: «You will find that those moments in which you exercise power over things and impress yourself upon them, form what you call your practical, or in the narrower sense, your moral life» (p. 37). It is in feeling, or the antithesis to this mode, however, that he locates not only the religious but the ground form of human consciousness. Feeling is «the operation of God in you by means of the operation of the world upon you. This series is not made up either of perceptions or...works..., but purely of sensations and the influence of all that lives and moves around, which accompanies them and conditions them. These feelings are exclusively the elements of religion, and none are excluded. There is no sensation that is not pious...» (p. 38). In another passage he describes religion more loosely as the «holy wedlock» of the individual and the Universe. «You lie directly on the bosom of the infinite world. In that moment you are its soul. Through one part of your nature you feel as your own all its powers and endless life. In that moment it is your body...» (p. 36). In *The Christian Faith*, trans. H.R. Mackintosh (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1928) this analysis is superseded by the more fundamental one we have here proposed: «In self-consciousness there are only two elements: the one expresses the existence of the subject for itself, the other its co-existence with an Other» (p. 16). The subject's sense of itself he terms Activity or the feeling of Freedom; the sense of its object as Receptivity or the feeling of Dependence. He then goes on to deny (what certain Hindu philosophers would assert) that a feeling of absolute Freedom is possible,

in order to make room for the claim that it is in the feeling of absolute Dependence [«the consciousness that the whole of our spontaneous activity comes from a source outside of us»] that the ultimate truth may be found.

iii. I am speaking here in a strictly phenomenological sense. That some philosophers have denied the existence of such an entity does not remove it from the world of man's lived experience. It should be added that even some phenomenologists, notably Jean-Paul Sartre, *The Transcendence of the Ego*, have attempted to analyse it away as an experience, but against these may be adduced the testimony of many other phenomenologists, not to mention the majority of Hindu philosophers and mystics. As a modern example we may adduce G.I. Gurdjieff's efforts to achieve «pure consciousness» by «self-remembering»; cf. P.D. Ouspensky, *In Search of the Miraculous* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1949), pp. 116-19.

iv. The classic study of agricultural religion remains Frazer's *Golden Bough*. See particularly the recent critical edition by Theodor Gaster: James George Frazer, *The New Golden Bough*, ed. Theodor H. Gaster (New York: Criterion Books, 1959), Parts IV («Dying and Reviving Gods») and V («Spirits of the Corn and Wild»).

v. Mircea Eliade, *Patterns in Comparative Religion*, trans. Rosemary Sheed (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1958), Chapter IX («Agriculture and Fertility Cults») deals not only with the connection between the agricultural orgy and vitalism («The orgy sets flowing the sacred energy of life»: p. 357), but also its relation to ego-loss («For a time man goes back to the amorphous, nocturnal state of chaos that he may be reborn, more vigorous than ever in his daylight self. Like immersion in water, the orgy destroys creation, while at the same time regenerating it; man hopes... to return to himself restored and regenerated, in a word, 'a new man'»: p. 357). The historic roots of agricultural orgiasticism are investigated by Umberto Pestalozza, *L'éternel féminin dans la religion méditerranéenne* (Bruxelles: Latonus, 1965), who declares that «Cette coutume n'est ni sémitique, ni moins encore aryenne. Elle parvient d'un substrat, présémetique et préaryen» (p. 47). The discussion of the «extraordinary ithyphallicism» of prehistoric Scandinavian rock carvings leads E.R. Hays, *In the Beginnings: Early Man and His Gods* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1963), pp. 145-49, into a discussion of «the religion of an exaggeratedly masculine hunting, pastoral and warrior mentality.» Speaking of the Indo-Europeans generally, he comments that «it is not hard to understand the emphasis on phallicism. The state of erection was the supremely male condition--hunting, potency, and warfare are complementary forms of ego expression.» Among the pastoral warriors, that is, the phallus was homologized not to the plow but to the spear, a weapon, and sexuality was less a form of fertility than of warfare. We find here the emphasis upon the ego and its might, whereas for the agriculturalists sexuality connoted ego-loss and submission.

vi. Mariasusai Dhavamony, *Love of God according to Saiva Siddhanta* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), Chapter VII («The Origin of Bhakti»), traces the Dravidian and agricultural background of the Indian *bhakti* cults: «Having traced the doctrine of bhakti in the early Sanskrit sacred writings, we find that there is not much that points to is Aryan origin» (p. 96). On the Dravidian origins of Tantrism, see Agehananda Bharati, *The Tantric Tradition* (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1970), pp. 204-6. As for Taoism it may be noted that the traditional homeland of Taoism is southern China, its agricultural region, and that its teachings centre around the importance of proper nitrition, living in harmony with the Earth, the development of the body (its sexual functions in particular), and the concept of *wu-wei* (not willing); cf. the discussion in Philip Rawson and Laszlo Legeza, *Tao: The Eastern Philosophy of Time and Change* (New York: Avon Books, 1973), pp. 7-32.

vii. Cf. Max Weber, *The Religion of India*, trans. Hans H. Gerth and Don Martindale (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1958), Chapter IV («Anti-orgiastic and Ritualistic Character of Brahmanical Religiosity»), pp. 137-62; Max Weber, *Ancient Judaism*, trans. Hans H. Gerth and Don Martindale (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1952), Chapter VII, Section 3 («The Fight of Yahweh against Orgiasticism»), pp. 187-94; E.R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), Chapter V («The Greek Shamans and the Origin of Puritanism»), pp. 135-78. The characteristic ideology of the warrior is discussed in Jan De Vries, *Heldenlied und Heldensage* (Bern: Francke Verlag, 1961), Chapter IX («Der Held und die heroische Zeit»), pp. 243-59; Georges Dumézil, *The Destiny of the Warrior*, trans. Alf Hiltebeitel (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970); Joseph Campbell, *The Hero with a Thousand Faces* (New York: Meridian Books, 1956), pp. 334-42 («The Hero as Warrior»).

viii. Yahweh leads Job (42:6) to «despise» himself; the cry for deliverance is St. Paul's (Romans 7:24). It may be seen that the remarks here follow the general approach of Ludwig Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, trans. George Eliot (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957): «Religion is the disuniting of man from himself; he sets God before him as the antithesis of himself» (p. 33). Cf. also Erich Fromm, *Psychoanalysis and Religion* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950): «When man has thus projected his most valuable powers unto God, what of his relationship to his own powers? They have become separated from him and in this process he has become alienated from himself» (p. 48).

ix. On pessimism among the Hindus see Albert Schweitzer, *Indian Thought and its Development*, trans. Mrs. Charles Russell (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), Chapter II («The Rise of World and Life Negation in Indian Thought»), pp. 19-31; among the Greeks, Gilbert Murray, *Five Stages of Greek Religion* (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1951), Chapter IV («The Failure of Nerve»), pp. 119-65. On the connection of yoga to these topics see G.A. Feuerstein, *The Essence of Yoga: A Contribution to the*

Psychohistory of Indian Civilization, particularly pp. 38-43 («The Omnipresence of Suffering»), 130-35 («Ultimate Transcendence»), 154-65 («The Yogin on the Battlefield»). Feuerstein analyses yoga as «the enstacy which lacks any form of object consciousness» (p. 130). For the nondualistic sources of yoga in the Upanishads see my «The Concept of the Self in the Upanishads: Its Origin and Symbols,» *Philosophy East and West*, Vol. XX, No. 1 (January 1970), pp. 51-61.

PEOPLE AND EVENTS

Dr. E.J. Furcha has been granted a research fellowship by the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for the purpose of refining work on a projected publication of two to three volumes on the Major Writings of H. Zwingli, 1484-1531. The grant will enable him to work in the relevant Archives in Zurich, Switzerland during June and July 1982.

He will present a paper to the Canadian Society of Church History in June 1982, *The Paradoxon as Hermeneutical Principle: The Case of Sebastian Franck, 1499-1542.*

The Faculty of Religious Studies in conjunction with interested persons from other McGill Faculties and Departments is planning a Luther Symposium in 1983 and an international Zwingli Symposium in 1984 on the occasion of the quinquecentennials of their births.

Dr. Eric Jay, Emeritus Professor of Theology, recently published an article, «From Presbyter-Bishops to Bishops and Presbyters», an assessment of Christian Ministry in the second century, in *The Second Century, A Journal of Early Christian Studies*, I, 3 (published at Abilene Christian University, Texas).

Dr. George Johnston was honoured by the United Theological College, former students, friends and colleagues by a Special Lecture and dinner, March 5th, 1982. The *Reverend Tom Edmonds*, Director of Studies, UTC, was chairman of the Planning Committee.

Dr. R.W. Stevenson lectured and led a discussion on *Modern Hindu Thought* on February 19th as part of a programme on Hinduism at the Unitarian Church of the Messiah, Montreal. On March 1st he lectured on *Hinduism* in the series «Christians Look at Other Religions» arranged by the Adult Education Committee of Dominion Douglas United Church, Montreal. *Dr. Telwatte Rahula* spoke on *Buddhism* in this same series on March 8th. Dr. Stevenson has submitted a book review of David Kinsley's *Hinduism: A Cultural Perspective* (Prentice-Hall, 1982) to *Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses.*

Dr. Frederik Wisse gave a paper in December 1981 at the annual meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature in San Francisco on Encratism and Gnosticism.

He also published the following articles: «Stalking Those Elusive Sethians» in *The Rediscovery of Gnosticism*, Vol. II (Bentley Layton, ed.), Leiden, 1981, pp. 563-76; and «The 'Opponents' in the New Testament in Light of the Nag Hammadi Writings» in *Colloque international sur les Textes de Nag Hammadi* (Bernard Barc, ed.), Quebec/Louvain, 1981, pp. 99-120.

Dr. Wisse attended the Second International Congress for Coptic Studies in Rome, September 22-26, 1981; he will attend a Colloquium on Encratism in April 1982 in Milan.

NOTES FROM THE MONTREAL INSTITUTE FOR MINISTRY

Don Thompson continues to be active on the Roman Catholic/Anglican Dialogue. He has been asked to co-author a set of pastoral guidelines for mixed marriages, as requested of the Dialogue by the Canadian Bishops' Ecumenical Committee (Ang./R.C.).

Tom Edmonds has recently visited Benin, West Africa, for a planning session of the Program of Solidarity in the Development of Sahel. This work is supported by the World Council of Churches and Agencies. Tom will be representing the World Council of Churches as a member of the Program Committee.

The Womanspace is the Montreal Ecumenical Women's Resource Centre and is located in the Diocesan College. This large room includes various kinds of resource materials expressing women's concerns. It is open on Tuesdays 12-4 p.m. and Thursdays 12-4 and 5-7 p.m. *Maureen Kabwe*, one of the members of the M.I.M. staff, is one of nine co-ordinators all of whom hope that this endeavour will promote an awareness and understanding of the issues and changes that women face in their lives and in society.

On February 10-11 the Canadian Caucus of the Association of Theological Field Educators met at Presbyterian College. *Tom Gemmell* was the co-ordinator of the conference which focussed on field education in terms of supervision, women in the church, and social justice.

At the beginning of January, *Art Van Seters* attended the meetings of the Academy of Liturgy and the Academy of Homiletics at Emory University in Atlanta. He presented two papers to the latter gathering on preaching and biblical interpretation from a social perspective.

Ruth Evans from the Division of Mission of the United Church of Canada led (with assistance from members of the M.I.M. staff) a four-day workshop on Sexuality and Ministry, February 22-25, for the In-Ministry Year students.

CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

Jutta Benfey is the German language tutor in the Faculty of Religious Studies.

Richard Cooper is a doctoral candidate in Philosophy of Religion at the Faculty of Religious Studies and Managing Editor of ARC.

E.J. Furcha, the Editor for this issue, is Associate Professor of Church History at the Faculty of Religious Studies.

George Johnston is Lecturer (Theology) in the Faculty of Religious Studies. He is a former Dean of the Faculty (1970-1975) and a regular contributor to ARC.

Morny Joy, who received her Ph.D. in Philosophy of Religion from McGill (1981), teaches at present in the Department of Religion, Gettysburg College, Gettysburg, Pennsylvania.

Grant LeMarquand is an S.T.M. student in the Faculty of Religious Studies.

Vera Leskov is a doctoral candidate in Theology at Concordia University, Montreal, and an icon artist.

Robert Luyster, Ph.D., is Associate Professor in the Philosophy Department of the University of Connecticut at Storrs.

Joseph C. McLelland, McConnell Professor of Philosophy of Religion, has been Dean of the Faculty of Religious Studies since 1975.

Celia Rabinovitch is a doctoral candidate in Religion and Culture in the Faculty of Religious Studies and a painter.

Asa W. Sprague is a B.Th. student at the Faculty of Religious Studies and a minister of the United Methodist Church.

William Van Gelder is a doctoral candidate in Christian Ethics at the Faculty Religious Studies.

ARC is an attempt to provide a means of maintaining the ties that exist betwee the academic community and its Alumni/Alumnae. To aid in this continuing theo logical education, we are publishing two issues per year which are distributed to almost 1500 graduates and friends of the Faculty of Religious Studies of McGill University, its affiliated Colleges (Anglican, Presbyterian and United Church) and the Montreal Institute for Ministry. We are asking for an annual contribution of $5.00 per person in order to offset costs of printing and distribution.

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ARC
The Faculty of Religious Studies
McGill University
3520 University Street
Montreal, PQ
H3A 2A7

Editor for this Issue	-	Edward J. Furcha
Editorial Committee	-	J. Arthur Boorman, E.J. Furcha, Katherine K. Young.
Managing Editor	-	Richard R. Cooper
Typist	-	Christine Paltoo
Cover Design	-	Celia Rabinovitch

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