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RELIGION AND VIOLENCE II

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EDITORIAL

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It is striking how rarely serious scholarship explores the connection of religion and violence. The topic seems situated between the critics of religion today who are only too willing to castigate religion in general or a particular religion for its violent episodes, epochs or basic nature, while the religions themselves more often than not forward a self-image associated with peace, the very antithesis of violence. But the rich texture of history and institutions defies such simple categorizations. There are different kinds of violence, different degrees. Some are legitimated by and for society. Then, too, different societies may legitimate different forms of violence; their attitudes may also change over time. Before we can arrive at generalizations, we need to look closely at each religion, especially at moments when the society is expanding its borders, forming larger political and economic entities, defending itself against intruders or seeking to quell internal dissensions, especially those of a religious nature. This would lead, in turn, to some understanding of how each religion addresses the issue of war not just as an abstraction but as a reflection on experience itself. Theory and praxis, in other words, must both enter the discussion.

Such is the topic for this issue of ARC: religious legitimations of war. While the previous issue of ARC looked at questions of religion and violence with primary reference to Christianity, this issue extends the analysis to several other religions, namely, Hinduism, Buddhism and Judaism in order to foster some insights of a comparative nature. To the extent that the world today is a "global village," we have the intellectual responsibility to know intimately this world as it affects all of us and we affect it with our almost instantaneous ability to traverse space and time. Our consciousness will and must become pluralistically aware of other religions and the cultures they inspire, for in the final analysis the global village is found in our own multicultural and therefore multi-religious society.

Dr. Arvind Sharma of the University of Sydney (Australia), who has previously taught in the Faculty of Religious Studies at McGill, looks at the subject at hand with a sensitivity to the dialectical relation of religion and society. He sees in the early cult of the god Indra a martial and self-assertive legitimation for Aryan aggression, which both established Aryan power in the Indian subcontinent and unified the various Aryan tribes, almost as a kind of divine mission, not unrelated to a sacralizing process and the concept of the moral order itself (*rta*). Once Aryan domination had been achieved, the scriptures legitimize war to *protect* this order and this obligation/duty falls to the Ksatriyas, the warrior caste, though in times of danger even the priestly caste (Brahmins) may take up arms. Given India's turbulent political history when her borders were constantly beseiged by foreigners, such as Alexander the Great, it is not surprising that the religion legitimizes war of a defensive nature alongside that of aggression to extend territory.

Dr. Braj Sinha of McGill's Faculty of Religious Studies argues that Buddhism in India confronted the religious ideology of aggressive war in the 6th century B.C. at the time of the consolidation of the vast Mauryan empire, with a perspective designed to foster peace and righteousness. The principles of non-injury to any living thing, compassion, and the interconnection of all life, led to a mental attitude and ethic not only for the monks and nuns but also for the laity and finally the state. What is revealing is that the laity is encouraged not to engage in "violent" occupations, even the warrior should become a "lord of the fields" (i.e. agriculturalist) and the merchant is not to engage in arms trade. True to his philosophy of the Middle Way, Buddha does not ignore the state but shows that the duty of the king is to be dharmic, i.e. righteous and to promote a peaceful and orderly realm. The Buddhist message thereby influenced the Brahmanical perspective and helped to shift the Aryan view of aggressive war and sacramental kingship to a concern with the protection and harmony of the state which was to be ruled by a just king. While wars, even wars of aggression, were by no means eliminated from the Indian subcontinent, the principle of *ahimsa* (non-injury) was an ameliorating influence and its truly radical nature eventually came to fruition in the figure of Mahatma Gandhi.

Dr. Robert Stevenson, a Gandhian scholar at the Faculty of Religious Studies, gives us quite a different view of Hinduism with reference to war than that presented by Dr. Sharma. Dr. Stevenson concludes that Gandhi would refuse to legitimate any war as righteous, whether aggressive or defensive. For Gandhi a cardinal Hindu value is non-injury (*ahimsa*) and this must be the guiding principle for all Hindus, all Indians, the world itself. True courage, willingness for self-suffering and self-sacrifice were the corollaries of *ahimsa*, and with Gandhi's leadership the "fight" for national independence was won non-violently.

Rabbi Fishbane, a Ph.D. candidate at Concordia University, contributes to this volume of ARC his reconstruction of the development of Jewish law regarding the legitimation of war with reference to the distinctions of *permissible* war for expansion, war of *obligation*, or defence, and war of commandment *for a religious cause*. These discussions show some resemblance to the analysis of Hinduism and war made by A. Sharma in his article with reference to legitimation of violence for aggression and defence, and more specifically how the god Indra as warrior or Krsna as charioteer, may be compared to the "Lord your God" who leads the battle in ancient Israel. Similar too was the reward for death in battle both in India and Israel.

RELIGION AND VIOLENCE

What is violence?
do we need theories or models in order to understand violence?
or could it be understood through direct observation
a transmutative observation
which would put an end to the thing observed
the observer is the observed

And what happens when the observer is the observed?
does not the wholeness of life blossom?
do we not give birth to intelligence, justice and integrity?
Essence and Intelligence are One

Essence in itself is One
Is it not symbol and materiality which make it appear
multifarious?
And is there an essence for violence?
No, I do not think so, violence is of the body--of the nerves and
of the brain
It is not of Intelligence

God gave man (and woman) the freedom to choose
even though freedom and choice is a contradiction in terms
perhaps then it was the Devil that gave man this pseudo-freedom
Can body and Mind ever be reconciled? Or are they to forever be
separate realms? What then is their connection?

All this is implied in the question of violence and religion.
It requires serious inquiry
not from books, or lectures, or personal ideas
but inquiry into the new, the birth of new knowledge, new vision
new understanding and a new sensuality

This is the wholeness of life
It is not acquired through memory, nor practice, nor evolution of
any kind
Indeed it is not acquired
Yet some people have it, and they live it--This is Religion
There is no room for violence here.

Jim n. Bardis

THE RELIGIOUS JUSTIFICATION OF WAR IN HINDUISM

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I

The corpus of sacred literature in Hinduism is usually classified into Sruti or Revelation and Smrti or Tradition.[1] It will, therefore, be helpful to look at both these categories of religious literature for the legitimation of war they afford in Hinduism.

II

Sruti is identified with the Vedas. Of the four Vedas the earliest and the most important is the RgVeda.[2] How then does the RgVeda address the issue of war?

War as a theme plays a very important role in RgVedic hymns. Consider, for example, the following verses (X.89:12-18) translated by Griffith in which the word Oganas probably stands for a "Hostile Clan" and Vrtras represents the obstructing enemy often in mythological but also at times in more mundane terms.

12. Forward, as herald of refulgent morning, let thine insatiate arrow fly, O Indra,
And pierce, as 'twere a stone launched forth from heaven, with hottest blaze the men who love deception.
13. Him, verily, the moons, the mountains followed, the tall trees followed and the plants and herbage.
Yearning with love both worlds approached, the waters waited on Indra when he first had being.
14. Where was the vengeful dart when thou, O Indra, clavest the demon ever bent on outrage?
When fiends lay there upon the ground extended like cattle in the place of immolation?
15. Those who are set in enmity against us, the Oganas, O Indra waxen mighty,

Let blinding darkness follow those our foemen,
while these shall have bright shining nights to
light them.

16. May plentiful libations of the people, and singing
rsis' holy prayers rejoice thee.
Hearing with love this common invocation, come
unto us, pass by all those who praise thee.

17. O Indra, thus may we be made partakers of the new
favours that shall bring us profit.
Singing with love! may we the Visvamitras win
daylight even now through thee, O Indra.

18. Call we on Maghavan, auspicious Indra, best hero
in the fight where spoil is gathered,
The strong who listens, who gives aid in battles,
who slays the Vrtras, wins and gathers riches.[3]

This hymn is addressed to Indra. The hymns of the RgVeda invoke numerous gods but the one invoked most often is Indra to whom about a quarter[4] of the 1028 hymns of the RgVeda are devoted. M. Hiriyanna has drawn attention to the fact that although both Indra and Varuna are called the two monarchs that support all living beings, it is Indra rather than Varuna who gains primacy in the RgVeda. Hiriyanna alludes to two possible reasons which might account for Indra's prominence: (1) Indra as a Rain-God became particularly important for economic reasons or (2) Indra may have gained prominence out of "the necessity that arose for seeking the aid of a martial and self-assertive deity by the immigrant Aryans for subjugating the hostile tribes who were prior residents of the land they had invaded."[5]

Hiriyanna himself does not try to assign relative weight to these two factors but most scholars regard the martial association of Indra as decisive in this context. Thomas J. Hopkins represents the generally held view in this context when he remarks that Indra's great popularity depended more on his personal qualities than on the mythical feat such as the releasing of the waters associated with him, though even that involved the slaying of Vrtra. He goes on to say: "As a god famous for successful warfare, he was the special champion of the Aryan warrior and the model of what a warrior should be. In contrast to the detached cosmic sovereignty of Varuna, Indra

engaged in active personal struggle with his foes. Besides slaying the mythic enemy Vritra, he is at times said to have fought the human enemies of the Aryans, the dark-skinned people called Dasas or Dasyus. The tawny Indra, belly full of exhilarating Soma juice, beard agitated, brandishing his glittering thunderbolt, boasting of his prowess and eager to join battle with the enemy, clearly reflects the Aryan warrior's selfimage."[6]

The association between Indra and Varuna is interesting as in one case it shows sovereignty passing from one to the other and in the other it shows a king depriving sovereignty from both. The first is exemplified by RgVeda X.124 which says that "Agni abandoned father Asura and goes over to Indra". As offerings made into Agni are central to the sacrificial ritual, here we have another case of ritual justification not of war, to be sure, but of transfer of power. The other illustration is provided by Trasadasyu who is said to have been born as a result of offerings made by his mother to both Indra and Varuna and became a killer of the Dasyus. Hymns IV.42 and IV.38 are particularly instructive in this context.

In other words, even Varuna gets drawn into the religious justification of war in the RgVeda though Indra is the chief war lord.

The question now naturally arises: what justification for aggression on Indra's part do the Vedic hymns offer?

The basic justification offered by the RgVedic hymns is that the non-Aryans did not practise the sacrificial cult of the Aryans. It is even asserted when the Aryans fight among themselves rather than the non-Aryans, that the opposing Aryans are lukewarm in their worship of Indra. Both of these points require elaboration.

The non-Aryans are called Dasas or Dasyus: "A dark-skinned, flat-nosed race who spoke a tongue unintelligible to the Aryans, possessed forts and herds of cattle coveted by the new-comers, *despised the sacrificial religion of the latter*, and possibly worshipped the phallus".[7]

There are passages in the RgVeda which describe the non-Aryans as non-practitioners of the sacrificial ritual and adjectives such as *Avrata, Asraddha, Akratu, Avedayu, Akarma, Amantu, Anyavrata,* used to qualify Dasyus in I.175.3; IV.16.9; VII.6.3; VIII.70.11; X.22.8 etc., clearly "convey associations of cult hostility."[8]

In view of this the following scenario does not appear far-fetched. "If the name *Hariyupiya*, which is the designation of a river or a city according to the commentators, and is associated with the mysterious people called Vrichivats who 'broke the sacrificial vessels', can be connected with Harappa, as has already been suggested by some, we have here an interesting glimpse of a period when that great centre of early Indus civilisation formed a battleground of fierce invaders exulting in the worship of Indra, clad in coats of mail (*varminah*) and possessed of 'prancing horses', both of which the warriors of the lower Indus culture possibly lacked."[9]

It is also worth noting that when the Aryan tribes are engaged in internecine warfare even the Indra-worshipping tribes do not hesitate to dub the opposite tribes as Dasas, closely allied in sense to Dasyus, and such a prominent tribe as the Purus is branded by the rival group as "mridhravachah, 'of hostile speech', an epithet applied otherwise only to non-Aryan *Dasyus.*"[10]

It is clear, therefore, that the religious justification of war in the RgVeda both between the Aryans and the non-Aryans and among the Aryan tribes themselves is provided by proper adherence to the Indra cult. The evidence in this regard has been systematically examined by Dr. Mahinda Palihawadana in his twopart study *The Indra Cult as Ideology: A Clue to Power Struggle in an Ancient Society.*[11] He presents his conclusion succinctly, from the point of view of this paper, in the following terms:

> Indra's function as the symbol most characteristically invoked for promoting Aryan aggrandisement at the expense of the Dasyus is sometimes pithily expressed in the form of a straightforward request to him, as for example in RV 1.103.3 cd: "Throw (your)

missile on the Dasyu, augment Aryan authority and glory!". That Indra was *the* god to whom it was most apt to make such a request is the best evidence for this chapter's theme: the cult of Indra signifies an impetus to power.

Depicting the *suris* as the instrument of Indra's might, as they whom the divine warrior in person aids, the *rsis* surely have attempted to *represent Aryan expansion as a divine mission, as a religious undertaking. This is clearly an attempt to provide what must be called an ideological basis for Aryan expansion*: and of course it was the only ideological basis possible in terms of the thinking of those times.

It would indeed be hard to find a cult more closely oriented to the aggrandizement of temporal power than is the Vedic Indra cult. Yet in fairness to the *rsis* we must emphasize that it was for them a genuinely divine imperative that the power of the devotees of Indra must assert itself and not go under Dasyu onslaught or be debased by adulteration with other cults.

Another aspect of the situation, however, must also be taken into account. In the RgVeda "the cosmic order or law prevailing in nature is recognized under the name of *Rta* (properly the course of things) which is considered to be under the guardianship of the highest gods. The same word also designates 'order' in the moral world as truth and 'right' and in the religious world as sacrifice or 'rite'."[13]

Now Indra is associated with *Rta* in the RgVeda though perhaps not as closely as some other gods like Varuna. One sense of *Rta* is truth and he is once called the "son of truth" (8.54.4). Cosmic actions are also attributed to him. He is said to have "settled the quaking mountains and plains." But even more to the point, he has the exclusive epithet of *Apsujit* or "conquering in the water", a conquest in which he is said to release waters from the mountains like pent up cows, and this "release of the waters is simultaneous with the winning of light,

sun, and dawn."[13a] The epithet "Rtasya Gopa" or guardians of order is applied to several gods but is also applied to Agni and Soma with whom Indra is closely related.[13b]

This is to suggest that though the martial image of Indra looms large on the RgVedic horizon, he is not dissociated from Rta in its triple sense of natural and moral order and religious punctilio. So the propagation of the Indra cult could be seen as a sacralizing process and thus providing a religious legitimation of Indra's aggressive activities. This is important for the concept of *Rta* in later Hinduism is replaced by the term *dharma*[13c] and the term used for righteous war in later Hinduism is *dharmayuddha*.

III

One may now consider the religious justification of war provided in Smrti literature. In this context two famous Smrti texts are selected to illustrate the approach: the Manusmrti and the Bhagavad-Gita.

The theme which is going to emerge as common in both these texts is that the pursuit and protection of dharma provides the religious justification of war.

The main duty prescribed for the king by Manu is protection of the subjects. Thus it is declared in VII.2:3:

> 2. A Kshatriya, who has received according to the rule the sacrament prescribed by the Veda, must duly protect this whole (world).
> 3. For, when these creatures, being without a king, through fear dispersed in all directions, the Lord created a king for the protection of this whole (creation).[14]

And subsequently in VII.87:88:

> 87. A king who, while he protects his people, is defied by (foes), be they equal in strength, or stronger, or weaker, must not shrink from battle, remem-

bering the duty of Kshatriyas.

88. Not to turn back in battle, to protect the people, to honour the Brahmanas, is the best means for a king to secure happiness.[15]

Even the honouring of Brahmins refers to the norm of dharma as traditionally conceived. Here it is useful to note that even the Brahmins were supposed to take up arms when dharma was threatened. Manu declares in VIII:348351.

348. Twice-born men may take up arms when (they are) hindered (in the fulfilment of) their duties, when destruction (threatens) the twice-born castes (*varna*) in (evil) times,

349. In their own defence, in a strife for the fees of officiating priests, and in order to protect women and Brahmanas; he who (under such circumstances) kills in the cause of right, commits no sin.

350. One may slay without hesitation an assassin who approaches (with murderous intent), whether (he be one's) teacher, a child or an aged man, or a *Brahmana* deeply versed in the Vedas.

351. By killing an assassin the slayer incurs no guilt, whether (he does it) publicly or secretly; in that case fury recoils upon fury.[16]

This passage is interesting for several reasons. Firstly, it provides a religious justification for *defensive* warfare. Secondly, it provides religious justification for *aggressive* warfare against injustice. It should be noted that in both cases dharma is involved. In the first case the verse in the original uses the word dharma itself and the unit translates as "where Dharma is obstructed". It is difficult to pin down the exact sense of a versatile word like *dharma* but it could mean either righteousness in general or fulfilment of duties in particular here. R.S. Tripathi has invoked this verse in the context of Brahmanical resistance to Alexander's invasion in a very instructive manner. He indicates how the Brahmins instigated the Mousikanos and Oxykanos to revolt against Alexander and lost their lives in doing so and how the Greek historians such as Arrian described the Brahmins as "men of spirit".[16] Then he goes

on to say:

> The taking up of arms by the meek Brahmans must not be regarded as a strange phenomenon or a mere figment of Greek imagination. Apart from the epic examples of such Brahman warriors as Parasurama, Dronacarya, and Asvatthama, we know that Kautilya actually refers to Brahman armies which were distinguished for their mildness towards the prostrate enemy. Besides, the Hindu law-givers explicitly permit them to exchange the *Sastra* for the *Sastra* in evil times and in defence of their country and Dharma. Thus says Manu: 'The Brahmans may take up arms when they are hindered in the fulfilment of their duties, or when destruction threatens the Twice-born in evil times.' The country was menaced with such a calamity during the Macedonian avalanche, and so the Brahmans valiantly rose to defend their honour and their hearth and home.[17]

The passage is probably coloured by the nationalistic tone of the years in which it was written but the point seems clear.

Manu clearly allows for the killing of oppressors, and these verses enable one to move towards a consideration of the religious justification of war in the Bhagavad-Gita. For Arjuna makes a statement in the first chapter which to Hindus in general and to the Ksatriyas in particular must appear astonishing. The statement runs as follows: I:36.

> Having slain Dhrtarastra's men, to us
> What joy would ensue, Janardana?
> Evil alone would light upon us,
> Did we slay these (our would-be) murderers.[18]

The key word involved here is *Atatayin* (oppressor). Hill glosses it by saying that the word literally means "those whose weapons are stretched out to take life". He adds that "Sridhara explains the word as describing those who commit six kinds of crime."[19] Sridhara's commentary lists the six crimes as (1) arson, (2) poisoning, (3) armed assault, (4) robbery, (5) forcible possession of land, and (6) molestation of wife.[20] The

Kauravas are guilty of not one but several of these crimes so no sin can really attach to killing them. But Arjuna says that sin will accrue in killing them despite the fact that they are oppressors, (*atatayins*) although it is clear, that no sin really attaches to Arjuna in killing the Kauravas and Krsna himself declares the battle to be in accordance with dharma (*dharmya*) later (II.33).

The reason for Arjuna's predicament is spelled out by Madhusudana Sarasvati:

> The traditional texts mention the following six types of persons as aggressors, the man guilty of arson, the man who administers poison to another, the armed man, the robber, the man who robs one of one's wife or land. The sons of Dhrtarastra fall under all the categories. It is also said, "Aggressors must be killed on approach without any thought". Killing of an aggressor is no crime. These rulings do not, in Arjuna's view, alter the colour of this misdeed. Arjuna says crime or no *crime* it will be a *sin* quite irrespective of any *seen or unseen utility such an act may have*. The Vedas say "Do not kill". This command is stronger than the regulation of the Arthasastra, the secular sciences. Yajnavalkya said, "when two Smrtis are in conflict over matters mundane, reason should determine acceptance. But when there is conflict between the empirical Sastras and the Dharma Sastras (the scriptures) the latter must prevail."[21]

This brings us face to face with a basic dilemma in Hindu ethics. Hindu ethics distinguishes between *varnasrama dharmas* and *sadharana dharmas*.[22] Varnasradharmas are duties appropriate to one's stage and station in life. Thus as a warrior it is Arjuna's duty to fight. *Sadharana dharmas* are those duties which apply to all human beings irrespective of stage and station or case in life and one of these is non-violence. In terms of Hindu ethical theory Arjuna's dilemma may be phrased as follows: in the event of a conflict between *varnasrama dharma* and *sadharana dharma* which has precedence?

It has been argued by some scholars that "the *sadharana*

dharmas constitute the foundation of the *varnasrama dharmas*, the limits within which the latter are to be observed and obeyed."[23] But S.N. Dasgupta shows quite persuasively that generally in the Hindu tradition the conflict has been resolved in favour of the specific duty or *varnasradharma*. Commenting on the statement quoted above he remarks: "The statement that the common good (*sadharana-dharma*) could be regarded as the precondition of the specific caste-duties implies that, if the latter came into conflict with the former, then the former should prevail. This is, however, inexact; for there is hardly any instance where, in case of conflict, the *sadharana-dharma*, or the common duties, had a greater force. Thus, for example, non-injury to living beings was a common duty; but sacrifices implied the killing of animals, and it was the clear duty of the Brahmins to perform sacrifices. War implied the taking of an immense number of human lives; but it was the duty of a Ksattriya not to turn away from a battle-field, and in pursuance of his obligatory duty as a Ksattriya he had to fight."[24]

Then he goes on to apply the principle to the Gita itself.

> The Gita is itself an example of how the caste-duties had preference over common duties. In spite of the fact that Arjuna was extremely unwilling to take the lives of his near and dear kinsmen in the battle of Kuruksetra Krsna tried his best to dissuade him from his disinclination to fight and pointed out to him that it was his clear duty, as a Ksattriya, to fight. It seems therefore very proper to hold that common duties had only a general application, and that the specific caste-duties superseded them, whenever the two were in conflict.[25]

It must be noted, however, that Dasgupta's resolution poses a problem. *Both* the Pandanas and the Kauravas are Ksatriyas so the argument by *Varna*, although used in the Gita, poses a problem - for the war is then in accordance with *dharma - ksatriya dharma* not only for Arjuna but all warriors. The problem it creates for interpreting the crucial word *dharmya* in II.33 can now be identified. "For a *Kshatriya* to be killed in battle facing the enemy is a sure way to gain paradise. *Pace* Radhakrishnan it seems to

make not the slightest difference whether one is fighting in a just or an unjust cause. It is generally agreed that Duryodhana's cause was not just, yet because he died in battle facing the enemy, he straightway entered paradise. His opponent, Yudhishthira, Arjuna's brother and leader of the Pandavas, himself the incarnation of Righteousness (*dharma*), found him there seated in the lap of luxury, 'shining like the sun, encompassed by the rich glory of the brave, and accompanied by resplendent gods and saints whose deeds were pure' (MBh. 18.1.4-5). Yudhishthira, who represents a more just and compassionate moral code, was filled with righteous indignation."[25a]

Zaehner is too dismissive of Radhakrishnan in this passage because he fails to recognize the distinction between *varnasrama* and *sadharana* dharma but the issue is otherwise clearly posed. The war cannot be called *righteous* from the point of view of Arjuna and the Pandavas unless the normative dimension of justice is introduced. The Pandavas had been cheated out of their fair share of the kingdom.

II

The religious justification of war, therefore, proceeds along several lines and these lines can be associated with a text.

(1) In the RgVeda war is justified as a means of furthering the Indra cult. This is a missionary justification of war.

(2) War is justified in the Manusmrti to protect society against internal disorder or foreign aggression. This is the legal justification of war.

(3) War is justified in the Bhagavad-Gita, among others,[26] in ethical terms, in terms of both specific and general duties. The former constitutes the deontological[27] and the latter the moral justification of war.

The Hindu tradition, however, along with others,[28] feels a certain uneasiness in justifying war. This goes back as far back at least as the doubts of Arjuna and Yudhisthira and reaches

right up to our times in the person of Mahatma Gandhi when confronted with the Gita. Thus although the Hindu tradition does offer religious legitimation of war on grounds with which other religions are not unfamiliar, it is more by way of empirical concession to the realities of life than in the pursuit of a militant ideal.

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25a. R.C. Zaehner, ed., *The Bhagavad Gita* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 137.

26. See, for instance, Franklin Edgerton, *op.cit.*, p. 140, fn. 7.
27. Franklin Edgerton does not find the answer entirely satisfactory, see *op.cit.*, p. 161-162.
28. *Ibid.*, pp. 185-186.

RELIGION AS VIOLENCE - AN EARLY BUDDHIST PERSPECTIVE

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It is inappropriate to suggest that on the question of war Buddhism said little (De Bary, *The Buddhist Tradition*, 1969, p.46). It may appear as quantitatively less in terms of actual statements attributed to the Buddha reflecting his rejection of war on purely ethical and religious grounds. However, the Buddhist approach to this significant human problem must be seen in conjunction with the question of violence in personal, societal and political contexts. Moreover, concerning war itself whatever evidence we have of Buddha's own position is most eloquent and significant in terms of his recognition of its utter futility in solving fundamental problems of humanity. The Buddha did not content himself simply by maintaining a noble silence on an issue that he saw to be of immense significance to the very existence of human society. Living as he did in the violent age of Mauryan consolidation of a centralized state by use of brute force, he passed unequivocal strictures on the utter futility of war. In war the Buddha saw the great chain reaction of violence engulfing the entire existence:

> Conquest engenders hate;
> the conquered lives in misery....
> The fool doth fancy 'now's the hour, the chance!
> But when the deed bears fruit, he fareth ill.
> The slayer gets a slayer in his turn;
> The conqueror gets on who conquers him;...'
> (Samyutta-Nikaya III. 2. 4-5)

Non-violence and The Sacrificial Cult

The earliest strata of the Buddhist canons do represent a new vision of society in which violence, in whatever form, takes a backstage. The new non-violent orientation definitely emerged or was consciously articulated in protest against the ritual sacrificial cult of the Rg-Vedic priestly class, the Brahmans.

In this scholars have seen a trend of Ksatriya rejection of the Brahmanic priestly dominance of the social life. Buddhism, along with Jainism, appears to have been a protest movement against the Brahmanic sacrificial cult which thrived on violence perpetuated against all forms of living beings. The textual references support the possibility of sacrifices, not only of animal lives, but also of human lives (Samyutta Nikaya, I.3.9). Moreover, the linking of the great sacrifice of the horse, (*asvamedha*), with the monarchical conquest provided an ideological justification of military ventures. All these definitely constituted the immediate context for giving such a prominent place to non-violence, *ahimsa* in the Buddhist ethico-religious teachings.

It is feasible to argue that the Buddhist rejection of the sacrificial cult in itself was not an innovation. That within the Vedic tradition itself there were signs of a certain dissatisfaction with the ritualistic sacrifices. The Aranyaka stratum of the Vedas had already given allegorical interpretations to the sacrifices, suggesting that the Vedic injunctions of sacrifice must not be taken literally, but only symbolically (Brkduranya). The Upanisadic speculations had even gone a step further by making scathing frontal attacks on the sacrificial practices (I.iv.10). Sacrifices were declared to be unsafe boats for seekers of spiritual goals; and the priestcraft thriving on such practices was ridiculed as a self-serving institution with little regard and relevance to the higher spiritual aspirations of human beings (Chandogya Upanisad,I.xii).

What, however, distinguishes the early Buddhist rejection of the cult of sacrifice from that of the Aranyaka and Upanisadic approach is the attitude of non-injury, *ahimsa*, towards life. It was the principle of non-violence toward life that constituted the *raison d'être* for the Buddhist rejection of the Brahmanical sacrificial cult. The Upanisadic response was essentially interiorization of sacrifice by making it a symbolic act to be performed at the mental level. The sacrifice becomes a meditative act in which the sacrificial victim is identified with the cosmic elements through mental projections (CU. III.xiv-xvii). Furthermore, sacrifice was not completely rejected. It was only relegated to a secondary place and the art of priestcraft continued to be relevant to the populace since meditational religio-

sity remained confined to a select group of sages and forest dwellers.

Buddhism, however, struck at the very root of the sacrificial cult by attacking the principle of violence which it saw to be contravening the principle of sanctity of all life. Thus, in a most articulate and convincing manner the Buddha protested against the Brahmanical custom of animal sacrifice and of such human sacrifices which may still have been in practice in some stray quarters. The following verse of the Anguttara-Nikaya clearly reflects the essential spirit of such a protest:

> The sacrifice of horse and human life
> The throwing of the peg, the drinking-rite
> The house unbarred, with all their cruelty
> Have little fruit. Where goats and sheep as kine
> Of diverse sorts are sacrificed, go not
> Those sages great who've travelled the right way.
> (Anguttara-Nikaya, II, 2.42)

The Pali canon is replete with such examples of express indignation over violence perpetrated against animal life in the Brahmanic sacrificial cult. Sutta/Nipata tells the story of a greedy Brahmin priest who had prevailed upon the King Okkaka to offer horses, human beings and cows in the sacrifice. The canon in the strongest possible terms expresses the acute sense of indignation towards the wickedness of this inexcusable violence to which innocent creatures are subjected:

> 'Tis wrong! 'tis wrong! arose th' united wail
> Of Brahmans, Indra, titans, demons too
> as cows were butchered for the sacrifice
> .....
> Thus the wise condemn this ancient guilt
> and folk condemn the sacrificers' crime.
> (Sutta Nipata 310-313)

This attitude of non-violence emanating from the assumption of a fundamental unity of all life is the theme of several of the significant *suttas*. At times it is present in an explicit and overt fashion; at times it consists of covert and indirect

devaluation of the Brahmanic sacrificial cult. Thus, Kutadanta Suttanta places the Vedic sacrifice of King Maha Vijita at the lowest rung. Moreover the very depiction of the sacrifice is designed to mitigate the violent character of the sacrifice. While technically, as a Vedic sacrifice, this would have included the slaughter of cows, goats, cocks and pigs etc., it constituted only the offerings of ghee, oil, butter, milk, honey and molasses. Whatever little value the sacrifice offered by the King Mahavijita has, it is not by virtue of the violent sacrifice of living beings. In final analysis it is the principal of non-violence that seems to be the most important weapon in the Buddhist arsenal against sacrifice.

Non-violence: The Ethical Dimension

The principle of non-violence in inter-personal relationships is the fundamental ethical dictum. It is not without significance that the Buddhist canon accords highest place to *ahimsa* (non-violence) in its scheme of ethical conduct (*pancsila*). The spiritual life and its growth is seen as integral to the ethics of non-violence. Here emphasis is on the continual process of nurturing and maturing the personal traits of benevolence and compassion towards all beings at all times. Far from being a negative ethic, the ethic of non-violence is seen as a positive response to one's fellow human beings.

The line of argument pursued in the early canons to affirm the value of non-violence in inter-personal relationship has a Kantian flavour to it. It proceeds with the assumption that to be a truly valid ethical principle, the ethical dictum must have universal applicability. However, while the Kantian model tends to affirm the formal character of the universal principle, the Buddhist approach appears to be concrete as grounded in experiential identification with all life. Thus the Buddha declares in the Udana:

> My thought has wandered in all directions throughout the world, I have never yet met with any thing that was dearer to any one, than his own self. Since to

> others, to each one for himself, the self is dear, let him who desires his own well being not harm another.
> (Udana)

The same tenor of thinking is discernible elsewhere. The following statement credited to the Buddha in the Dhammapada echoes the preceding sentiment: "Everyone is afraid of violence; all love life. Likening others to oneself one should neither slay nor cause to slay" (Dhammapada, 130).

The ethical injunction to abandon or eschew all violence, all killing, all bloodshed is structurally linked to the notion of the interconnection of all life. Compassion, the loving kindness towards all human beings at all times, is a logical corollary to the belief that life is one. Belief in the unity of life cannot sustain a life-negating ethical attitude. Non-violence or compassion cannot be restrictive. It is not to be cultivated only towards some human beings on a selective basis. Rather it must be all encompassing and comprehensive. Love of all is the true love. Love that is selective and restrictive can be passion, but not compassion.

The Ethics of Non-violence and the Buddhist View of War

The central theme of non-violence is at the core of the Buddha's denunciation of war. The major ideas pertaining to war and its evil consequences are formulated in two significant contexts. The first context is the monastic order and its relationship to the violent elements of the state machinery. The second context is the explicit political philosophy of pacifism as an active ethical principle of state both in respect to its internal administration and external relationship to other political entities. It may even be argued that in Buddha's teachings one finds the first rudiments of a political philosophy that attempts to transform the state into an ethical category. It is this perspective that distinguishes the Buddhist view of the state from the Hindu conception as present in the Arthasastra and Mahabharata.

Returning to the theme of war, it is significant to note

that for Buddha's monastic disciples not only is war abhorrent, but also its idea has defiling effect on one's spiritual progress. There are specific injunctions in the Pali canon which suggest that even ideas, verbal reports or discussions pertaining to war are seen to have adverse effect on the moral and spiritual development of the monk.

This censure of the degrading and defiling character of the violence of war, even in its mental or ideational forms, is clearly discernible in Buddha's advice to the monks. He prohibited monks from engaging in *tiracchanakatha*, the low, inferior talk concerned with the legends, stories and gossip pertaining to the armies and their exploits and ventures (Vinaya Pitaka, i, 188; iv, 164). Such talk was not seen to be of an edifying nature, and certainly not conducive to the noble life that leads to the transcendental goal of Nibbana (Samyuta Nikaya V.420). Buddha specifically recommended substitution of the above mentioned topics with an alternate ten topics of conversation that would contribute to the moral and spiritual growth of the adherents to his path. Monks so oriented were bound to outshine in brilliance the moon and the sun. They would stand out among other renunciants, wanderers and followers of other sects who were prone to indulgences in *tiracchanakatha*, low and inferior talk concerning, among other things, the tales and exploits of warmongerers (Anguttara Nikaya v.129).

The monastic disciples of Buddha were specifically prohibited from pursuing warfare as an occupation. This probably succeeded, at least in India, in preventing any developments comparable to Western monasticism where monks saw nothing wrong or incongruous in resorting to arms. The third Parajika rule specifically dealt with this situation by clearly stipulating that any association with deprivation of life was an unpardonable offence. Thus, a monk who deprived a human being of life or indirectly contributed to such deprivations by encouraging suicide or inducing another person to commit murder automatically elicited the penalty of expulsion from the monastic order. In conformity with the general assumption of the sanctity of life, even intentional destruction of animal life was considered an offence and constituted another check on participation in warfare since, along with infantry, the army consisted of elephants and

horses too. In effect then the monastic disciples' indulgence in warfare was permanently closed by Buddha by clear stipulations to that effect in the Vinaya rules.

The Buddhist conception of right vocation prohibits professions which may be injurious to others. The significance of this component can only be realized if one keeps in mind that the vocational prescriptions definitely relate to the laity since the vocation of the monks and nuns is already determined. Furthermore, here one sees a significant departure from the Brahmanic view of the Ksatriya who must indulge in warfare as incumbent upon him by virtue of his belonging to the warrior class. It is interesting to note that in one of the significant passages dealing with the emergent Varna system Buddha refers to Ksatriya not as the warrior but as the lord of the field "because he was the lord of the fields (or lands) he was called Ksatriya." Even in the case of Vaisyas, who were required to participate in all mercantile and trading activities, right vocation specifically barred trade activities pertaining to warfare by clearly prohibiting arms trade.

Violence and State

The question of war acquires a very different orientation once one moves from the generality of individual and unorganized violence to the particularity of the organized violence of the state. Early Buddhist canons have significant statements to make in this area too. Denunciation of violence is not confined only to the context of individual monks or individual laity. Rather, Buddha faces the issue in the larger context of the place of violence in statecraft and its limitations. Critical analysis of the relevant passages here too reflects a continuity in the logic of argument: a unitary perspective on life and the notion of interdependence of the constitutive parts of the whole provide the fundamental framework within which a case is made against the perpetration of violence by the state, either against its own citizens or against other states.

It may be instructive to note the line of argument that is employed in the early Buddhist canons for rejection of the use of

violence by the state in its own territories against those who may be seen to be creating a situation of tension within the state. Two significant passages from the Dirgha Nikaya deserve special attention. In the first passage a story is told of the legendary King Mahavijita, the Great Conqueror who had acquired abundant and vast kingdoms through military conquest and earthly exploitation. Inspite of the might of the King's army the kingdom was infested with internal discensions and violence. The King's chaplain, the wise and severe Brahmin, counselled the King in the following words:

> It might be that Your Majesty would think the revolt of the brigands could be suppressed by means of executions, imprisonment, confiscations, threats or banishment. However, this revolt of the brigands will not be suppressed perfectly in that way. Those who survive the killings will afterwards harass the King's country. However, depending on the following policy this revolt of the brigands will be suppressed perfectly: Now, let His Majesty the King grant seed and fodder to those in his country who take up agriculture and cattle breeding. Let His Majesty grant capital to those in his country who undertake commerce. Let His Majesty dispense wages and food to those in his country who undertake the royal service. Those people, being intent on their own work, will not harass the King's country and at the same time there will be a great accumulation for the King. Through the country remaining secure and without oppression or subversion I think men will live with open houses, glad and rejoicing, making their children dance.
>
> (Digha Nikaya 5)

The basic thrust of the Brahmin's counsel pertains to the reactionary character of violence. Violence as a policy of statecraft is self-defeating and destructive. Violence perpetrated in any amount and degree creates a chain reaction and generates further violence. Rebellion cannot be contained with violence. It can only be contained by pursuing a policy of justice and moderation. There is a close link between injustice and violence. The relationship is of direct proportion. The more

unjust the state the greater the violence. Use of more violence on the part of the state to contain the violent aberrations makes the state more unjust and calls for more violent reactions from its subjects.

The question of justice with its relationship to the legitimacy of the State seems to be the primary concern of the author of Dirgha Sutra which addresses itself to the right of the ruler. Right to rule in this case is not linked to might, but to Dharma (righteousness). Deviation from Dharma by the King has direct bearing on the state of affairs that will prevail in the state. Its immediate and direct consequence is increase in violence and disruption. The Sutra continues to predict intensification of violent outbursts in such a situation that will ultimately lead to total disruption of the social and political order. Return to normalcy and restoration of order will have to wait for the coming of the emperor Samkka who "will conquer the whole Earth without force, without the sword, by justice" (*dharma*).

This notion of spiritual conquest or conquest through righteousness is the defining element in the early Buddhist vision of interstate relationship. The relationship of one state to another is not based on the principle of force or violence, but on common commitment to Dharma, the universal principle of righteousness. Use of force is detrimental to the best interests of all parties concerned.

GANDHI AND LEGITIMATE WAR

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In considering Gandhi's attitude towards war it is useful to come at it via the fundamental position from which he tried to develop all his theories, policies and actions. This position was a religious one and it centred upon his life's goal, that of achieving *moksha*, liberation from the rounds of worldly birth, life, death, and re-birth. In 1925, when introducing the book version of his autobiography, he wrote, "I live and move and have my being in pursuit of this goal. All that I do by way of speaking and writing, and all my ventures in the political field are directed to this same end" (Gandhi 1957, xii). Those who have read Gandhi's autobiography will know to what extent and in what detail he sought to bring *every* aspect of his public and personal life, not merely his activities in the political field, into harmony with his goal and with the principles which he believed would lead him to it.

The first of these principles was the understanding that God was Truth, "...I worship God as Truth only" (Gandhi 1957, xiv). (A later reformulation, that Truth is God, can be seen as an attempt to clarify what he meant by God, not as the substitution of an abstract principle for deity [Chatterjee 58].) From this principle radiated all the others that governed Gandhi's life, such as justice, liberty, honesty, love, the service of mankind, dignity, celibacy, and the important principle for the purposes of this article, *ahimsa*.

The word is a negative of the Sanskrit root *hims* - to harm, injure or kill; thus *ahimsa* means non-injury, non-killing. Gandhi translated it basically as "non-violence". It is an ancient and cardinal virtue in India, understood traditionally to govern one's thoughts, words and deeds, an understanding to which Gandhi subscribed (Gandhi 1957, 505).

The *prima facie* view of an outsider on the doctrine of *ahimsa* in Indian thought would be that its practice is a self-

protective or self-purificatory measure; it is a virtue that prevents the accumulation of evil karmic residue which binds one to the cycle of re-birth, and/or enables the accumulation of good *karma* thus bringing one closer to *moksha.* Gandhi emphasized in *ahimsa* a meaning not immediately obvious in the traditional Indian understanding, namely, that of love for one's fellow beings. (It is worth noting, although not necessary to follow up here, that in Gandhi's discursive thinking, his *ahimsa* becomes inextricably involved in other, widely varied concepts such as self-suffering and self-sacrifice, desireless action, domestic relations and political reform.) In fact, he often used love and non-violence synonymously and he insisted that love/non-violence was the law of the human race, "...the source and end of life" (Gandhi 1942, 130). Thus the doctrine of non-violence was for Gandhi not merely a personal creed but one which he felt should be adopted by Hindus, all Indians, India as a nation, and ultimately by the whole world.

In terms of a personal creed, Gandhi was completely dedicated to the pursuit and practice of total non-violence because he felt it to be the only means to the realization of God. The process required total self-purification: the elimination within himself of all passions, attachment and aversions (Gandhi 1957, 504-05). By 1925 Gandhi claimed to be capable of subduing and controlling these, but confessed that he recognized their presence, though dormant, still within him. He felt that until he was entirely free of them he would be unable to communicate universal non-violence perfectly and effectively (Gandhi 1942, 31). His own freedom from passion and perfection in non-violence would, Gandhi felt, render others non-violent. Accordingly he blamed himself in part for the communal rioting that ravaged India during the last years of his life. We find that with his last fast, which was aimed at bringing communal peace to the country and which took place in January 1948, two weeks before his assassination, Gandhi was still trying to purify himself and others of their passions: "The fast is a process of self-purification and is intended to invite all who are in sympathy with the mission of the fast to take part in the process of self-purification..." (Fischer 493).

Within India, Gandhi constantly urged rioting Hindus and

Muslims to adopt the ways of fraternal peace and love. He frequently used religious themes and examples, whether Hindu, Buddhist or Christian, to illustrate the non-violent attitudes he saw as essential for the Indian people (e.g. Gandhi 1949, 160-61; 227-28). His interpretation of the Hindu religious text, the *Bhagavadgita*, illustrates the extent to which *ahimsa* dominated his thinking. The setting of the poem is in "No-man's Land" between two armies at the start of a war that will devastate two rival branches of a family and destroy untold numbers of people. Arjuna, a leader of one of the clans, is appalled at the foreseeable consequences to family and society of the coming slaughter. He suggests that it is preferable not to fight and asks his charioteer, Krishna, for advice. Krishna, it turns out, is a manifestation of the god, Vishnu, and he proceeds to convince Arjuna for both practical and religious reasons that he must fight. In spite of the setting and outcome of the poem, Gandhi insisted that its fundamental teaching (which, according to his interpretation, was the performance of action without attachment to its fruits in order to attain *moksha*) required the practice of *ahimsa* in our day and age. He accounted for the warlike setting of the poem and Krishna's arguments in favour of fighting by claiming it was an allegory depicting the struggle between good and evil in men's hearts (an interpretation that he did not sustain consistently in his commentary on the poem) (Desai 127, 132-3).

The Mahatma was bitterly disappointed when India was divided into two countries along religious lines at Independence; but he dearly hoped that India would subsequently adopt a policy of non-violence in her internal affairs and be an example to the rest of the world (e.g. Gandhi 1949, 137 and 280). In the light of the horrors of World War II and of the atom bomb, he felt that the only hope for the world was to turn to non-violent means of settling conflicts and that India, with her experience of non-violent techniques, had a world mission both to adopt and proliferate non-violence (Gandhi 1949, 194-5, 94,; 1942, 256). Gandhi abhorred war. He felt it was useless. It not only caused suffering but brutalized the participants. The violence of war begot greater violence and in the long run no one was the winner (Gandhi 1949, 86-7).

In spite of his detestation of war and his firm faith in the ideal of absolute *ahimsa*, Gandhi knew from personal experience that its application in the world was extraordinarily difficult. There were circumstances under which he would condone, even suggest the use of violence. In addition, he recognized that on four occasions in his life he was voluntarily involved in the "crime of war".

That Gandhi could have suggested the use of violence was a consequence of his concept of *ahimsa*. There was no room in it for cowardice. It was a weapon for the brave (Gandhi 1949, 140, 253-4, 258-9); and the abandonment of truth and honour in running away or doing nothing because of fear was for Gandhi a greater evil than that of fighting and even killing one's opponents. In theory, since he felt that nations could and should practice *ahimsa*, one could speculate that Gandhi might have regarded war as an excusable action for a nation without the courage to offer non-violent resistance to an aggressor. To my knowledge however Gandhi did not ever suggest such a solution at the level of international relations. To the Abyssinians in the face of Mussolini, and the Czechs under threat from Hitler, he counselled non-violence together with non-cooperation, even if it meant death (Gandhi 1942, 153, 161-63). In short, his solution was the implementation of the technique he developed in South Africa and used against the British in India -- *Satyagraha*. It involved active, non-violent resistance to any thing that violated truth and its concomitant elements such as justice, liberty, honour, human dignity and so forth; it invited punishment, even death for such resistance, to be suffered with love for one's opponents, in the belief that such suffering would melt the hearts of one's oppressors and reform them. A firm conviction as to the essential goodness of human nature is fundamental to such a doctrine. Gandhi believed that no man's heart, even Hitler's, could ultimately withstand such loving, unmerited suffering (Gandhi 1942, 192).

What then of the occasions in which Gandhi, by his own admission, participated in war? He recruited and led Indian ambulance corps in both the Boer and Zulu wars; he recruited and helped train a similar corps in England in 1914; and he recruited soldiers for the British Army in India in 1918.

To many people the involvement with ambulance work -- the relieving of suffering and the saving of lives -- would seem innocent enough and in keeping with the principles of non-violence; but not to Gandhi (nor indeed, to many of his critics). In his opinion those who did ambulance work were as guilty of war activity as those who carried guns (Gandhi 1942, 78).

His critics, some in humble bewilderment and others in indignation, wanted to know how he could justify this activity. Gandhi's replies, made at different times in succeeding years, repeat several points and may be summarized roughly as follows:

1. The course of action to take is not always easy to decide; there may be conflicting principles demanding attention (Gandhi 1942, 77).
2. At the times in question he believed in the British Empire; he felt that it was the route to freedom for Indians and that his work would help improve their status in the Empire (Gandhi 1942, 24-25, 28).
3. At those times also he was loyal to the Empire and believed that since he was under its protection, his duty was to help it in its trouble (Gandhi 1942, 53, 28).
4. It is impossible to live without inflicting violence on someone or thing in some way. He attempted always to choose the course of action in any situation that would be the least injurious in the light of all considerations. He had done so in these instances with non-violent motives and without "sordid or other national interests" (Gandhi 1942, 78-9).

There are of course inconsistencies in this position. Gandhi was caught between his nationalist objectives and his non-violent ideals as Louis Fischer has pointed out (Fischer 1962, 166-7). But Gandhi was never afraid to be inconsistent. It was a consequence of his belief that we only see the truth partially at any given time. He had therefore to act in any situation as "truthfully" as he could, in the knowledge that his understanding might change radically at any moment. This was an attitude that required constant openness to new information and opinion. It also required no little courage when he was, for example, fasting to death for something he believed to be true!

Gandhi always maintained that his involvement with war was the best he could do at those times. He also, as always, acknowledged his own weakness and his frequent failures in living up to his ideals (Gandhi 1942, 80).

Having discussed Gandhi's religiously oriented attitude towards war, the situations under which he might excuse it and the situations in which he engaged in war activity, can we imagine him accepting the concept of legitimate war? It seems to me that the phrase would have stuck in Gandhi's throat. There might be excusable wars (a people lacking the courage to offer non-violent resistance to aggression) or unavoidable wars (both sides unconvinced by and/or untrained in the principle of *ahimsa*). He recognized that wars would be waged by those who believed in violence, and pointed out that they could hardly be be coerced to change their views by the protagonist of non-violence. But opting for war and lending it virtue by blessing it with the term "legitimate" is not something Gandhi could have done. In 1928 he wrote:

> ...the Light within me is steady and clear. There is no escape for any of us save through Truth and non-violence. I know that war is wrong, is an unmitigated evil. I know too that it has got to go. I firmly believe that freedom won through bloodshed or fraud is no freedom (Gandhi 1942, 80).

World War II and the atomic bomb only confirmed his opinion.

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JESUS, OUR BROTHER, COMPASSIONATE PRIEST

Jesus, our brother,
compassionate priest,
welcomed to your table
as friends at your feast.

In the midst of the struggle
we recall it is yours:
your tears in the chalice,
your bread of the poor.

There's no human flag redder
than your banner unfurled:
your way of the cross crimson
through a suffering world.

Recalling that path
of death into life:
we make your memorial
in this our sacrifice.

Be known to us, Jesus,
in the breaking of bread:
renew dreams and visions
by your blood here shed.

By the Spirit of Justice,
give us good news for the poor:
of a world without weapons,
of the Year of the Lord.

Andrew Taylor

LEGITIMIZING WAR IN JUDAISM

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I. Introduction

Rabbinic Law as understood today was developed from the Mishnah,[1] and the Talmud,[2] and then its interpretation by later commentaries, codes and responsa. This paper will survey the major literature found in Rabbinic Halachic writings that legitimize war. It will deal with only the material related to the Jew (Israelite) in a Jewish army in defence of his Jewish state. This material will be examined "vertically," from the Bible (*Torah*) and up through modern Rabbinic literature.

One must first understand the relationship of Biblical narratives and law which plays a role in *Halachah* only when used or analyzed in Mishnaic or Talmudic sources. In the writings of post-Talmudic law-makers there is not to be found additional or different analyses of *Torah* passages.

At the other end of the vertical survey, one must also acknowledge that from the time the editor(s) of the Mishnah presented the laws dealing with war, until approximately the 1940's when a Jewish army became a reality, these laws had only a theoretical or utopian relevance. With the establishment of a Jewish army fighting in its own State, conquering and protecting lands they claimed were their own, theory became a reality.[3] Rabbinical law-makers, serving the Halachic observant Jewish community utilized earlier Rabbinic sources to justify and even obligate participation in the armed forces. These writings were also the source for solving political and social problems that arose as a result of the new phenomenon, such as, observing the Sabbath, Kosher dietary laws, marriage laws, role of the women, etc. With the participation of orthodox Jewish community in Israeli politics, these laws became a national problem and not only a Halachic one.

II. Biblical Law

In the book of Deuteronomy 20:1-20, the Torah discusses three areas dealing with the question of war.

a. Priestly sanctions and encouragement to the soldiers on the battlefield before they enter into combat: The anointed Priest of War (*Cohen Mashuach Milchamah*) announces, in the holy tongue, (see *Mishnah Sotah*, chapter 1, *Mishnah* 1)[4]

> Hear O Israel![5] You are about to join battle with your enemy. Let not your courage falter. Do not be in fear, or in panic, or in dread of them. For it is the Lord your God who marches with you to battle for you against your enemy, to bring you victory.
>
> (verses 1-4)

b. The Torah enumerates those who are exempted from battle and are obliged to return to their homes. They are:

> 1. one who has built a house, but has not yet dedicated it (verse 5),
> 2. one who has planted a vineyard, but has not harvested it (verse 6),
> 3. one who has paid for a wife, but has not completed a marriage with her (but she is his legal wife, nonetheless) (verse 7), [There is an additional verse in Deut. 24:5, that states "when a man has taken a bride, he shall not go out with the army or be assigned to it for any purpose, he shall be exempt one year for the sake of his household, to give happiness to the woman he has married." This supplements the above case (no.3) where the soldier, even though exempt from battle, is obligated to do the non-combat tasks of "supply water and food and repair the roads and guard on the walls." (See B.T. *Sotah* 41a, and the *Mishnah Torah's* decision.)]
> 4. one who is afraid of and is disheartened

by the battle (verse 8) [The B.T. *Sotah* (44a) explains this fear is caused as a result of either natural fear of war, or the fear of sins that he, the soldier, had committed. The result is the fear of punishment by God during the battle].

c. These passages instruct the soldiers on how to behave when attacking. This includes the call for peace before attacking, sieges, prisoners, booty, and destruction of property (verses 10-20). The Torah also differentiates between places of close proximity and the immediate area.

The Torah's presentation of laws, even though dealing with the topic of war, does not answer the problem we are dealing with. The Mishnaic and Rabbinic scholars could not find, in these verses, the answer to or the formula for when the Torah does legitimeze war, or when is war justified. The Torah does speak of the destruction of Amalek (Deut. 17:1-2). These are two specific wars that are given religious significance as well as obligation, but are dependent upon a given objective, that when completed, is ended. The law-makers of Judaism in the Mishnaic period were a group of Rabbis, organized as a small circle of masters and disciples creating an ordered structured island in a sea of social chaos (see J. Lightstone, "Scripture in Earliest Rabbinic Judaism," p. 14). They searched to organize a legal system for an Halachically controlled society. The Rabbis were confronted with the problem of how to give war the necessary religious legitimization that would make the Israelite a believer in his God and he would march to the battlefield willingly and with religious fervour when ordered. The Biblical verses had answered what to do, how to act, and who should go, once mobilized or in battle. The Torah did not offer the solution to their problem: when is war legitimate, when do we decide that war, how mobilization and conscription are to be enforced.[7]

III. The Immediate Post-Torah Period

Little is known how the Israelites living in their land during this period adapted and applied the Biblical laws dealing

with war. In the book of Maccabees, claiming to report the battles of Judah the Maccabee, we are told how Judah instructs his soldiers before departing into battle: "and he said to builders of houses and the taker of a wife (lit. engaged), to the planters of vineyards and to the weak hearted to return each to his home according to the Torah" (Maccabees I, 3:56).

Here, too, we are left with the question: Were the Maccabees' mobilizations of the Israelites to go to war justified in accordance to Rabbinic Torah Law? The problem became more complex when the Mishnah law was examined later, in greater details. The Mishnah (*Sotah*, chapter 8, *Mishnah* 7) has categorized all the laws referred to in the Torah (Deut. 20:1-9) and therefore the laws stated by Judah the Maccabee as a permissible war--*Milchemet Reshut* (a war of expansion) in contrast to a war of obligation--*Milchemet Mitzvah* (justified war).[8] Some Rabbinic scholars, willing to recognize the problem, attempted to find solutions for the uniqueness of the Maccabeean War (see S. Goren, *Torat ha'Moadim*, pp. 164-185).

IV. The Mishnah and the Talmud

War is dealt with in the Mishnah primarily in chapter eight of tractate *Sotah*.[9] *Mishnah* 1 through *Mishnah* 6 continued to expand and develop the laws found in Deuteronomy 20:1-9. This is in accordance with the style of the Mishnah, as described by Professor Lightstone (ibid., p. 13),

> ...much of the Mishnah, indeed almost all of the fifth Order and much of the sixth, systematically develops Pentateuchal law. Other tractrates, like the body of Ohalot, bring to scripture their own idiomatic generative conception, and proceed to develop matters of the former in light of the latter. The remainder of Mishnah sees in the scripture at the very least a corpus of unimpeachable facts.

The Talmud continues to pursue this direction and further

develops the same laws. At the end of the chapter, in *Mishnah* 7, there is an abrupt change in style and direction presenting the whole chapter, and consequently the Torah laws, in a new perspective. This *Mishnah* (no. 7) would seem to be a later addition. Its purpose might possibly be to solve certain Halachic problems as well as specific social and national security problems as related to the social framework created by the Mishnah editor(s) (see ibid., p. 14). For example, the need for legitimizing war as a religious obligation with the sanction of God gives the warrior a religious obligation to go to war as well as personal spiritual rewards, even in the case of death.

The Mishnah presents us with three categories of war:
a. *Milchemet Mitzvah*--a war of commandment,
b. *Milchemet Reshut*--a war waged of free choice of permission,
c. *Milchemet Chovah*--a war waged of obligation, or duty bound.
This *Mishnah* specifically writes that all earlier laws of exemptions cited in chapter 8 concern a *Milchemet Reshut*. "What has been said applies to a battle waged of free choice" (*Mishnah* 7).

In the case of *Milchemet Mitzvah*, a war of religious purpose and content, there are no exemptions. The Mishnah chooses as an example, based on the book of Joel (2:16), to emphasize this law: "...but in the battle waged in a religious cause (i.e. *Milchemet Mitzvah*) all go forth even the bridegroom out of his chamber and the bride out of her bride chamber" (*Mishanh* 8). In most societies, even today, the seriousness of the above example is clearly understood.

The editor(s) of the Mishnah have informed us that there is a type of war, a holy war or justified war, that all must participate in. The Mishnah chooses the word *Mitzvah*--a scriptural as well as Mishnaic word--whose connotation would be no different than keeping the Sabbath, building a *Sukkah*, eating kosher food, or eating *Matzah* on Passover. The word communicates obligatory, spiritual and legal Jewish obligations with heavenly reward and punishment.

The Mishnah continues,
Rabbi Judah said: What has been said applies

> to a battle waged in a religious cause (*Milchemet Mitzvah*), but in a battle waged in duty bound (*Chovah*) all go forth even a bridegroom out of his chambers and bride out of her chambers.
>
> (*Mishnah* 8)

The Mishnah does not present a dispute between *Tana'im* (Rabbinical scholars in the era of the Mishnah), but rather a difference in terminology (see J.N. Epstein, *Introduction to Tananaic Literature*, p. 2). Rabbi Judah could not conceive any war fought by the people of Israel in their land as a *Milchemet Reshut*, but all had to have religious connotations. Therefore by calling the lesser of the two wars *Milchemet Mitzvah* and the higher *Milchemet Chovah* both are placed in a religious structure.

The Babylonian Talmud (B.T. *Sotah* 44b), after briefly dealing with the differences in terminology found in the Mishnah asks for a definition of the two wars. *Chovah* or *Mitzvah* is explained as "the wars waged by Joshuah to conquer Canaan." *Milchemet Reshut* (or *Mitzvah*, according to Rabbi Judah) is described as the wars waged by the House of David for territorial expansion.

The Talmud, realizing that the higher level of war was dependent upon a specific period of history, therefore leaving the Rabbinic law-maker without a *Milchemet Mitzvah* after Joshuah's era, offers a third category of war, a war to protect one's life and property. The Talmud writes that "war against heathens so that these (heathens) should not march against them (Israelites)" (B.T. *Sotah*, 44b). The Palestinian Talmud (P.T. *Sotah* 37b) presents the same categories of wars (but differs in attributing these same laws to the same *Tanah* as the B.T.). The P.T. even uses the same two examples to describe *Milchemet Reshut* and *Milchemet Chovah*. But in the third example a descriptive difference is found. Rabbi Judah would call *Milchemet Reshut* as we go upon them (it would seem to refer to a case where the Israelites are the aggressors), *Milchemet Chovah* as they are upon us (this also would be included in the category according to others of *Milchemet Mitzvah*). This last description both in the B.T. and the P.T. offered Rabbinical scholars the solution of how

religiously to legitimize any military threat to the land or people of Israel.

To understand further the religious significance attributed to these wars, the *Mishnah Sanhedrin* (chapter 1, *Mishnah* 5) discusses who is authorized to order the conscription of the warriors and consequently the command to enter the battle: "He [the king] may lead forth (the host) to a voluntary war (*Milchemet Mitzvah*) on a decision of a court of Seventy-one." The *Mishnah* only specifies *Milchemet Reshut*. For *Milchemet Mitzvah* or *Chovah*, explain the Rabbinical authorities, the king or any other equivalent legal authority had the religious prerogative to decide this on their own. Their authority is religiously justified as God's representative. This decision will then obligate the nation religiously to obey the call for mobilization and to go to battle (thus making it a type of Hegelian philosophy of war--see *The Philosophy of Right*, paragraph 324).

The Babylonian Talmud (*Sanhedrin*, 16a) was not content with the concept of the Israelites being able to participate in any type of aggression or war of expansion without religious sanction. It adds two additional requirements to be able to declare *Milchemet Reshut*:

a. authorization of the king,

b. authorization of the *Urim U'Tumim* (Priestly lots or oracles) [even though the Talmud, in B.T. *Yomah*, 21b, writes that the oracles do not exist since the destruction of the first temple].[10]

Both have religious authority, and therefore give the *Milchemet Reshut* a new dimension, namely that of religious legitimacy (see S. Areyelei, p. 98).

(See B.T. *Eruvin*, 17a for further development of the status of *Milchemet Reshut* as a religiously sanctioned action.)

V. The Post-Talmudic Period Until Modern Time

The post Talmudic period found Rabbinic scholars analysing, commenting and developing the above Mishnah and Talmudic sources. Their work was not organized in the form of any Code of Law and

they perceived their work in this area as a theoretical study. The exception was Rabbi Moses ben Maimon (Maimonides, 1135-1204). His Code of Law, the *Mishnah Torah* (also known as the *Yad ha'Chazakah*), was compiled without sources, was clear and decisive, avoiding the disputes found throughout the Mishnaic and Talmudic literature. His laws, he claims, were derived from the literature of the Talmudic era. Maimonides studied and presented his Code as law, regardless of the immediate relevance to Jewish society of his day.

The scholars of Rabbinical law in our era, discussing the justification of war, found a source in the *Mishnah Torah* as the next "rung" after the literature of the Talmudic era. Other scholars, such as Rabbi Shlomo Izhaki (Rashi, 1040-1145) and Rabbi Menachen ben Shlomo Meir (ha'Meiri, 1249-1306) lost their centrality when dealing with the topic of war, and take a place behind the *Mishnah Torah*. Even Rabbi Moses ben Nachman (Ramban, 1194-1270), who writes that the commandment to conquer and settle Israel today is still relevant, is not accepted as an Halachic source as is the Maimonidean Code (see Ramban, *Sefer ha'Mitzvot, Mitzvah* 95).

In the *Mishnah Torah* (Book of Judges, Treatise 5, laws concerning kings and wars, chapter V, laws 1-2), we find:

> The primary war which the king wages is a war for a religious cause. Which may be denominated a war for religious cause? It includes the war against the seven nations, that against Amalek, and a war to deliver Israel from the enemy attacking him (*Ezrat Israel mi'Yad Tzar*). Thereafter he may engage in an option war, that is, a war against neighbouring nations to extend the borders of Israel and to enhance his greatness and prestige.
>
> For a war waged for a religious cause, the king need not obtain the sanction of the court. He may at any time go forth of his own accord and compel the people to go with him. But in case of an optional war, he may not

> lead forth the people save by a decision of the court of seventy-one.

Maimonides presents the third category, *Ezrat Israel mi'Yad Tzar*, as a *Milchemet Mitzvah* with all its connotations.

Maimonidean commentaries analyse the above statements and attempt to discover their Talmudic origin. Rabbinical sources today focus on this third category of *Ezrat Israel mi'Yad Tzar* to justify and legitimize the wars which are being fought by the State of Israel. Areyeli, after quoting Maimonides, writes:

> We can deduce that the wars of the State of Israel that were *Ezrat Israel mi'Yad Tzar* were a *Milchemet Mitzvah*... according to all ... this war--*Ezrat Israel mi'Yad Tzar*--is the only *Milchemet Mitzvah* that remains today. The destruction of the Seven Nations does not still exist in our day, since their memory has been lost.
>
> (*Mishpat ha'Milchamah* p. 170)

Zevin (*le'Or Halachah*, p. 65) further develops this idea:

> In our day, when we have the privelege of an independent State of Israel, free from the yoke and enslavement of nations, it is clear the War of Independence represented all the laws of *Milchemet Mitzvah* and *Chovah* from two aspects *Ezrat Israel mi'Yad Tzar* and the conquering of the land...also we have already seen that *Milchemet Mitzvah* does not need a court of seventy-one: the king is replaced by the government that leads the State.

Dr. Y Cohen in *Guyos Banot ve'Sherut le'Umi*, pp. 12-13, after quoting Rabbi S. Goren that the obligation of participating in the wars of Israel is Torah law, continues to quote Rabbi Y ha'Levi that "the situation today in the land of Israel is in the category of *Milchemet Mitzvah*" (a detailed bibliography of materials relating to this topic can be found in *Arachim*

be'Mivchan Milchamah, pp. 252-257, and *Bi'Kvot Milchemet Yom ha'Kippurim*, pp. 59-64).

The Rabbinical authorities who interpret the modern-day security problems of the State of Israel as a *Milchemet Mitzvah* are identified with the Zionist idea and cause. There is literature published by Rabbinical authorities identified as non-Zionists who do not accept today's wars of Israel as a *Milchemet Mitzvah*. The religious parties in Israel include both groups. The latter finds it Halachically difficult to deal with the military decisions of the government. Consequently, they have succeeded in introducing laws that will assist their community of followers, such as the exemption of all girls as well as students of Rabbinical academies (who are male and include almost all their children) from any type of military service. (See ibid. ha'Cohen.) The first group, the pro-Zionist, are not concerned with these problems. The wars of the State of Israel are a *Milchemet Mitzvah*, a justified religious war. Their children, both boys and girls, are therefore required, according to their interpretation of the Halachah, to serve in the I.D.F. or a similar civil service. A chaplaincy was established in the I.D.F. to serve the religious and spiritual needs of the soldiers. Books and periodicals, dealing with Halachic problems that arose as a result of the wars being a *Milchemet Mitzvah*, were published. (See S. Goren, *Piskei Hilchot Milchamah* and Yehuda Isenberg, *Dinei Tzavah u'Milchamah*.)

Rabbi Goren, a major representative of this Rabbinical sector, who served as Chief Chaplain of the I.D.F., and then chief Ashkenazic rabbi of the State of Israel concludes:

> Milchemet Mitzvah as it is fought in contemporary times is a defensive war but includes pre-emptive wars according to the view of Maimonides in the *Yad ha'Chazakah*. Even though we are not being attacked by enemies but the initiative is in our names, even though this law is dependent upon the existence of a Jewish king, nonetheless it is relevant in this era. For every matter of leadership of the common weal in accordance of

> Halachah is dependent upon the king.
>
> This does not necessarily mean an actual king, but rather an independent Jewish government that rules in accordance with the standards of government of the State of Israel. Therefore, with the establishment of the State of Israel and the establishment of an Israeli government in their land, this government is considered equivalent to a government of the Torah, and is permitted to fight wars against its enemies as attributed to Maimonides.
>
> *Meshiv Milchamah* II, p. 137

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Footnotes

1. The Mishnah was edited in Palestine in approximately 200 C.E., and is attributed to our "Holy Rabbi Judah the Patriarch." "Mishnah can be described as an ordered study of a particular legal area that progresses in an ordered way both internally within chapters and from chapters to chapters" (Professor Jack Lightstone, at a lecture in Concordia University, February 12, 1986).

2. The *Babylonian Talmud* was compiled in Babylonia around the sixth century, and is attributed by Rabbinical authorities to Raviva and Rav Ashi. Scholars claim that it was clearly compiled several generations later.

3. This reality was fully realized in 1948 with the creation of the State of Israel and the establishment of the Israel Defence Forces (I.D.F.).

4. The *Cohen Mashuach Milchamah* was awarded, and occupied the status of a high priest in national life (see B.T. Huroit 19b, and Hirsch commentary on Deut. 20:2).

5. It is doubtful if this expression had special relevance during the Biblical period. Hirsch, interestingly, writes, on chapter XX, verse 3, "Just as it is with these words that every Jew early and late daily brings home to his mind his allegiance to the One and Only God with all its consequences, so is it also the same thought and the same allegiance to the One and Only God before Whom in the moment of battle all other greatness and power loses all importance, and with the consciousness of serving His Will and confident of His support, in the weakest human breast, power and courage, calmness and strength grows."

6. Heavenly ritual is related to strong feelings of sin and guilt. See Mary Douglas, *Natural Symbols*, p. 27.

7. I have examined all other Pentateuchical sources and concluded that there are no other additional laws or narratives relevant to this study.

8. Albek, commenting on the Mishnah (*Sotah* chapter 8, *Mishnah* 7), writes that in the case of Judah the Maccabee it is a *Milchemet Reshut*, and therefore there are exemptions in accordance with Rabbi Judah's law.

9. These laws were most probably placed in *Mishnah Sotah* because the whole Order deals with the Priestly authority outside the realm of purities and sacrifices; the topic of war, where the Priestly role was essential, would logically find its place here.

10. The Rabbinical law scholars did not accept this point. Maimonides, in his Code, does not mention this, but in his *Sefer Ha'Mitzvot, Sof Shoresh Daled*, he does.

BOOK REVIEW

THE NIEBUHR NOT TAUGHT IN SCHOOL

Richard Wightman Fox. *Reinhold Niebuhr: A Biography.* New York: Pantheon Books, 1985, 340 pp. $19.95 (US).

Thomas G. Nordberg

Richard Fox has done a great service for those of us who belong to the post-Niebuhr generation. We who have chased the shadow of American's foremost social ethicist, political philosopher and (though he denied the charge himself) theologian, can now at long last begin to understand the enigmatic Reinhold Niebuhr with reference to his ever-changing personal, political and historical contexts.

In this brilliant biographical work Fox succeeds in introducing us to several aspects of Niebuhr we would otherwise never have come to know: the young itinerant preacher proclaiming to his German immigrant denomination the gospel of Americanization; the near cradle-to-grave journalist of world-wide moral conundrums; the Detroit pastor who between the college lecture circuit and municipal social issues could hardly find time to spend with his congregation; the anchor of hope for what was a very insecure family.

As an historian, Fox tends to give the most detailed accounting to Niebuhr's political sojourn: the thorn in the flesh of Henry Ford, a pacifist within the Fellowship of Reconciliation, the candidate on Socialist Norman Thomas' electoral ticket, a co-founder of the radical Fellowship of Socialist Christians.

Fox notes Niebuhr's perennial insecurity as a scholar and author in the field of social ethics while contrasting this to the competitive bids of ivy league universities which desired to acquire Niebuhr's increasing notoriety for their own gain. To this reader, however, Fox's chief shortcoming rests in his failure to introduce us to Reinhold Niebuhr the Union Seminary

professor, for whom some of us wish we were born just a few years earlier.

The advent of Hitler's fascism led to Niebuhr's break with socialist pacifism. This break, in turn, resulted in Niebuhr's increased passion for matters more strictly theological in character. Perhaps the greatest insight into Niebuhr as the Christian ethicist in search of a credible theology rests in Fox's having brought to light the correspondence between Reinhold and his brother and fellow ethicist, H. Richard. The latter is pictured as the nagging, theological conscience of the former. On several occasions Richard summons his older, prodigal and modernist brother to return to the *evangelische* faith of their pastor father. With each of Reinhold's books of the 1930's it is revealed that he increasingly heeded his younger brother's call.

His Gifford Lectures of 1939, delivered while Nazi bombs exploded in the streets of Edinburgh, would serve as the basis for his magnum opus, *The Nature and Destiny of Man.* This work still stands as a turning point in American theology and a prime example of a *theologia crucis.*

Fox explains that the Battle of Britain prompted Niebuhr to become engaged once more in secular political organization. His subsequent theology suffered for it. Niebuhr served as a co-founder of the Union for Democratic Action as well as its left-wing but staunchly anti-communist successor, the Americans for Democratic Action. While Niebuhr was summoned by the White House staff to help flesh out Roosevelt's concept of the "Four Freedoms," J. Edgar Hoover's FBI was engaged in an extensive investigation of Niebuhr's leftist past. While he made a tour of England and Scotland the British War Information Office asked Niebuhr to address the public and the allied troops on the matter of comprehensive war aims.

The biography continues by explaining how Reinhold Niebuhr and his late 1940's brand of "Christian Realism" came to be regarded as a harbinger of wisdom for the American establishment. Niebuhr was courted by Henry Luce, publisher of *TIME-Life.* He was also briefly considered as a possible Democratic candidate for the American presidential race of 1948. George Kennan

recruited Niebuhr for his State Department's Policy Planning Committee and assisted in having the theologian made an American delegate to the newly formed UNESCO.

Meanwhile, Niebuhr continued with his career as a teacher, author and journalist. He also sparred with the theological giants of the age: against the "eschatologically irresponsible" Barth at the first assembly of the World Council of Churches in Amsterdam (1948): and, in the mid-fifties, with his philosophical mentor, colleague and former friend Paul Tillich.

The portrayal which Fox offers of Niebuhr following his 1952 stroke is that of a man increasingly weakened and depressed, but nevertheless, perseverant. No longer capable of maintaining the whirlwind public pace of his former years, Niebuhr still kept up his sizeable teaching load as he continued to generate a constant stream of literary work (hunt and pecking single-handedly). All this while Niebuhr kept his hands in matters political. Fox suggests that his politics at this point became embittered. While Niebuhr condemned McCarthyism, he also sanctioned the execution of the Rosenbergs. He despised Vice President Richard Nixon but also perpetuated his own brand of tough-minded anti-communism. He verbally assaulted friends and colleagues in the press, but then, as if fulfilling his own theological ethic, Niebuhr repented.

Today's neo-conservatives who attempt to make Niebuhr their archetype and icon seem to patronize him only up to this point (cf. esp. Michael Novak's *The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism*, Simon and Schuster 1982, chap. XIX). Their paradigmatic narration seems to come to a screeching halt at about 1954. Fox's work, on the other hand, goes the full biographical distance.

The escalation of American military involvement in Southeast Asia fulfilled Niebuhr's prophecy that the one time innocent American nation would, without a resource of humility, quickly become an imperial power in its own right. It would thereby reduce the moral difference between itself and its chief superpower adversary. Fox also explains Niebuhr's strong sympathy for and endorsement of Martin Luther King Jr.'s

leadership in the Civil Rights and disarmament movement. Niebuhr's politics were gradually coming around full circle. Despite his feebleness, he was to be regarded once more as he was in his youth, a sharp thorn in the flesh of the establishment.

In the final decade of his life Niebuhr's literary treatises came to be almost exclusively of the character of political philosophy. Fox contends that these last works were of less rigour and creativity (a view recently contested by Niebuhr's life-long colleague John C. Bennett). Fox gathers enough remembrances of Niebuhr's last years to remind us that this aged, faltering gladiator for things moral was still the one to whom the new knights and would-be camelot kings never ceased to come a-courting.

One of the final and most revealing images of Niebuhr with which Fox leaves the reader is that of a man weary and worn from prolonged paralysis, lying prone on his matress, propping himself up before a television image of President Richard Nixon, shouting out the words "You bastard!" To his dying days Niebuhr had no hesitancy to point his prophetic finger at political pretence.

Reinhold Niebuhr: A Biography clearly demonstrates that its author has carefully researched the entire Niebuhr corpus: more than a score of books and hundreds of articles and reviews. For a non-theologue he handles the material with sensitivity and acumen. Fox has also painstakingly sifted through the vast Niebuhr Papers at the Library of Congress, only recently made available to the public. He has conducted countless interviews with Niebuhr's family, colleagues and friends. With only a few technical errors apparent, Richard Wightman Fox has brilliantly succeeded where so many others have failed. His work allows the legacy of Reinhold Niebuhr to live on.

THE ANNUAL BIRKS LECTURES & INTERNATIONAL CALVIN SYMPOSIUM

From September 29th to October 3rd our Faculty is sponsoring an exciting symposium on John Calvin to commemorate the 450th anniversary of the publication of the 1st edition of *The Institutes*.

Scholars from Canada, France, The Netherlands, Switzerland and the United States will present papers and engage in discussions on significant issues raised by Calvin's work relating to theology and christian life.

The Birks Lectures series and the Anderson Lectures series of Presbyterian College have generously combined their resources with ours to make this international symposium a unique experience.

Clergy and interested lay persons are invited to set this week aside and to join us for the Birks Lectures and the Calvin Symposium. Among the lecturers are: Jane Dempsey Douglass, Princeton, N.J., Fritz Büsser, Switzerland, our own J.C. McLelland, Moderator of the Presbyterian Church in Canada, B. Roussel, France and W. Nijenhuis, The Netherlands.

The two Birks Lectures on Monday by Profs. Fritz Büsser and Jane Douglass are open to the public free of charge. Attendance of the symposium sessions is limited to registered participants. The cost of registration for the entire week (including the opening banquet and several lunches) is $50.00. Cost for the opening banquet (on Tuesday night at the Faculty Club) is $20.00 per person for non registered guests.

FROM THE DEAN'S DESK

Robert C. Culley

The long-awaited news finally came on January 20th when the Board of Governors of McGill University announced the appointment of Donna Runnalls, Associate Professor in Old Testament and Judaism, as Dean of the Faculty of Religious Studies, starting the first of June 1986.

Prof. Runnalls began her studies with a B.A. at the University of British Columbia and then came to McGill (the Faculty of Divinity as it was then called) for a B.D. The next stage was a Ph.D. at the Department of Near Eastern Studies at the University of Toronto with a dissertation on Josephus, witten under the supervision of Prof. Abraham Shalit of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. This meant a period of study in Israel, which involved first hand experience of the Six Day War as well as visits to most of the important countries and archaeological sites relating to the ancient Mediterranean world.

The writings of Flavius Josephus continued to be the primary research interest of Prof. Runnalls and formed the basis of her Presidential Address to the Canadian Society of Biblical Studies (Guelph, May 1980). Other papers have been presented relating to the use of agricultural symbols in the Bible.

When Donna Runnalls came to McGill in 1972 to teach in our Faculty, she was also appointed Warden of Royal Victoria College (1972-1979). Among other positions held have been the Chair of the Senate Committee on Student Grievances and a member of the Board of Governors of the United Theological College.

All of us here at McGill look forward to a new chapter in the life of the Faculty as Donna begins her term as Dean at the beginning of June. It is also worth mentioning that Donna will be the first woman appointed Dean at McGill University. On behalf of teachers and students, as well as I am sure all the readers of ARC, best wishes, Donna, in your new venture.

There is other news about staff. Tom Wright, Assistant Professor of New Testament, has resigned to accept a Lectureship in New Testament Studies at Oxford together with a Fellowship and Chaplaincy at Worchester College, Oxford. We say good-bye with genuine regret and will miss his presence among us. Nevertheless, we offer our best wishes to Tom and his family as they take up a new challenge.

Since Donna Runnalls will be assuming the Deanship, Patricia Kirkpatrick has been invited to stay on for another year as an Assistant Professor in Old Testament Studies. She will also be teaching a course in Women's Studies and another in Interdisciplinary Theological Studies. This will make the third year that Patricia has helped us and the fact that we have invited her back once again is a clear indication of how much we value her contribution to our Faculty.

There is some good news about two of our graduates. Gary Redcliffe (Ph.D. 1982) has accepted a position as Professor of Pastoral Theology at Emmanuel College, Toronto. Gary Watts (Ph.D. 1981) has recently accepted a position at Camrose Lutheran College, Camrose, Alberta.

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

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ARC is an attempt to provide a means of maintaining the ties that exist between the academic community and its Alumni/Alumnae. To aid in this continuing theological education, we are publishing two issues per year which are distributed to almost 1000 graduates and friends of the Faculty of Religious Studies of McGill University, its affiliated Colleges (Anglican, Presbyterian and United Church) and the Montreal Institute for Ministry. We are asking for an annual contribution of $5.00 per person in order to offset costs of printing and distribution.

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THE TELLING OF NON-VIOLENCE

The Essence is very real;
In it are Evidences.
Art surely points towards
What is Ultimate.

Lao Tzu
Paul Tillich

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